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THE   BOOK 


OF 


THE  .constitution: 


CONTAINING 


THE    CONSTITUTION    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES 

A    SYNOPSIS    OF 

THE   SEVERAL    STATE    CONSTITUTIONS  ; 

WITH  VARIOUS  OTHER 

IMPORTANT    DOCUMENTS 

AND   USEFUL   INFORMATION. 


COMPILED 


BY  EDWIN  WILLIAMS, 

AtfTHOR  OF    THE   NEW  YORK   ANNUAL   REGISTER,    &o. 


NEW  YORK: 

PETER  HILL,  94,  BROADWAY. 

M  ^CCC  XXXIII. 


Entered  according  to  act  of  ConOTess,  in  the  year  one  thousand 
eight  hundred  and  thirtytliree,  by  Edwin  Williams,  in  the  Clerk's 
office  of  the  District  Court  of  tlie  Southern  District  of  New  York. 


HENRY   MASON,   PRINT.   HANOVER  saUARE. 

/ 


INTRODUCTION.  v 

latter  recognize  no  common  tribunal  of  decision.  In  this  point  of  view, 
the  questions  that  have  been  lately  discussed  as  to  the  manner  of  form- 
ing and  ratifying  the  constitution,  would  seem  to  tend  rather  to  the 
gratification  of  historical  curiosity,  than  to  be  absolutely  necessary  to  a 
right  understanding  or  elucidation  of  the  principles  of  the  constitution. 

The  view  of  the  constitution  taken  by  Mr.  Madison  (its  last  surviv- 
ing framer),  in  his  admirable  letter,  which  is  given  in  this  collection, 
and  substantially  by  President  Jackson,  in  his  late  Proclamation,  ap- 
pears to  be  acquiesced  in  by  the  great  majority  of  their  fellow  citizens, 
who  rightly  consider  that  under  any  other  construction  of  it  the  go- 
yernment  would  be  impracticable.  To  preserve,  however,  the  impar- 
tiality of  this  collection,  and  to  render  it  useful  as  the  depository  of  the 
arguments  of  both  parties,  several  documents  in  favor  of  nullification 
have  been  given,  together  with  the  Virginia  and  Kentucky  Resolutions ; 
the  true  meaning  and  object  of  which  are  a  mooted  point  amongst 
politicians.  The  address  and  resolutions  of  the  Hartford  Convention, 
the  name  of  which  is  so  familiar,  and  the  objects  and  motives  of  which 
are  so  little  known,  to  the  mass  of  readers,  have  also  been  added. 

It  was  considered  unnecessary  to  insert  the  message  of  the  President, 
of  January  16,  1833,  as  its  object  seems  to  have  been  rather  the  recom- 
Mi^ndation  of  practical  measures  suited  to  the  present  emergency  of  affairs, 
than  any  new  exposition  of  his  opinions  upon  constitutional  sub- 
jects, which  had  already  been  amply  developed  in  his  proclamation,  and 
from  which,  in  the  message,  there  is  no  departure. 

Appended  to  this  collection,  will  be  found  tables  of  the  votes  cast  for 
different  candidates,  as  President  and  Vice  President  of  the  United 
States,  since  tlie  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  and  of  the  votes  given  in 
Congress  from  the  several  states  on  the  tariff  acts,  since  1816. 

The  editor  submits  the  whole  collection  to  the  public,  as  containing 
the  largest  mass  of  information,  on  Constitutional  subjects,  that  has  yet 
appeared  in  one  volume,  and  as  calculated  to  increase  the  information 
and  facilitate  the  researches  of  the  American  citizen,  in  relation  to  the 
political  institutions  under  which  he  lives.  He  thinks  that  it  will  be 
found  not  merely  temporarily  interesting,  as  suited  to  the  present  excite- 
ment of  public  feeling,  but  as  permanently  valuable,  when  patriotism 
and  discretion  shall  have  dissipated  the  clouds]  that  now  lower  upon 
the  prospects  of  our  country. 


1* 


CONTENTS. 

PAGE. 

Introduction S 

Articles  of  Confederation 7 

Constitution  of  the  United  States 13 

Amendments  to  the  Constitution 22 

Resolutions  and  Address  of  the  Convention  of  1787  24 

Synopsis  of  the  Constitution  of  each  of  the  United  States        .  96 

Virginia  Resolutions,  and  Mr.  Madison's  Report  of  1799  42 

Kentucky  Resolutions,  of  1798 19 

Kentucky  Resolutions,  of  1799 84 

Mr.  Jefferson's  Letter  to  Governor  Giles 86 

Mr.  Madison's  Letter  to  Mr.  Everett 87 

Remarks  of  the  Richmond  Enquirer  on  the  right  of  Secession   .  94 

Hartford  Convention — Names  of  Delegates,  &c.          .  95 

Report,  &c 96 

Extracts  from  Mr.  Hayne's  Speech  in  the  U.  S.  Senate,  1830  111 

Elxtracts  from  Mr.  Webster's  Speech  in  reply  to  Mr.  Hayne  113 

South  Carolina  Ordinance,  November,  1832  117 

Remonstrance  and  Protest  of  the  South  Carolina  Union  Party  119 

President's  Proclamation,  Dec.  1832 121 

Elections  of  President  and  Vice  President         ....  136 

Dates  of  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  by  the  several  States  137 

Votes  on  the  Tariffs 138 

Virginia  Resolutions  of  1810 MO 

Mr.  Calhoun's  Speech  in  the  Senate,  1833        ....  142 


ARTICLES  OF  CONFEDERATION. 


In  Congress,  July  8,  1778. 

articles  of  confederatiojl  and  perpetual  union 

Between  the  states  of  New  Hampshire^  Massachusetts  Bay,  Rhode  Island 
and  Providence  Plantations,  Connecticut,  New  York,  New  Jersey, 
Pennsylvania,  Delaware,  Maryland,  Virginia,  North  Carolina, 
South  Carolina,  and  Georgia. 

Article  1.  The  style  of  this  confederacy  shall  be,  "  The  United  States 
OE  America.'* 

Art.  2.^  Each  state  retains  its  sovereignty,  freedom,  and  independence. 
and  every  pow^r,  jurisdiction,  and  right,  wmch  is  not  by  this  confederation 
expressly  delegated  to  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled. 
#  Art.  3.  The  said  states  hereby  severally  enter  into  a  firm  league  of  friend- 
ship with  each'otlMr,  Iot  their  common  defence,  the  security  of  their  liber- 
ties, and  their  mutual  and  general  welfare,  b[nding  themselves  to  assist  each 
other  against  all  fome  offered  t^.  or  attackV Iftade  upon  them,  or  any  of 
them,  on  account  or  iftigl'on,  sovereignty,  ^trad^^  or  any  other  pretence 
whatever. 

Art.  4.  Sec.  1.  The  better  to  secure  and  perpetuate  mutual  friendship  and 
intercourse  among  the  people  of  the  different  states  in  this  union,  the  free 
inhabitants  of  each  of  these  states,  paupers,  vagabonds,  and  fugitives  from 
justice  excepted,  shall  be  entitled  to  all  privileges  and  immunities  of  free 
citizens  in  the  several  states ;  and  the  people  of  each  state  shall  have  free 
ingress  and  egress  to  and  from  any  other  state,  and  shall  enjoy  therein  all 
the  privileges  of  trade  and  commerce,  subject  to  the  same  duties,  imposi- 
tions, and  restrictions,  as  the  inhabitants  thereof  respectively ;  provided 
that  such  restrictions  shall  not  extend  so  far  as  to  prevent  the  removal  of 
property  imported  into  any  state,  to  any  other  state  of  which  the  owner  is 
an  inhabitant;  provided  also,  that  no  imposition,  duties,  or  restriction, 
shall  he  laid  by  any  state  on  the  property  of  the  United  States,  or  either 
of  them. 

Sec.  2.  If  any  person  guilty  of,  or  charged  with  treason,  felony,  or  other 
high  misdemeanor  in  any  state  shall  flee  from  justice,  and  be  found  in  any 
of  the  United  States,  he  shall,  upon  the  demand  of  the  governir  or  execuiiv* 
power  of  the  state  from  which  he  fled,  be  delivered  up  and  removed  to  the 
state  having  jurisdiction  of  his  offence. 

Sec.  3.  Full  faith  and  credit  shall  be  given  in  each  of  these  states,  to  the 
records,  acts,  and  judicial  proceedings  of  the  courts  and  magistrates  of 
every  other  state. 

Art.  5.  Sec  1.  For  the  more  convenient  management  of  the  general  inte- 
rests of  the  United  States,  delegates  shall  be  annually  appointed  in  such 
manner  as  the  legislature  of  each  state  shall  direct,  to  meet  in  congress  on 
the  first  Monday  In  November,  in  every  year,  with  a  power  reserved  to  each 
state  to  recall  its  delegates,  or  any  of  them,  at  any  time  within  the  year, 
and  to  send  others  in  their  stead  for  the  remainder  of  the  year. 

Sec.  2.  No  state  shall  be  represented  in  congress  by  less  than  two,  not 


y 


8  ARTICLES  OP  CONFEDERATION. 

more  tbao  seven  memben ;  and  no  person  shall  be  capable  of  being  a  dele- 
gate for  more  than  three  years,  in  any  term  of  six  years ;  nor  shall  any 
person,  being  a  delegate,  be  capable  of  holding  any  office  under  tlie  United 
States,  for  which  he,  or  any  other  for  his  benefit,  receives  any  salary,  fees, 
or  emolument,  of  any  kind. 

Sec.  S.  Each  state  shall  maintain  its  own  delegates  in  a  meeting  of  the 
states,  and  while  they  act  as  members  of  the  committee  of  these  stalM. 

Sec.  4.  In  determining  questions  in  the  United  States,  in  congress  assem- 
bled, each  state  shall  have  one  vote. 

Sec.  '^^  FroaMfjpn  ^f  gpgfifih  m j  dAhatft  in  congress  shall  not  be  impeach- 
ed or  questionec^inany  court  orjlace  out  of  congress,  and  the  members  of 
congress  shall  be  prolecled  in  U!Rr  persons  Irom  arrests  and  imprisonments 
during  the  time  of  their  going  to  and  from,  and  attendance  on  congress, 
except  far  treason,  felony,  or  breach  of  the  peace. 

Art.  6.  Sec.  1.  No  state,  without  the  consent  of  the  United  States  in  con- 
gress asssemhled,  shall  send  any  embassy  to,  or  receive  any  embassy  from, 
or  enter  into  any  conference,  agreement,  alliance,  or  treaty,  with  any  king, 
prince,  or  state,  nor  shall  any  person,  holding  any  office  of  profit  or  trust 
under  the  United  States,  or  any  of  them,  accept  of  any  present,  emolument, 
office,  or  title,  of  any  kind  whatever,  from  any  king,  prince,  or  foreign 
state;  nor  shall  the  United  States,  in  congress  assembled, t»r  any  of  them 
grant  any  title  of  nobility. 

Sec.  2.  No  two  or  more  states  shall  enter  into  any%eaty.  ctyifede ration,  or 
alliance  whatpvpr,  tlP^Wftn  ^iym.  wiihom  ihe  cOT15eRt  ot  the  United  Slates 
jciTvi 


in  congress  assembled,  specifying,  accurately,  the  pUtpUbeii  Ail  wilflih  the 
same  is  to  be  entered  into,  and  how  long  It  shall  caatinue. 

Sec.  3.  No  state  shall  lay  any  imposts  or  dutierwhich  may  interfere  with 
any  stipulations  in  treaties,  entered  into  by  the  United  States  in  congress 
assembled,  with  any  king,  prince,  or  sute,  in  pursuance  of  any  treaties 
already  proposed  by  congress  to  the  courts  of  France  and  Spain. 

Sec.  4^  No  vessels  of  war  shall  be  kept  up  in  time  of  peace  by  any  state, 
except  such  number  onhr  as  shall  be  deemed  necessary  by  the  United  l>tates 
in  congress  assembled,  for  the  defence  of  such  state,  or  its  trade :  nor  shall 
any  body  of  forces  be  kept  up,  by  any  state,  in  time  of  peace,  except  such 
number  only  as,  in  the  judgment  of  the  United  States  in  congress  assem- 
bled, shall  be  deemed  requisite  to  garrison  the  forts  necessary  for  the  defence 
of  such  state  ;  but  every  state  shall  always  keep  up  a  regular  and  well  disci- 
plined militia,  sufficiently  armed  and  accoutred,  and  shall  provide  and  con- 
stantly have  ready  for  use,  and  in  public  stores,  a  due  number  of  field 
pieces  and  tents,  and  a  proper  quantity  of  arms,  ammunition,  and  camp 
equipage. 

Sec.  gfjn  ■*"**'  °^?ll  '"'Tfy'  '"  ""r  "'*''  tmthmit  thn  ftnn^nTit  nf  ttiA  TT^JIf/i 

S^a^es  in  ConoLCSs  assembled,  unless  such  state  be  actually  invaded  by  ene- 
mies,  or  shall  nave  received  certain  advice  of  a  resolution  being  formed  by 
some  nation  of  Indians  to  invade  such  state,  and  the  danger  is  so  imminent 
as  not  to  admit  of  delay  till  the  United  States,  in  congress  assembled,  can 
be  consulted ;  nor  shall  any  state  grant  commissions  to  any  ships  or  vessels 
of  war,  nor  letters  of  marque  or  reprisal,  except  it  be  after  a  declaration  of 
war  by  the  United  States  in  congress  assembled,  and  then  only  agaiost  the 
kingdom  or  state,  and  the  subjects  thereof,  against  which  war  has  been  so 
dedared,  and  under  such  regulations  as  shall  be  established  by  the  United 
States  in  congress  assembled,  unless  such  state  be  infested  by  pirates,  in 
which  case  vessels  of  war  may  be  fitted  out  for  that  occasion,  and  kept  so 
long  as  the  danger  shall  continue,  or  until  the  United  States  in  congress 
assembled,  shall  determine  otherwise. 


INTRODUCTION. 


The  expediency  of  collecting  into  one  volume  all  the  documents  that 
are  given  in  the  following  pao;es,  was  first  suggested  to  the  editor,  by 
the  inconvenience  which  he  himself  experienced  in  the  course  of  his 
own  investigations,  in  referring  to  the  different  places  where  they  are 
separately  to  be  found.  This  inconvenience  must  be  common  to  that 
very  large  number  of  readers  who,  in  a  country  like  ours,  can  scarcely 
be  considered  as  possessing  even  a  tolerable  share  of  generaf  knowl- 
edge, without  bein^  acquainted  with  the  history  and  nature  of  the  govern- 
ments under  which  they  live.  To  those  whose  professions  or  studies 
lead  them  more  particularly  to  the  investigation  of  constitutional  ques- 
tions, the  difficulty  of  reference,  to  which  allusion  has  been  made,  forms 
a  subject  of  constant  embarrassment  and  complaint.  The  object  of  the 
present  volume  is  to  present  in  one  collection  a  synopsis  of  the  consti- 
tutions of  the  different  states,  of  the  constitution  of  the  United  States, 
and  of  the  docimients  that  have  been  considered  as  the  best  explana- 
tions of  their  various  provisions  and  relations. 

For  the  outlines  of  tne  state  constitutions,  the  editor  is  principally  in- 
debted to  the  American  Almanac,  of  1831. 

Some  of  the  documents,  such  as  the  proceedings  and  resolutions  of 
the  Virginia  and  Kentucky  Legislatures,  and  of  the  Hartford  Conven- 
tion, were  procured  with  considerable  difficulty,  having  been  but  sel- 
dom republished  since  their  first  promulgation. 

It  was  deemed  expedient  to  include  the  old  articles  of  confederation, 
which  although  superseded  by  the  present  constitution,  are  often  refer- 
red to,  as  being  the  first  successful  attempt  towards  the  formation  of  a 
regular  and  systematic  Union,  and  as  exhibiting  most  of  the  outlines 
of  the  present  form  of  the  general  government. 

The  articles  of  confederacy  arose  from  the  necessities  of  the  revolu- 
tionary contest,  and  formed  the  first  Union  and  general  government 
that  had  existed  in  tlic  North  American  Colonies.  All  the  former  con- 
nexions that  had  existed  between.them,  can  be  looked  upon  Only  as 
leagues  or  confederacies,  such  as  mi^ht  have  existed  between  nations 
perfectly  independent  of  each  other.  Of  this  nature  was  the  confederacy 
formed  amongst  the  New  England  Colonies,  as  early  as  the  year  1643, 
for  certain  limited  purposes,  principally  connected  with  the  Indian 
wars.  The  last  attempt  for  a  more  general  union  amongst  the  colo- 
nies, was  made  in  1754,  but  was  never  carried  into  full  effect. 

The  difficulties  which,  shortly  afterwards,  arose  between  tlie  colonies 
and  the  mother  country,  made  it  necessary  that  they  should  seek  the 
aid  of  united  councils.  This  necessity  gave  rise  to  the  organization  of 
the  old  Continental  Congress,  the  first  meeting  of  which  took  place  on 
September  5th,  1774.  In  this  Congress  twelve  colonies  were  repre- 
sented by  delegates.  When  it  was  ascertained  that  the  pacific  mea- 
sures which  had  been  adopted  by  Congress  to  resist  the  attempts  which 
were  made  by  the  mother  country  to  reduce  them  to  unconditional  sub- 
mission, were  not  sufficiently  energetic  for  the  crisis.  Congress  reas- 


it  INTRODUCTION. 

sembled  in  May,  1775,  and  assumed  tlie  character  of  an  independent 
nation  to  effect  certain  specified  objects.  The  colonies  ratified  their 
proceedings,  and  conferred  on  that  body,  by  resolutions  passed  in  their 
primary  assemblies,  the  powers  of  a  national  government,  for  the  pur- 
poses conferred  upon  it. 

By  the  declaration  of  independence,  in  1776,  the  colonies  held  them- 
selves out  to  the  world,  and  made  treaties,  not  as  separate  and  inde- 
pendent sovereignties,  but  as  one  united  nation,  known  in  that  capacity 
alone  to  foreign  powers.     The  articles  of  confederation  were  agreed  to 
in  Congress,  on  the  15th  November,  1777,  but  were  not  to  be  conclu- 
sive, imtil  they  were  approved  by  the  legislatures  of  all  the  states. 
Eleven  of  tlie  states   ratified  them  in   1778,  one  in  1779,   and  one 
state,  thh  last  of  the  thirteen,  on  the  1st  March,  1781.    Every  one  who 
is  at  all  familiar  with  tlie  history  of  the  revolution,  must  have  observed 
how  inadequate  were  the  powers  which  were  at  that  time  granted  to 
the  general  government ;  how  it  was  compelled  to  supplicate,  when  it 
should  have  had  the  power  to  command  ;  and  to  recommend,  when  it 
ought  to  have  acted.     Nothing  but  the  necessity  of  imiting  against  the 
assaults  of  a  powerful  invading  enemy,  would  have  held  the  states  to- 
gether under  such  a  confederation,  even  for  a  single  year,  and  the  revo- 
lution was  conducted  to  a  successful  issue,  by  the  wisdom  and  valor  of 
our  forefathers,  in  spite  of  the  feeble  and  ineffective  government  under 
which  the  struggle  was  made.     It  was  intended  to  be  merely  tempora- 
ry, until  the  restoration  of  more  tranquil  times  should  give  a  better  op- 
portunity to  repair  the  political  edifice,  that  had  already  begun  to  crum- 
ble to  pieces.     A  government  more  energetic  and  able  by  the  powers 
vested  in  it,  to  maintain  its  authority,  without  being  entirely  at  the 
mercy  of  the  separate  states,  was  sought  to  be  formed  by  tlie  conven- 
tion which  formed  the  present  constitution  of  the  United  States,  and 
except  its  framers  grossly  deceived  themselves,  that  object  was  attain- 
ed, and  the  evils  guarded  against,  of  which  there  had  been  so  bitter  an 
experience.     The  present  constitution  was  framed,  instituted  indeed 
for  limited  purposes,  but  for  these  purposes  absolute  and  uncontrolled, 
except  by  its  own  appointed  interpreter,  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States.     The  framers  of  the  constitution, — men  well  acquainted 
with  the  ambiguities  to  which  all  language,  however  accurate  and  pre- 
cise, was  necessarily  exposed,  even  when  examined  by  tlie  eye  of  good 
sense  and  patriotism,  and  not  ignorant  of  the  doubts  that  might  be  rais- 
ed by  weakness,  by  subtlety,  or  ambition, — were  not  so  destitute  of  pru- 
dence as  to  suffer  the  constitution  to  pass  from  their  hands,  without  de- 
claring the  manner  in  which,  in  the  last  resort,  it  was  to  be  interpreted, 
nor  to  suffer  that  interpretation  to  rest  upon  the  will  of  each  particular 
state.     Even  allowing  the  theory  assumed  by  some  statesmen  to  be  cor- 
rect, that  the  government  of  the  United  States  was  the  act  of  individu- 
ed  states,  operating  in  their  sovereign  capacities,  yet  even  in  that  case, 
as  a  common  umpire  has  been  appointed  by  the  instrument  of  confe- 
deration, to  whose  decision  all  questions  arising  as  to  its  construction 
were  to  be  referred,  the  right  of  aisunion  by  a  single  state  would  be  en- 
tirely excluded.     The  analogy,  so  frequently  instituted  on  this  subject, 
by  Uie  strenuous  advocates  of  nullification,  between  the  case  of  our 
various  state  governments   and  that  of  sovereign  independent  na- 
tions, bound  together  by  leagues,  fails  from  the  fact  that  an  arbiter  of 
disputes  is  expressly  appointed  by  and  amongst  the  former,  whilst  the 


ARTICLES  OP  CONFEDERATION.  9 

Art.  7.  When  land  forces  are  raised  by  any  state  for  the  common  defeace, 
mil  officers  of  or  under  the  rank  of  colonel  shall  be  appointed  by  the  legisla- 
ture of  each  state  respectively,  by  whom  such  forces  shall  be  raised,  or  in 
tuch  manner  as  such  state  shall  direct,  and  all  vacancies  shall  be  filled  up 
by  the  state  which  first  made  the  appointment. 

Art.  8.  All  charges  of  war,  and  all  other  expenses  that  shall  be  incurred 
for  the  common  defence  or  general  welfare,  and  allowed  by  the  United  States 
in  congress  assembled,  shall  be  defrayed  out  of  a  common  treasury,  which 
shall  be  supplied  by  the  several  states,  in  proportion  to  the  value  of  all  land 
within  each  state,  granted  to  or  surveyed  for  any  person,  as  such  land  and 
the  buildings  and  improvements  thereon  shall  be  estimated,  according  to 
such  mode  as  the  United  States  in  congress  assembled  shall,  from  time  to 
time,  direct  and  appoint.  The  taxes  for  paying  that  proportion  shall  be  laid 
and  levied  by  the  authority  and  direction  of  the  legislatures  of  the  several 
states  within  the  time  agreed  upon  by  the  United  States  in  congress  assem- 
bled. 

Art.  9.  Sec.  1.  The  United  States  in  congress  assembled  shall  have  the 
sole  and  exclusive  right  and  power  of  determining  on  peace  and  war,  ex- 
cept in  the  cases  mentioned  in  the  sixth  article,  of  sending  and  receiving 
ambassadors ;  entering  into  treaties  and  alliances,  provided  that  no  treaty 
of  commerce  shall  be  made,  whereby  the  legislative  power  of  the  respective 
states  shall  be  restrained  from  imposing  such  imposts  and  duties  on  foreign- 
ers, as  their  own  people  are  subjected  to,  or  from  prohibiting  the  exporta- 
tion or  importation  of  any  species  of  goods  or  commodities  whatsoever  \  of 
establishing  rules  for  deciding  in  all  cases,  what  captures  on  land  or  water 
shall  be  legal,  and  in  what  manner  prizes  taken  by  land  or  naval  forces  in 
the  service  of  the  United  States  shall  be  divided  or  appropriated  ;  of  grant- 
ing letters  of  marque  and  reprisal  in  times  of  peace;  appointing  courts  for 
the  trial  ot  piracies  and  felonies  committed  on  the  high  seas  ;  and  establish- 
ing courts  for  receiving  and  determining  finally  appeals  in  all  cases  of  cap- 
tures; provided  that  no  member  of  congress  shall  be  appointed  a  judge  of 
any  of  the  said  courts. 

Sec.  2.  The  United  States  in  congress  assembled  shall  also  be  the  last 
resort  on  appeal  in  all  disputes  and  differences  now  subsisting,  or  that  here- 
after may  arise  between  two  or  more  states  concerning  boundary,  jurisdic- 
tion, or  any  other  cause  whatever;  which  authority  shall  always  be  exer- 
cised in  the  manner  following:    Whenever  the  legislative  or  executive 
authority  or  lawful  agent  of  any  state  in  controversy  with  another,  shall 
present  a  petition  to  congress,  stating  the  matter  in  question,  and  praying 
for  a  hearing,  notice  thereof  shall  be  given  by  order  of  congress  to  the 
legislative  or  executive  authority  of  the  other  state  in  controversy,  and  a 
day  assigned  for  the  appearance  of  the  parties  by  their  lawful  agents,  who 
shall  then  be  directed  to  appoint,  by  joint  consent,  commissioners  or  judges 
to  constitute  a  court  /or  hearing  and  determining  the  matter  in  question ; 
but  if  they  cannot  agree,  congress  shall  name  three  persons  out  of  each  of 
the  United  States,  and  from  the  list  of  such  persons  each  party  shall  alter- 
nately strike  out  one,  the  petitioners  beginning,  until  the  number  shall  be 
reduced  to  thirteen ;  and  from  that  number  not  less  than  seven  nor  more 
than  nine  names,  as  congress  shall  direct,  shall,  in  the  presence  of  congress, 
be  drawn  out  by  lot;  and  the  persons  whose  names  shall  be  so  drawn,  or 
any  five  of  them,  shall  be  commissioners  or  judges,  to  hear  and  finally  de- 
termine the  controversy,  so  always  as  a  major  part  of  the  judges,  who  shall 
hear  the  cause,  shall  agree  in  the  determination:  and  if  either  party  shall 
neglect  to  attend  at  the  day  appointed,  without  showing  reasons  which  con- 
gress shall  judge  sufficient,  or  being  present,  shall  refuse  to  strike,  the  con- 


10  ARTICLES  OF  CONFEDERATION.^ 

gress  iball  proceed  to  nominate  three  persons  out  of  each  state,  and  the 
secretary  of  congress  shall  strike  in  behalf  of  such  party  absent  or  refusing: 
and  the  judgment  and  sentence  of  the  court,  to  be  appointed  in  the  manner 
before  prescribed,  shall  be  final  and  conclusive;  and  if  any  of  the  parties 
shall  refuse  to  submit  to  the  authority  of  such  court,  or  to  appear  or  defend 
their  claim  or  cause,  the  court  shall  nevertheless  proceed  to  pronounce  sen- 
tence, or  judgment,  which  shall  in  like  manner  be  final  and  decisive;  the 
judgment  or  sentence  and  other  proceedings  being  in  either  case  transmitted 
to  congress,  and  lodged  among-  the  acts  of  congress,  for  the  sccnrity  of  the 
parties  concerned :  provided,  that  every  commissioner,  before  he  sits  in 
judgment,  shall  take  an  oath,  to  be  administered  by  one  of  the  judges  of 
the  supreme  or  superior  court  of  the  state  where  the  cause  shall  be  tried, 
"well  and  truly  to  hear  and  determine  the  matter  in  question,  according 
to  the  best  of  his  judgment,  witiiout  favor,  affettion,  or  hope  of  reward." 
Provided  a^o,  that  no  state  shall  be  deprived  of  territory  for  the  benefit  of 
the  United  States. 

Sec.  3.  All  controversies  concerning  the  private  right  of  soil  claimed 
under  diffef^nt  grants  of  two  or  more  states,  whose  jurisdiction,  as  they 
may  respt^ct  such  lands,  and  the  stales  which  passed  such  grants  are  adjust- 
ed, the  said  grants  or  either  of  them  being  at  the  same  time  claimed  to  have 
originated  antecedent  to  such  settlement  of  jurisdiction,  shall,  on  the  peti- 
tion of  either  party  to  the  congress  of  the  United  States,  be  finally  deter- 
mined, as  near  as  may  be,  in  the  same  manner  as  is  before  prescribed  for 
deciding  disputes  respecting  territorial  jurisdiction  between  difierent  stales. 
Sec.  4  The  United  States  in  congress  assembled,  shall  also  have  the  sole 
and  exclusive  right  and  power  of  regulating  the  alloy  and  value  of  coin 
struck  hy  their  own  authority,  or  by  that  of  the  respective  states ;  fixing 
tlie  standard  of  weights  and  measures  throughout  the  United  States;  regu- 
lating t  he  trade  and  managing  all  affairs  with  the  Indians,  not  members  of 
any  of  the  states  :  provided  that  the  legislative  right  of  any  state,  within 
its  own  hraits,  be  not  infringed  or  violated;  establishing  and  regulating  post 
offices  from  one  state  to  another,  throughout  all  the  United  States,  and  ex- 
acting such  postage  on  papers  passing  through  the  same  as  may  be  requisite 
to  defray  the  expenses  of  the  said  office;  appointing  all  officers  of  the  land 
forces  in  the  service  of  the  Unitad  States,  excepting  regimental  officers  ; 
appointing  all  the  officers  of  the  naval  forces,  and  commissioning  all  officers 
whatever  in  the  service  of  the  United  States :  making  rules  for  the  govern- 
ment and  regulation  of  the  said  land  and  naval  forces,  and  directing  their 
operations. 

Sec.  5.  The  United  States  in  congress  assembled,  shall  have  authority  to 
appoint  a  committee,  to  sit  in  the  recess  of  congress  to  be  denominated, 
*♦  A  Committee  of  the  States,"  and  to  consist  of  one  delegate  from  each 
state;  and  to  appoint  such  other  committees  and  civil  officers  as  may  be 
necessary  for  managing  the  general  affairs  of  the  United  States  under  their 
direction;  10  appoint  one  of  their  number  to  preside  ;  provided  that  no  per- 
son be  allSved  to  serve  in  the  office  of  president  more  than  one  year  in 
any  term  of  three  years;  to  ascertain  the  necessary  sums  of  money  to  be 
raised  for  the  service  of  the  United  States,  and  to  appropriate  and  apply 
the  same  for  defraying  the  public  expenses ;  to  borrow  money  or  emit  bills 
on  the  credit  of  the  United  States,  transmitting  every  half  year  to  the 
respective  states  an  account  of  the  sums  of  money  so  borrowed  or  emitted ; 
to  build  and  equip  a  navy  ;  to  agree  upon  the  number  of  land  forces,  and 
to  make  requisitions  from  each  state  for  its  quota,  in  proportion  to  the  num- 
ber of  white  inhabitants  in  such  state,  which  requisition  shall  be  binding ; 
and  thereupon  the  legislature  of  each  state  shall  appoint  the  regimental 


ARTICLES  OF  CONFEDERATION.  11 

officers,  raise  the  men,  clothe,  arm,  and  equip  thera,  in  a  soldier-like  man- 
ner, at  the  expense  of  the  United  States ;  and  the  officers  and  men  so 
clothed,  armed,  and  equipped,  shall  march  to  the  place  appointed,  and 
within  the  time  agreed  on  by  the  United  States  in  congress  assembled ;  but 
if  the  United  States  in  congress  assembled  shall,  on  consideration  of  cir- 
cumstances judge  proper  that  any  state  should  not  raise  men,  or  should 
raise  a  smaller  number  than  its  quota,  and  that  any  other  state  should  raise 
a  greater  number  of  men  than  the  quota  thereof,  such  extra  number  shall 
be  raised,  officered,  clothed,  armed,  and  equipped  in  the  sanie  manner  as 
the  quota  of  such  state,  unless  the  legislature  of  such  state  shall  judge  that 
such  extra  number  cannot  be  safely  spared  out  of  the  same,  in  which  case 
they  shall  raise,  officer,  clothe,  arm,  and  equip,  as  many  of  such  extra  num- 
ber as  they  judge  can  be  safely  spared,  and  the  officers  and  men  so  clothed, 
armed,  and  equipped,  shall  march  to  the  place  appointed,  and  within  the 
time  agreed  on  by  the  United  States  in  congress  assembled. 

See.  6.  The  United  States  in  congress  assembled,  shall  never  engage  in  a 
war,  nor  grant  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal  in  time  of  peace,  nor  enter  in 
any  treaties  or  alliances,  nor  coin  money,  nor  regulate  the  value  thereof, 
nor  ascertain  the  sums  and  expenses  necessary  for  the  defence  and  welfare 
of  the  United  States,  or  any  of  them,  nor  emit  bills,  nor  borrow  money  on 
the  credit  of  the  United  States,  nor  appropriate  money,  nor  agree  upon  the 
number  of  vessels  of  war  to  be  built  or  purchased,  or  the  number  of  land  or 
sea  forces  to  be  raised,  nor  appoint  a  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  or 
navy,  unless  nine  states  assent  to  the  same  :  nor  shall  a  question  on  any 
other  point,  except  for  adjourning  from  day  to  day,  be  determined,  unless  by 
the  votes  of  a  majority  of  the  United  States  in  congress  assembled. 

Sec.  7.  The  congress  of  the  United  States  shall  have  power  to  adjourn  to 
any  time  within  the  year,  and  to  any  place  within  the  United  States,  so  that 
no  period  of  adjournment  be  for  a  longer  duration  than  the  space  of  six 
months,  and  shall  publish  the  journal  of  their  proceedings  monthly,  except 
such  parts  thereof  relating  to  treaties,  alliances,  or  military  operations,  as 
in  their  judgment  require  secresy ;  and  the  yeas  and  nays  of  the  delegates 
of  each  state,  on  any  question,  shall  be  entered  on  the  journal,  when  it  is 
desired  by  any  delegate;  and  the  delegates  of  a  state,  or  any  of  them,  at 
his  or  their  request,  sliall  be  furnished  with  a  transcript  of  the  said  journal, 
except  such  parts  as  are  above  excepted,  to  lay  before  the  legislatures  of 
the  several  states. 

Art.  10.  The  committee  olf  the  states,  or  any  nine  of  them,  shall  be  au- 
thorized to  execute,  in  the  recess  of  congress,  such  of  the  powers  of  con- 
gress as  the  United  States,  in  congress  assembled,  by  the  consent  of  nine 
states,  shall,  from  time  to  time,  think  expedient  to  vest  them  with ;  provided 
that  no  power  be  delegated  to  the  said  committee,  for  the  exercise  of  which, 
by  the  articles  of  confederation,  the  voice  of  nine  states,  in  the  congress  of 
the  United  States  assembled,  is  requisite. 

Art.  11.  Canada  accedinp;  to  this  confedemtion,  and  joining  in  the  mea- 
sures of  the  United  States.  shalTbe  admitted  into,  and  entitled  to  all  the  ad- 
vantages of  this  union ;  hut  n^  other  cnlonysjiall  be  admitted  into  t^^^ame 
unless  sucn  admfssTon  be  agreed  to  by  nine  sia'tes. 

Art.  ri.  All  bill^  6f  credit  emiited,  uiUtJCJ's  borrowed,  and  debts  Con- 
tracted by  or  under  the  authority  of  congress,  before  the  assembling  of  the 
United  States,  in  pursuance  of  the  present  confederation,  shall  be  deemed 
und  considered  as  a  charge  against  the  United  States,  for  payment  and  satis- 
faction whereof  the  said  United  States  and  the  public  faith  are  hereby 
solemnly  pledged. 


12  ARTICLES  OF  CONFEDERATION. 

Art.  13.  ^F.vpry  Rtiitft  shall  abi^e  hv  the  determination  of  thfi  United  Sftait 
in  rongrosB  nygjimMed,  in  all  questions  whick  by  this  confederation  are  sub- 
mitted to  them.  And  the  articles  of  this  confederation  shall  be  inviolably 
observed  by  every  state,  and  the  union  shall  be  perpetual ;  nor  shall  any 
alteration  at  any  time  hereafter  be  made Jn  any  of  them,  unless  such  alter- 
ation be  agreed  to  in  a  congress  of  the  United  States,  and  be  alterwards 
confirmed  by  the  legislature  of  every  state. 

And  whereas  it  hath  pleased  the  great  Governor  of  the  world  to  incline 
the  hearts  .of  the  legislatures  we  respectively  represent  in  congress,  to  ap- 
prove of,  and  to  authorize  us  to  ratify  the  said  articles  of  confederation  and 
perpetual  union,  Know  ye,  that  we,  the  undersigned  delegates,  by  virtue  of 
the  power  and  authority  to  us  given  for  that  purpose,  do,  by  these  presents, 
in  the  name  and  in  behalf  of  our  respective  constituents,  fully  and  entirely 
ratify  and  confirm  each  and  every  of  the  said  articles  of  confederation  and 
perpetual  union,  and  all  and  singular  the  matters  and  things  therein  con- 
tained. And  we  do  further  solemnly  plight  and  engage  the  faith  of  our 
respective  constituents,  that  they  shall  abide  by  the  determinations  of  the 
United  States  in  congress  assembled,  in  all  questions  which  by  the  said  con- 
federation are  submitted  to  them ;  and  that  the  articles  thereof  shall  be 
inviolably  observed  by  the  states  we  respectively  represent,  and  that  the 
union  shall  be  perpetual.  In  witness  whereof,  we  have  hereunto  set  our 
hands  in  congress. 

Done  at  Philadelphia,  in  the  state  of  Pennsylvania,  the  9th  day  of 
July,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  1778,  and  in  the  third  year  of  the 
Independence  of  America. 

NEW  HAMPSHIRE.— Josiah  Bartlett,  John  Wcntworth,  Jr. 

MASSACHUSETTS  BAY.— John  Hancock,  Samuel  Adams,  Elbridge 
Gerry,  Francis  Dana,  James  Lovel,  Samuel  Holten. 

RHODE  ISLAND,  (fee— William  Ellery,  Henry  Merchant,  John  Collins. 

CONWECTIGUT.— Roger  Sherman,  Samuel  Huntington,  Oliver  Wolcott, 
Titus  Hosmer,  Andrew  Adams. 

NEW  YORK.— Jas.  Duane,  Fra.  Lewis,  Wm.  Duer,  Gouv.  Morris. 

NEW  JERSEY.— Jno.  Witherspoon,  Nath.  Scudder. 

PENNSYLVANIA.— Robert  Morris,  Daniel  Roberdeau,  Jona.  Bayard 
Smith,  William  Clingan,  Joseph  Reed. 

DELAWARE  — Thos.  M'Kean,  John  Dickinson,  Nicholas  Van  Dyke. 

MARYLAND  —John  Hanson, Daniel  Carroll. 

VIRGINIA.— Richard  Henry  Lee,  John  Bannister,  Thomas  Adams,  Jno. 
Harvie,  Francis  Lightfoot  Lee. 

NORTH  CAROLINA.— John  Penn,  Cons.  Harnett,  Jno.  Williams. 

SOUTH  CAROLINA.— Henry  Laurens,  William  Henry  Drayton,  Jmx 
Mathews,  Richard  Hutson,  Thos.  Heyward,  Jr. 

GEORGIA.— Jno.  Walton,  £dwd.  Telfair,  Edwd.  Langwortby. 


CONSTITUTION 


OF 


THE   UNITED    STATES 


Copied  from  the  RoH  in  the  Department  of  State. 


:,  the  people  of  the  IJnited  States,  m  order  to  form  a  jnoreperfect 
nion/'establish  jusrfce,  insi%^omestic  tranquillity,  proyicle'tor  the 


We, 

union,  ^          .         "  -  -     -        '  ■  - 

^  common  defence,  promote  the  general  welfare,  and^secure,the  blessings 

of  liberty  to  ourselves' antl  our  posterity,  do  ordain' and  establish  this 

Constitution  for  the  United  States  of  America. 


ARTICLE  I. 

Section  I.  All  legislative  powers  herein  granted  shall  be  vested  in 
a  Congress  of  the  United  States,  which  shall  consist  of  a  Senate  and 
House  of  Representatives. 

Sec.  II.  The  House  of  Representatives  shall  be  composed  of  mem- 
bers chosen  every  second  year  by  the  people  of  the  several  states,  and 
the  electors  in  each  "Slate  siirall  have  thg  quatifications  requisite  for  elec- 
tors of  the  most  numerous  branch  of  the  state  legislatm'e. 

No  person  shall  be  a  representative  who  shall  not  have  attained  to 
the  age  of  twenty-five  years,  and  been  sevgjo^ years  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  and  who  shall  not,  when  elected,  be  an  inhabitant  of 
that  state  in  which  he  shall  b#  chosen. 

Representatives  and  direct  taxes  shall  be  apportioned  among  the 
several  states  which  may  be  included  within  this  union,  according  to 
their  respective  numbers,  which  shall  be  detennined  by  adding  to  the 
whole  nmnbers  of  free  persons,  including  those  bomid  to  service  for  a 
term  of  years,  and  excluding  Indians  not  taxed,  three-fifths  of  all  other 
persons.  The  actual  enumeration  shall  be  made  within  three  years, 
after  the  first  meeting  of  the  congress  of  the  United  States,  and  within 
every  subsequent  term  of  ten  years,  in  such  manner  as  they  shall  by 
law  direct.  The  number  of  representatives  shall  not  exceed  one  for 
every  thirty  thousand,  but  each  state  shall  have  at  least  one  representa- 
tive ;  and  until  such  enumeration  shall  be  made,  the  state  of  New 
Hampshire  shall  be  entitled  to  choose  three,  Massachusetts  eiffht, 
Rhode  Island  and  Providence  Plantations  one,  Connecticut  five,  New 
York  six.  New  Jersey  four,  Pennsylvania  eight,  Delaware  one,  Mary- 
land six,  Virginia  ten,  North  Carolina  five,  South  Carolina  five,  and 
Georgia  three. 

2 


14  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE 

When  vacancies  happen  in  llie  representation  from  any  state,  the 
executive  authority  tliereof  shall  issue  writs  of  election  to  fill  such 
vacancies. 

The  House  of  Representatives  shall  choose  their  speaker  and  other 
officers ;  and  shall  have  the  sole  power  of  impeachment. 

Sec.  III.  The  Senate  of  the  United  States  shall  be  composed  of  two 
senators  from  each  state,  chosen  by  the  legislature  thereof,  for  six  years ; 
and  each  senator  shall  have  one  vote.   •*=*— -^  "* 

Immediately  after  they  shall  be  assembled  in  consequence  of  tlie  first 
election,  they  shall  be  divided  as  equally  as  may  be  into  three  classes. 
The  seats  of  the  senators  of  the  first  class  shall  be  vacated  at  the  expir- 
ation of  the  second  year,  of  the  second  class  at  tlie  expiration  of  the 
fourth  year,  and  of  the  third  class  at  the  expiration  of  the  sixth  year, 
so  tliat  one  third  may  be  chosen  every  second  year ;  and  if  vacancies 
happen  by  resignation,  or  otherwise,  during  the  recess  of  the  legislature 
of  any  state,  the  executive  thereof  may  make  temporary  appointments 
until  the  next  meeting  of  the  legislauire,  which  shall  then  fill  such 
vacancies. 

No  person  shall  be  a  senator  who  shall  not  have  attained  to  the  age 
of  thirty  years^  and  been  nine  years  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  and 
who  shall  not,  when  elected,' be  an  inhabitant  of  that  state  for  which 
he  shall  be  chosen. 

The  vice-president  of  the  United  States  shall  be  jiresident  of  Uie 
Senate,  but  shall  have  no  vote,  unless  they  be  equally  divided. 

The  Senate  shall  choose  their  otlmr  officers,  and  also  a  president  pro- 
tempore,  in  the  absence  of  the  vice-jn-esident,  or  when  he  sliall  exercise 
the  office  of  president  of  the  United  States. 

The  Senate  shall  have  the  sole  power  to  try  allimpeachments :  when 
sitting  for  that  purpose,  they  shall  be  on  oaflT^i*  affinnat'ion.  '  When  the 
president  of  the  United  States  is  tried,  the  chief  justice  shall  preside ; 
and  no  person  shall  be  convicted  without  the  concurrence  of  two-tliirds 
of  the  members  present. 

Judgment  in  cases  of  impeachment  shall  not  extend  further  tl\an  to 
removal  from  office,  and  disqualification  to  hold  and  enjoy  any  o^ce  of 
honor,  trust,  or  profit,  under  the  United  States ;  but  the  party  convicted 
shall  nevertheless  be  liable  and  subject  to  indictment,  trial,  judg^^tient, 
and  punishment,  according  to  law.  • 

Sec.  ly.  The  times,  place.^>,  and  manner  of  holding  election  for 
senators  and  representatives,  shall  be  prescribed  in  each  state  by  the 

le;r-  '  ' ^^    rcof;  but  the  congress  may  at  any  time  by  law  make  or 

all  ttions,  except  as  to  places  of  choosing  senators. 

1  111  I oii-K  N.S  shall  assemble  at  least  once  in  eveiy  year,  and  such 
meeting  shall  be  on  the  first  ]yiondt\y.m  December,  unless  they  shall 
by  law  appoint  a  diflferent  day.  " 

Sec,  V .  Each  House  shall  be  tlie  judge  of  the  elections,  returns  and 
qualifications  of  its  own  members,  and  a  majority  of  each  shall  consti- 
tute a  quorum  to  do  business;  but  a  smaller  number  may  adjourn  from 
day  to  day,  and  may  be  authorized  to  compel  the  attendance  of  absent 
members,  in  such  manner,  and  under  such  penalties,  as  each  house  may 
provide. 

Each  house  may  determine  the  rules  of  its  proceedings,  punish  its 
members  for  disorderly  behavior,  and  witli  the  concurrence  of  t\\•(^-tllirds, 
expel  a  member. 


UNITED  STATES.  16 

Each  house  shall  keep  a  journal  of  its  proceedings  and  from  time  to 
time  publish  the  same,  excepting  such  parts  as  may  in  their  judg- 
ment require  secrecy ;  and  the  yeas  and  nays  of  the  members  of  either 
house  on  any  question  shall,  at  the  desire  of  one-fifth  of  those  present, 
'  be  entered  on  the  journal. 

Neither  house,  during  the  session  of  congress,  shall,  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  otlier,  adjom-n  for  more  than  three  days,  nor  to  any  other 
place  than  that  in  which  the  two  houses  shall  be  sitting. 

Sec.  VI.  The  senators  and  representatives  shall  receive  a  compen- 
sation for  their  services,  to  be  ascertained  by  law,  and  paid  out  of  the 
trrnmry  nf  thn  Tliiirrfi  Mtptr-  They  shall  in  all  cases,  except  treason,  / 
'  felony,  and  breach  of  the  peace,  be  privileged  from  arrest  during  their 
attendance  at  the  session  of  their  respective  houses,  and  in  going  to  and 
returning  from  the  same ;  and  for  any  speech  or  debate  in  either  house, 
they  shall  not  be  questioned  in  any  other  place. 

No  senator  or  representative  shall,  during  the  time  for  which  he  was 
elected,  be  appointed  to  any  civil  office  imder  the  authority  of  the  United 
States,  which  shall  have  been  created,  or  the  emoluments  whereof  shall 
have  been  increased  dui-ing  such  time ;  and  no  person  holding  any 
office  under  the  United  States,  shall  be  a  member  of  eitlier  house  during 
his  continuance  in  office. 

Sec.  VII.    All  bills  for  raising  revenue  shall  origina.te  in  tha.HfiUS£u. 
of  Representatives ;  but  tlie  fcienate  may  propose  or  concur  witli  amend- 
ments as  on  other  bills. 

Every  bill  which  shall  have  passed  the  Hcuse  of  Representatives 
and  the  Senate,  shall,  before  it  become  a  law,  be  presented  to  the  presi- 
dent of  tlie  United  Statwr  if  he  approve  he  shall  sigh  il,"but  if  not  he 
shall  return  it,  with  his  objections  to  that  house  in  which  it  shall  have 
originated,  who  shall  enter  the  objections  «at  large  on  their  journal,  and 
proceed  to  reconsider  it.  If  after  such  reconsideration  two-thirds  of 
that  house  shall  agree  to  pass  tlie  bill,  it  shall  be  sent,  together  with  the 
objections,  to  the  other  house,  by  whith  it  shall  likewise  be  reconsi- 
dered, and  if  approved  by  two-thirds  of  that  house,  it  shall  become  a  law. 
But  in  all  such  cases  the  votes  of  both  houses  shall  be  determined  by 
yeas  and  nays,  and  the  names  of  the  persons  voting  for  and  against  the 
bill  shall  be  entered  on  the  journal  of  each  house  respectively.  If  any 
bill  shall  not  be  returned  by  the  president  within  ten  days  (Sundays 
excepted)  after  it  shall  have  been  presented  \o  him,  the  same  shall  be  a 
law  m  like  manner  as  if  he  had  signed  it,  unless  the  congress  by  their 
adjournment  prevent  its  return,  in  which  case  it  shall  not  be  a  law. 

Every  order,  resolution,  or  vote,  to  which  the  concurrence  of  the 
Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  JTItiy  be  necessary  (except  on  a 

?uestion  of  adjournment)  shall  be  presented  to  the  president  of  the 
Fnited  States ;  and  before  the  same  shall  take  effect,  shall  be  approved 
by  him,  or  being  disapproved  by  him,  shall  be  repassed  by  two-thirds 
of  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives,  according  to  the  rules  and 
limitations  prescribed  in  the  case  of  a  bill. 

Sec.  yill.  The  congress  shall  have  power  to  lay.  and  collect  taxes,  ^^ 
duties,  imposts  and  exciseSj^to  pay  the  debts  agd  provide  for  the  com*  v 
moi^"defence"ahd£eneraTw^  United  States;  but  all  duties,     ' 

imposts,  and  exciseTsliall  be  umfonnlliroughout  tlie  JJnited  States  j  ^  ■»'  ; 
To  borrow  money  on  the  credit  of  the  United  States. 
To  regulate  commerce  with  foreign  nations,  and  among  the  several  ^ 
etates,  and  with  the  Indian  tribes; 


16  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE 

To  establish  an  uniform  rule  of  naturalization,  and  unifonn  laws  on 
the  subject  of  bankruptcies  lliroughout  the  United  States: 

To  coin  money,  regulate  tlie  value  tliereof,  and  of  foreign  coin,  and 
fix  the  standard  of  weights  and  measures : 

To  provide  for  tlie  pmiishment  of  counterfeiting  the  securities  anci 
current  coin  of  tlie  United  States ; 

To  establish  post  offices  and  post  roads ; 

To  promote  tlie  progress  of  science  and  useful  arts,  by  securing  for 
limited  times  to  authors  and  inventors  the  exclusive  right  to  their  re- 
spective writings  and  discoveries ; 

To  constitute  tribunals  inferior  to  the  supreme  court ; 
^       To  define  and  punish  piracies  and  felonies  committed  on  tlie  high 
seaSj  and  offences  against  the  law  of  nations ; 

To  declare  war,  grant  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal,  and  make  rules 
concerning  captures  on  land  and  water ; 

To  raise  and  support  annies,  but  no  appropriation  of  money  to  that 
use  shall  be  for  a  longer  term  than  two  years  j 

To  provide  and  maintain  a  navy ; 

To  make  rules  for  the  government  and  regula,tk)n  of  tlie  land  and 
naval  forces ; 
^,       To  provide  for  calling  forth  the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the 
*•  ^union,  suppress  insuiTections  and  repel  invasions ; 

Xo  provide  for  organizing,  arming,  and  disciplining  the  militia,  and 
for  governing  such  parts  of  them  as  may  be  employed  in  the  service  of 
the  united  States,  reserving  to  tlie  States  respectively  the  appointment 
of  the  officers,  and  tlie  authority  of  training  tlie  militia  according  to  tlie 
discipline  prescribed  by  congress ; 

To  exercise  exclusive  legislation  in  all  cases  whatsoever,  over  such 
district  (not  exceeding  ten  miles  square)  as  may,  by  cession  of  particu- 
lar states,  and  tlie  acceptance  of  congrest,  become  the  seat  of  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States,  and%  exercise  like  authority  over  all  places 
purchased  by  the  consent  of  the  legislature  of  the  state  in  which  the 
same  shall  be,  for  the  erection  of  forts,  magazines,  arsenals,  dock  yards, 
and  other  needful  buildings ;  and 
y  To  make  all  laws  which  shall  be.Ji^e|sa^;.^ii4.p£Q£ej;^for  carrying 
into  execution  the  foregpuig  powers^  and"  ail  other  powers  vested  by 
this  constitution  in  the  government  of  the  United  States,  or  in  any  de^^ 
partment  or  office  thereof.^ 
—  i^  Sec.  IX.  The  migration  or  importation  of  such  persons  as  any  of 
the  states  now  existing  shall  think  proper  to  admit,  shall  not  be  prohi- 
bited by  the  congress  prior  to  the  year  one  thousand  eight  liundred  and 
eight,  but  a  tax  or  duty  may  be  imposed  on  such  importation,  not  ex- 
ceeding ten  dollars  for  each  person. 

The  privilege  of  the  writjjfJiabeas  corpus  shall  not  be  suspended^. 
•  unless  when  in  cases  of  rebellion  or  invasion  the  public  safety  may 

require  it. 
i.       No  bill  of  attainder  or  e:JLpiistJiictQ  law  shall  be  passed. 
,\       No  cajiitatio^,  or  other  diiTctJai,:^all  be  laid^  unless  in  proporlifln 
to  the  census  or  enumeration  herein  before  directed  to  be  taken, 
f.       No  tax  or  duty  shnll  Lp  ]iui\  pllijCticks  cYpnrto^fmm  any  State. 

I'ia4)relert'nc(^  shall  be  given  by  any  regulation  of  commerce  or 
''enue  to  the*p()f-ts  of  one  state  over  those  of  jnw.ilwr-  nnr  i^lmil  vessels 


UNITED  STATES.  17 

bound  to,  or  from,  one  state,  be  obliged  to  enter,  clear,  or  pay  duties  in 
another. 

No  money  shall  be  drawn  from  the  treasury,  but  in  consequence  of 
appropriations  made  by  law :  and  a  regular  statement  and  account  of 
the  receipts  and  expenditure^  of  all  public  money  shall  be  published       * 
from  time  to  time. 

No  title  of  nobility^hall  be  granted  by  the  United  States :  And  no 
person  holding  any  office  of  profit  or  trust  under  them,  shall,  without 
the  consent  of  the  congress,  accept  of  any  present,  emolument,  office,  or 
title,  of  any  kind  whatever,  from  any  king,  prince,  or  foreign  state. 

Sec.  X.    No  state  shall  €nter  into^a^^iegLt^  alliance^  QC  confedera-       .  , 
tionj  grant  letters  of  margafi-^nd  reprisal;-,  cojn  .money ;  einit  billCjpf       ^ 
creHit ;  :make  anylHng"butgold  and  silver  coin  a  lender  in  paymeot 
ordeHtSj  pass  any  bills  bf^tt^inder^ex  postfacto..la»^,  or  law  impaur- 
ing  the  obligationj)f  contracts^^r^gra^itan^        of  nobility.       -, 

No' slate  sTTall,  without  the  consienfof  the~congress,  lay  anx  imposts,     X* 
or  duties  ^  impo^«  "^  PYpnris^  p.Y^ppt  what  may  be  absolutely jaeces-     ^ 
sary  for  executing  its  inspection  laws:  and  the  net  produce  of  all 
dutie's~and  imposts,  laid  by  any  state  on  imports  or  exports,  shall  be 
for  the  use  of  the  treasury  of  the  United  States;  and.all  such  laws  shall 
be  subject  to  the  revision  ahd  control  of  the  congress.. 

No  state  shalT,  without  the  consent  of  congress,  lay^^ny  duty_of_^ton-      ^   i 
nage^keep  troops r^r  ships  of  war  jn  time  of  peace,  enter  into  any  -    ^ 
agceement^r^ompact  with  another  stat^  or  with  a._foi^ign  power,  or 
engagemwar,  unless  actually  invaded,  or  in  such  imminent  danger  as 
will  noTadnut  of  delay. 

ARTICLE  II.  1^ 

Section  I.  The  executive  power  shall  be  vested  in  a  President  of 
the  United  States  of  America.  He  shall  hold  his  office  during  the  term 
of  four  years,  and,  together  with  the  vice-president,  chosen  for  the  same 
term,  be  elected,  as  follows : 

Each  state  shall  appoint,  in  such  manner  as  the  legislature  thereof     • 
may  direct,  a  number  of  electors  equal  to  the  whole  number  of  senators 
and  representatives  to  which  the  state  may  be  entitled  in  the  congress : 
but  no  senator  or  representative,  or  person  holding  an  office  9^  trust  or 
profit  under  the  United  States,  shall  be  appointed  an  elector. 

[♦The  electors  shall  meet  in  their  respective  states,  and  vote  by  ballot 
for  two  persons,  of  whom  one  at  least  shall  not  be  an  inhabitant  of  the 
same  state  with  themselves.  And  they  shall  make  a  list  of  all  the  per- 
sons voted  for,  and  of  the  number  of  votes  for  each ;  which  list  Uiey 
shall  sign  and  certify,  and  transmit  sealed^ to  the  seat  of  government  of 
the  United  States,  directed  to  the  presicM^f  the  senate.  The  presi- 
dent of  the  senate  sl;iall,  in  the  presen^^Bthe  senate  and  house  of 
representatives,  open  all  the  certificat^^BB  the  votes  shall  then  be 
counted.     The  person  bavins:  the  ffreatesoiumber  of  votes  shall  be  the 


president,  if  such  number  be  a  majority  of  the  whole  nu^^fer  of  e 
appointed ;  and  if  there  be  more  than  one  who  have  sucjiPajority,  and 
have  an  equal  number  of  votes,  then  the  house  of  representatives  sh|U 
immediately  choose  by  ballot  one  of  them  for  president ;  and  if  no  p^ 

•  This  clause  U  annulled.    See  amendmenU,  Art.  12. 

2  * 


18  CONSTITUTION  OP  THE 

son  have  a  majority,  then  from  the  five  highest  6n  the  list,  the  said 
house  shall  in  like  manner  choose  the  president.  >»But  in  choosing  the 
president,  tlie  votes  shall  be  taken  by  states,  tlie  representation  from 
each  state  having  one  vote :  A  quorum  for  tliis  purpose  shall  consist  of 
a  member  or  members  from  two-tliirds  of  the  states,  and  a  majority  of 
all  the  states  shall  be  necessary  to  a  choice.  In  every  case,  after  the 
choice  of  tlie  president,  the  person  having  the  greatest  number  of  votes 
of  tlie  electors  shall  be  vice-president.  But  if  Uiere  should  remain  two 
or  more  who  have  equal  votes,  the  senate  shall  choose  from  them  by 
ballot  the  vice-president.] 

The  congress  may  determine  the  time  of  choosing  the  electors,  and 
the  day  on  which  they  shall  give  their  votes ;  which  day  shedl  be  the 
same  throughout  the  United  States. 

No  person,  except  a  natural  borft  citizen,  or  a  citizen  of  the  'United 
States,  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  tlirs  constitution,  shall  be  eligible 
to  the  office  of  president ;  neither  shall  any  person  be  eligible  to  that 
office  who  shall  not  have  attained  tKe  a^e  of  tliirtj^-fiye years,  and  been 
fourteenjrears  a  resident  within  the  United  States'.'*  ^ 

In  case  of  tlie  removal  of  the  president  from  office,  or  his  death,  resig- 
nation, or  inability  to  discharge  the  powers  and  duties  of  the  said  office, 
the  same  shall  devolve  on  the  vice-president,  and  the  congress  may  by 
law  provide  for  the  case  of  removal,  death,  resignation  or  inability, 
both  of  tlie  president,  and  vice  pfesident,  declaring  what  officer  shall 
then  act  as  president,  and  such  officer  shall  act  accordingly,  until  the 
disability  be  removed,  or  a  president  shall  be  elected. 

The  president  shall  at  stated  times  receive  for  his  services  a  com- 
pensation, which  sH^U  neither  be  increased  nor  diminished  during  the 
period  for  which  he  shall  have  been  elected,  and  he  shall  not  receive 
within  that  period  any  other  emolument  from  the  United  State^  or  any 
of  them. 

Before  he  enter  on  the  execution  of  his  office,  he  shall  take  the  fol- 
lowing oath  or  affirmation  : — "  I  do  solemnly  swear  (or  affirm)  that  1 
will  faithfully  execute  the  office  of  president  of  the  United  S^^tes,  and 
will,  to  the  best  of  my  ability,  preserve,  protect  and  defend  the  constitu- 
tion of  t%  United  States." 

Sjgc.  XL  The  president  shall  be  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  and 
^navy  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the  militia  of  the  several  states, 
'"^Vhen  called  into  the  actual  service  of  tlie  United  States ;  he  may  re- 
quire the  opinion,  in  writing,  of  the  principal  officer  m  each  of  tl^  ex- 
ecutive departments,  upon  any  subject  relating  to  the  duties  of  their  re- 
spective offices,  and  he  shall  have  power  to  grant  rej^rieves  and  pardons 
for  offences  against  tlie  United  States,  except  in  cases  of  impeachment. 

He  shall  have  power,  b^^^witli  the  tidvice  and  coiisent  of  the  se- 
nate, to  make  treaties,  pra^^^LworJliirds^oT'the  senators  present  con- 
cur ;  and  he  shall  nomina^^^Vby  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  senate,  shall  appoint  aiwHssadors,  other  public  ministers  and  con- 
suls, judges  i^he  supreme  court,  and  all  other  officers  of  the  United 
States,  whoijp^pointments  are  not  herein  otherwise  provided  for,  and 
which  shall  oe  established  by  law  :  but  the  congress  may  by  law  vest 
t9  appoihtment  of  such  inferior  officers,  as  they  think  proper,  in  the 
president  alone,  in  the  courts  of  law,  or  in  the  heads  of  departments. 

The  president  shall  have  power  to  fill  up  all  vacancies  that  may 


UNITED  STATES.  19 

happen  during  the  recess  of  the  senate,  by  granting  commissions  which 
shall  expire  at  the  end  of  their  next  session. 

Sec.  III.  He  shall  from  time  to  time  give  to  the  congress  informa- 
tion of  tlie  state  of  the  union,  and  recommend  to  their  consideration 
such  measures  as  he  shall  judge  necessary  and  expedient;  he  may,  on 
extraordinary  occasions,  convene  botli  houses,  or  either  of  them,  and  in 
case  of  disagreement  between  tKem,  with  respect  to  the  time  of  ad- 
journment, he  may  adjourn  them  to  such  time  as  he  shall  think  proper : 
he  shall  receive  ambassadors  and  other  public  ministers ;  he  shall  take 
care  that  the  laws  be  faithfully  executed,  and  ^  shall  commission  all  the 
ofHcers  of  the  United  States. 

Sec.  IV.  The  president,  vice-president,  and  all  civil  officers  of  the 
United  States,  shall  be  removed  from  office  on  impeachment  for,  and 
conviction  of,  treason,  bribery,  or  other  high  crimes  and  misdemeanors. 

ARTICLE  III. 

Sec.  I.  The  judicial  powers  of  the  United  States  shall  be  vested  in 
one  supreme  court,  and  in  such  inferior  courts  as  the  congress  may  from 
time  to  time  ordain  and  establish.  The  judges,  both  of  the  supreme 
and  inferior  courts,  shall  hold  their  offices  during  good  behavior,  and 
shall,  at  stated  times,  receive  for  their  services  La  compensation  which 
shall  not  be  diminished  during  their  continuance  in  office. 

Sec.  II.  The  judicial  power  shall  extend  to  all  cases,  in  law  and 
equity,  arising  under  this  constitution,  the  laws  of  the  United  States, 
and  treaties  made,  or  which  shall  be  made  under  their  authority ; — to 
all  cases  affectiirg^ttmbassadors,  other  public  ministers  and  consuls ; — 
to  all  cases  of  admiraltY  and  maritime  iui'isdiction ; — to  controversies 
to  which  the  United  States  shall  be  a  party ; — ^to  controversies  between 
two  or  more  states ; — between  a  state  and  citizen  of  another  state  ; — 
between  citizens  of  different  states ; — between  citizens  of  the  same 
state  claiming  lands  under  grants  of  different  states,  and  between  a 
state  or  the  citizens  thereof,  and  foreign  states,  citizens,  or  subjects. 

In  all  cases  affecting  ambassadors,  other  public  ministers  and  con- 
suls, and  those  in  which  a  state  shall  be  a  party,  the  supreme  court  shall 
have  origiifSl  jurisdiction.  In  all  the  other  cases  before  mentioned,  the 
supreme  court  shall  have  appellate  jurisdiction,  both  as  to  law  and  fact, 
with  such  exceptions,  and  under  such  regulations  as  the  congress  shall 
make. "  ^ 

The  trial  of  all  crimes,  except  in  cases  of  impeachment,  shall  be  by 
jury ;  and  such  trial  shall  be  held  in  the  state  where  the  said  crimes 
shall  have  been  committed ;  but  when  not  committed  within  any  state, 
the  trial  shall  be  at  such  place  or  places  as  the  congress  may  by  law 
have  directed. 

Sec.  III.  Tieason  against  tV>p  TTi^i|^Pt"itr-  nhnll  -m-j"*  -^nJY  •'' 
levying  war  againsUiiSi^  or  Jfl_^41iS^^R[iEirJBnemIe«,  giving  them, 
aia  ana  comfprt.  -*^^^«-— — 

T^  person  ^all  be  convicted  of  treasSi  unless  on  the  testiniony  of 
two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  on  confession  inf^en  court. 

The  congress  shall  have  powder  to  declare  the  punisl^pnt  of  treason, 
but  no  attainder  of  treason  shall  work  corruption  of  blood,  or  forfeiture, 
except  during  the  life  of  the  person  attainted. 


91  CONSTITUTION  OP  THE 

ARTICLE  IV. 

Sec.  I.  Full  faith  and  credit  shall  be  given  in  each  state  to  tlie  public 
acts,  records,  and  judicial  proceedings  of  every  other  state.  And  the 
congress  may  by  general  laws  prescribe  the  manner  in  which  such  acts, 
records  and  proceedings  shall  be  proved,  and  the  effect  thereof 

Sec.  II.  The  citizens  of  each  state  shall  be  entitled  to  all  privileges 
and  immunities  of  citizens  in  the  several  states. 

A  person  charged  in  any  state  with  treason,  felony,  or  other  crime, 
who  shall  flee  from  justice,  and  be  found  in  another  state,  shall,  on  de- 
mand of  the  executive  authority  of  the  state  from  which  he  fled,  be 
delivered  up,  to  be  removed  to  the  state  having  jurisdiction  of  the  crime. 

No  person  held  to  service  or  labor  in  one  state,  under  the  laws  thereof 
escaping  into  another,  shall,  in  consequence  of  any  law  or  regulation 
therein,  be  discharged  from  such  service  or  labor,  but  shall  be  delivered 
up  on  claim  of  the  party  to  whom  such  service  or  labor  may  be  due. 

Sec.  III.  New  states  may  be  admitted  by  the  congress  into  this 
union  :  but  no  new  state  shall  be  formed  or  erected  withm  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  any  other  state ;  nor  any  state  be  formed  by  the  junction  of  two 
or  more  states,  or  parts  of  states,  without  the  consent  of  the  legislatures 
of  tlie  states  concerned  as  well  as  of  the  congress. 

The  congress  shall  have  power  to  dispose  of  and  make  all  needful 
rules  and  regulations  respecting  the  territory  or  other  property  belong- 
ing to  tlie  United  States ;  and  nothing  in  this  constitution  shall  be  so 
construed  as  to  prejudice  any  claims  of  the  United  States,  or  of  any 
particular  state. 

Sec.  IV.  The  United  States  shall  guarantee  to  every  state  in  the 
union,  a  republican  form,  of  government,  and  shall  protect  each  of  tliem 
against  invasion ;  and  on  application  of  the  legislature,  or  of  the  execut- 
ive (when  the  legislature  cannot  be  convened)  against  domestic  vio- 
lence. 

ARTICLE  V. 
The  congress,  whenever  two-thirds  of  both  houses  shall  deem  it  ne- 
cessary, shall  prppmie  liiTirndments  t5  this  c6h§tit\!ffbn,  or,  on  the  appli- 
cation of  the  leoj-slatures  of  iwo-lllirU!j  bl  tne  several  states,  shall  call  a 
convention  for  prgposin^  amendH^titST^wKrchy^-in  either  ca|e,  shall  be 
valid  to  all  intents  and  purpo!JUiS,g'y  LiRTlof  this  co^^tjtutioQ^when  rati- 
fied by  the  legislatures  ot'  inj-pp-Tn\,rrfc£iJhe  several  states,  or  by  con- 
^ftlttntions  in  three-fourths'  thereot,  as  the  one'or  the" oIR^r  mode  of  ratifi- 
cation may  be  proposed  by  congress :  provided  that  no  amendment 
which  may  be  made  prior  to  the  year  one  thousand  eight  hiyidred  and 
eight  shall  in  any  manner  affect  the  first  and  fourth  clauses  in  the  ninth 
section  of  the  first  article ;  and  that  no  state,  without  its  consent,  shall 
be  deprived  of  its  equal  suffrage  in  the  senate. 


eI^PKk 


[CLE  VI.  ♦. 

All  debts  contracted  and  ci^pRnents  entered  into,  befo];e  the  adoption 
of  this  constitution,  shall  be  as  valid  against  tlie  United  States  under 
this  constitutJJ^as  under  the  confederation. 

This  constiBion,  and  the  laws  of  the  United  States  which  shall  be 
ms^e  in  pursuance  thereof:  and  all  treaties  made,  or  which  shall  be 
made,  under  the  authority  of  the  United  States,  shall  be  the  supreme 
law  of  the  land  ;  and  the  judges  in  every  state  shall  be  bound  thereby. 


UNITED  STATES. 


n 


any  thing  in  the  constitution  or  laws  of  any  state  to  the  contrary  not- 
withstanding. 

The  senators  and  representatives  before  mentioned,  and  the  members 
of  the  several  state  legislatures,  and  all  executive  and  judicial  officers, 
both  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  several  states,  shall  be  bound  by 
oath  or  affii-mation,  to  support  this  constitution :  but  no  religious  test 
shall  ever  be  required  as  a  qualification  to  any  office  of  public  trust 
under  the  United'States. 

ARTICLE  VII. 

The  ratification  of  the  conventions  of  nine  states,  shall  be  sufficient 
for  the  establishment  of  this  constitution  between  the  states  so  ratifying 
the  same. 

Done  in  convention  by  the  unanimous  consent  of  the  states  present, 
the  seventeenth  day  of  September,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one 
thousand  seven  hundred  and  eighty-seven,  and  of  the  independ- 
ence of  the  United  States  of  America  the  twelfth.  In  witness 
whereof  we  have  hereunto  subscribed  our  names. 

GEORGE  WASHINGTON,  President, 
and  Deputy  from  Virginia, 


New  Hampshire, 
John  Langdon, 
Nicholas  Gilman. 

Massachusetts. 
Nathaniel  Gorham,  ^ 
Rufus  King. 

Connecticut. 
William  Samuel  Johnson, 
Roger  Sherman. 

New  York. 
Alexander  Hamilton. 

New  Jersey. 
William  Livingston, 
David  Brearly, 
William  Patterson, 
Jonathan  Dayton. 

Pennsylvania, 
Benjamin  Franklin, 
Thomas  Mifflin, 
Robert  Morris, 
George  Clymer, 
Thomas  Fitzsimons, 
Jared  IngersoU, 
James  Wilson, 
Governor  Morris.  * 


Delaware..,, 
George  Reed, 
Gunning  Bedford,  junr. 
John  Dickinson, 
Richard  Bassett, 
Jacob  Broom. 

Maryland. 
James  M' Henry, 
Dan.  of  St.  Thomas  Jenifer, 
Daniel  Carroll. 

Virginia.        j^ 
John  Blair, 
James  Madison,  jimr. 

North  Carolina. 
William  Blount, 
Richard  Dobbs  Spaight, 
Hugh  Williamsoo.^.-^''^'' 

South  Carolina. 
John  Rutledge, 

Charles  Cotesworth  Pinckney, 
Charles  Pinckney, 
Pierce  Butler. 

Georgia. 
William  Few, 
Abraham  Baldwin. 

Attest,  William  Jackson,  Secretary. 


V 


as  CONSTITUTION  OP  THE 

AMENDMENTS 
To  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  ratified  according  to  the  provi- 
sions of  tlie  fifth  article  of  the  foregoing  Constitution, 

[Congress  at  its  first  session,  begun  and  held  in  the  city  of  New 
York,  on  Wednesday,  the  4th  of  March,  1789,  proposed  to  the  legisla- 
tures of  the  several  states,  twelve  amendments  to  the  constitution,  ten 
of  which,  only,  were  adopted.     They  are  the  ten  first  following. 

The  11th  Article  of  the  amendments  was  proposed  at  the  second 
session  of  the  third  congress,  in  1794 ;  and  the  12th  Article  at  the  first 
session  of  the  eighth  congress  in  1804.  Both  of  which  were  afterwards 
adopted  by  the  requisite  number  of  states.] 
"^^  Article  I.  Congress  shall  make  no  law  respecting  an  establish-^ 
ment  of  religion,  or  prohibiting  the  free  exercise  thereof;  or  abridging 
the  freedom  of  speech,  or  of  the  press ;  or  the  right  of  tlie  people 
peaceably  to  assemble,  and  to  petition  the  government  for  a  redress  of 
grievances. 

Art.  II.    A  well  regulated  militia,  being  necessary  to  the  security 
•  of  a  free  state,  tlie  right  of  the  people  to  keep  and  bear  anns  shall  not 
be  infringed 

Art.  III.  No  soldier  shall  in  time  of  peace  be  quartered  in  any 
house,  without  the  consent  of  the  owner,  nor  in  time  of  war,  but  in  a 
manner  to  be  prescribed  by  law. 

Art.  IV.     The  right  of  the  people  to  be  secure  in  their  persons, 
houses,  papers,  and  effects,  against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures, 
shall  not  be  violated,  and  no  warrants  shall  issue,  but  upon  probable 
cause,  supported  by  oath  or  affirmation,  and  particularly  describing  the  j 
place  to  be  searched,  and  the  persons  or  things  to  be  seized. 
/      Art.  V.    No  person  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a  capital,  or  other- 
wise infamous  crime,  unless  on  a  presentiment  or  indictment  of  a 
grand  jury,  except  in  cases  arising  in  the  land  or  naval  forces,  or  in  the 
militia,  when  in  actual  service  in  time  of  war  or  public  danger ;  nor 
shall  any  person  be  subject  for  the  same  offence  to  be  twice  put  in  jeo-  - 
pardy  of  life  or  limb  ;  nor  shall  be  compelled  in  any  criminal  case  to 
be  a  witness  against  himself,  nor  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  pro- 
perty, without  due  process  of  law ;  nor  shall  private  property  be  taken 
for  public  use,  without  just  compensation. 

Art.  VI.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accused  shall  enjoy  the 
right  to  a  speedy  and  public  trial,  by  an  impartial  jury  of  the  state  and 
district  wherein  the  crime  shall  have  been  committed,  which  district 
shall  have  been  previously  ascertained  by  law,  and  to  be  informed  of 
the  nature  and  cause  of  the  accusation ;  to  be  confronted  by  the  wit- 
nesses against  him  ;  to  have  compulsory  process  for  obtaining  witnesses 
in  his  favor,  and  to  have  the  assistance  of  council  for  his  defence. 

Art.  VII.  In  suits  of  common  law,  where  the  value  in  controversy 
shall  exceed  twenty  dollars,  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall  be  p.i^^rvedf, 
and  no  fact  tried  by  a  jury,  shall  be  o,Lheo^isg,^;e^amineain  any 
court  of  the  United  States,  thanaccorclTng  tomeruJes^of  the  common 
law.  ---^^ N^--^--..^ 

Art.  VIII.  Excessive  bail  shall  not  be  required,  nor  excessive  fines 
imposed,  nor  cruel  and  unusual  punisliments  inflicted. 


UNITED  STATES.  23 

Art.  IX.  The  enumeration  in  the  constitution,  of  certain  rights, 
shall  not  be  construed  to  deny  or  disparage  others  retained  by  the 
people.  / 

Art.  X.  The  powers  not  delegated  to  the  United  States,  by  the  con- 
stitution, nor  proliibited  by  it  to  the  states,  are  reserved  to  the  states 
respectively,  or  to  the  people. 
■"^  Art.  XL  The  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  shall  not  be  con-  J 
strued  to  extend  to  any  suit  w  1f\-\y  or  gj^u^ty^  commencftd  or  proseg^ited 
against  onej)fJ;li«  United  States  by^citizensof  Another  state,  or  by  citi- 
zens or  subjects  of  an3^foreigi^ state."  " 

Art.  IJII.  The  electors  shall  meet  in  their  respective  states,  and*^ 
vote  by  ballot  for  president  and  vice  president,  one  of  whom,  at  least, 
shall  not  be  an  inhabitant  of  the  same  state  with  themselves ;  they  shall 
name  in  their  ballots  the  person  voted  for  as  president,  and  in  distinct 
ballots  the  person  voted  for  as  vice-president,  and  they  shall  make  dis- 
tinct lists  of  all  persons  voted  for  as  president,  and  of  all  persons  voted 
for  as  vice-president,  and  of  the  number  of  votes  for  each,  which  lists 
they  shall  sign  and  certify,  and  transmit  sealed  to  the  seat  of  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States,  directed  to  the  president  of  tlie  senate  : — The 
president  of  the  senate  shall,  in  the  presence  of  the  senate  and  house 
of  representatives,  open  all  the  certificates,  and  the  votes  shall  then  be 
counted  : — The  person  having  the  gi'eatest  number  of  votes  for  presi- 
dent, shall  be  the  president,  if  such  nmnber  be  a  majority  of  the  whole 
number  of  electors  appointed ;  and  if  no  person  have  such  majority, 
then  from  the  persons  having  the  highest  numbers  not  exceeding  tlure^ 
on  the  list  of  those  voted  for  as  president,  the  house  of  representatives 
shall  choose  immediately,  by  ballot,  the  president.  But  in  choosing 
tlie  president,  tlie  votes  shall  be  taken  by  states^  the  representation  from 
each  state  having  one  vote ;  a  quorum  for  this  purposS'sliall  consist  of 
a  member  or  members  from  two-thirds  of  tlie  states,  and  a  majority  of 
all  tlie  states  shall  be'  necessary  to  a  choice.  And  if  the  house  of  re- 
presentatives shall  not  choose  a  president  whenever  tlie  right  of  choice 
shall  devolve  upon  them,  before  the  fourth  day  of  March  next  following, 
then  the  vice-president  shall  act  as  president,  as  in  the  case  of  the  deam 
or  other  constitutio?ial  disability  of  the  president.  The  person  having 
the  greatest  nmnber  of  votes  as  vice-president,  shall  be  tlie  vice-presi- 
dent, if  such  number  be  a  majority  of  the  whole  number  of  electors  ap- 
pointed, and  if  no  person  have  a  majority,  then  from  the  two  highest 
nimibers  on  the  list,  the  senate  shall  choose  the  vice-president ;  a  quo- 
rum for  the  purpose  shall  consist  of  two-thirds  of  the  whole  number  of 
senators,  and  a  majority  of  the  whole  number  shall  be  necessary  to  a 
choice.  But  no  person  constitutionally  ineligible  to  the  office  of  presi- 
dent shall  be  eligible  to  that  of  vice-president  of  the  United  States. 

Note.  Another  amendment  was  proposed  as  Article  xiii.  at  the 
second  session  of  the  eleventh  congress,  but  not  having  been  ratified  by 
a  sufficient  number  of  the  states,  has  not  yet  become  valid,  as  a  part  of 
the  constitution  of  the  United  States.  It  is  erroneously  given  as  a  part 
of  the  constitution,  in  page  74,  vol.  I.  Laws  of  the  United  States. 


24  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE 

RESOLUTIONS  AND  ADDRESS, TO  CONGRESS. 

Adopted  by  the  ConTention  which  framed  the  Constitution  in  1787. 

In  Convention^  Monday,  September  17,  1787. 
Present,  the  states  of  New  Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  Connecticut, 
Mr.  Hamilton,  from  New  York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Dela- 
ware, Maryland,  Virginia,  North  Carolina,  Soutli  Carolina,  and 
Greorgia. 

Resolved,  That  the  preceding  constitution  be  laid  before  the  United 
States  in  congress  assembled,  and  that  it  is  the  opinion  of  tlii%  conven- 
tion, that  it  should  afterwards  be  submitted  to  a  convention  of  delegates 
chosen  in  each  state  by  the  people  thereof,  under  the  recommendation  of 
its  legislature,  for  their  assent  and  ratification  ;  and  that  each  conven- 
tion assenting  to,  and  ratifying  the  same,  shall  give  notice  thereof  to  the 
United  States  in  congress  assembled. 

Resolved,  That  it  is  the  opinion  of  this  convention,  that  as  soon  as 
the  conventions  of  nine  states  shall  have  ratified  this  constitution,  the 
United  States  in  congress  assembled  should  fix  a  day  on  which  electors 
should  be  appointed  by  the  states  which  shall  have  ratified  the  same  ; 
and  a  day  on  which  the  electors  should  assemble  to  vote  for  the  presi- 
dent, and  the  time  and  place  for  commencing  proceedings  under  this 
constitution.  That  after  such  publication,  the  electors  should  be  ap- 
pointed, and  the  senators  and  representatives  elected.  That  the  electors 
should  meet  on  the  day  fixed  for  the  election  of  the  president,  and  should 
transmit  their  votes  certified,  signed,  sealed,  and  directed,  as  the  consti- 
tution requires,  to  the  secretary  of  the  United  States  in  congress  assem- 
bled. That  the  senators' and  representatives  should  convene  at  the  time 
and  place  assigned.  That  the  senators  should  appoint  a  president  of 
the  senate  for  the  sole  purpose  of  receiving,  opening,  and  counting  tlie 
votes  for  president ;  and,  that  after  he  shall  be  chosen,  the  congress,  to- 
gether with  the  president,  should,  without  delay,  proceed  to  execute  this 
constitution. 
By  the  unanimous  order  of  the  convention.         '' 

GEORGE  WASHINGTON,  President. 
William  Jackson,  Secretary. 

In  Convention,  September  17,  1787. 

SIR, — We  have  now  the  honor  to  submit  to  the  consideration  of  the 
United  States  in  congress  assembled,  that  constitution  which  has  ap- 
jDeared  to  us  the  most  adviseable. 

The  friends  of  our  country  have  long  seen  and  desired,  that  the 
power  of  making  war,  peace,  and  treaties,  that  of  levying  money,  and 
regulating  commerce,  and  the  correspondent  executive  and  judicial  au- 
thorities, should  be  fully  and  effectually  vested  in  the  general  govern- 
ment of  the  union ;  but  the  impropriety  of  delegating  such  extensive 
trust  to  one  body  of  men  is  evident.  Hence  results  tlie  necessity  of  a 
diflferent  organization. 

It  is  obviously  mipracticable  in  the  federal  government  of  these  states, 
to  secure  all  rights  of  independent  sovereignty  to  each,  and  yet  provide 
for  the  interest  and  safety  of  all.  Individuals  entering  into  society, 
must  give  up  a  share  of  liberty  to  preserve  the  rest.    The  magnitude  of 


UNITED  STATES.  25 

the  sacrifice  must  depend  as  well  on  situation  and  circumstance,  as  on 
the  object  to  be  obtained.  It  is  at  all  times  difficult  to  draw  with  precis- 
ion the  line  between  those  rights  which  must  be  surrendered,  and 
those  which  may  be  reserved ;  and  on  the  present  occasion  tliis  difficulty- 
was  increased  by  a  difference  among  the  several  states,  as  to  their  situ- 
ation, extent,  habits,  and  particular  interests. 

In  all  our  deliberations  on  this  subject,  we  kept  steadily  in  our  view, 
that  which  appears  to  us  the  greatest  mterest  of  every  true  American,  the 
Consolidation  of  our  Union,  in  which  is  involved  our  prosperity,  felicity, 
safety,  perhaps  our  National  Existence.  This  important  consideration, 
seriously  and  deeply  impressed  on  our  minds,  led  each  state  in  the  con- 
vention, to  be  less  rigid  on  points  of  inferior  magnitude,  than  might 
have  been  otherwise  expected :  and  thus  the  constitution,  which  we  now 
present,  is  the  result  of  a  spirit  of  amity,  and  of  that  mutual  deference 
and  concession,  which  the  peculiarity  of  our  political  situation  rendered 
indispensible. 

That  it  will  meet  the  full  and  entire  approbation  of  every  state,  is  not, 
perhaps,  to  be  expected :  but  each  will,  doubtless,  consider,  that  had  her 
interests  been  alone  consulted,  the  consequences  might  have  been  parti- 
cularly disagreeable  to  others.  That  it  is  liable  to  as  few  exceptions, 
as  could  reasonably  have  been  expected,  we  hope  and  believe.  That  it 
may  promote  the  lasting  welfare  of  that  countiy  so  dear  to  us  all,  and 
secure  her  freedom  and  happiness,  is  our  most  ardent  wish.  With 
great  respect,  we  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir. 

Your  excellency's  most  obedient  and  humble  servant, 

GEORGE  WASHINGTON,  President 

By  unanimous  consent  of  the  Convention. 
His  excellency  the  President  of  Congress. 


Resolution  of  Congress  recommending  the  appointment  of  State  Con- 
ventions, to  consider  the  preceding  Constitution. 

The  United  States  in  Congress  assembled,  Friday  Sept.  28,  1787. 
Present,  New  Hampshire,  Massachusetts,   Connecticut,   New  York, 
New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Delaware,   Virginia,  North  Carolina, 
South  Carolina,  and  Gorgia,  and  from  Mauyland,  Mr.  Ross. 

Congress  having  received  the  report  of  the  convention  lately  assem- 
bled in  Philadelphia, 

Resolved,  unanimously,  that  the  said  report,  with  the  resolutions  and 
letter  accompanying  the  same,  be  transmitted  to  the  several  legislatures, 
in  order  to  be  submitted  to  a  convention  of  delegates,  chosen  in  each 
state  by  the  people  thereof,  in  conformity  to  the  resolves  of  the  conven- 
tion, made  and  provided  in  that  case. 

CHARLES  THOMSON,  Secretary. 


STATE  CONSTITUTIONS. 


A   SYNOPSIS 

OP   THE   PRINCIPAL   FEATURES    OF   THE   CONSTITUTION  OF  EACH   OF   THE 
UNITED   STATES. 

MAINE. 

The  Constitution  of  this  state  was  formed  1819,  and  went  into  ope- 
ration in  1820. 

The  legislative  power  is  vested  in  a  Senate  and  a  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, both  elected  annually  by  the  people,  on  the  second  Monday 
in  September.  These  two  bodies  are  together  styled  The  Legislature  of 
Maine. 

The  number  of  representatives  cannot  be  less  than  100,  nor  more 
than  200.  A  town  having  1,500  inhabitants  is  entitled  to  send  1  repre- 
sentative; having  3,750,2;  6,775,3;  10,500,4;  15,000,5;  20,250,6; 
26,250,  7 ;  but  no  town  can  ever  be  entitled  to  more  than  7  representa- 
tives.— The  number  of  senators  ceuinot  be  less  than  20,  nor  more 
than  31. 

The  Legislature  meets  (at  Augusta)  annually,  on  the  first  Wed- 
nesday in  January. 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  Governor,  who  is  elected  annually 
by  the  people,  on  the  second  Monday  in  September,  and  his  term  of 
office  commences  on  the  first  Wednesday  in  January.  A  Council  of 
seven  members  is  elected  annually  on  the  first  Wednesday  in  January, 
by  jomt  ballot  of  the  senators  and  reprentatives,  to  advise  the  governor 
in  the  executive  part  of  government. 

The  right  of  sufjrage  is  granted  to  every  male  citizen  aged  21  years 
or  upwards  (excepting  paupers,  persons  under  guardianship,  and  In- 
dians not  taxed),  having  had  nis  residence  established  in  the  state  for  the 
term  of  three  months  next  preceding  an  election. 

The  judicial  power  is  vested  in  a  Supreme  Judicial  Court,  and  such 
other  courts  as  tne  legislature  may,  from  time  to  time,  establish.  All 
<fee  iudges  are  appointed  by  the  governor,  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  council ;  and  thev  hold  their  offices  during  good  behavior,  but 
not  beyond  the  age  of  70  years. 

NEW  HAMPSHIRE. 

A  Constitution  was  established  in  1784;  and  in  1792,  this  Constitu- 
tion W£w  altered  and  amended,  by  a  convention  of  delegates  held  at 
Concord,  and  is  now  in  force. 

The  legislative  power  is  vested  in  a  Senate  and  House  of  Represent- 
atives, which,  together,  are  styled,  Tke  General  Court  of  New  Hamp- 
shire. 


STATE  CONSTITUTIONS.  27 

Every  town,  or  incorporated  township,  having  150  ratable  polls,  may 
send  one  representative ;  and  for  every  300  additional  polls,  it  is 
entitled  to  an  additional  representative. 

The  Senate  consists  of  12  members,  who  are  chosen  by  the  people 
in  districts. 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  Governor  and  a  Council,  which 
consists  of  five  members. 

The  governor,  council,  senators,  and  reprentatives,  are  all  elected 
annually,  by  the  people,  on  the  second  Tuesday  in  March ;  and  their 
term  of  service  commences  on  the  first  Wednesday  in  June. 

The  General  Court  meets  annually  (at  Concord)  on  the  first  Wed- 
nesday in  June. 

The  right  of  suffrage  is  granted  to  every  male  inhabitant  of  21  years 
of  age,  excepting  paupers  and  persons  excused  from  paying  taxes  at 
their  own  request. 

The  judiciary'  power  is  vested  in  a  Superior  Court  and  a  Court  of 
Common  Pleas.  The  judges  are  appointed  by  the  governor  and  coun- 
cil, and  hold  their  offices  during  good  behavior,  but  not  beyond  the  age 
of  70  years. 

VERMONT. 
The  first  Constitution  of  this  state  was  formed  in  1777 ;  the  one 
now  in  operation  was  adopted  on  the  4th  of  July,  1793. 

The  legislative  power  is  vested  in  a  single  body,  a  House  of  Re- 
presentatives, elected  annually,  on  the  first  Tuesday  in  September, 
every  town  in  the  state  being  entitled  to  send  one  representative.  The 
representatives  meet  (at  Montpelier)  annually  on  the  second  Thursday 
of  the  October  succeeding  their  election,  and  are  styled  The  General 
Assembly  of  the  State  of  Vermont. 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  Governor,  Lieutenant  Governor, 
and  a  Council  of  12  persons,  who  are  all  chosen  annually  by  the  free- 
men on  tlie  first  Tuesday  in  September,  and  their  term  of  office  com- 
mences on  the  second  Thursday  in  October.  They  are  empowered  to 
commission  all  officers ;  to  sit  as  judges  to  consider  and  determine  on 
impeachments ;  to  prepare  and  lay  before  the  General  Assembly  such 
business  as  shall  appear  to  them  necessary ;  and  have  power  to  revise 
and  propose  amendments  to  the  laws  passed  by  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives. 

The  Constitution  grants  the  right  of  suffrage  to  every  man  of  the 
full  age  of  21  years,  who  has  resided  in  the  state  for  the  space  of  one 
whole  year,  next  before  the  election  of  representatives,  and  is  of  quiet 
and  peacable  behavior. 

The  judiciary  power  is  vested  in  a  Supreme  Court  consisting  of 
three  judges ;  and  of  a  County  Court  of  three  jud^'es  for  each  county. 
The  judges  of  the  Supreme,  County,  and  Probate  Courts,  sheriffs,  and 
justices  of  the  peace,  are  elected  annually  by  the  General  Assembly. 

A  Council  of  Censors,  consisting  of  13  persons,  are  chosen  every 
seven  years  (first  elected  in  1799)  on  the  last  Wednesday  in  March, 
and  meet  on  the  first  Wednesday  in  June.  Their  duty  is  to  inquire 
whether  the  Constitution  has  been  preserved  inviolate ;  whether  the 
legislative  and  executive  branches  of  government  have  performed  their 
duty  as  guardians  of  the  people ;  whether  the  public  taxes  have  been 
jusUy  laid  and  collected;  in  what  manner  the  public  moneys  have 
been  disposed  of;  and  whether  the  laws  have  been  duly  executed. 


STATE  CONSTITUTIONS. 


MASSACHUSETTS. 
The  Constitution  of  this  state  was  formed  in  1780,  and  amended 
in  1821. 

The  legislative  power  is  vested  in  a  Senate  and  House  of  Represent- 
atives, which  together  are  styled  The  General  Court  of  Massach'w- 
setts. 

The  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  are  elected  annually 
on  the  second  Monday  in  November,  Every  corporate  town  having 
150  ratable  polls  may  elect  one  representative,  and  another  for  every 
additional  225  ratable  polls. 

The  Senate  consists  of  40  members,  who  are  chosen,  by  districts, 
annually,  on  the  second  Monday  in  November. 

The  supreme  executive  magistrate  is  styled  the  Governor  of  the 
Covimonwealth  of  Massachusetts,  and  has  the  title  of  "  His  Excellency  J^ 
The  Governor  is  elected  annually  by  the  people  on  the  second  Monday  in 
November,  and  at  the  same  time  a  Lieutenant  Governor  is  chosen,  who 
has  the  title  of  "  His  Honor. ''^  The  Governor  is  assisted  in  the  executive 
part  of  government,  by  a  Council  of  nine  members,  who  are  chosen  by 
the  joint  ballot  of  the  Senators  and  Representatives,  from  the  Senators ; 
and  in  case  the  persons  elected,  or  any  of  them,  decline  tlie  appoint- 
ment, the  deficiency  is  supplied  from  among  the  people  at  large. 

The  General  Court  meets  (at  Boston)  on  the  first  Wednesday  of 
January. 

The  right  of  suffrage  is  granted  to  every  male  citizen,  21  years  of 
age  and  upwards  (excepting  paupers  and  persons  under  guadianship), 
•who  has  resided  within  the  commonwealth  one  year,  and  within  the 
town  or  district  in  which  he  may  claim  a  right  to  vote,  six  calandar 
months  next  preceding  any  election,  and  who  has  paid  a  state  or  county 
tax,  assessed  upon  him  within  two  years  next  preceding  such  election; 
and  also  every  citizen  who  may  be  by  law  exempted  from  taxation, 
and  who  may  be  in  all  other  respects  qualified  as  above  mentioned. 

The  judiciary  is  vested  in  a  Supreme  Court,  a  Court  of  Common 
Pleas,  and  such  other  courts  as  the  Legislature  may  establish.  The 
judges  are  appointed  by  the  Governor  by  and  with  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Council,  and  hold  their  oflices  during  good  behavior. 

RHODE  ISLAND. 

The  government  of  this  state  is  founded  on  the  provisions  of  the 
Charter  granted  to  the  colony  by  Charles  II.,  in  1663 ;  and  this  is  the 
only  state  in  the  Union  which  is  without  a  written  Constitution. 

The  legislative  power  is  vested  in  a  General  Assembly,  consisting  of 
a  Senate  and  a  House  of  Representatives. 

The  House  of  Representatives  consists  of  72  members,  6  from  New- 
port, 4  from  each  of  the  towns  of  Providence,  Portsmouth,  and  lyar- 
wick,  and  two  from  each  of  the  other  towns  in  the  State ;  and  they  aro 
elected  semi-annually  in  April  and  August. 

The  Senate  consists  of  10  members,  who  are  elected  annually  in 
April. 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  Grovemor,  who  is  elected  annually 
in  April.  A  Lieutenant  Governor  is  also  elected,  on  whom  the  execute 
ive  duties  devolve  in  case  of  the  office  of  governor  being  vacated. 


STATE  CONSTITUTIONS.  ^ 

The  General  Assembly  meets  four  times  a  year  (at  Newport) ;  on 
the  first  Wednesday  in  May  (the  commencement  of  the  political  year), 
and  by  adjournment,  at  the  s£ime  place,  in  June.  It  meets  on  the  last 
Wednesday  in  October,  alternately  at  Providence,  and  South  Kings- 
ton ;  and  by  adjournment,  in  January,  at  East  Greenwich^  Bristol, 
or  Providence. 

The  judges  are  appointed  annually  by  the  Gener£d  Assembly. 

CONNECTICUT. 

The  Charter  granted  in  1662  by  Charles  II.,  formed  the  basis  of  th» 
government  of  Connecticut  till  1818,  when  the  present  Constitution 
was  framed. 

The  legislative  power  is  vested  in  a  Senate  and  House  of  Represent- 
atives, which  together  are  styled  the  General  Assembly. 

The  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  are  chosen  by  the 
different  towns  in  the  state  :  the  more  ancient  towns,  the  majority  of 
the  whole  nimiber,  send  each  two  representatives  j  the  rest  only  one 
each.    The  present  number  is  208. 

The  Senate  must  consist  of  not  less  than  18,  nor  more  than  24  mem- 
bers, who  are  chosen  by  districts.     The  present  mmiber  is  21. 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  Governor.  A  Lieutenant  Gro- 
vemor  is  also  chosen,  who  is  president  of  the  Senate,  and  on  whom  the 
duties  of  the  governor  devolve  in  case  of  his  death,  resignation,  or 
absence. 

The  representatives,  senators,  governor,  and  lieutenant  governor,  ard 
all  elected  annually  by  the  people  on  the  first  Monday  in  April. 

The  General  Assembly  has  one  stated  session  every  year,  on  the 
first  Wednesday  in  May,  alternately  at  Hartford  (1833)  and  at  New 
Haven  (1834.) 

"  Every  white  male  citizen  of  the  United  States,  who  shall  have 
gained  a  settlement  in  this  state,  attained  the  age  of  21  years,  and  re- 
sided in  the  town  in  which  he  may  offer  himself  to  be  admitted  to  the 
privilege  of  an  elector,  at  least  six  months  preceding,  and  have  a  free- 
hold estate  of  the  yearly  value  of  seven  dollars,  in  this  state ;  or  having 
been  enrolled  in  the  militia,  shall  have  performed  military  duty  therein 
for  the  term  of  one  year  next  preceding  the  time  he  shall  offer  himself 
for  admission,  or  bemg  liable  thereto,  shall  have  been,  by  authority  of 
law,  excused  therefrom ;  or  shall  have  paid  a  state  tax  within  the  year 
next  preceding  the  time  he  shall  present  himself  for  such  admission, 
and  snaJl  sustain  a  good  moral  character,  shall,  on  the  taking  such  an 
oath  as  may  be  prescribed  by  law,  be  an  elector." 

The  judicial  power  is  vested  in  a  Supreme  Court  of  Errors,  a  Su- 
perior Court,  and  such  inferior  courts  as  the  General  Assembly  may, 
fj;om  time  to  time,  establish.  The  judges  are  appointed  by  the  Gene- 
ral Assembly ;  and  those  of  the  Supreme  and  Superior  Courts  hold 
their  offices  during  good  behavior ;  but  not  beyond  the  age  of  70  years. 

No  person  is  compelled  to  join,  or  support,  or  to  be  classed  with,  or 
associated  to,  any  congregation,  church,  or  religious  association.  Bit 
every  person  may  be  compelled  to  pay  his  proportion  of  the  expenws 
of  the  society  to  which  he  may  belong :  he  may,  however,  separalw 
himself  from  the  society  by  leaving  a  written  notice  of  his  wish  with 
the  clerk  of  such  society. 

3  * 


^  STATE  CONSTITUTIONS. 


NEW  YORK. 
The  present  Constitution  of  tlie  state  of  Now  York  was  formed  in 
1821. 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  Governor,  who  is  elected  by  the 
people  every  two  years ;  and  at  the  same  time,  a  Lieutenant  Governor 
is  also  chosen,  who  is  President  of  the  Senate,  and  on  whom,  in  case 
of  the  impeachment,  resignation,  death,  or  absence  of  the  Governor, 
from  office,  the  powers  and  duties  of  Governor  devolve. 

The  legislative  power  is  vested  in  a  Senate  of  32  members,  who  ar» 
chosen  for  four  years,  and  an  Assembly,  of  128  members,  who  are 
elected  annually ;  and  these  bodies  united  are  styled  the  Legislature. 

For  the  election  of  the  senators,  the  state  is  divided  into  eight  dis- 
tricts, each  being  entitled  to  choose  four  senators,  one  of  whom  is  elect- 
ed every  year.  The  members  of  the  Assembly  are  chosen  by  counties, 
and  are  apportioned  according  to  population. 

The  election  of  governor,  lieutenant  governor,  senators,  and  mem- 
bers of  the  Assembly,  is  held  at  present  on  the  first  Monday  in  No- 
vember, and  continues  three  days ;  or  at  such  time  in  the  month  of 
October  or  November,  as  the  legislature  may  by  law  provide. 

The  political  year  commences  on  the  first  day  of  January;  and  the 
legislature  meets  annually  (at  Albany')  on  the  first  Tuesday  in  January, 
unless  a  different  day  is  appointed  by  law. 

The  Constitution  grants  the  right  of  suffrage,  in  the  election  of  pub- 
lic oflicers,  to  every  white  male  citizen,  of  the  age  of  21  years,  who 
has  been  an  inhabitant  of  the  state  one  year  next  preceding  any  elec- 
tion, and,  for  the  preceding  six  months,  a  resident  in  the  county  where 
he  may  offer  his  vote  ;  but  no  man  of  color  is  entitled  to  vote  unless  he 
is  possessed  of  a  freehold  estate  of  the  value  of  $250,  without  any  in- 
cumbrance. 

The  chancellor  and  judges  are^  appointed  b)^  the  Governor,  with  the 
consent  of  the  Senate.  The  chancellor  and  justices  of  the  Supreme 
and  Circuit  Courts  hold  their  offices  during  good  behavior,  or  until  they 
attain  the  age  of  60  years.  The  judges  of  the  County  Courts,  or 
Courts  of  Common  Pleas,  are  appointed  for  a  term  of  five  years. 

NEW  JERSEY. 

The  Constitution  of  New  Jersey  was  fomned  in  1776;  and  no  re- 
vision of  it  has  since  taken  place,  except  that  the  Legislature  has  under- 
taken to  explain  its  provisions  in  particular  parts.  The  government  is 
vested  in  a  Governor,  Legislative  Council,  and  General  Assembly ; 
and  these  bodies  united  are  styled  the  Legislature. 

The  members  of  the  Legislative  Council  and  of  the  General  Assem- 
bly, are  elected  annually,  on  the  second  Tuesday  in  October. 

The  number  of  members  of  the  Legislative  Council  is  14,  one  being- 
elected  by  each  county  in  the  state.  The  General  Assembly  has  con- 
sisted, for  a  number  of  yea^s  past,  of  43  members;  but  by  a  law  en- 
acted in  1829,  seven  additional  njembers  were  added;  and  it  now 
eonsists  of  50  members,  apportioned  among  the  counties  as  follows: 
Bergen  3,  Essex  5,  Morris  4,  Sussex  3,  Warren  3,  Hunerdon  5,  Somer- 
9ett  3,  Middlesex  4,  Monmouth  4,  Burlington  5,.  Gloucester  4,  Salem  3> 
Cumberland  3,  and  Cape  May  L 


STATE  CONSTITUTIONS.  31 

The  Legislature  meets  armugdly  (at  Trenton)  on  the  fourth  Tuesday 
in  October. 

The  governor  is  chosen  annually  by  a  joint  vote  of  the  Council  and 
Assembly,  at  their  first  joint  meeting  after  each  annual  election.  The 
Governor  is  President  of  the  Council ;  and  the  Council  also  elect  from 
their  own  body,  at  their  first  annual  meeting,  a  vice-president,  who  acts 
in  tlie  place  of  the  Governor  in  his  absence.  The  Governor  and  Coun- 
cil form  a  Court  of  appeals,  in  the  last  resort  in  all  causes  of  law ;  and 
they  possess  the  power  of  granting  pardon  to  criminals  after  condem- 
nation. 

The  Constitution  grants  the  right  of  suffrage  to  "  all  persons  of  full 
age  who  are  worth  50  pounds  proclamation  money,  clear  estate  in  the 
same,  and  have  resided  within  the  county  in  which  they  claim  to  vote 
for  twelve  months  immediately  preceding  the  election."  [The  Legis- 
lature has  declared  by  law,  that  every  white  male  inhabitant,  who  shall 
be  over  the  age  of  21  years,  and  shall  have  paid  a  tax,  shall  be  consi- 
dered worth  fifty  pounds,  and  shall  be  entitled  to  vote ; — and  by  anotlier 
legislative  act,  females  and  negroes  are  prohibited  from  voting.] 

The  judges  are  appointed  by  the  Legislature ;  those  of  the  Supreme 
Oourt  for  a  term  of  seven  years,  and  those  of  the  inferior  courts,  for 
five  years,  both  are  capable  of  being  reappointed. 

PENNSYLVANIA. 

The  first  Constitution  of  Pennsylvania  was  adopted  in  1776;  the 
present  Constitution,  in  1790. 

The  legislative  power  is  vested  in  a  General  Assembl/y,  consisting  of 
a  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives. 

The  Representatives  are  elected  annually  on  the  second  Tuesday  in 
October,  by  the  citizens  of  Philadelphia  and  of  the  several  counties, 
apportioned  according  to  the  number  of  taxable  inhabitants.  The 
number  cannot  be  less  than  60,  nor  more  than  100. 

The  senators  are  chosen  for  four  years,  one  fourth  being  elected  an- 
nually, at  the  time  of  the  election  of  the  representatives.  Their  num- 
ber cannot  be  greater  than  one  third,  nor  less  than  one  fourth  of  the 
number  of  the  representatives. 

[In  1829,  it  was  enacted  by  the  General  Assembly,  "  that  imtil  the 
next  enumeration  of  taxable  inhabitants,  and  an  apportionment  thereon, 
the  senate,  at  a  ratio  of  7,700  (taxable  inhabitants),  shall  consist  of  33 
members;"  and  "the  House  of  Representatives,  at  a  ratio  of  2,544, 
shall  consist  of  100  members." — The  following  statem^t  shows  the 
representative  number,  and  the  number  of  members  of  the  legislature, 
at  different  pci'iods : 

Ratio.  Senators.  Ratio.  Representa, 

1793  to  1800  24 

1800  to  1807  4,670      25    .        .        . 
1807  to  1814  4,500      31 
1814  to  1821 5,250      31     .        .        . 
1821  to  1828  6,300      33 
1828  to  1835  7,700      33    .        .        . 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  Grovemor,  who  is  elected  by  the 
people  on  the  2d  Tuesday  in  October,  and  who  holds  his  oflUce  during 
three  years,  from  the  third  Tuesday  in  December  next  following  his 


78 

1,350 

86 

1,500 

95 

1,750 

97 

2,100 

100 

•8,544 

100.] 

3d  STATE  CONSTITUTIONS. 

election ;  and  he  cannot  hold  the  office  more  than  9  years,  in  any  term 
of  12  years. 

The  General  Assembly  meets  annucdly  (at  Harrisburg)  on  the  first 
Tuesday  in  December,  unless  sooner  convened  by  the  Governor. 

The  judicial  power  is  vested  in  a  Supreme  Court,  in  Courts  of  oyer 
andi  terminer  and  jail  delivery,  in  Courts  of  Common  Pleas,  an  Or- 
phans' Court,  a  Register's  Court,  a  Court  of  Gluarter  Sessions  of  the 
reace  for  each  coimty ;  and  in  such  other  courts  as  the  legislature  may 
from  time  to  time  establish.  The  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court  and 
the  several  Courts  of  Common  Pleas,  are  appointed  by  the  Governor, 
and  hold  their  offices  during  good  behavior. 

The  right  of  suffrage  is  possessed  by  every  freeman  of  the  age  of  21 
years,  who  has  resided  in  the  state  two  years  next  preceding  an  elec- 
tion, and  witliin  that  time  paid  a  state  or  county  tax,  assessed  at  least 
six  months  before  the  election. 

DELAWARE. 

Constitution  formed  in  1792,  and  amended  1831. 

The  Legislature  is  styled  the  General  Assembly,  and  consists  of  a 
Senate  and  House  of  Representatives.  * 

The  senators  are  nine  in  number,  namely :  three  from  each  county, 
and  are  elected  for  a  term  of  four  years.  The  representatives  are 
elected  for  a  term  of  two  years,  and  are  21  in  number,  7  from  each 
county. 

The  General  Assembly  meets  (at  Dover),  biennially,  on  the  first 
Tuesday  in  January,  imless  sooner  convened  by  the  Governor. 

The  generd  election  is  held  biennially,  on  the  second  Tuesday  in 
November. 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  GovemOT,  who  is  elected  by  tUe 
people  for  a  term  of  four  years,  and  is  not  eligible  for  a  second  term. 

The  judicial  power  is  vested  in  a  Court  of  Errors  and  Appeals,  a 
Superior  Court,  a  Court  of  Chancery,  an  Orphans'  Court,  a  (Jourt  of 
Oyer  and  Terminer,  a  Court  of  General  Sessions  of  the  peace,  and  jail 
delivery,  a  Register's  Court,  Justices  of  the  Peace,  and  such  other 
courts  as  the  General  Assembly  may  (by  a  vote  of  two  thirds  of  each 
house)  establish. 

The  right  of  suffrage  is  granted  to  every  white  male  citizen,  of  the 
age  of  22  years  or  upwards,  having  resided  in  the  state  one  year,  next 
before  the  election,  and  the  last  month  in  the  county  where  he  votes ; 
and  having  within  two  years  paid  a  county  tax.  Also,  to  every  free 
white  male  over  21,  and  under  22  years  of  age,  having  resided,  as 
aforesaid,  without  payment  of  any  tax. 

MARYLAND. 

The  Constitution  of  this  state  was  first  formed  in  1776;  since  which 
time  many  amendments  have  been  made. 

The  legislative  power  is  vested  in  a  Senate,  consisting  of  15  mem- 
bers, and  a  House  of  Delegates,  consisting  of  80  members ;  and  these 
two  branches  united  are  styled  T%^  General  Assembly  of  Maryland. 

The  members  of  t^ie  House  of  Delegates,  four  from  each  county, 
and  two  each  fr»m  the  cities  of  Baltimore  and  Annapolis,  are 
elected  annually  by  the  people,  on  the  firg^  Monday  in  October ;  and 
the  members  of  the  Senate  are  elected  ev^y  'fiflh  year  on  the  third 
Monday  in  September,  at  Annapolis,  by  electors  who  are  chosen  by 


STATE  CONSTITUTIONS.  33 

the  people  on  the  first  Monday  of  the  same  month  of  September. 
These  electors  choose  by  ballot  9  senators  from  the  Western  Shore,  and 
6  from  the  Eastern,  who  hold  their  offices  five  years. 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  Governor,  who  is  elected  annually 
on  the  first  Monday  in  January,  by  a  joint  bollot  of  both  Houses  of  the 
General  Assembly.  No  one  can  hold  the  office  of  governor  more  than 
three  years  successively,  nor  be  eligible  as  governor  until  the  expira- 
tion of  four  years  after  he  has  been  out  of  that  office.  The  governor 
is  assisted  by  a  Council  of  five  members,  who  are  chosen  annually  by 
a  joint  ballot  of  the  Senate  and  House  of  Delegates. 

The  General  Assembly  meets  annually  (at  Annapolis)  on  the  last 
Monday  in  December.  The  Council  of  the  Governor  is  elected  on  the 
first  Tuesday  in  January ;  the  governor  nominates  to  office,  and  the 
council  appoints. 

The  Constitution  grants  the  right  of  suffrage  to  every  free,  white, 
male  citizen,  above  21  years  of  age,  having  resided  twelve  months 
within  the  state,  and  six  months  in  tlie  county,  or  in  the  city  of  Anna- 
polis or  Baltimore,  next  preceding  the  election  at  which  he  offers  to 
vote. 

The  chancellor  and  judges  are  nominated  by  the  governor,  and  ap- 
pointed by  the  council  j  and  they  hold  their  offices  during  good  be- 
havior. 

VIRGINIA. 
The  old  Constitution  of  this  state  was  formed  in  1776,  and  continued 
in  operation  until  1830,  when  the  present  amended  Constitution  was 
formed  by  a  convention,  and  accepted  by  the  people. 

By  this  Constitution  the  legislative  power  is  vested  in  a  Senate  and  a 
House  of  Delegates,  which  are  together  styled,  T/ie  General  Assembly 
of  Virginia. 

The  House  of  Delegates  consists  of  134  members,  chosen  annually ; 
31  from  the  26  counties  west  of  the  Alleghany  mountains ;  25  from  the 
14  counties  between  the  Alleghany  mountains  and  Blue  Ridge,  42  from 
the  29  counties  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  above  tide-water ;  and  36^ 
from  the  counties,  cities,  towns,  and  boroughs  lying  upon  tide-water. 

The  Senate  consists  of  32  members,  13  from  the  counties  west  of  the 
Blue  Ridge,  and  19  from  the  counties,  cities,  towns,  and  boroughs  east 
thereof.  The  senators  are  elected  for  four  years  5  and  the  seats  of  one- 
fourth  of  them  are  vacated  every  year.  In  all  elections  to  any  office  or 
place  of  trust,  honor,  or  profit,  the  votes  are  given  openly,  or  viva  voce, 
and  not  by  ballot. 

A  reapportionment  for  representation  in  both  houses,  is  to  take  place 
every  ten  years,  commencing  in  1841,  until  which  time  there  is  to  be  no 
change  in  the  number  of  delegates  and  senators  from  the  several  divi- 
sions ;  and  after  1841,  the  number  of  delegates  is  never  to  exceed  150  j 
nor  that  of  the  senators,  36. 

The  time  of  election  of  Delegates  is  fixed  by  the  General  Assembly, 
and  at  present  tedces  place  in  April, 

The  General  Assembly  meets  annually  (at  Richmond^  on  the  first 
Monday  in  December. 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  GJovemor  elected  by  the  joint  vote 
of  the  two  houses  of  the  General  Assembly.  He  holds  his  office  three 
years,  commencing  on  the  1st  of  Janueury  next  succeeding  his  election, 
or  on  such  other  day  as  may  be  from  time  to  time  prescribed  by  law ; 


H  STATE  CONSTITUTIONS. 

and  he  is  ineligible  for  the  three  years  next  after  the  expiration  of  his 
term  of  office. 

There  is  a  Council  of  State,  consisting  of  Uiree  members  elected  for 
three  years,  by  the  joint  vote  of  tlie  two  houses :  the  seat  of  one  being 
vacated  annually.     The  senior  counsellor  is  lieutenant  governor. 

The  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Appeals  and  of  the  Superior 
Courts  are  elected  by  a  joint  vote  of  both  houses  of  the  General  Assem- 
bly, and  hold  their  offices  during  good  behavior ;  or  until  removed  by  a 
concurrent  vote  of  both  houses ;  but  two- thirds  of  the  members  present 
must  concur  in  such  vote,  and  the  cause  of  removal  be  entered  on  the 
journals  of  each  house. 

The  right  of  suffrage  is  extended  to  every  white  male  citizen  of  the 
commonwealth,  resident  therein,  aged  21  years  and  upwards,  who  is 
qualified  to  exercise  the  right  of  suffrage  according  to  the  former  Con- 
stitution and  laws ; — or  who  owns  a  freehold  of  the  value  of  $25 ;  or 
who  has  a  joint  interest  to  the  amount  of  $25  in  a  freehold ; — or  who 
has  a  life  estate  in,  or  reversionary  title  to,  land  of  the  value  of  S50, 
having  had  been  so  possessed  for  six  months ;  or  who  shall  own  and  be 
in  the  actual  occupation  of  a  leasehold  estate,  having  the  title  recorded 
two  months  before  he  shall  offer  to  vote — of  a  term  originally  not  less 
than  five  years,  and  of  the  annual  value  or  rent  of  $!200 ; — or  who  for 
twelve  months  before  offering  to  vote,  has  been  a  house-keeper  and  head 
of  a  family,  and  shall  have  been  assessed  with  a  part  of  the  revenue  of 
the  commonwealth  within  the  preceding  year,  and  actually  paid  the 
same. 

NORTH  CAROLINA. 
TheConstitution  of  North  Carolina  was  agreed  to  and  resolved  upon, 
by  representatives  chosen  for  that  purpose,  at  Halifax,  December  18, 
1776. 

The  legislative  authority  is  vested  in  a  body,  styled  The  General 
Assemblij,  consisting  of  a  Senate  and  a  House  of  Commons,  both  elect- 
ed annually  by  the  people.  One  senator  and  two  members  of  the  House 
of  Commons  are  sent  from  each  of  the  62  counties ;  and  one  of  the 
latter  also  from  each  of  the  towns  of  Edenton,  Newbem,  Wilmington, 
Salisbury,  Hillsborough,  and  Halifax. 

The  chief  executive  officer  is  the  Governor,  who  is  chosen  annually 
by  a  joint  vote  of  the  two  Houses ;  and  he  is  eligible  for  3  years  only 
in  6.  He  is  assisted  by  an  executive  Council  of  seven  members,  chosen 
annually  by  a  joint  vote  of  the  two  Houses.  In  case  of  the  death  of 
the  Governor,  his  duties  devolve  upon  the  Speaker  of  the  Senate. 

The  judges  of  the  Supreme  and  Superior  Courts  are  appointed  by  a 
joint  vote  of  the  two  Houses,  and  hold  their  offices  during  good  be- 
havior. 

The  Constitution  grants  the  right  of  voting  for  members  of  the  House 
of  Commons  to  all  freemen  of  the  age  of  21  years,  who  have  been  in- 
habitants of  the  state  12  months  immediately  preceding  the  election ; 
but  in  order  to  vote  for  a  senator,  a  freeman  must  be  possessed  of  a  free- 
hold of  50  acres  of  land. 

The  time  of  electing  the  members  of  the  General  Assembly  is  ap- 
pointed by  the  legislature,  and  commonly  takes  place  in  the  month  of 
August. 

The  Assembly  meeta  annually  (at  Ralei^^h),  and  usually  on  the  2d 
Monday  in  November ;  and  the  governor  is  commonly  chosen  in  De- 
cember. 


STATE  CONSTITUTIONS.  35 


SOUTH  CAROLINA. 

The  first  Constitution  of  this  st£ite  was  formed  in  1775 ;  the  present 
Constitution  was  adopted  in  1790. 

The  legislative  authority  is  vested  in  a  General  Assembly j  consisting 
of  a  Senate  and  a  House  of  Representatives. 

The  Senate  consists  of  45  members,  who  are  elected  by  districts  for 
foui-  years,  one  half  being  chosen  biennially. 

The  House  of  Representatives  consist  of  124  members,  who  are  ap- 
portioned among  the  several  districts,  according  to  the  number  of  white 
inhabitants  and  taxation ;  and  are  elected  for  two  years.  The  repre- 
sentatives and  one  half  of  the  senators  are  chosen  every  second  year, 
on  the  second  Monday  in  October  and  the  day  following. 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  Governor,  who  is  elected  for  two 
years,  by  a  joint  vote  of  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives,  at 
every  first  meeting  of  the  House  of  Representatives.  A  governor  edfter 
having  performed  the  duties  of  the  office  for  two  years,  cannot  be  re- 
elected till  after  the  expiration  of  four  years. 

At  the  time  of  the  election  of  Governor,  a  Lieutenant  Governor  is 
chosen  in  the  same  manner,  and  for  the  same  period. 

The  General  Assembly  meets  annually  (at  Columbia,)^  on  the  fourth 
Monday  in  November. 

The  Chancellor  and  Judges  are  appointed  by  the  joint  ballot  of  the 
Senate  and  House  of  Representatives,  and  hold  their  offices  during  good 
behavior. 

The  Constitution  grants  the  right  of  suffrage  to  every  free  white, 
male  citizen,  of  the  age  of  21  years,  having  resided  in  tJie  state  two 
years  previous  to  the  day  of  election,  and  having  been  possessed  of  a 
freehold  of  50  acres  of  land,  or  a  town  lot,  at  least  six  months  before 
such  election,  or  (not  having  such  freehold  or  town  lot)  having  been  a  ' 
resident  in  the  election  district  in  which  he  offers  his  vote,  six  months 
before  said  election,  and  having  paid  a  tax  the  preceding  year  of  3*. 
sterling  towards  the  support  of  the  government. 

GEORGIA. 

The  first  Constitution  of  Georgia  was  formed  in  1777 ;  a  second,  in 
1785  ;  and  a  third,  the  one  now  in  operation,  in  1798. 

The  legislative  power  is  vested  in  a  Senate  and  House  of  Represent- 
atives, which  together  are  styled  The  General  Assembly. 

The  members  of  both  houses  are  chosen  annually  on  the  first  Mon- 
day in  October.  One  senator  is  elected  for  each  county,  and  the  number 
of  representatives  is  in  proportion  to  population,  including  three-fifths  of 
all  the  people  of  color ;  but  each  county  is  entitled  to  at  least  one,  and  no 
one  to  more  than  four  members. 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  Governor,  who  was  formerly 
elected  by  the  General  Assembly ;  but  he  is  now  (and  ever  since  1824) 
elected  by  the  people  on  the  first  Monday  in  October  ;  and  he  holds  the 
office  for  two  years. 

The  General  Assembly  meets  (at  Milled^eville)  on  the  first  Monday 
in  November ;  unless  convened  at  another  time  by  the  Governor. 

The  Constitution  grants  the  right  of  suffrage  to  all  "  citizens  and  in- 
habitants who  have  attained  the  age  of  21  years,  and  have  paid  all  the 


36  STATE  CONSTITUTIONS. 

taxes  which  may  have  been  required  of  them,  and  which  they  may 
have  had  opportunity  of  paying,  agreeably  to  law,  for  the  year  preced- 
ine;  the  election,  and  shall  have  resided  six  months  within  the  county." 
The  judicial  power  is  vested  in  a  Superior  Court  and  in  such  inferior 
jurisdictions  as  the  legislature  may,  from  time  to  time,  ordain  and  esta- 
blish; and  the  superior  and  inferior  courts  sit  twice  in  each  county 
every  year.  The  judges  of  the  Superior  Court  are  elected  by  the  legis- 
lature for  three  years ;  the  justices  of  the  inferior  courts,  and  justices 
of  the  peace,  are  elected  quadriennally  by  tlie  people ;  and  the  clerks  of 
the  superior  eind  inferior  courts  biennially. 

ALABAMA. 

The  legislative  power  is  vested  in  two  branches,  a  Senate  and  House 
of  Representatives,  which  together  are  styled  The  General  Assembly  of 
the  State  of  Alabama. 

The  representatives  are  elected  annually,  and  are  apportioned  among 
the  different  counties  in  proportion  to  the  white  population  ;  the  whole 
nimiber  cannot  exceed  100,  nor  fall  short  of  60.  The  senators  are  elect- 
ed for  three  years,  and  one-third  of  them  are  chose  every  year.  Their 
number  cannot  be  more  than  one-third,  nor  less  than  one-fourth  of  the 
number  of  representatives. 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  Governor,  who  is  elected  by  the 
people  for  two  years  ;  and  is  eligible  4  years  out  of  6. 

The  representatives  and  one-third  of  the  senators  are  elected  annually 
on  the  first  Monday  in  August  and  the  day  following ;  and  the  governor 
is  elected  biennially  at  the  same  time. 

The  General  Assembly  meets  annually  (at  Tuscaloosa),  on  the  fourth 
Monday  in  October. 

The  right  of  suffrage  is  possessed  by  every  white,  male  citizen  of  21 
.  years  of  age,  who  has  resided  within  the  state  one  year  preceding  an 
election,  and  the  last  three  months  within  the  county,  city,  or  town,  in 
which  he  offers  his  vote. 

The  judicial  power  is  vested  in  one  Supreme  Court,  in  Circuit  Courts, 
and  such  inferior  courts  as  the  General  Assembly  may,  from  time  to 
time,  direct  and  establish.  The  judges,  after  November  in  1833,  are  to 
be  elected  by  a  joint  vote  of  both  Houses  of  the  Genered  Assembly, 
every  six  years. 

MISSISSIPPI. 
The  Constitution  of  this  state  was  formed  at  the  town  of  Washington, 
in  August,  1817. 

The  legislative  power  is  vested  in  a  Senate  and  a  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, which  are  together  styled  The  General  Assembly  of  the  State 
of  Mississippi. 

The  representatives  are  elected  annually  on  the  first  Monday  in  Au- 
gust, in  the  ratio  of  one  to  every  3,000  white  inhabitants.  Each  county, 
however,  is  entitled  to  one ;  and  the  present  whole  number  is  33.  Ac- 
cording to  the  Constitution,  when  tlie  number  of  white  inhabitants  ex- 
ceeds 80,000,  the  number  of  representatives  cannot  be  less  than  35,  nor 
more  than  100. 

The  members  of  the  Senate  are  elected  for  three  years,  one-third 
being  chosen  annuallj.    Their  number  cannot  be  less  than  one-fourtli, 
nor  more  than  one-third  of  the  whole  number  of  representatives. 
The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  Governor,  who  is  elected  by  the 


STATE  CONSTITUTIONS.  37 

f|eople,  for  two  years,  on  the  first  Monday  in  August.  At  every  elec- 
tion of  Governor,  a  Lieutenant  Governor  is  also  chosen,  who  is 
President  of  the  Senate,  and  on  whom  the  executive  duties  devolve  in 
case  of  the  death,  resignation,  or  absence  of  the  governor. 

The  General  Assembly  meets  (at  Jackson\  annually  on  the  first 
Monday  in  November. 

The  right  of  suffrage  is  granted  to  every  free,  white,  male  citizen  of 
the  United  States,  of  the  age  of  21  years  or  upwards,  who  has  resided 
within  this  state  one  year  next  preceding  an  election,  and  the  last  six 
months  within  the  county,  city,  or  town  in  which  he  offers  to  vote,  and 
is  enrolled  in  the  militia  thereof,  unless  exempted  by  law  from  military 
service ;  or  having  the  aforesaid  qualifications  of  citizenship  and  resid- 
ence, has  paid  a  state  or  county  tax. 

The  judicial  power  is  vested  in  a  Supreme  Court,  and  such  superior 
and  inferior  courts  of  law  and  equity,  as  the  legislature  may  from  time 
to  time  establish.  The  judges  of  the  several  courts  are  elected  by  tlie 
General  Assembly,  and  hold  their  offices  during  good  behavior,  till  the 
age  of  65  years.  '  . 

LOUISIANA. 

The  Constitution  of  this  state  was  formed  in  1812. 

The  legislative  power  is  vested  in  a  Senate  and  House  of  Represent- 
atives, both  together  styled  The  General  Assembly  of  the  State  of 
Louisiana. 

The  representatives  are  elected  for  two  years  on  the  first  Monday, 
Tuesday,  and  Wednesday  in  July.  Their  number  cannot  be  less  than 
25,  nor  more  than  50 ;  and  they  are  apportioned  according  to  the  num- 
ber of  electors,  as  ascertained  by  enumeration  every  4  years. 

The  members  of  the  Senate  are  elected  for  four  years  ;  one  half 
being  chosen  every  two  years,  at  the  time  of  the  election  of  the  repre- 
sentatives. The  state  is  divided  into  16  senatorial  districts,  in  each  of 
which  one  senator  is  chosen. 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  Governor,  who  is  elected  for  the 
term  of  four  years.  The  people  give  their  votes  for  a  governor  at  the 
time  and  place  of  voting  for  representatives  and  senators ;  and  on  tlie 
second  day  of  the  succeeding  session  of  the  General  Assembly,  the 
two  Houses,  by  a  joint  ballot,  elect  for  Governor,  one  of  the  two  candi- 
dates who  have  the  greatest  number  of  votes.  The  governor's  term  of 
office  commences  on  the  fourth  Monday  succeeding  his  election. 

The  General  Assembly  meets  (since  1829,  at  Donaldson^  or  Donald- 
sonville)  annually,  on  the  first  Monday  in  January,  except  in  the  years 
of  the  election  of  President  of  the  United  States,  when  it  meets  on  the 
3d  Monday  in  November. 

The  right  of  suffrage  is  possessed  by  every  white  male  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  of  the  age  of  21  years,  who  has  resided  in  the  county  in 
which  he  offers  to  vote  one  year  next  preceding  the  election,  and  who  in 
the  last  six  months  prior  to  said  election  has  paid  a  state  tax. 

The  judiciary  power  is  vested  in  a  Supreme  Court,  which  possesses 
appellate  jurisdiction  only,  and  such  inferior  courts  as  the  legislature 
may  establish.  The  judges  are  appointed  by  the  Governor,  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  and  hold  their  offices  during  good 
behavior. 

4        " 


38  STATE  CONSTITUTIONS. 


TENNESSEE. 

The  Constitution  of  this  state  was  formed  at  Knoxville,  in  1796. 

The  legislative  autliority  is  vested  in  a  General  Assembly,  consisting 
of  a  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives ;  and  the  members  of  both 
houses  are  elected  biennially  on  tlie  first  Thursday  and  Friday  in 
Au^st. 

The  number  of  representatives  is  60,  who  are  a'pportioned  among 
the  different  counties  according  to  the  number  of  taxable  inhabitants. 
The  number  of  senators  cannot  be  less  than  one-third,  nor  more  than 
one-half  of  the  nimiber  of  representatives.,  ♦ 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  Governor,  who  is  elected  ixU  the 
same  time  with  tlie  senators  and  representatives  ;  and  who  holds  his 
office  for  the  term  of  two  years,  but  is  not  eligible  more  than  6  years  in 
any  term  of  8. 

The  General  Assembly  meets  (at  Nashville)  biennially,  on  the  third 
Monday  in  September,  next  following  the  election ;  and  it  may  be  called 
together,  if  necessary,  at  other  times  by  the  governor. 

The  right  of  suffrage  is  granted  to  every  freeman  of  the  age  of  21 
years,  possessing  a  freehold  in  the  county  where  he  offers  his  vote,  and 
to  every  freeman  who  has  been  an  inhabitant  of  any  one  county  in  the 
state  six  months  immediately  preceding  the  day  of  election. 

The  judiciary  power  is  vested  in  such  superior  and  inferior  courts,  as 
the  legislature  may  from  time  to  time  direct  and  establish.  The  judges 
are  appointed  by  a  joint  bollot  of  both  Houses,  and  hold  tlieir  offices 
during  good  behavior. 

KENTUCKY. 

On  the  separation  of  Kentucky  from  Virginia,  in  1790,  a  Constitution 
was  adopted  which  continued  in  force  till  1799,  when  a  new  one  was 
formed  instead  of  it ;  and  this  is  now  in  force. 

The  legislative  power  is  vested  in  a  Senate  and  House  of  Represent- 
atives, which  together  are  styled  The  General  Assembly  of  the  Commotv- 
vjealth  of  Kentucky. 

The  representatives  are  elected  annually,  and  are  apportioned,  every 
fo'Jir  years,  among  the  different  counties  according  to  the  number  of 
electors.  Their  present  number  is  100,  which  is  the  highest  number 
that  the  Constitution  authorizes ;  58  being  the  lowest. 

The  senators  ai-e  elected  for  four  years,  one  quarter  of  them  being 
chosen  annually.  Their  present  number  is  38 ;  and  they  cannot  exceed 
this  number,  nor  fall  short  of  24. 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  Governor,  who  is  elected  for  four 
years,  and  is  ineligible  for  the  succeeding  seven  years  after  the  expira- 
tion of  his  term  of  office.  At  the  election  of  Governor,  a  Lieutenant 
Governor  is  also  chosen,  who  is  Sj)eaker  of  the  Senate,  and  on  whom 
the  duties  of  the  Governor  devolve,  in  case  of  his  absence  or  removal. 

The  representatives  and  one  quarter  of  the  members  of  the  senate 
are  elected  annually  by  the  people,  on  the  first  Monday  in  August ;  the 
governor  is  elected  by  the  people,  every  fourth  year,  at  the  same  time ; 
and  he  commences  the  execution  of  his  office  on  the  fourth  Tuesday 
succeeding  the  day  of  the  commencement  of  the  election  at  wliich  he  is 


STATE  CONSTITUTIONS.  39 

chosen.  The  polls  are  kept  open  three  d  ays ;  and  the  votes  are  given 
openly,  or  viva  voce,  and  not  by  ballot. 

The  General  Assembly  meets  (at  Frankfort)  annually  on  the  first 
Monday  in  December. 

The  Constitution  grants  the  right  of  suffrage  to  every  free  male 
citizen  (people  of  color  excepted)  who  has  attained  the  age  of  21  years, 
and  has  resided  in  the  state  two  years,  or  in  tlie  county  where  he  offers 
his  vote,  one  year,  next  preceding  the  election. 

The  judiciary  power  is  vested  in  a  Supreme  Court,  styled  the  Court 
of  Appeals,  and  m  such  inferior  courts  as  the  General  Assembly  may, 
from  time  to  time,  erect  and  establish.  The  judges  of  the  different 
courts  and  justices  of  the  peace,  hold  their  offices  during  good  behavior. 

OHIO. 

The  Constitution  of  this  state  was  formed  at  Chillicothe,  in  1802. 

The  legislative  power  is  vested  in  a  Senate  and  House  of  Represent- 
atives, which  together  are  styled  The  General  Assembly  of  the  State  of 
Ohio. 

The  representatives  are  elected  annually  on  the  second  Tuesday  in 
October ;  and  they  are  apportioned  among  the  counties  according  to  the 
number  of  white  male  inhabitants  above  21  years  of  age.  Their  num- 
ber cannot  be  less  than  36,  nor  more  than  72. 

The  senators  are  chosen  biennially,  and  are  apportioned  according  to 
the  number  of  white  male  inhabitants  of  21  years  of  age.  Their 
number  cannot  be  less  than  one-third,  nor  more  than  one-half  of  the 
number  of  representatives. 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  Governor,  who  is  elected  by  the 
people  for  two  years,  on  the  second  Tuesday  in  October ;  and  his  term 
of  service  commences  on  the  first  Monday  in  December. 

The  General  Assembly  meets  annually  (at  Columbus),  on  the  first 
Monday  in  December. 

The  right  of  suffrage  is  granted  to  all  white  male  inhabitants  ahove 
the  age  of  21  years,  who  has  resided  in  the  state  one  year  next  preced- 
ing the  election,  and  who  have  paid,  or  are  charged  with  a  stale  or  county 
tax. 

The  judicial  power  is  vested  in  a  Supreme  Court,  in  courts  of  Common 
Pleas  for  each  county,  and  such  other  courts  as  the  legislature  may  from 
time  to  time  establish.  The  judges  are  elected  by  a  joint  ballot  of 
both  Houses  of  the  General  Assembly  for  the  term  of  7  years. 

INDIANA.       * 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  Governor,  who  is  elected  by  the 
people  for  a  term  of  three  years,  and  may  be  once  re-elected.  At  every 
election  of  Governor,  a  Lieutenant  Governor  is  also  chosen,  who  is  Pre- 
sident of  the  Senate,  and  on  whom,  in  case  of  the  death,  resignation,  or 
removal  of  the  governor,  the  powers  and  duties  of  governor  devolve. 

The  legislative  authority  is  vested  in  a  General  Assembly,  consisting 
of  a  Senate,  the  members  of  which  are  elected  for  three  yesirs,  and  a 
House  of  Repi'esentatives,  elected  annually. 

The  nimiber  of  representatives  can  never  be  less  than  36,  nor  more 
than  100 ;  and  they  are  apportioned  among  the  several  counties  accord* 
ing  to  the  number  of  white  male  inhabitants  above  21  years  of  age. 
The  number  of  senators,  who  are  apportioned  in  like  manner,  cannot 


40  STATE  CONSTITUTIONS. 

be  less  than  one-third,  nor  more  than  one-half  of  the  number  of  repre- 
sentatives. 

The  representatives  and  one-third  of  the  members  of  the  senate,  are 
elected  annually  on  the  first  Monday  in  August;  and  the  Governor  is 
chosen  on  the  same  day,  every  third  year. 

The  Greneral  Assembly  meets  annually  (at  Indianapolis)  on  tlie  first 
Monday  in  December. 

The  right  of  suffrage  is  granted  to  all  male  citizens  of  the  a^e  of  21 
years  or  upwards,  who  may  have  resided  in  the  state  one  year  mmiedi- 
ately  preceding  an  election. 

The  judiciary  power  is  vested  in  one  Supreme  Court,  in  circuit  courts, 
and  in  such  other  inferior  courts  as  the  General  Assembly  may  esta- 
blish. The  Supreme  Court  consists  of  three  judges  ;  and  each  of  the 
Circuit  Courts  consists  of  a  president  and  two  associate  judges.  The 
judges  are  all  appointed  for  the  term  of  seven  years.  The  judges  of 
the  Supreme  Court  are  appointed  by  the  governor,  with  the  consent  of 
the  Senate ;  the  presidents  of  the  Circuit  Courts,  by  the  legislature ;  and 
the  associate  judges  are  elected  by  the  people. 

ILLINOIS. 

The  legislative  authority  is  vested  in  a  General  Assemhly,  consisting 
of  a  Senate,  the  members  of  which  are  elected  for  four  years;  and  of  a 
House  of  Representatives,  elected  biennially. 

"  The  number  of  representatives  shall  not  be  less  than  27,  nor  more  . 
than  36,  until  the  number  of  inhabitants  within  the  state  shall  amount  to 
one  hundred  thousand ;  and  the  number  of  senators  shall  never  be  less 
than  one-third,  nor  more  than  one-half  of  the  number  of  representatives." 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  Governor,  who  is  elected  by  the 
people  for  four  years ;  and  he  is  not  eligible  for  more  than  four  years  in 
any  term  of  eight  years.  At  the  election  of  Governor,  a  Lieutenant 
Governor  is  also  chosen,  who  is  Speaker  of  the  Senate ;  and  on  whom,  in 
case  the  governor  vacates  his  office,  the  duties  of  governor  devolve. 

The  representatives  and  one-half  of  the  senators  are  elected  biennially 
on  the  first  Monday  in  August ;  and  the  governor  is  chosen  every  fourth 
year,  at  the  same  time. 

The  General  Assembly  meets  every  other  year  (at  Vandalia)^  on  the 
first  Monday  in  the  December  next  following  the  election;  and  the 
governor  is  authorized  to  convene  it,  on  extraordinary  occasions,  at  other 
times. 

All  white  male  inhabitants,  above  the  age  of  21  years,  having  resided 
in  the  state  six  months  next  preceding  an  election,  have  the  rights  of 
electors. 

The  judicial  power  is  vested  in  a  Supreme  Court,  and  in  such  inferior 
courts  as  the  General  Assembly  may  establish.  The  judges  arc  appointed 
by  a  joint  ballot  of  both  branches  of  the  General  Assembly,  and  hold 
their  offices  during  good  behavior. 

MISSOURI. 

The  Constitution  of  this  state  was  formed  at  St.  Louis,  in  1820. 
The  legislative  power  was  vested  in  a  General  Assembly^  consisting 
of  a  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives. 

The  representatives  are  chosen  every  second  year.    Every  county  is 


STATE  CONSTITUTIONS.  41 

entitled  to  at  least  one  representative ;  but  the  whole  number  can  never 
exceed  100.  , 

The  senators  are  elected  for  four  years ;  the  seats  of  one- half  being 
vacated  every  second  year.  The  constitutional  number  is  not  less  than 
14,  nor  more  than  33.  They  are  chosen  by  districts,  and  are  appor- 
tioned according  to  the  number  of  free  white  inhabitants. 

The  elections  for  representatives  and  senators  are  held  biennially  on 
the  first  Monday  in  Au^ist. 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  a  Governor,  who  is  elected  for  four 
years,  on  the  first  Monday  in  August ;  and  he  is  ineligible  for  the  next 
four  years  after  the  expiration  of  his  term  of  service. 

At  the  time  of  the  election  of  Governor,  a  Lieutenant  Governor  is 
also  chosen,  who  is,  by  virtue  of  his  office,  President  of  the  Senate. 

The  Legislature  meets  every  second  year  (at  the  City  of  Jefferson^ 
on  the  first  Monday  in  November. 

The  right  of  suffrage  is  granted  to  every  white  male  citizen  who  has 
attained  the  age  of  21  years,  and  has  resided  in  the  state  one  year  before 
an  election,  the  last  three  months  thereof  being  in  the  county  or  district 
in  which  he  offers  his  vote. 

The  judicial  power  is  vested  in  a  Supreme  Court,  in  a  Chancellor, 
Circuit  Courts,  and  such  other  inferior  tribunals  as  the  General  Assem- 
bly may,  fi-om  time  to  time,  establish. 

The  judges  are  appointed  by  the  Governor,  by  and  with  the  advice 
and  consent  of  the  Senate ;  and  they  hold  their  offices  during  good  beha- 
vior, but  not  beyond  tlie  age  of  65  years. 


4* 


RESOLUTIONS 

OF 

VIRGINIA  AND  KENTUCKY, 


PENNED   BY    MADISON     AND    JEFFERSON,    IN    RELATION     TO    THE     ALIEN 
AND    SEDITION   LAWS. 

We  publish  the  Resolutions  of  Virginia  and  Kentucky,  penned  by 
Madison  and  Jefferson,  in  relation  to  the  Alien  and  Sedition  laws,  in 
the  years  1798  and  1799,  from  a  copy  in  pamphlet  form  reprinted  at 
Charleston  in  1828,  from  a  Richmond  edition,  issued  two  years  before. 

The  Alien  and  Sedition  laws  were  enacted  by  Congress,  during  the 
session  of  1797-98. 

On  the  10th  of  November,  1798,  Mr.  John  Breckenridge  introduced 
into  the  Legislature  of  Kentucky,  resolutions  expressive  of  the  sense  of 
that  body  in  relation  thereto,  which  were  known  to  have  been  written 
by  Mr.  Jefferson ;  and  on  the  21st  of  December  of  the  same  year, 
Colonel  John  Taylor  of  Caroline,  proposed  in  the  Legislature  of  Vir- 
ginia, resolutions  also  on  the  same  subject,  drawn  up  by  Mr.  Madison. 
By  these  resolutions,  the  Governors  were  desired  to  transmit  a  copy  to 
tire  Executive  of  each  of  the  States,  to  be  laid  before  their  respective 
Legislatures,  the  result  of  which  was  that  the  States  of  Vermont, 
New  Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island,  Connecticut,  New  York 
and  Delaware,  passed  resolves  expressive  of  their  disapprobation  of  the 
doctrines  contained  in  the  same. 

These  dissenting  resolutions  were  taken  up  on  'the  14th  of  Novem- 
ber, 1799,  by  the  Legislature  of  Kentucky,  which,  by  an  unanimous 
vote,  resolved  to  adhere  to  the  principles  originally  laid  down.  The 
same  subject  was  referred  to  a  Committee  in  the  Virgiiiia  Legislature, 
and  a  report  made  thereon  during  the  session  of  '99-1800.  This  report, 
of  which,  on  the  20th  of  January  of  the  latter  year,  five  thousand  copies 
were  ordered  to  be  printed  for  distribution,  was  penned  by  Mr.  Madi- 
son, and  as  it  contains  in  its  body  a  verbatim  copy  of  all  the  resolutions 
of  December  21st,  1798,  the  necessity  is  obviated  of  inserting  those 
resolutions  in  a  separate  form. — Banner  of  the  Constitution. 

Virginia  House  of  Delegates.    Session  of  1799 — 1800. 
REPORT  of  the  Committee  to  whom  were  referred  the  Communica- 
tions of  the  various  States,  relative  to  the  Resolutions  of  the  last 
General  Assembly  of  the  State,  concerning  the  Alien  and  Sedition 
Laws. 

Whatever  room  might  be  found  in  the  proceedings  of  some  of  the 
States,  who  have  disapproved  of  the  Resolutions  of  the  General  As- 
sembly of  this  Commonwealth,  passed  on  the  21st  day  of  December, 
1798,  for  painful  remarks  on  the  spirit  and  manner  of  those  proceed- 
ings, it  appears  to  the  Committee  most  consistent  with  tlie  duty  as 


RESOLUTIONS  &c.  43 

well  as  dignity  of  tlie  General  Assembly,  to  hasten  an  oblivion  of 
every  circumstance,  which  might  be  construed  into  a  diminution  of 
mutual  respect,  confidence,  and  affection,  among  the  members  of  the 
Union. 

The  Committee  have  deemed  it  a  more  useful  task  to  revise,  with  a 
critical  eye,  the  resolutions  which  have  met  with  this  disapprobation ; 
to  examine  fully  the  several  objections  and  arguments  which  have  ap- 
peared against  them ;  and  to  inquire  whether  there  be  any  errors  of 
fact,  of  principle,  or  of  reasoning,  which  the  candor  of  tlie  General 
Assembly  ought  to  acknowledge  and  correct. 

The  first  of  the  resolutions  is  in  the  words  following : 

"  Resolved^  That  the  General  Assembly  of  Virginia  doth  unequivo- 
cally express  a  firm  resolution  to  maintain  and  defend  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States,  and  the  Constitution  of  this  State,  against  every 
aggression,  either  foreign  or  domestic,  and  that  they  will  support  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  in  all  measures  warranted  by  the 
former." 

No  unfavorable  comment  can  have  been  made  on  the  sentiments 
here  expressed.  To  maintain  and  defend  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  and  of  their  own  State,  against  every  aggression,  both  foreign 
and  domestic,  and  to  support  the  Government  of  the  United  States  in 
all  measures  warranted  by  their  Constitution,  are  duties  which  the 
General  Assembly  ought  always  to  feel,  and  to  which,  on  such  an 
occasion,  it  was  evidently  proper  to  express  their  sincere  and  firm 
adherence. 

In  their  next  resolution — "  The  General  Assembly  most  solemnly 
declares  a  warm  attachment  to  the  Union  of  the  States,  to  maintain 
which  it  pledges  all  its  powers  ;  and,  that  for  this  end,  it  is  their  duty 
to  watch  over  and  oppose  every  infraction  of  those  principles,  which 
constitute  the  only  basis  of  that  Union,  because  a  faithful  observance  of 
them  can  alone  secure  its  existence  and  the  public  happiness." 

The  observation  just  made  is  equally  applicable  to  this  solemn  de- 
claration of  warm  attachment  to  the  Union,  and  this  solemn  pledge  to 
maintain  it ;  nor  can  any  question  arise  among  enlightened  friends  of 
the  Union,  as  to  the  duty  of  watching  over  and  opposing  every  infrac- 
tion of  those  principles  which  constitute  its  basis,  and  a  faithful  observ- 
ance of  which  can  alone  secure  its  existence,  and  tlie  public  happiness 
thereon  depending. 

The  third  resolution  is  in  the  words  following: 

"  That  this  assembly  doth  explicitly  and  peremptorily  declare,  that 
it  views  the  powers  of  the  Federal  Government,  as  resulting  from  the 
compact  to  which  the  States  are  parties,  as  limited  by  tlie  plain  sense 
and  intention  of  the  instmment  constituting  that  compact — as  no  further 
valid  than  they  are  authorised  by  the  grants  enumerated  in  that  com- 
pact ;  and  that  in  case  of  a  deliberate,  palpable,  and  dangerous  exercise 
of  other  powers,  not  granted  by  the  said  compact,  the  States  who  are 
parties  thereto,  have  the  right,  and  are  in  duty  bound,  to  interpose, 
for  arresting  the  progress  of  the  evil,  and  for  maintaining  within 
their  respective  limits,  the  authorities,  rights,  and  liberties  appertaining 
to  them." 

On  this  resolution  the  Committee  have  bestowed  all  the  attention 
which  its  importance  merits ;  They  have  scanned  it  not  merely  with  a 
strict,  but  with  a  severe,  eye  j  and  they  feel  confidence  in  pronouncing, 


44  RESOLUTIONS  OF 

that,  in  its  just  and  fair  construction,  it  is  unexceptionnbly  true  in  its 
several  positions,  as  well  as  constitutional  and  conclusive  in  its  infer- 
ences. 

The  resolution  declares,  first^  that  "  it  views  the  powers  of  the 
Federal  Government,  as  resulting  from  the  compact  to  wnich  tlie  States 
are  parties  ;"  in  other  words,  that  the  Federal  powers  are  derived  from 
the  Constitution ;  and,  tliat  tlie  Constitution  is  a  compact  \o  which  the 
States  are  parties. 

Clear  as  the  position  must  seem,  that  the  Federal  porwers  are  derived 
from  the  Constitution,  and  from  that  alone,  the  Committee  are  not  un- 
apprised of  a  late  doctrine,  which  opens  another  source  (»f  Federal 
powers,  not  less  extensive  and  important,  than  it  is  new  and  unexpect- 
ed. The  examination  of  this  doctrine  will  be  most  conveniently  con- 
nected with  a  review  of  a  succeeding  resolution.  The  Committee  satisfy 
themselves  here  with  briefly  remarking,  that  in  all  the  contemporary 
discussions  and  comments  which  the  Constitution  underwent,  it  was 
constantly  justified  and  recommended,  on  the  ground,  that  the  powers 
not  given  to  the  Government,  were  withheld  from  it;  and,  that  if  any 
doubt  could  have  existed  on  this  subject,  under  the  original  text  of  the 
Constitution,  it  is  removed,  as  far  as  words  could  remove  it,  by  the  13th 
amendment,  now  a  part  of  the  Constitution,  which  expressly  declares, 
"  that  the  powers  not  delegated  to  the  United  States,  by  the  Constitu- 
tion, nor  prohibited  by  it  to  the  States,  are  reserved  to  the  States  re- 
spectively, or  to  the  people." 

The  other  position  involved  in  this  branch  of  the  resolution,  namely, 
"  that  the  States  are  parties  to  the  Constitution  or  compact,"  is,  in  the 
judgment  of  the  Committee,  equally  free  from  objection.  It  is  indeed 
true,  that  the  term  "  States,"  is  sometimes  used  in  a  vague  sense,  and 
sometimes  in  different  senses,  according  to  the  subject  to  which  it  is 
applied.  Thus,  it  sometimes  means  the  separate  sections  of  territory 
occupied  by  the  political  societies  within  each ;  sometimes  the  particular 
governments  established  by  those  societies ;  sometimes  those  societies 
as  organized  into  those  particular  governments ;  and  lastly,  it  means 
the  people  composing  those  political  societies,  in  their  highest  sovereign 
capacity.  Although  it  miaht  be  wished  tliat  the  perfection  of  language 
admitted  less  diversity  in  the  signification  of  the  same  words,  yet  lit3e 
inconvenience  is  produced  by  it,  where  the  true  sense  can  be  collected 
with  certainty  from  the  different  applications.  In  the  present  instance, 
whatever  different  constructions  of  tlie  term  "  States,"  in  the  resolution, 
may  have  been  entertained,  all  will  at  least  ccnciu*  in  the  last  mention- 
ed ;  because  in  that  sense  the  Constitution  was  submitted  to  the  "  States," 
in  that  sense  the  "States"  ratified  it;  and,  in  that  sense  of  the  term 
"  States,"  they  are  consequently  parties  to  the  compact,  from  which  the 
powers  of  the  Federal  Government  result. 

The  next  position  is,  that  the  General  Assembly  views  the  powers 
of  the  Federal  Government,  "  as  limited  by  the  plain  sense  and  intention 
of  the  instrument  constituting  that  compact,"  and  "  as  no  fartlier  valid 
than  they  are  authorized  by  the  grants  therein  enumerated."  It  does  not 
seem  possible  that  any  just  objection  can  lie  against  either  of  these 
clauses.  The  first  amounts  merely  to  a  declaration  that  the  compact 
ought  to  have  the  interpretation  plainly  intended  by  the  parties  to  it ; 
the  other  to  a  declaration,  that  it  ought  to  have  the  execution  and  effect 
intended  by  them.    If  the  powers  granted,  be  valid,  it  is  solely  because 


VIRGINIA  AND  KENTUCKY.  45 

they  are  granted ;  and,  if  the  panted  powers  are  valid,  because  granted, 
all  other  powers  not  granted,  must  not  be  valid. 

The  resolution  having  taken  this  view  of  the  Federal  compact,  pro- 
ceeds to  infer,  "  that,  in  case  of  a  deliberate,  palpable,  and  dangerous 
exercise  of  other  powers,  not  granted  by  the  said  compact,  the  States, 
who  are  parties  thereto,  have  the  right  and  are  in  duty  bound  to  inter- 
pose for  arresting  the  progress  of  the  evil,  and  for  mamtaining  within 
their  respective  limits,  the  authorities,  rights,  and  liberties,  appertaining 
to  them." 

It  appears  to  your  Committee  to  be  a  plain  principle,  founded  in 
common  sense,  illustrated  by  common  practice,  and  essential  to  the 
nature  of  compacts — that,  where  resort  can  be  had  to  no  tribunal,  supe- 
rior to  the  authority  of  the  parties,  the  parties  themselves  must  be  the 
rightful  judges  in  the  last  resort,  whether  the  bargain  made  has  been 
pursued  or  violated.  The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  was  formed 
by  the  sanction  of  the  States,  given  by  each  in  its  sovereign  capacity. 
It  adds  to  the  stability  and  dignity,  as  well  as  to  the  authority  of  the 
Constitution,  that  it  rests  on  this  legitimate  and  solid  foundation.  The 
States,  then,  being  the  parties  to  the  Constitutional  compact,  and  in 
their  sovereign  capacity,  it  follows  of  necessity,  that  there  can  be  no 
tribunal  above  their  authority  to  decide  in  the  last  resort,  whether  the 
compact  made  by  them  be  violated ;  and,  consequently,  that,  as  the  par- 
ties to  it,  they  must  themselves  decide,  in  the  last  resort,  such  questions 
as  may  be  of  sufficient  magnitude  to  require  their  interposition. 

It  does  not  follow,  however,  that  because  the  States,  as  sovereign 
parties  to  their  Constitutional  compact,  must  ultimately  decide  whether 
It  has  been  violated,  that  such  a  decision  ought  to  be  interposed,  either 
in  a  hasty  manner,  or  on  doubtful  and  inferior  occasions.  Even  in  the 
case  of  ordinary  Conventions  between  different  nations,  where,  by  the 
strict  rule  of  interpretation,  a  breach  of  a  part  may  be  deemed  a  breach 
of  the  whole ;  every  part  being  deemed  a  condition  of  every  other  part, 
and  of  the  whole,  it  is  always  laid  down  that  the  breach  must  be  both 
wilful  and  material  to  justify  an  application  of  the  rule.  But  in  the 
case  of  an  intimate  and  Constitutional  Union,  like  that  of  the  United 
States,  it  is  evident  that  the  interposition  of  the  parties,  in  their  sove- 
reign capacity,  can  be  called  for  by  occasions  only,  deeply  £ind  essen- 
tially affecting  the  vital  principles  of  their  political  system. 

The  resolution  has,  accordingly,  guarded  against  any  misapprehen- 
sion of  its  object,  by  expressly  requiring  for  such  an  interposition,  "  the 
case  of  a  deliberate^  palpable,  and  dangerous  breach  of  the  Constitution, 
by  the  exercise  of  powers  not  granted  by  it."  It  must  be  a  case,  not 
of  a  light  and  transient  nature,  but  of  a  nature  dangerous  to  the  great 
purposes  for  which  the  Constitution  was  established.  It  must  be  a 
case,  moreover,  not  obscure  or  doubtful  in  its  consti-uction,  but  plain 
and  palpable.  Lastly,  it  must  be  a  case  not  resulting  from  a  partial 
consideration,  or  hasty  determination ;  but  a  case  stampt  with  a  final 
consideration  and  deliberate  adherence.  It  is  not  necessary,  because 
the  resolution  does  not  require,  that  the  question  should  be  discussed, 
how  far  the  exercise  of  any  particular  power,  ungranted  by  the  Constitu- 
tion, would  justify  the  interposition  of  the  parties  to  it.  As  cases  might 
easily  be  stated,  which  hone  would  contend  ought  to  fall  witliin  that 
description  j  cases,  on  the  other  hand,  might,  wiUi  equal  ease,  be  stated, 


From 


41  RESOLUTIONS  OP 

to  iafRUit  And  to  fainl,  as  to  unite  every  opinion  in  placing  Uiem  with- 
in the  description. 

But  the  rMolution  has  done  more  than  gnard  Against  ;      tion, 

bf  viptmtAy  r«f(^rring  to  caaet  of  a  delikBraUj  pilpab  rous 

It  •!»'     '       ""'  object  of  the  inter{>(x»i  cuntem- 

,  to  be  s  of  arrcslini;  the  progrt>  :  usurpa- 

luid  of  moiuuuuiiig  the  authorities,  rights,  j  'pcrtarn- 

10  the  States,  as  parties  to  tiic  conslituiion. 

Vom  this  view  of  the  resolution,  it  would  seem  ii  'at  it 

can  incur  any  just  disapprobation  from  those,  who  all 

momentary  impressions,  and  recoileciin^  the  gci  t 

of  the  Federal  Constitution,  shall  caudicily  "od 
igof  the  General  Assembly.     If  tli 

powers,  palpably  withheld  by  tJie  C  y 

parties  to  it,  in  intcqmsinsj  even  so  far  us  to  airc^il  LUc  pio^rtss  of 
the  evil,  and  thereby  to  preserve  tJic  Constitution  itself,  as  well  as  to 
provide  for  the  safety  of  the  parties  to  it;  tliere  would  bo  )  all 

relief  from  usurped  jmwer.   and  a  direct  subversion  of  th(  |icci- 

fiedor  necogni/  >(ate  Constitutions,  as  well  ai  a  ^jlain 

denial  of  the  \\  . I i^e  on  which  our  independence  itself 

was  declared. 

But  it  is  objected,  that  t]ie  Judicial  authority  is  to  be  regarded  as  the 
•ole  expositor  of  the  Constitution  in  the  last  resort ;  and  it  may  be  ask- 
ed for  what  reason,  the  declaration  by  the  General  Assembly,  supposing 
it  to  be  tJieoreticaliy  true,  could  be  required  at  the  present  day  and  in  so 
eolemn  a  manner. 

On  this  objection  it  might  by  observed,  first:  lliat  there  may  be  in- 
■tances  of  tisurped  power,  which  tlie  forms  of  the  Constitution  would 
nererdraw  within  the  control  of  the  Judicial  <  •  //«; 

that  if  the  decision  of  tlie  Judiciary  be  raised  ab*  ;"  the 

aovereign  parties  to  the  Constitution,  t1  Us  ol  Ui*  art- 


-— «— ,  not  carried  by  tlic  forms  of  tlie  C  n  before  \\  iry, 

must  be  equally  outiioritative  and  final  wiili  die  decisions  of  Uiatde- 
]Nurtment     But  the  proper  answer  to  tlie  objection  is,   that  the  resolu- 
tioa  of  the  Greneral  Assembly  relates  to  tliose  great  and  » 
cans,  in  which  all  the  forms  of  the  Constitution  may  pro\  i 

against  infractions  dangerous  to  tlie  essential  rights  of  ih<  , ,  it. 

The  resolution  supposes  tliat  dangerous  i>owers  not  i\t\cir  not 

only  be  usurped  and  executed  by  tlie  otlier  tho 

Juciicial  department,  also,  may  exercise  or  >  ,  rs 

beyond  the  grant  of  the  Constitution ;  and  «.  >  >    j;  dti. 

mala  right  of  the  parties  to  the  Constitution,  t<>  judj,    ,  ^m- 

paethaa  been  dangerously  violated,  must  extend  to  >  by  one 

deiecaled  authority,  an  wHi  » ^  by  another ;  by  the  Ju<  .  .  ^  well  as 

by  tne  Exeeutive,  or        t  mc. 

However  true,  th»  i  .be  that  the  Judicial  department  is, 

in  all  ({uestiona  submiUA^^d  to  it  by  the  forms  of  the  Con  to 

^eeide  in  the  laat  resort,  this  resort  must  necessarily  be  de*  '  ist 

in  relation  to  the  authorities  of  the  other  departments  of  i  n- 

ment;  not  in  relation  to  tlie  rights  of  the  parties  to  the  C<  nal 

compaeL  from  which  the  Judicial  as  well  ils  the  other  dtimrunenta 
hold  their  delegated  trusts.  On  any  oUicr  hypothesis  the  delegation 
of  JudicuU  power  would  annul  the  audiority  delegating  it;   and  the 


VIRGINIA  AND  KENTUCKY.  47 

concurrence  of  this  department  with  the  others  in  usurped  powers, 
might  subvert  forever,  and  beyond  the  possible  reach  of  any  rightful 
remedy,  tlie  very  Constitution  which  all  were  instituted  to  preserve. 

The  truth  declared  in  the  resolution  being  established,  Uie  expedien- 
cy of  making  the  declaration  at  the  present  day  may  safely  be  left  to 
the  temperate  consideration  and  candid  judgment  of  the  American  pub- 
lic. It  will  be  remembered,  that  a  frequent  recurrence  to  fundamental 
principles,  is  solemnly  enjoined  by  most  of  the  State  Constitutions,  and 
particularly  by  our  own,  as  a  necessary  safeguard  against  Uie  danger 
of  degeneracy  to  which  Republics  are  liable,  as  well  as  other  Govern- 
ments, thoiigli  in  a  less  degree  than  otJiers.  And  a  fair  comparison  of 
the  political  doctrines  not  unfrequent  at  the  present  day,  with  those 
which  characterized  the  epoch  of  our  Revolution,  and  which  forms  the 
basis  of  our  Republican  Constitutions,  will  best  determine  whether  the 
declaratory  recurrence  here  made  to  those  principles,  ought  to  be  view- 
ed as  unseasonable  and  improper,  or  as  a  vigilant  discharge  of  an  im- 
portant duty.  The  authority  of  Constitutions  over  Governments,  and 
of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  over  Constitutions,  are  truths  which 
are  at  all  times  necessary  to  be  kept  in  mind ;  and  at  no  time,  perhaps, 
more  necessary  than  at  present. 

The  fourth  resolution  stands  as  follows : 

"  That  the  General  Assembly  doth  also  express  its  deep  regret,  that 
a  spirit  has,  in  sundry  instances,  been  manifested  by  the  Federal  Gro- 
vernment  to  enlarge  its  powers  by  forced  constructions  of  the  Constitu- 
tional charter  which  defines  them ;  and  that  indications  have  appeared 
of  a  design  to  expound  certain  general  phrases  (which,  having  been 
copied  from  the  very  limited  grant  of  powers  in  tlie  fonner  eurticles 
of  confederation,  were  the  less  liable  to  be  misconstmed),  so  as  to 
destroy  the  meaning  and  effect  of  the  particular  enumeration  which 
necessarily  explains,  and  limits  the  general  phrases;  and  so  as  to  con- 
solidate the  States  by  degrees,  into  one  sovereignty,  the  obvious  tend- 
ency and  inevitable  result  of  which  would  be,  to  transform  the  present 
Republic  system  of  the  United  States  into  an  ab$olute,  or  at  best  a 
mixed  monarchy." 

The  first  question  here  to  be  considered  is,  wletlier  a  spirit  has  in 
sundry  instances  been  manifested  by  the  Federal  Government  to  enlarge 
its  powers  by  forced  constructions  of  the  Constitutional  charter. 

The  General  Assembly  having  declared  tlieir  opinion  merely  by  regret- 
ting in  general  tenns  that  forced  constructions  for  enlarging  the  Fedferal 
powers  nave  taken  place,  it  does  not  appear  to  the  Committee  necessary 
to  go  into  a  specification  of  every  instance  to  which  the  resolution  may 
allude.  The  Alien  and  Sedition  Acts  being  particularly  named  in  a 
succeeding  resolution,  are  of  course  to  be  understo(5d  as  mcluded  in  the 
allusion.  Omitting  others  which  have  less  occupied  public  attention, 
or  been  less  extensively  regarded  as  unconstitutional,  the  resolution  may 
be  presumed  to  refer  particulfirly  to  tlie  Bank  Law,  which,  from  the  cir- 
cumstances of  its  passage,  as  well  as  ilie  latitude  of  construction  on 
which  it  is  founded,  strikes  the  attention  with  singular  force ;  and  the 
carriage  tax,  distinguished  also  by  circumstances  in  its  history,  having 
a  similar  tendency.  Those  instances  alone,  if  resulting  from  forced 
construction,  and  calculated  to  enlarge  the  powers  of  the  Federal 
Grovemment,  as  the  Committee  cannot  but  conceive  D  be  the  case,  suffi- 
ciently warrant  tliis  part  of  tlie  resolution.    The  Committee  have  not 


RESOLUTIONS  OP 

il  incumbent  on  tlmn  to  extend  their  attention  to  laws  which 

ol»)wled  to,  rather  am  varyine  the  Constitutional  distribution 

€f  poven  in  the  Federal  QoTemnient,  uan  as  an  absolute  enlargement 
of  them  i  because  instanoat  of  this  sort,  however  im}x>rUint  in  their 
principles  and  tendencies,  do  not  appear  to  fall  strictly  wiilun  tlie  text 
under  rcTiew. 

The  other  questions  presenting  themselTe^  are— 1.  Whether  indica- 
tions haTe  appeared  of  a  desijni  to  expound  certain  general  phrases 
ttOied  firom  the  *'  Articles  of  Confederation"  so  as  to  oestroy  the  effect 
OitKe  particular  enumeration  explaining  and  limiting  tlieir  meaning. 
9L  Whether  this  exposition  would'by  degrees  consolidate  tlie  States  into 
€oe  aorereicinty.  i.  Whetlier  the  tendency  and  result  of  this  consoli- 
dation woiud  DC  to  transform  the  republican  system  of  the  United 
Stales  into  a  monarchy. 

1.  The  general  phrases  here  meant  must  be  those  "  of  providing  for 
the  common  defence  and  general  welfare." 

In  the  "  Articles  of  Confederation,"  the  phrases  are  used  as  follows, 
in  Art  VIIl.,  "  All  charges  of  war,  and  all  otlier  expenses  that  shall  be 
incurred  for  tkt  common  dejenu  and  general  welfare,  are  allowed  by 
the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled,  shall  be  defrayed  out  of  a 
common  treasury,  which  shall  be  supplied  by  the  several  States,  in  pro- 
Doition  to  the  value  of  all  land  witliin  each  state,  granted  to,  or  surveyed 
■or,  any  penoiL  as  such  land  and  tlie  building^  and  the  improvements 


estimated,  according  to  such  mode  as  ilie  United 
States,  in  Congress  assembled,  jhall  from  time  to  time  direct  and 
appoint" 

In  the  existing  Constitution,  Ihey  make  the  following  part  of  Sec.  8. 
"  The  Congrees  shall  liave  power,  to  lay  and  collect  taxes,  duties,  im- 
posts and  excises,  to  pay  tlic  debts,  and  provide  for  the  conmion  defence 
adceoeral  wel Cure  of  the  United  States." 

Tfie  similarity  in  the  use  of  these  phrases  in  the  two  great  Federal 
duuters,  might  well  be  considered,  as  rendering  their  meaning  less 
liable  to  be  misconstmed  in  tlie  latter:  because  it  will  scarcely  be  said 
that,  in  the  former,  lliey  were  ever  understood  to  be  eiilier  a  general 
grant  of  power,  or  U.  authorize  tlie  requisition  or  application  of  money 
Djr  the  obi  Congress  to  the  common  defence  and  general  welfare,  ex- 
oqpt  in  the  cases  ailerwards  enumerated,  which  explained  and  limited 


uevmeamnc;  and  if  such  was  the  limited  meaning  atlatched  to  these 
Pm^*y  .io  the  very  instrument  revised  and  remodeled  by  ilie  present 
mirtitution,  it  can  never  be  supposed  that  when  copied  into  tlus  Con- 
iCttatioD,  a  different  meaning  ought  to  be  atlaclicd  to  tlieni. 

That,  nocwithsumdin^  thu  remarkable  security  against  misconstruc- 
tion,  a  dcsi^  has  Ijtcn  iiMllcaiw!  t..  ...«..,•  ul  i^csc  phruiic^i  in  tlie  Con- 
■titution^  as  U  •    particular  enumeration  of 

ffowmhf  mhieh  II      , ..i„  li,  m,  must  have  fallen  under 

the  otieenratioo  01  those  who  have  utf.ndcd  to  tlie  course  of  public 
^ensactioos.  Not  to  multiply proofii  on  this  subject,  it  will  suffice  to 
refer  to  the  DebatM  of  the  Fecleral  Legislature,  in  which  arguments 
Sy*.^  °'°^"^^  occasions  been  drawn,  with  apparent  effect,  from 
tMM  phrases,  m  their  indefinite  meaning. 

To  thete  indici^ions  might  be  added,  without  looking  farther,  the 

-  report  oo  Maanfactures,  by  the  late  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 

n  the  5th  of  Deeembcr,  1751  j  and  the  report  of  a  Committee  of 


VIRGINIA  AND  KENTUCKY.  49 

Congress,  in  January,  1797,  on  the  promotion  of  Agriculture.  In  the 
first  of  tliese,  it  is  expressly  contended  to  belono^  "  to  the  discretion  of 
the  National  Legislature,  to  pronounce  upon  me  objects  which  con- 
cern tlie  general  welfare,  and  for  which,  under  that  description,  an 
appropriation  of  money  is  requisite  and  proper.  And  there  seems  to 
be  no  room  for  a  doubt,  that  whatever  concerns  the  general  interests 

of  LEARNING,  of   AGRICULTURE,  of  MANUFACTURES,  and  of  COMMERCE, 

are  within  the  sphere  of  the  National  Councils,  as  far  as  regards  an 
application  of  moiieyy  The  latter  report  assumes  tlie  same  latitude 
of  power  in  tlie  National  Councils,  and  applies  it  to  the  encouragement 
of  Agriculture,  bv  means  of  a  society  to  be  established  at  the  seat  of 
Government.  Although  neither  of  these  reports  may  have  received  the 
sanction  of  a  law  carrying  it  into  effect ;  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
extraordinary  doctrine  contained  in  both,  has  passed  without  the  slight- 
est positive  mark  of  disapprobation  from  tlie  autliority  to  which  it  was 
addressed. 

Now,  whether  the  phrases  in  question  be  construed  to  authorise 
every  measure  relating  to  the  common  defence  and  general  welfare,  as 
contended  by  some ;  or  every  measure  only  in  which  there  might  be  an 
application  of  money,  as  suggested  by  the  caution  of  others ;  the  effect 
must  substantially  be  the  same,  in  destroying  the  import  and  force  of 
the  particular  enumeration  of  powers  which  follow  these  general  plirases 
in  the  Constitution.  For,  it  is  evident  that  there  is  not  a  single  power 
whatever,  which  may  not  have  some  reference  to  the  common  defence, 
or  the  general  welfare ;  nor  a  power  of  any  magnitude,  which,  iii  its 
exercise,  does  not  involve  or  admit  an  application  of  money.  The  Go- 
vernment, therefore,  which  possesses  power  in  either  one  or  other  of 
these  extents,  is  a  government  without  the  limitations  formed  5y  a  par- 
ticular enumeration  of  powers;  and, consequently,  the  meaning  and 
effect  of  this  particular  enumeration,  is  destroyed  by  tb^  exposition 
given  to  these  general  phrases. 

This  conclusion  will  not  be  affected  by  an  attempt  to  qualify  the 
power  over  the  "  general  welfare,"  by  referring  it  U  cases  where  the 
general  welfare  is  beyond  the  reach  of  se;;ara^  provisions  by  the 
individual  states ;  and  leaving  to  these  tlieir  junsdictions  in  ceises  to 
which  their  separate  provisions  may  be  competf<^t.  For,  as  tlie  autho- 
rity of  the  individual  states  must  in  all  cases  b*  incompetent  to  general 
regulations  operating  tlirough  the  whole,  thf  autliority  of  the  United 
States  would  be  extended  to  every  object  reUting  to  the  general  welfare, 
which  might,  by  any  possibility,  be  proviaed  for  by  tlie  general  autho- 
rity. This  qualifying  construction,  therefore,  would  have  little,  if  any 
tendency,  to  circumscribe  the  power  naimed  under  the  latitude  of  the 
tenns  "  general  welfare." 

The  true  and  fair  construction  of  liiis  expression,  both  in  the  original 
and  existing  Federal  compacts,  appears  to  the  Committee  too  obvious 
to  be  mistaken.  In  botli,  tlie  Congress  is  authorised  Ui  provide  money 
for  die  common  defence  and  general  welfare.  In  both  is  subjoined  to 
this  authority  an  enumeration  of  tlie  cases  to  which  their  power  shall 
extend.  Money  cannot  be  applied  to  the  general  welfare,  otherwise 
than  by  an  application  of  it  to  some  particular  measure  conducive  to 
the  general  welfare.  Whenever,  therefore,  money  has  been  raised  by 
the  general  authority,  and  is  to  be  applied  to  a  particular  measure,  a 
question  arises,  whether  the  particular  measure  be  within  the  enume- 


VIRGENIA  RESOLUTIONS. 

TMted  in  Congress.    If  it  be,  ''  v  requisite  for 

JL  MAT  btafMilied  to  it;  if  it  be  not,  no  such  nj  can  be  made. 

Aui  niir  aiidobvious  inteipretatjon  coincides  with,  and  is  enforced  by, 
IIm  danw  in  tlie  constitution)  which  declares  Uiat  ''  no  money  shall  be 
drawn  fton  the  Treasury^  but  in  consequence  of  appropriations  by 
law."  An  appropriation  of  money  to  the  general  welfare,  would  be 
'  rather  a  mockery  than  an  observance  of  tliis  Constitutional 


inknictioo. 

^t  Whether  the  exposition  of  the  g:eneral  phrases  here  combatted, 
woald  not,  by  demea,  conHolidnte  the  States  mto  one  sovereignty,  is  a 
flBMlion,  concemmg  w>  ;iittee  can  perceive  little  room  for 

JUhnnot  of  opinion,     i  <  the  States  into  one  sovereignty, 

TM^h«»y  more  can  be  waut«;d  iJmii  to  supersede  their  respective  sove- 
rainties  in  the  cases  resefvcd  to  them,  by  extending  the  sovereignty  of 
iheUnited  States  to  all  cases  of  the  "  general  welfare,"  that  is  to  say, 
to  ali  oises  vhatever. 

3.  That  the  obvious  tendency  and  inevitable  result  of  a  consolidation 
of  the  States  into  one  sovrrriLnity,  would  be  to  transform  tlie  republican 
cyHan  of  the  United  St  •  monarchy,  is  a  point  which  seems  to 

have  been  sufficiently  d  y  tiie  general  sentiment  of  America. 

In  afanost  every  instance  of  discussion,  relating  to  the  consolidation  in 
qiieetion,  its  certain  tendency  to  pave  the  way  to  monarchy,  seems  not 
to  have  been  contested.  I'he  prospect  of  such  a  consolidation  has 
fimncd  the  only  topic  of  controverfy.  It  would  be  unnecessary,  there- 
fiire.  for  the  committee  to  dwell  long  on  the  reasons  which  support  the 
poaiv.'m  of  tlie  General  Assembly.  It  may  not  be  improper,  liowcver, 
to  n  PiArk  two  consequences,  evidently  flowing  from  an  extension  of 
the  TwWal  powers  to  every  subject  falling  witliin  tlie  idea  of  the 
"general  Welfare." 

One  con»>quence  must  be,  to  enlarge  the  sphere  of  discretion  alloted 
lo  the  KxeciRivc  Magistrate.  Even  within  the  Legislative  limits 
properly  defined  by  the  Constitution,  the  difficulty  of  accommodating 
legal  regqlations  ^  a  country  so  great  in  extent,  and  so  various  in  its 
dfcmiistaneea,  ha^been  much  felt ;  and  has  led  to  occasional  invest- 
■Mtiti  of  jpower  in  (Ve  Executive,  which  involve,  perhaps,  as  large  a 
portion  or  discretion  vx  can  be  deemed  consistent  with  tli<;  nature  ofthe 
Executive  trust.     In  pniiiortioii  vi»  tlie  objects  of  I  wi  cure  might 

be  multiplied,  would  the  ti^c  allowed  for  each  i  ished,  and  the 

diilflnliy^or  providing  uiiiFjrm  and  particular  regulations  for  all,  be 
taarMMd.  From  these  sotrrcs  would  necessarily  ensue  a  greater 
latilnde  lothe  agency  of  that  iK^wurUncnt  which  is  always  in  existence, 
and  whieb eoukl  best  mould  r.<Nlaiions  of  a  general  nature  so  as  to 
suit  them  lo  the  diversity  of  parfviilar  Kituations.  And  it  is  in  this 
latiUide,  M  a  »upf>lrmrnt  to  ihr-  drfrirnry  of  the  laws,  that  the  degree 
ofExeeotireprero^  .Hints. 

td^^^StH  y^l '  '  "f  nn  excessive  augmentation 

2J5^"i~*»t'*'  •'"  iJ^e  Executive  will. 

^mu^iSlJl!?*'  ^^^  description  which 

aT  «!1t*??  '  would  I..  linn,  and  turn  over  to 

IMrMMlGi..  .1  the  p«ti  t   the  Executive  would 

£ak!tkioiW^  "*        »wtUcd  m.this  caae,  as  iu  prerogative  would 
Thk  dkpnipoitaoiiAta  increase  of  prerogative  and  patronage,  mini  | 


VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS.  5t 

evidently  either  enable  the  Chief  Magistrate  of  the  Union,  by  quiet 
means,  to  secure  his  re-election  from  time  to  time,  and,  finally,  to  regu- 
late the  succession  as  he  might  please ;  or,  by  giving  so  transcendent 
an  importance  to  the  office,  would  render  the  elections  to  it  so  violent 
and  corrupt,  that  the  public  voice  itself  might  call  for  an  heriditary,  in 
place  of  an  elective,  succession.  Whichever  of  these  events  might 
follow,  the  transformation  of  the  republican  system  of  the  United 
States  into  a  monarchy,  anticipated  by  the  General  Assembly  from  a 
consolidation  of  tlie  States  into  one  sovereignty,  would  be  equally  ac- 
complished; and  whetlier  it  would  be  into  a  mixed  or  an  absolute 
monarchy,  might  depend  on  too  many  contingencies  to  admit  of  any 
certain  foresight. 

The  resolution  next  in  order  is  contained  in  the  following  terms : 

"  That  the  GeiTeral  Assembly  doth  particularly  protest  against  the 
palpable  and  alarming  infractions  of  the  Constitution,  in  the  two  late 
cases  of  tlie  *  Alien  and  Sedition  Acts,'  passed  at  the  last  session  of 
Congress ;  the  first  of  which  exercises  a  power  no  where  delegated  to 
the  Federal  Government ;  and  which,  by  uniting  Legislative  and  Judi> 
cial  powers  to  those  of  Executive,  subverts  the  general  principles  of  a 
free  government,  as  well  as  the  particular  organization  and  positive 
provisions  of  the  Federal  Constitution ;  and  3ie  other  of  which  acts 
exercises,  in  like  manner,  a  power  not  delegated  by  the  Constitution  j 
but,  on  the  contrary,  expressly  and  positively  forbidden  by  one  of  the 
amendments  thereto ;  a  power,  whieh,  more  than  any  other,  ou^ht  to 
produce  universal  alarm ;  because  it  is  levelled  agamst  that  right  of 
freely  examining  public  characters  and  measures,  and  of  free  communi- 
cation among  the  people  thereon,  which  has  ever  been  justly  deemed 
the  only  effectual  guurdian  of  every  other  ri»ht." 

The  subject  of  tliis  resolution  having,  it  is  presumed,  more  particu- 
larly led  the  General  Assembly  into  the  proceedings  which  they  com- 
municated to  the  other  States,  and  being  in  itself  of  peculiar  importance ; 
it  deserves  the  most  critical  and  faithful  investigation ;  for  tiie  length 
of  which  no  other  apology,  will  be  necessary. 

The  subject  divides  itself  inio,Jirst,  "  The  Alien  Act,"  secondlv. 
"  The  Sedition  Act." 

Of  the  "  Alien  Act,"  it  is  affirmed  by  tlie  Resolution,  1st  That  it 
exercises  a  power  no  where  delegated  to  the  Federal  Gk)vemment.  3d. 
That  it  unites  Legislative  and  Judicial  powers  to  those  of  the  Executive. 
3d.  Thai  this  union  of  power,  subverts  the  general  principles  of  free 
government.  4th.  That  it  subverts  the  particular  organization  and 
positive' provisions  of  the  Federal  Constitution. 

In  order  to  clear  the  way  to  a  correct  view  of  the  first  position,  seve- 
ral observations  will  be  premised. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  to  be  borne  in  mind,  that  it  being  a  characteri»> 
tic  feature  of  tne  Federal  Constitution,  as  it  was  originally  ratifiwl,  and 
an  amendment  thereto  having  precisely  declared,  "  That  the  powers 
not  delegated  to  the  United  States  by  tlie  Constitution,  nor  pronibited 
by  it  to  the  States,  are  reserved  to  the  States  respectively,  or  to  the 
people  ;"  it  is  incumbent  in  this,  as  in  every  other  exercise  of  power  by 
die  Federal  Government,  to  prove,  from  the  Constitution,  that  it  grants 
theparticular  power  exercised. 

The  next  observation  to  be  made,  is,  that  much  confusion  and  fallacy 
have  been  thrown  into  the  question,  by  blending  the  two  cases  o{  aliens j 


ai  VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS. 

mimbers  of  a  hostile  nation ;  and  aliens,  members  of  friendly  nations. 
TlMse  two  cases  are  so  obviously,  and  so  essentiaify  distinct,  that  it 
occasions  no  litUe  surprise  that  the  distinction  should  have  been  disre- 
garded ;  and  the  surprise  is  so  much  the  greater,  as  it  appears  that  the 
two  cases  are  actually  distinguished  by  two  separate  acts  of  Congress, 
passed  at  the  same  session,  and  comprised  in  the  same  publication; 
the  one  providing  for  the  case  of"  alien  enemies,"  the  other  "  concern- 
ing aliens"  indiscriminately ;  and  conseqiiently  extending  to  aliens  of 
every  nation  in  peace  and  amity  with  tlie  United  States.  With  respect 
to  alien  enemies,  no  doubt  has  been  intimated  as  to  the  Federal  authori- 
ty over  them ;  the  Constitution  having  expressly  delegated  to  Congress 
tne  power  to  declare  war  against  any  nation,  and  of  course  to  treat  it 
and  all  its  members  as  enemies.  With  respect  to  aliens,  who  are  not 
enemies,  but  members  of  nations  in  peace  and  amity  with  the  United 
States,  die  power  assumed  by  the  act  of  Congress,  is  denied  to  be  con- 
stitutional ;  and  it  is  accordingly  against  this  act  that  the  protest  of  the 
Gteneral  Assembly  is  expressly  and  exclusively  directed. 

A  third  observation  is,  that  were  it  admitted,  as  is  contended,  that  the 
"  act  concerning  Aliens^"  has  for  its  object,  not  a  penal,  but  a  prevent- 
ive juBiice -,  it  would  still  remain  to  be  proved  that  it  comes  within  the 
constitutional  power  of  tlie  Federal  Legislature;  and,  if  within  its 
power,  that  the  Legislature  has  exercised  in  a  constitutional  manner. 

In  the  administration  of  preventive  justice,  the  following  principles 
have  been  held  sacred  ;  that  some  probable  ^ound  of  suspicion  be  ex- 
hibited before  some  Judicial  authority ;  that  it  be  supported  by  oath  or 
affirmation  ;  that  the  party  may  avoid  being  thrown  into  connnement, 
by  finding  pledges  or  sureties  for  his  legal  conduct  sufficient  in  the 
judgment  ot  some  Judicial  authority ;  that  he  may  have  the  benefit  of 
a  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  and  thus  obtain  his  release,  if  wrongfully 
confined ;  and  that  he  may  at  any  time  be  discharged  from  his  recog- 
nizance, or  his  confinement,  and  restored  to  his  former  liberty  and 
rights,  on  the  order  of  the  proper  Judicial  authority,  if  it  shall  see  suf- 
ficient cause. 

All  these  principles  of  the  only  preventive  justice  known  to  Ameri- 
can jurisprudence,  are  violated  by  the  Alien  act.  Tjie  ground  of  sus- 
picion is  to  be  judged  of  not  by  any  Judicial  authority,  but  by  the  Exe- 
Olrtive  Magistrate  alone;  no  oath  or  affirmation  is  required;  if  the 
■uspicion  be  held  reasonable  by  the  President,  he  may  ord«M  the  sus- 
pected Alien  to  depart  the  territory  of  the  United  States,  without  the 
^opportunity  of  avoiding  the  sentence,  by  finding  pledges  for  his  future 
good  conduct;  as  the  President  may  limit  the  time  of  departure  as  he 
pleaaes,  the  benefit  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  may  be  su.sp(  luled  with 
retpect  to  the  party,  although  the  Constitution  ordains,  that  it  shall  not 
be  suspended,  unless  when  the  public  safety  may  require  it  in  case  of 
rebellion  or  invasion,  neither  of  which  existed  at  the  passage  of  the  act; 
and  the  party,  being  under  the  sentence  of  the  president,  either  removed 
firom  the  Untied  States,  or  being  pimished  by  imprisonment,  or  disqua- 
lification ever  to  become  a  citizen  on  conviction  of  not  obeying  the 
order  of  removal,  he  cannr>t  be  discharged  from  the  proceedings  against 
Um,  and  restored  to  the  Ix'nefits  of  his  former  situation,  although  the 
kigkest  Judicial  authority  should  see  the  most  sufficient  cause  fnr  it. 

Vat,  in  the  last  place,  it  can  never  Ix*  admitted  that  the  removal  of 
Aliens,  authorised  by  the  act,  is  to  be  considered,  not  as  punishment  for 


VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS.  S3 

an  offence,  but  as  a  measure  of  precaution  and  prevention.  If  the  ba- 
nishment of  an  alien  from  a  country  into  which  he  has  been  invited,  as 
the  asylum  most  auspicious  to  his  happiness;  a  country  where  he  may 
have  formed  the  most  tender  connections ;  where  he  may  have  invested 
his  entire  property,  and  acquired  property  of  the  real  ancl  permanent,  as 
well  as  the  moveable  and  temporary  kind ;  where  he  enjoys  under  the 
laws  a  greater  share  of  the  blessings  of  personal  security,  and  personal 
liberty,  than  he  can  elsewhere  hope  for,  and  where  he  may  have  nearly 
completed  his  probationary  title  to  citizenship ;  if,  moreover,  in  the  ex- 
ecution of  the  sentence  against  him,  he  is  to  be  exposed,  not  only  to  the 
ordinary  dangers  of  the  sea,  but  to  the  peculiar  casualties  incident  to  a 
crisis  of  war,  and  of  unusual  licentiousness  on  that  element,  and  possi- 
bly to  vindictive  purposes  which  his  emigration  itself  may  have  pro- 
voked ;  if  a  banishment  of  this  sort  be  not  a  punishment,  and  among 
the  severest  of  punishments,  it  will  be  difficult  to  imagine  a  doom  to 
which  the  name  can  be  applied.  And  if  it  be  a  punishment,  it  will  re- 
main to  be  inquired,  whether  it  can  be  constitutionally  inflicted,  on 
mere  suspicion,  by  the  single  will  of  the  Executive  Magistrate,  on  per- 
sons convicted  of  no  personsal  offence  against  the  laws  of  the  land,  nor 
involved  in  any  offence  against  the  law  of  nations,  charged  on  the 
foreign  state  of  which  they  are  members. 

One  argument  offered  in  justification  of  this  power  exercised  over 
Aliens,  is,  that  the  admission  of  them  into  the  country  being  of  favor, 
not  of  right,  the  favor  is  at  all  times  revocable.  » 

To  this  argmnent  it  might  be  answered,  tliat,  allowing  the  truth  of 
the  inference,  it  would  be  no  proof  of  what  is  required.  A  question 
would  still  occur,  whether  the  Constitution  has  vested  the  discretionary 
power  of  admitting  Aliens,  in  the  Federal  government  or  in  the  State 
governments. 

But  it  cannot  be  a  true  inference,  that  because  the  admission  of  an 
Alien  is  a  favor,  the  favor  may  be  revoked  at  pleasure.  A  grant  of 
land  to  an  individual,  may  be  of  favor,  not  of  right ;  but  the  moment 
the  grant  is  made,  the  favor  becomes  a  right,  and  must  be  forfeited  be- 
fore it  can  be  taken  away.  To  pardon  a  malefactor  may  be  a  favor, 
but  the  pardon  is  not,  on  tliat  account,  the  less  irrevocable.  To  admit 
an  Alien  to  naturalization,  is  as  much  a  favor,  as  to  admit  him  to  reside 
in  the  country,  yet  it  cannot  be  pretended  that  a  person  natiu-alized 
can  be  deprived  of  the  benefits  any  more  than  a  native  citizen  can  be 
disfranchised. 

A^ain,  it  is  said  tliat  Aliens  not  being  parties  to  the  Constitution, 
the  rights  and  privileges  which  it  secures,  cannot  be  at  all  claimed  by 
them. 

To  this  reasoning,  also,  it  might  be  answered,  that  although  Aliens 
are  not  parties  to  the  Constitution,  it  does  not  follow  tliat  tlie  Constitu- 
tion has  vested  in  Congress  an  absolute  power  over  them.  The  par- 
ties to  the  Constitution  may  have  granted,  or  retained,  or  modified  the 
power  over  Aliens,  without  regard  to  that  particular  consideration. 

But  a  more  direct  reply  is,  that  it  does  not  follow,  because  Aliens  are 
not  parties  to  the  Constitutions,  as  citizens  are  parties  to  it,  that  whilst 
they  actually  conform  to  it,  they  have  no  right  to  its  protection.  Aliens 
are  not  more  parties  to  the  laws,  than  they  are  parties  to  the  Constitu- 
tion ;  yet,  it  will  not  be  disputed,  that  as  they  owe,  on    one  hand,  a 

5* 


54  VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS. 

IflBlpoifttry  obediaooe,  they  are  entitled  in  rabirn  to  their  proteelte  mod 
•dhrentage. 

IfAlienshadno  right  under  the  Constitution,  the]r  might  not  only 
be  banithedi  but  even  capitally  punished,  without  a  jury  or  the  other 
incidents  to  a  (air  trial.  But  to  far  has  a  contrary  principle  been  car* 
ried.  in  cTcry  part  of  the  United  States,  thatexcept  on  charges  of  treason, 
an  Alien  has,  besides  all  the  common  privileges,  the  special  one  of 
bein^  tried  by  a  jury,  of  which  one  half  may  be  also  Aliens. 

It  u  said,  rurtner,  that  by  the  law  and  practice  of  nations,  Aliens 
may  be  removed  ai  discretion,  for  offences  against  the  law  of  nations : 
that  Congress  are  authorized  to  define  and  punish  such  offences ;  and 
that  to  be  dangerous  to  the  peace  of  society,  is,  in  Aliens,  one  of  thoee 
offences. 

The  distinction  between  Alien  enemies  and  Al  •  < Is,  is  a  clear 

and  conclusive  answer  to  this  argument    Alien  •  ^re  under  the 

law  of  nations,  and  liable  to  be  punished  for  otVciic^s  against  it. 
Alien  fciends,  except  in  the  single  cose  of  public  ministers,  are  und»  r  the 
municipal  law,  ana  must  be  tried  and  punished  acr4)rding  to  that  law 
onlv. 

This  arg:ument  also,  by  referring  the  Alien  act  to  the  power  of  Con- 

rB  to  define  and  punish  ofTences  against  the  law  of  nations,  yields 
point  that  the  act  is  of  a  pefuil,  not  merely  of  a  preventive 
operation.  It  must  in  truth  be  so  considered.  And  if  it  be  a  penal 
act,  the  punishment  it  indicts  must  be  justified  by  some  offence  that 
deserves  it 

Offences  for  which  Aliens,  within  tlie  jurisdiction  of  a  country,  are 
punishable,  are  first,  offences  committed  by  the  nation  of  which  they 
make  a  part,  and  in  whose  offences  they  are  involved :    Secondly, 
offences  committed  by  themselves  alone,   without  any  rhar're  to  the 
nation  to  which  they  belong.     The  first  is  the  case  of  Al 
the  second,  Uie  case  of  Alien  friends.      In  tlie  first  case,   i 
nation  can  no  otherwise  l)e  punished  tlian  by  war,  one  of  U»< 
which,  authorises  the  expulsion  of  such  of  its  members  as 
found  witliin  country,  against  which  tlie  offence  has  been  c»m 
In  the  second  case,  the  offence  bein^  committed  by  tlie  indivi 
by  his  nation,  and  against  the  municipal  law,  not  again 
nations,  tlie  individual  only,  and  not  Uie  nation,  is  pun 
the  punishment  must  be  conducted  acconling  to  tlie  nn 
not  according  to  the  law  of  nations.     Under  this  view  «■: 
the  act  of  Congress,  for  the  removal  of  Alien  enemies,  \ni 
bleto  the  law  of  nations,  is  justified  by  the  Constitution  ;  . 
for  tlie  removal  of  Alien  friends,  1  ngnaiit  to  tlie  coiit»uiuLiuual 

principles  of  Municipal  law,  is  iin  . . 

Nor  is  the  act  of  Congress  for  the  removal  of  Alien   '- 
a^jeeable  to  the  general  practice  of  nations,  than  it  is  ^  > 
view  of  the  law  of  nations.     The  general  practice  of  naiuuui  dt&uii- 
guishes  between  Alien  friends  and  Alien  enemies.     The  Inttcr  it   has 
proceeded  against^  acconling  to  the  law  of  nati 
as  enemies;  the  u>micr  it  lias  consitKred  as  un 
rary  allegiance,  and  eniiilnl  to  a  corresjKmdcnt  prutectiuti.     ll 
instances  are  tol>e  found   in  barbaniun  countries,  under  unHt  i 
fogatives,  or  amid  revolutionary  daii^^ers,  they  will  not  I 


VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS.  55 

precedents  for  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  even,  if  not  beyond 
Us  constitutional  authority. 

It  is  said  that  Congress  may  grant  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal ; 
that  reprisals  may  be  ihade  on  persons,  as  well  as  property  ;  and  that 
the  removal  of  Aliens  may  be  considered  as  the  exercise,  in  an  inferior 
degree,  of  the  general  power  of  reprisal  on  persons. 

Without  entering  mmutely  into  a  c^uestion  that  does  not  seem  to  re- 
quire it,  it  may  be  remarked,  that  reprisal  is  a  seizure  of  foreign  persons 
or  property,  with  a  view  to  obtain  that  justice  for  injuries  done  by  one 
State  or  its  members  to  another  State  or  its  members :  for  which,  a 
refusal  of  the  aggressors  requires  such  a  resort  to  force  under  the  law 
of  nations.  It  must  be  considered  as  an  abuse  of  words,  to  call  the 
removal  of  persons  from  a  country,  a  seizure  or  reprisal  on  them  ;  nor 
is  tlie  distinction  to  be  overlooked  between  reprisals  on  persons  within 
the  country  and  under  the  faith  of  its  laws,  and  on  persons  out  of  the 
country.  But  laving  aside  these  considerations,  it  is  evidently  impossi- 
ble to  bring  the  Alien  act  within  the  power  of  granting  reprisals ;  since 
it  does  not  allege  or  imply  any  injury  received  from  any  particular 
nation,  for  which  this  proceeding  against  its  members  was  intended  as 
a  reparation. 

The  proceeding  is  authorized  against  Aliens  of  every  nation ;  of 
nations  charged  neither  with  any  similar  proceeding  against  American 
citizens,  nor  with  any  injuries  for  which  justice  might  be  sought, 
in  the  mode  prescribed  by  the  act.  Were  it  true,  therefore,  that  good 
causes  existed  for  reprisals  against  one  or  more  foreign  nations,  and 
that  neither  the  persons  nor  property  of  its  members,  under  the  faith  of 
our  laws,  could  plead  an  exemption ;  the  operation  of  tlie  act  ought  to 
have  been  limited  to  the  Aliens  among  us,  belonging  to  such  nations. 
To  license  reprisals  against  all  nations,  for  aggressions  charged  on  one 
only,  would  be  a  measure  as  contrary  to  every  principle  of  justice  and 
public  law,  as  to  a  wise  policy  and  the  universal  practice  of  nations. 

It  is  said  that  the  right  of  removing  Aliens  is  an  incident  to  the 
power  of  war,  vested  in  Congress  by  the  Constitution. 

This  is  a  fonner  argument  in  a  new  shape  only ;  and  is  answered  by 
repeating,  that  the  removal  of  Alien  enemies  is  an  incident  to  tlie 
power  of  war ;  that  the  removal  of  Alien  friends  is  not  an  incident  to 
the  power  of  war. 

It  is  said  that  Congress  are  by  the  Constitution  to  protect  each  state 
against  invasion;  and  that  the  means  of  preventing  invasion  are  in- 
cluded in  the  power  of  protection  against  it. 

The  power  of  war,  in  general,  having  been  before  granted  by  the 
Constitution,  this  clause  must  either  be  a  mere  specification  for  greater 
caution  and  certainty,  of  which  there  are  other  examples  in  tlie  instru- 
ment ;  or  by  the  iniunclion  of  a  duty,  superadded  to  a  grant  of  the 
power.  Under  either  explanation,  it  cannot  enlarge  tlie  powers  of 
Congress  on  tlie  subgect.  The  power  and  the  duty  to  protect  each  state 
affainst  an  invading  enemy  would  be  tlis  samevmder  the  general  power, 
if  this  regard  to  greater  caution  had  been  omitted. 

Invasion  is  an  operation  of  war.  To  protect  against  invasion  is  an 
exercise  of  the  power  of  war.  A  power,  therefore,  not  incident  to 
war,  cannot  be  incident  to  a  particular  modification  of  war.  And  as 
the  removal  of  alien  friends,  has  appeared  to  be  no  incident  to  a  gener£d 


56  VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS. 

state  of  war,  it  cannot  be  incident  to  a  partial  state,  or  a  particular 
modification  of  war. 

Nor  can  it  ever  be  granted,  that  a  power  to  act  on  a  case  when  it 
actually  occurs,  includes  a  power  over  all  the  means  that  may  tend  to 
prevent  tlie  occurrence  of  the  case.  Such  a  latitude  of  construction 
would  render  unavailing  every  practical  definition  of  particular  and 
limited  powers.  Under  the  idea  of  preventing  war  in  general,  as  well 
as  invasion  in  particular,  not  only  an  indiscriminate  removal  of  all 
aliens  might  be  enforced,  but  a  thousand  other  things  still  more  remote 
from  the  operations  and  precautions  appurtenant  to  war,  might  take 
place.  A  bigotted  or  tyrannical  nation  might  threaten  us  with  war, 
unless  certain  religious  or  political  regulations  were  adopted  by  us ; 
yet  it  never  could  be  inferred,  if  the  regulations  which  would  prevent 
war,  w^ere  such  as  Congress  had. otherwise  no  power  to  make,  that  the 
power  to  make  them  would  grow  out  of  the  pui-pose  they  were  to 
answer.  Congress  have  power  to  suppress  insurrections,  yet  it  would 
not  be  allowed  to  follow,  that  they  might  employ  all  the  means  tending 
to  prevent  them ;  of  which  a  system  of  moral  instruction  for  the  igno- 
rant, and  of  provident  support  for  the  poor,  might  be  regarded  as  among 
the  most  efficacious. 

One  argument  for  the  power  of  the  General  Government  to  remove 
aliens,  would  have  been  passed  in  silence,  if  it  had  appeared  under 
any  authority  inferior  to  that  of  a  report  made  during  the  last  session  of 
Congress,  to  the  House  of  Representatives,  by  a  committee,  and 
approved  by  the  House.  The  doctrine  on  which  this  argument  is 
founded  is  of  so  new,  and  so  extraordinary  a  character,  and  sti'ikes 
so  radically  at  the  political  system  of  America,  that  it  is  proper  to  state 
it  in  the  very  words  of  the  report. 

"  The  act  [concerning  aliens]  is  said  to  be  unconstitutional,  because 
to  remove  aliens  is  a  direct  breach  of  the  Constitution,  which  provides, 
by  the  9th  section  of  the  1st  article :  That  the  migration  or  importation 
of  such  persons  as  any  of  the  states  shall  think  proper  to  admit,  shall 
not  be  prohibited  by  the  Congress,  prior  to  the  year  1808." 

Among  the  answers  given  to  this  objection  to  the  constitutionality  of 
the  act,  the  following  very  remarkable  one  is  extracted : 

"  Thirdly,  that  as  the  Constitution  has  given  to  the  states  no  power 
to  remove  aliens,  during  the  period  of  the  limitation  under  considera- 
tion, in  the  mean  time,  on  the  construction  assumed  there  would  be  no 
authority  in  the  country  empowered  to  send  away  dangerous  aliens, 
which  cannot  be  admitted." 

The  reasoning  here  used  would  not  in  any  view  be  conclusive  ;  be- 
cause there  are  powers  exercised  by  most  other  governments,  which^^n 
the  United  States  are  withheld  by  the  people,  both  from  the  General 
Government  and  from  the  State  Gevernments.  Of  this  sort  are  many 
of  the  powers  prohibited  by  the  declarations  of  right  fDrefixed  to  the 
Constitutions,  or  by  the  clauses  in  the  Constitutions  in  the  nature  of 
such  declarations.  Nay,  so  far  is  the  political  system  of  the  United 
States  distinguishable  from  that  of  other  countries,  by  the  caution  with 
which  powers  are  delegated  and  defined ;  that  in  one  very  important 
case,  even  of  commercial  regulation  and  revenue,  the  power  is  abso- 
lutely locked  up  against  the  hands  of  both  governments.  A  tax  on 
e:jLports  can  be  laid  by  no  constitutional  authority  whatever.  Under  a 
system  thus  peculiarly  guarded  there  could  surely  be  no  absurdity  in 


VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS.  57 

supposing  that  alien  friends,  who,  if  guilty  of  treasonable  machinations, 
may  be  punished,  or  if  suspected  on  probable  grounds,  may  be  secured 
by  pledges  or  imprisonment,  in  like  manner  with  permanent  citizens, 
were  never  meant  to  be  subjected  to  banishment  by  any  arbitrary  and 
unusual  process,  either  under  the  one  government  or  the  other. 

But  it  is  not  the  inconclusiveness  of  the  general  reasoning  in  this  pas- 
sage, which  chiefly  calls  the  attention  to  it.  It  is  the  principle  assumed 
by  it,  that  the  powers  held  by  the  states  are  given  to  tl:iem  by  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States ;  and  the  inference  from  this  principle, 
that  the  powers  supposed  to  be  necessary,  which  are  not  so  given  to  the 
State  Governments,  must  reside  in  the  Government  of  the  United 
States. 

The  respect  which  is  felt  for  every  portion  of  the  constituted  authori- 
ties, forbids  some  of  the  reflections  which  this  singular  paragraph 
might  excite ;  and  they,  are  the  more  readily  suppressed,  as  it  may  be 
presumed,  with  justice  perhaps,  as  well  as  candor,  that  inadvertence  may 
have  had  its  share  in  the  error.  It  would  be  an  unjustifiable  delicacy, 
nevertheless,  to  pass  by  so  portentous  a  claim,  proceeding  from  so  high 
an  authority,  witliout  a  monitory  notice  of  the  fatal  tendencies  with 
which  it  would  be  pregnant. 

Lastly,  it  is  said  that  a  law  on  the  same  subject  with  the  Alien  Act, 
passed  by  this  state  originally  in  1785,  and  re-enacted  in  1792,  is  a  proof 
that  a  summary  removal  of  suspected  aliens,  was  not  heretofore  re- 
garded by  the  Virginia  Legislature,  as  liable  to  tlie  objections  now 
urged  against  such  a  measure. 

This  charge  against  Virginia  vanishes  before  the  simple  remark, 
tliat  the  law  of  Virginia  relates  to  "  suspicious  persons  being  the  sub- 
jects of  any  foreign  power  or  state,  who  shall  have  made  a  declaration 
of  war^  or  actually  commenced  hostilities^  or  from  whom  the  President 
shall  apprehend  hostile  designs ;"  whereas  the  act  of  Congress  relates 
to  aliens,  being  the  subjects  of  foreign  powers,  and  states,  who  have 
neither  declared  war,  nor  commenced  hostilities,  nor  from  whom  hostile 
designs  are  apprehended. 

II.  It  is  next  aflirmed  by  the  Alien  Act,  that  it  unites  Legislative, 
Judicial,  and  Executive  powers  in  the  hands  of  the  President. 

However  diflicult  it  may  be  to  mark  in  every  ca^e  with  clearness  and 
certainty,  the  line  which  divides  Legislative  power  from  the  other  de- 
partments of  power,  all  will  agree  that  the  powers  referred  to  these 
departments  may  be  so  general  and  undefined  as  to  be  of  a  legislative, 
not  of  an  executive  or  judicial  nature ;  and  may  for  that  reason  be  un- 
constitutional. Details  to  a  certain  degree  are  essential  to  the  nature 
and  character  of  a  law ;  and  on  criminal  subjects  it  is  proper  that  de- 
tails should  leave  as  little  as  possible  to  the  discretion  of  those  who  are 
to  apply  and  execute  the  law.  If  nothing  more  were  required  in  exer- 
cising a  legislative  trust,  than  a  general  conveyance  of  authority,  with- 
out laying  down  any  precise  rules,  by  which  the  authority  conveyed 
should  be  carried  into  effect ;  it  would  follow  that  the  whole  power  of 
legislation  might  be  transferred  by  the  Legislature  from  itself,  and  pro- 
clamations might  become  substitutes  for  laws.  A  delegation  of  power 
in  this  latitude  would  not  be  denied  to  be  a  union  of  the  different 
powers. 

To  determine,  then,  whether  the  appropriate  powers  of  the  distinct 
departments  are  united  by  the  act  authorising  tlie  executive  to  remove 


58  VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS. 

aliens,  it  must  be  inquired  whether  it  contains  such  details,  definitions, 
and  rules  as  appertain  to  the  true  character  of  a  law  ;  especially  a  law 
by  which  personal  liberty  is  invaded,  property  deprived  of  its  \C^}g  to 
the  owner,  and  life  itself  indirectly  exposed  to  danger. 

The  Alien  Act  declares,  "  that  it  shall  be  lawful  for  the  President  to 
order  all  such  aliens  as  he  shall  judge  dangerous  to  the  peace  and  safety 
of  the  United  States,  or  shall  have  reasonable  ground  to  suspect^  are 
concerned  in  any  treasonable,  or  secret  machinations  against  the  go- 
vernment thereof,  to  depart,"  &c. 

Could  a  power  be  well  given  in  terms  less  definite,  less  particular, 
and  less  precise  1  To  be  dangerous  to  the  public  safety  ;  to  be  51^5- 
pected  of  secret  machinations  against  the  government :  these  can  never 
be  mistaken  for  legal  rules  or  certain  definitions.  They  leave  every 
thing  to  the  President.     His  will  is  the  law. 

But  it  is  not  a  Legislative  power  only  that  is  given  to  the  President. 
He  is  to  stand  in  the  place  of  the  Judiciary  also.  His  suspicion  is  the 
only  evidence  which  is  to  convict :  his  order  the  only  judgment  which 
is  to  be  executed. 

Thus  it  is,  the  President,  whose  will  is  to  designate  the  offensive 
conduct ;  it  is  his  will  that  is  to  ascertain  the  individuals  on  whom  it  is 
charged ;  and  it  is  his  will  that  is  to  cause  the  sentence  to  be  executed. 
It  is  rightly  affirmed,  therefore,  that  the  act  unites  Legislative  and  Judi- 
cial powers  to  those  of  the  Executive. 

III.  It  is  affirmed  that  this  union  of  power  subverts  the  general 
principles  of  free  government. 

It  has  become  an  axiom  in  the  science  of  government,  that  a  separa- 
tion of  the  Legislative,  Executive,  and  Judicial  departments  is  neces- 
sary to  the  preservation  of  public  liberty.  Nowhere  has  this  axiom 
been  better  understood  in  theory,  or  more  carefully  pursued  in  practice, 
than  in  the  United  States. 

IV.  It  is  affirmed  that  such  a  union  of  powers  subverts  the  particular 
organization  and  positive  provisions  of  the  Federal  Constitution. 

According  to  the  particular  organization  of  the  Constitution,  its  legis-  > 
lative  powers  are  vested  in  the  Congress,  its  Executive  powers  in  the 
President,  and  its  Judicial  powers  in  a  supreme  and  inferior  tribunals. 
The  union  of  any  two  of  these  powers,  and  still  more  of  all  three,  in 
any  one  of  these  departments,  as  has  been  shown  to  be  done  by  the 
Alien  Act,  must  consequently  subvert  the  constitutional  organization  of 
them. 

That  positive  provisions  in  the  Constitution,  securing  to  individuals 
the  benefits  of  fair  trial,  are  also  violated  by  the  union  of  powers  in  the 
Alien  Act,  necessarily  results  from  the  two  facts,  that  the  act  relates  to 
alien  friends,  and  that  alien  friends  being  under  the  municipal  law  only, 
are  entitled  to  its  protection. 

The  second  object  against  which  the  resolution  protests,  is  the  Sedi- 
tion Act. 

Of  this  act  it  is  affirmed,  1.  That  it  exercises  in  like  manner  a  power 
not  delegated  by  the  Constitution.  2.  That  the  power,  on  the  contary, 
is  expressly  and  positively  forbidden  by  one  of  the  amendments  to  the 
Constitution,  3.  That  this  is  a  power  which  more  than  any  other 
ou^ht  to  produce  universal  alarm,  because  it  is  levelled  against  that 
rignt  of  freely  examining  public  characters  and  measures,  and  of  free 


VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS.  69 

communication  thereon,  which  has  ever  been  justly  deemed  the  only- 
effectual  guardian  of  every  other  right. 

1.  That  it  exercises  a  power  not  delegated  by  the  Constitution. 
Here  again  it  will  be  proper  to  recollect,  that  the  Federal  government 
being  composed  of  powers  specifically  granted,  with  a  reservation  of 
all  others,  to  the  states  or  to  the  people,  the  positive  authority  under 
which  the  Sedition  Act  could  be  passed  must  be  produced  by  those  who 
assert  its  constitutionality.  In  what  part  of  the  Constitution  then  is 
this  authority  to  be  found. 

Several  attempts  have  been  made  to  answer  this  question,  which  will 
be  examined  in  their  order.  The  Committee  will  begin  with  one, 
which  has  filled  them  with  equal  astonishment  and  apprehension ;  and 
which,  they  cannot  but  persuade  themselves,  must  have  tlie  same  effect 
on  all  who  will  consider  it  with  coolness  and  impartiality,  and  with  a 
reverence  for  our  Constitution,  in  the  true  character  in  which  it  issued 
from  the  sovereign  authority  of  the  people.  The  Committee  refer  to  the 
doctrine  lately  advanced  as  a  sanction  to  the  Sedition  Act;  "  that  the 
common  or  unwritten  law,"  a  law  of  vast  extent  and  complexity,  and  em- 
bracing almost  every  possible  subject  of  legislation,  both  civil  and  cri- 
minal, makes  apart  of  the  law  of  these  states,  in  their  united  and  national 
capacity. 

The  novelty,  and,  in  the  judgment  of  the  Committee,  the  extrava- 
gance of  this  pretension,  would  have  consigned  it  to  the  silence  in  which 
they  have  passed  by  other  arguments,  which  an  extraordinary  zeal  for 
the  act  has  drawn  into  the  discussion ;  but  tlie  auspices  under  which 
this  innovation  presents  itself,  have  constrained  the  Committee  to  be- 
stow on  it  an  attention  which  other  considerations  might  have  forbid- 
den. 

In  executing  the  task,  it  may  be  of  use  to  look  back  to  the  colonial 
state  of  this  country  prior  to  the  Revolution  ;  to  trace  the  effect  of  the 
Revolution  which  converted  the  colonies  into  independent  states ;  to  in- 
quire into  the  import  of  the  articles  of  confederation,  the  first  instrument 
by  which  the  union  of  the  states  was  regularly  established ;  and,  finally, 
to  consult  the  Constitution  of  1787,  which  is  the  oracle  that  must  decide 
the  important  question. 

In  the  state  prior  to  the  Revolution,  it  is  certain  that  the  common  law, 
under  different  limitations,  made  a  part  of  the  colonial  codes.  But 
whether  it  be  understood  that  the  original  colonists  brought  the  law  with 
them,  or  made  it  their  law  by  adoption,  it  is  equally  certain  that  it  was 
the  separate  law  of  each  colony  within  its  respective  limits,  and  was 
unknown  to  them,  as  a  law  pervading  and  operating  through  the  whole, 
as  one  society. 

It  could  not  possibly  be  otherwise.  The  common  law  was  not  the 
same  in  any  two  of  the  colonies ;  in  some  the  modifications  were  ma- 
terially and  extensively  different.  There  was  no  common  legislature, 
by  which  a  common  will  could  be  expressed  in  the  fonn  of  a  law  ;  nor 
any  common  magistracy,  by  which  such  a  law  could  be  carried  into 
practice.  The  will  of  each  colony,  alone  and  separately,  had  its  organs 
for  these  purposes. 

This  stage  of  our  politiced  history  furnishes  no  foothold  for  the  pa- 
trons of  this  new  doctrine. 

Did,  then,  tlie  principle  or  operation  of  the  great  event  which  made 


O)  VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS. 

the  oolonie»  n*(lon<^udeiu  states,  imply  or  inuoduce  the  conuiion  law,  as 
A  law  oft). 

Therm,  I  principle  of  tlie  Revoliitinn  WMK  ilmt  ill.    rnlitnies 

•werc<  s  with  each  other,  .  :  of 

<in '^n  Minmn  •xt'cutive  tuA . .  ;  by 

ill  The  legishr  lin- 

lu...c^.  . .  ..V  ..    .  v...i..,. liiierican  parliui ish 

parliament    And  llie  royal  prerogative  waa  in  force  in  uy, 

by  virtue  of  its  acknowUtlging  the  king  f(>r  its  ex«  <  "«' v  i  us 

it  was  in  Great  Britain,  by  virtue  of  a  like  ackii<  A 

denial  of  these  principles  by  Great  Britain,  and  tliv,  ...,^v...^... . .  ...i  .u  by 

America,  produced  Uie  Revolution. 

There  was  a  time,  indeed,  when  an  exception  to  the  legislative  sepa- 
ration of  tlie  several  conijmnent  and  co-equal  parts  of  tlie  empire,  ob- 
tained a  degree  of  acquiescence.  The  British  Parliament  was  allowed 
to  regulate  the  trade  with  foreign  nations,  and  between  the  different 
parts  of  the  empire.  This  was,  however,  mere  practice  witli  our  right, 
and  contrary  to  tlie  tluory  of  tlie  Constitution.  The  convenience  of 
some  regulations  in  both  cases  was  apparent ;  and,  as  there  was  no 
legislature  with  power  over  the  whole,  nor  any  constitutional  pre-emi- 
nence among  tlie  legi.slutures  of  the  several  parts,  it  was  natural  for  the 
legislature  of  that  particular  part  which  was  the  eldest  and  the  largest, 
to  assume  Uiis  function,  and  for  llie  others  to  acquiesce  in  it.  This  tacit 
arrangement  was  tlie  less  criticised,  as  tlie  regulations  established  by 
the  British  Parliament  operated  in  favor  of  that  part  of  the  empire, 
which  seemed  to  bear  the  principal  share  of  tlie  public  burdens,  ond 
were  regarded  as  an  indemnification  of  its  advances  for  tlie  other  parts. 
As  long  as  this  regulating  power  was  confined  to  tlie  two  objects  of  con- 
veniency  and  equity,  it  was  not  complained  of,  nor  much  inquired  into. 
But,  no  sffoner  was  it  perverted  to  tlie  selfish  views  of  Uie  party  assimi- 
ing  it,  than  the  injured  parties  began  to  feel  and  to  reflect ;  and  tlic  moment 
the  claim  to  a  direct  and  indefinite  power  was  ingrafted  on  tlie  preced- 
ent of  the  regulating  power,  the  wliole  chanii  was  dissolved,  and  every 
eye  onen  to  tlie  usurpation.  The  assertion  by  Great  Britain  of  a  power 
to  maxe  laws  for  tlie  other  members  of  the  empire  in  all  cases  whaUo- 
ever  ended  in  the  discovery  that  she  had  a  right  to  make  laws  for  them 
in  no  cases  whatsoever. 

Such  bein^  the  ground  of  our  revolution,  no  support  nor  color  can  be 
drawn  from  it,  for  the  doctrine  that  the  conunon  law  is  binding  on 
these  States  as  one  society.  The  doctrine,  on  the  contrary,  is  evidently 
repugnant  to  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  Revolution. 

The  articles  of  confederation,  are  tlie  next  source  of  information  on 
this  subject 

In  the  interval  between  the  commencement  of  the  Revolution  and  the 
final  ratification  of  these  articles,  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  Union 
was  determined  by  the  circumstances  of  the  crisis,  ratlier  than  by  any 
accurate  delineation  of  the  general  authority.  It  will  not  be  alledged 
that  the  "  common  law"  could  have  had  any  legitimate  birth  as  a  law 
of  the  United  States  during  tli  ^  *  f  things.  If  it  came  assuch'into 
existence  at  all,  the  charter  oi  tiion  must  have  been  its  parent 

Hchreagain,  however,  its  pn  '  itely  destitute  of  lounda- 

tkML    This  instrument  do<:s   i  ace  or  a  syllabic  that 

can  be  tortured  into  acQtmtenance  oi  me  luca,  mat  the  parties  to  it  were, 


VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS.  61 

with  respect  to  the  objects  of  the  common  law,  to  form  one  community. 
No  such  law  is  named,  or  implied,  or  alluded  to,  as  being  in  force,  or 
as  brought  into  force  by  that  compact.  No  provision  is  made  by  which 
such  a  law  could  be  carried  into  operation ;  whilst  On  the  other  hand, 
every  such  inference  or  pretext  is  absolutely  precluded  by  article  2, 
which  declares  "  that  each  State  retains  its  sovereignty,  freedom,  and 
independence,  and  every  power,  jurisdiction,  and  right,  which  is  not 
by  this  confederation  expressly  delegated  to  the  United  States,  in  Con- 
gress assembled." 

Thus  far  it  appears  that  not  a  vestige  of  this  extraordinary  doctrine 
can  be  found  in  Uie  origin  or  progress  of  American  institutions.  The 
evidence  against  it  has,  on  the  contrary,  grown  stronger  at  every  step, 
till  it  has  amounted  to  a  formal  and  positive  exclusion,  by  written  arti- 
cles of  compact  among  the  parties  concerned. 

Is  this  exclusion  revoked,  and  the  common  law  introduced  as  nation- 
al law,  by  the  present  constitution  of  the  United  States  1  This  is  the 
final  question  to  be  examined. 

It  is  readily  admitted  that  particular  parts  of  the  common  law  may 
have  a  sanction  from  the  Constitution,  so  far  as  they  are  necessarily 
comprehended  in  the  technical  phrases  which  express  the  powers  dele- 
gated to  the  government ;  and  so  far,  also,  as  such  other  parts  may  be 
adopted  by  Congress  as  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying  into  execu- 
tion the  powers  expressly  delegated.  But,  the  question  does  not  relate 
to  either  of  these  portions  of  the  common  law.  It  relates  to  tlie  common 
law  beyond  these  limitations. 

The  only  part  of  the  Constitution  which  seems  to  have  been  relied  on 
in  this  case,  is  the  2d  section  of  Article  III.  "The  Judicial  power 
shall  extend  to  all  cases,  in  law  and  equity ,  arising  under  this  Consti- 
tution, the  laws  of  the  UnitedStates,  and  Treaties  made,  or  which  shall 
be  made,  under  their  authority." 

It  has  been  asked,  what  cases,  distinct  from  those  arising  under  the 
laws  and  treaties  of  the  United  States,  can  arise  under  the  Constitution, 
other  than  those  arising  under  the  common  law ;  and  it  is  inferred, 
that  the  common  law  is  accordingly  adopted  or  recognized  by  the  Con- 
stitution. 

Never,  perhaps,  was  so  broad  a  construction  applied  to  a  text  so 
clearly  unsusceptible  of  it.  If  any  color  for  the  mference  could  be 
found,  it  must  be  in  the  impossibility  of  finding  any  other  cases  in  law 
and  equity,  within  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution,  to  satisfy  the 
expression ;  and  rather  than  resort  to  a  construction  affecting  so  essen- 
tially the  whole  character  of  the  government,  it  would  perhaps  be  more 
rational  to  consider  the  expression  as  a  mere  pleonasm  or  inadvertence. 
But  it  is  not  necessary  to  decide  on  such  a  dilemma.  The  expression  is 
fully  satisfied,  and  its  accuracy  justified,  by  two  descriptions  of  cases, 
to  which  the  judicial  authority  is  extended,  and  neither  of  which  implies 
that  the  common  law  is  the  law  of  the  United  States.  One  of  these 
descriptions  comprehends  the  cases  growing  out  of  the  restrictions  on 
the  Legislative  power  of  the  States.  For  example,  it  is  provided  that 
*'  no  State  shall  emit  bills  of  credit,"  or  "  make  any  thing  but  ^old  and 
silver  coin  a  tender  in  payment  of  debts."  Should  this  prohibition  be 
violated,  and  a  suit  between  citizens  of  the  same  State  be  the  conse- 
quence, this  would  be  a  case  arising  under  the  -Constitution  before  the 
Judicial  power  of  tlie  United  States.  A  second  description  comprehends 
6 


63  VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS. 

suits  between  citizens  and  foreigners,  of  citizens  of  different  States,  to 
be  decided  according  to  the  State  or  foreign  laws ;  but  submitted  by  the 
Constitution  to  the  Judicial  power  of  the  United  States ;  the  Judicial 
power  being  in  several  instances,  extended  beyond  the  Legislative 
power  of  the  United  States. 

To  this  explanation  of  the  text,  the  following  observations  may  be 
added: 

The  expression,  "  cases  in  law  and  equity,"  is  manifestly  confined 
to  cases  of  a  civil  nature ;  and  would  exclude  cases  of  criminal  juris- 
diction. Criminal  cases  in  law  and  equity  would  be  a  language  un- 
known to  the  law. 

The  succeeding  paragraph  of  the  same  section  is  in  haimony  with 
this  construction.  It  is  in  these  words :  "  In  all  cases  affecting  AmbaS' 
sadors,  or  other  public  Ministers,  and  Consuls,  and  tliose  in  which  a 
State  shall  be  a  party,  the  Supreme  Court  shall  have  original  jurisdic- 
tion. In  all  the  other  cases  [including  cases  of  law  and  equity  arising 
under  the  Constitution]  the  Supreme  Court  shall  have  appellate  juris- 
diction both  as  to  law  and  fact ;  with  such  exceptions,  and  under  such 
regulations,  as  Congress  shall  make." 

This  paragraph,  by  expressly  giving  ^  an  appellate  jurisdiction,  in 
<jases  of  law  and  equity  arising  under  the  Constitution,  to  fact,  as  well 
as  to  law,  clearly  excludes  criminal  cases,  where  the  trial  by  jury  is 
secured;  because  the  fact  in  such  cases,  is  not  a  subject  of  appeal.  And, 
although  the  appeal  is  liable  to  such  exceptions  and  regulations  as  Con- 
gress may  adopt,  yet  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  ilmt  slu  exception  oi  all 
criminal  cases  could  be  contemplated ;  as  well  because  a  discretion 
in  Coiigressto  make  or  omit  the  exception  would  be  improper,  as 
because  it  would  have  been  unnecessary.  The  exception  could  as 
easily  have  been  made  by  the  Constitution  itself,  as  referred  to  the 
Congress. 

Once  more ;  the  amendment  last  added  to  the  Constitution,  deserves 
attention  as  throwing  light  on  this  subject.  "  The  Judicial  power  of 
the  United  States  shall  not  be  construed  to  extend  to  any  suit  in  law  or 
equity,  commenced  or  prosecuted  against  one  of  the  United  StAtes,  by 
citizens  of  another  State,  or  by  citizens  or  subjects  of  any  foreign  pow- 
er." As  it  will  not  be  pretended  that  any  criminal  proceeding  could 
take  place  against  a  State ;  the  terms  law  or  equity,  must  be  understood 
as  appropriate  to  civil  in  exclusion  of  criminal  cases. 

From  these  considerations,  it  is  evident  that  this  part  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, even  if  it  could  be  applied  at  all,  to  tlie  purpose  for  which  it  has 
been  cited,  would  not  include  any  cases  whatever  of  a  criminal  nature  : 
and  consequently,  would  not  authorise  the  inference  from  it,  that  the 
Judicial  authority  extends  to  offences  against  the  common  law,  as  offences 
arising  under  the  Constitution. 

It  is  further  to  be  considered,  that  even  if  this  part  of  the  Constitution 
could  be  strained  into  an  application  to  every  common  law  case,  crimi- 
nal as  well  as  civil,  it  could  have  no  effect  in  justifying  the  Sedition 
Act;  which  is  an  exercise  of  Legislative  and  not  of  Judicial  power; 
and  it  is  the  Judicial  power,  only,  of  which  the  extent  is  defined  in  this 
part  of  the  constitution. 

There  are  two  passages  in  the  Constitution,  in  which  a  description 
of  the  law  of  the  United  States  is  found.  The  first  is  contained  in  Art. 
m.  Sec.  2.  in  the  words  following:    "^This  Constitution,  the  laws  of 


VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS.  ^ 

the  U.  S.  and  treati^  made,  or  which  shall  be  made  under  this  authori- 
ty." The  second  is  contained  in  the  second  paragraph  of  Article  VI. 
as  follows :  "  This  Constitution,  and  the  laws  of  tne  United  States 
which  shall  be  made  in  purusance  thereof,  and  all  treaties  made,  or 
which  shall  be  made  under  the  authority  of  the  United  States  shall  be 
the  supreme  law  of  the  land."  The  first  of  these  descriptions  was 
meant  as  a  guide  to  the  Judges  of  the  United  States ;  the  second  as  a 
guide  to  the  Judges  of  the  several  States.  Both  of  them  consist  of  an 
enumeration,  which  was  evidently  meant  to  be  precise  and  coinplete. 
If  the  common  law  had  been  understood  to  be  a  law  of  the  United 
States,  it  is  not  possible  to  assign  a  satisfactory  reason  why  it  was  not 
expressed  in  the  enumeration. 

In  aid  of  these  objections,  the  difficulties  and  confusion  inseparable 
from  a  constructive  introduction  of  the  common  law,  would  afford  pow- 
erful reasons  against  it. 

Is  it  to  be  the  common  law  with,  or  without  the  British  Statutes'? 

If  without  the  statutory  amendments,  the  vices  of  the  code  would  be 
insupportable. 

If  with  these  amendments,  what  period  is  to  be  fixed  for  limiting  the 
British  authority  over  our  laws  1 

Is  it  to  be  the  date  of  the  eldest  or  the  youngest  of  the  colonies  1 

Or  are  the  dates  to  be  thrown  together,  and  a  medium  deduced  1 

Or  is  oiu"  independence  to  be  taken  for  the  date  ? 

Is,  again,  regard  to  be  had  to  the  various  changes  in  the  common  law 
made  by  the  local  codes  of  America  1 

Is  regard  to  be  had  to  such  changes,  subsequent,  as  well  as  prior,  to 
the  establishment  of  the  Constitution  1 

Is  regard  to  be  had  to  future,  as  well  as  past  changes  1 

Is  tlie  law  to  be  different  in  every  State,  as  differently  modified 
by  its  code ;  or  are  the  modifications  of  any  particular  State  to  be  ap- 
plied to  all  1 

And  on  the  latter  supposition,  which  among  the  State  codes  would 
form  the  standard  1 

Ctuestions  of  this  sort  might  be  multiplied  with  as  much  ease  as  there 
would  be  difficulty  in  answering  them. 

The  consequences  flowing  from  the  proposed  construction,  furnish 
other  objections  equally  conclusive  ;  unless  the  text  were  peremptory 
in  its  meaning,  and  consistent  witli  other  parts  of  the  instrument. 

These  consequences  may  be  in  relation  to  the  Legislative  authority 
of  the  United  States ;  to  the  Executive  authority ;  to  3ie  Judicial  autho- 
rity ;  and  to  the  Governments  of  the  several  States. 

If  it  be  understood  thai  the  common  law  is  established  by  the  Con- 
stitution, it  follows  that  no  part  of  the  law  can  be  altered  by  the  Legis- 
lature ;  such  of  the  statutes  already  passed,  as  may  be  repugnant  there- 
to, would  be  nullified ;  particularly  the  "  Sedition  Act"  itself,  which 
boasts  of  being  a  melioration  of  the  common  law;  and  the  whole  code, 
with  all  its  incongruities,  barbarisms,  and  bloody  maxims,  would  be 
inviolably  saddled  on  the  good  people  of  the  United  States. 

Should  this  consequence  be  rejected,  and  the  common  law  be  held, 
like  other  laws,  liable  to  revision  and  alteration,  by  the  authority  of 
Congress,  it  then  follows,  that  the  authority  of  Congress  is  co-extensive 
with  the  objects  of  common  law;  that  is  to  say,  with  every  object  of 
legislation.    For,  to  every  such  object,  does  some  branch  or  other  of  the 


64  VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS. 

common  law  extend.  The  authority  of  Congress  would,  therefore,  be 
no  longer  under  the  limitations  marked  out  in  the  Constitution.  They 
would  be  authorised  to  legislate  in  all  cases  whatsoever. 

In  the  next  place,  as  the  President  possesses  the  executive  powers  of 
the  Constitution,  and  is  to  see  that  the  Laws  be  faithfully  executed,  his 
authority  also  must  be  co-extensive  with  every  branch  of  the  common 
law.  The  additions  which  this  would  make  to  his  power,  though  not 
readily  to  be  estimated,  claim  the  most  serious  attention. 

This  is  not  all ;  it  will  merit  the  most  profound  consideration,  how 
far  an  indefinite  admission  of  the  common  law,  with  a  latitude  in  con- 
struing it,  equal  to  the  construction  by  which  it  is  deduced  from  the 
Constitution,  might  draw  after  it  the  various  prerogatives  making  part 
of  the  unwritten  law  of  England.  The  English  Constitution  itself,  is 
nothing  more  than  a  composition  of  unwritten  laws  and  maxims. 

In  the  third  place,  whether  the  common  law  be  admitted  as  of  legal 
or  of  constitational  obligation,  it  would  confer  on  the  Judicial  depart- 
ment a  discretion  little  short  of  a  legislative  power. 

On  the  supposition  of  its  having  a  constitutional  obligation,  this 
power  in  the  Judges  would  be  permanent  and  irremediable  by  the  Le- 
gislature. On  the  other  supposition,  the  power  would  not  expire  until 
the  Legislature  should  have  introduced  a  full  system  of  statutory  pro- 
visions. Let  it  be  observed,  loo,  that  besides  all  the  uncertainties  above 
enumerated,  and  which  present  an  immense  field  for  judicial  discretion, 
it  would  remain  with  the  same  department  to  decide  what  parts  of  the 
common  law  would,  and  what  would  not,  be  properly  applicable  to  the 
circim:! stances  of  the  United  States. 

A  discretion  of  this  sort  has  always  been  lamented  as  incongruous 
and  dangerous,  even  in  the  Colonial  and  State  courts ;  although  so 
much  narro-vved  by  positive  provisions  in  the  local  codes  on  all  the 
principal  subjects  embraced  by  the  common  law.  Under  the  United 
States,  where  so  few  laws  exist  on  those  subjects,  and  where  so  great  a 
lapse  of  time  must  happen  before  the  vast  chasm  could  be  supplied,  it 
is  manifest  that  the  power  of  the  judges  over  the  law,  would,  in  fact, 
erect  them  into  legislators ;  and,  that  for  a  long  time,  it  would  be  im- 
possible for  the  citizens  to  conjecture,  either  what  was,  or  would  be 
law. 

In  the  last  place,  the  consequence  of  admitting  the  common  law  as 
the  law  of  the  United  States,  on  the  authority  of  the  individual  States, 
is  as  obvious  as  it  would  be  fatal.  As  this  law  relates  to  every  subject 
of  legislation,  and  would  be  paramount  to  the  Constitutions  and  laws 
of  the  States,  the  admission  of  it  would  overwhelm  the  residuary  sove- 
reignty of  the  States,  and  by  one  constructive  operation,  new-model 
the  whole  political  fabric  of  the  country. 

From  the  review  thus  taken  of  the  situation  of  the  American  colonies, 
prior  to  their  independence,  of  the  effect  of  this  event  on  their  situation,  of 
the  nature  and  import  of  the  articles  of  confederation,  of  the  true  meaning 
of  the  passage  in  the  existing  Constitution  from  which  the  common  law 
has  been  deduced,  of  the  difficulties  and  uncertainties  incident  to  the 
doctrine,  and  of  its  vast  consequences  in  extending  the  powers  of  the 
Federal  Government,  and  in  superseding  thq  authorities  of  the  State 
Governments,  the  committee  feel  the  utmost  confidence  in  concluding 
that  the  common  law  never  was,  nor  by  any  fair  construction  ever  can 
be,  deemed  a  law  for  the  American  people  as  one  community ;  and 


VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS.  M 

they  indulge  the  strongest  expectation  that  the  same  conclusion  will 
finally  be  drawn  by  all  candid  and  accurate  inqdirers  into  the  subject. 
It  is,  indeed,  distressing  to  reflect  that  it  ever  should  have  been  made  a 
question,  whether  the  Constitution,  on  the  whole  face  of  which  is  seen 
so  much  labor  to  enumerate  and  define  the  several  objects  of  Federal 
power,  could  intend  to  introduce  in  the  liunp,  in  an  indirect  manner,  and 
by  a  forced  construction  of  a  few  phrases,  the  vast  and  multifarious 
jurisdiction  involved  in  the  common  law ;  a  law  filling  so  many  ample 
volumes,  a  law  overspreading  the  entire  field  of  legislation,  and  a  law 
that  would  sap  the  foundation  of  the  Constitution  as  a  system  of  limit- 
ed and  specified  powers.  A  severer  reproach  could  not,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  committee,  be  thrown  on  the  Constitution,  on  those  who  framed, 
or  on  those  who  established  it,  than  such  a  supposition  would  throw  on 
them. 

The  argument,  then,  drawn  from  the  common  law,  on  the  ground  of 
its  being  adopted  or  recognised  by  the  Constitution,  being  inapplicable 
to  the  Sedition  Act,  the  committee  will  proceed  to  examine  the  other 
arguments  which  have  been  founded  on  the  Constitution. 

They  will  waste  but  little  time  on  the  attempt  to  cover  the  act  by  the 
preamble  to  the  Constitution,  it  being  contrary  to  every  acknowledged 
rule  of  construction,  to  set  up  this  part  of  an  mstrument,  in  opposition 
to  the  plain  meaning  expressed  in  {he  body  of  the  instrument.  A  pre- 
amble usually  contains  the  general  motives  or  reasons  for  the  particu- 
lar regulations  or  measures  which  follow  it,  and  is  always  understood 
to  be  explained  and  limited  by  them.  In  the  present  instance,  a  con- 
trary interpretation  would  have  the  inadmissible  effect  of  rendering 
rugatory  or  improper,  every  part  of  the  Constitution  which  succeeds 
thepreamble. 

The  paragraph  in  Art.  1,  Sec.  8,  which  contains  the  power  to  lay  and 
collect  taxes,  duties,  imposts  and  excises ;  to  pay  the  debts,  and  provide 
for  the  common  defence  and  general  welfare,  having  been  already  ex- 
amined, will  also  require  no  particular  attention  in  this  place.  It  will 
have  been  seen  that,  in  its  fair  and  consistent  meaning,  it  cannot  en- 
laro^e  the  enumerated  powers  vested  in  Congress. 

The  part  of  the  Constitution  which  seems  most  to  be  recurred  to,  in 
defence  of  the  "  Sedition  Act,"  is  the  last  clause  of  the  above  section, 
empowering  Congress  "  to  make  all  laws  which  shall  be  necessary 
and  proper  for  carrying  into  execution  the  foregoing  powers,  and  all 
other  powers  vested  by  this  Constitution  in  the  Government  of  the  Unit- 
ed States,  or  in  any  department  or  oflicer  thereof" 

The  plain  import  of  this  clause  is,  that  Congress  shall  have  all  the 
incidental  or  instrumental  powers  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying 
into  execution  all  the  express  powers,  whether  they  be  vested  in  the 
government  of  the  United  States,  more  collectively,  or  in  the  several 
departments  or  oflicers  thereof  It  is  not  a  grant  of  new  powers  to  Con- 
gress, but  merely  a  declaration,  for  the  removal  of  all  uncertainty,  that 
the  means  of  carrying  into  execution  those  otherwise  granted,  are  in- 
cluded in  the  grant. 

Whenever,  therefore,  a  question  arises  concerning  the  constitution- 
ality of  a  particular  power,  the  first  question  is,  whether  the  power  be 
expressed  in  the  Constitution.  If  it  be,  the  question  is  decided.  If  it 
be  not  expressed,  the  next  inquiry  must  be,  whether  it  is  properly  an 
incident  to  an  express  power,  and  necessary  to  its  execution.     If  it  be, 


66  VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS. 

it  may  be  exercised  by  Congress.    If  it  be  not,  Congress  cannot  exer- 
cise it. 

Let  the  question  be  asked,  then,  whether  the  power  over  the  press, 
exercised  in  the  "  Sedition  Act,"  be  found  among  the  powers  expressly 
vested  in  the  Congress  1     This  is  not  pretended. 

Is  there  any  express  power,  for  executing  which  it  is  a  necessary 
and  proper  power '? 

The  power  which  has  been  selected  as  least  remote  in  answer  to  this 
question,  is  that  "  of  suppressing  insurrections  ;"  which  is  said  to  im- 
ply a  power  to  prevent  insurrections,  by  punishing  whatever  may  lead 
or  tend  to  them.  But  it  surely  cannot,  with  the  least  plausibility,  be 
said  that  the  regulation  of  the  press,  and  a  punisement  of  libels,  are 
exercises  of  a  power  to  suppress  insurrections.  The  most  that  could 
be  said,  would  be,  that  the  punishment  of  libels,  if  it  had  the  tendency 
ascribed  to  it,  might  prevent  the  occasion  of  passing  or  executing  laws, 
necessary  and  proper  for  the  suppression  of  insurrections. 

Has  the  Federal  Government  no  power,  then,  to  prevent  as  well  as  to 
punish  resistance  to  the  laws  1 

They  have  the  power  which  the  Constitution  deemed  most  proper  in 
their  hands  for  the  purpose.  The  Congress  has  power,  before  it  hap- 
pens, to  pass  laws  for  punishing  it;  and  the  Executive  and  Judiciary 
nave  power  to  enforce  those  laws  when  it  does  happen. 

It  must  be  recollected  by  many,  and  could  be  shown  to  the  satisfac- 
tion of  all,  that  the  construction  here  put  on  the  terms  "  necessary  and 
proper,"  is  precisely  the  construction  which  prevailed  during  the  dis- 
cussions and  ratifications  of  the  Constitution.  It  may  be  added,  and 
cannot  too  often  be  repeated,  that  it  is  a  construction  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  maintain  their  consistency  with  the  peculiar  character  of  the  go- 
vernment, as  possessed  of  particular  and  definite  powers  only  ;  not  of 
the  general  and  indefinite  powers  vested  in  ordinary  governments.  For 
if  the  power  to  suppress  insurrections,  includes  a  power  to  punish  libels j 
or  if  the  power  to  punish,  includes  a  power  to  prevent,  by  all  the  means 
that  may  have  that  tendency,  such  is  the  relation  and  influence  among 
the  most  remote  subjects  of  legislations,  that  a  power  over  a  very  few 
would  carry  with  it  a  power  over  all.  And  it  must  be  wholly  immate- 
rial, whether  unlimited  powers  be  exercised  under  the  name  of  unlimit- 
ed powers,  or  be  exercised  under  the  name  of  unlimited  means  of  carry- 
ing into  execution,  limited  powers. 

This  branch  of  the  subject  will  be  closed  with  a  reflection  which  must 
have  weight  with  all ;  but  more  especially  with  those  who  place  pecu- 
liar reliance  on  the  judicial  exposition  of  the  Constitution,  as  the  bul- 
wark provided  against  undue  extensions  of  the  legislative  power.  If 
it  be  understood  that  the  powers  implied  in  the  specified  powers,  have 
an  immediate  and  appropriate  relation  to  them,  as  means  necessary  and 
proper  for  carrying  them  into  execution,  questions  on  the  constitution- 
ality of  laws  passed  for  this  purpose,  will  be  of  a  nature  sufliciently 
precise  and  determinate  for  judicial  cognizance  and  control.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  Congress  are  not  limited  in  the  choice  of  means  by  any  such 
appropriate  relation  of  them  to  the  specified  powers ;  but  may  employ 
all  such  means  they  may  deem  fitted  to  prevent  as  well  as  to  punish 
crimes  subjected  to  their  authority,  such  as  may  have  a  tendency  only 
to  promote  an  object  for  which  they  are  authorized  to  provide;  every 
one  must  perceive  that  questions  relating  to  means  of  this  sort,  must  be 


VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS.  61 

c|uestions  for  mere  policy  and  expediency ;  on  which  legislative  discre- 
tion alone  can  decide,  and  from  which  the  judicial  interposition  and 
control  are  completely  excluded. 

II.  The  next  point  which  the  resolution  rec^uii-es  to  be  proved  is,  that 
the  power  over  Uie  press  exercised  by  the  Sedition  Act,  is  positively  for- 
bidden by  one  of  the  amendments  to  the  Constitvition. 

The  amendment  stands  in  these  words — "  Congress  shall  make  no 
law  respecting  an  establishment  of  religion,  or  prohibiting  the  free  exer- 
cise thereof,  or  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech,  or  of  the  press  ;  or  the 
right  of  tlie  people  peaceably  to  assemble  and  to  petition  the  govern- 
ment for  a  redress  of  grievances." 

In  the  attempts  to  vindicate  the  "  Sedition  Act,"  it  has  been  contend- 
ed— 1.  That  tlie  "  freedom  of  tlie  press"  is  to  be  determined  by  the 
meaning  of  tliese  tenns  in  tlie  common  law.  2.  That  the  aiticle  sup- 
poses the  power  over  the  press  to  be  in  Congress,  and  prohibits  them 
only  from  abridging  the  freedom  allowed  to  it  by  the  common  l&w. 

Although  it  will  be  shown,  on  examining  the  second  of  these  po- 
sitions, tliat  the  amendment  is  a  denial  to  Congress  of  all  power  over 
the  press,  it  may  not  be  uselesss  to  make  tlie  foUowing  observations  on 
the  first  of  them. 

It  is  deemed  to  be  a  sound  opinion,  that  the  Sedition  Act,  in  its  defini- 
tion of  some  of  the  crimes  created,  is  an  abridgment  of  the  freedom  of 
publication,  recognized  by  principles  of  the  common  law  in-England. 

The  freedom  of  the  press,  under  the  common  law,  is,  in  the  defences 
of  the  Sedition  Act,  made  to  consist  in  an  exemption  from  all  previous 
restraint  on  printed  publications,  by  persons  authorized  to  inspect  and 
prohibit  them.  It  appears  to  the  Committee  that  this  idea  of  the  free- 
dom of  the  press  can  never  be  admitted  to  be  the  American  idea  of  it; 
since  a  law  inflicting  penalties  on  printed  publications,  would  have  a 
similar  effect  with  a  law  authorizing  a  previous  restraint  on  them.  It 
would  seem  a  mockery  to  say  that  no  laws  should  be  passed  prevent- 
ing publications  from  being  made,  but  that  laws  might  be  passed  for 
punishing  them  in  case  tliey  should  be  made. 

The  essential  difference  between  the  British  Government  and  the 
American  Constitutions,  will  place  this  subject  in  the  clearest  light. 

In  the  British  Government,  the  danger  of  encroachments  on  the  rights 
of  tlie  people,  is  understood  to  be  confined  to  the  executive  magistrate. 
The  representatives  of  the  people  in  the  legislature,  are  not  only  exempt 
themselves  from  distrust,  but  are  considered  as  sufficient  guardians  of 
the  rights  of  their  constituents  against  the  danger  from  the  executive. 
Hence  it  is  a  principle,  that  the  Parliament  is  unlimited  in  its  power ; 
or,  in  their  own  language,  is  omnipotent.  Hence,  too,  all  the  ramparts 
for  protecting  the  rights  of  the  people,  such  as  their  Magna  Charta,  their 
Bill  of  Rights,  &c.,  are  not  reared  against  the  Parliament,  but  against 
the  royal  prerogative.  They  are  merely  legislative  precautions  against 
executive  usurpations.  Under  such  a  government  as  this,  an  exemp- 
tion of  the  press  fjrom  previous  restraint  by  licensers  appointed  by  the 
king,  is  all  the  freedom  that  can  be  secured  to  it. 

In  the  United  States  the  case  is  altogether  different.  The  people, 
not  the  government,  possess  the  absolute  sovereignty.  The  legislature, 
no  less  than  the  executive,  is  under  limitations  of  power.  Encroach- 
ments are  regarded  as  possible,  from  the  one  as  well  as  from  the  other. 
Hence  in  the  United  States,  the  great  and  essential  rights  of  the  people 


68  VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS. 

are  secured  against  legislative,  as  well  as  executive  ambition.  They 
are  secured,  not  by  laws  paramount  to  prerogative,  but  by  Constitutions 
paramount  to  laws.  This  security  of  the  freedom  of  the  press  requires 
that  it  should  be  exempt,  not  only  from  previous  restraint  by  the  execut- 
ive, as  in  Great  Britain,  but  from  legislative  restraint  also ;  and  this 
exemption  to  be  effectual,  must  be  an  exemption,  not  only  from  the  pre- 
vious inspection  of  licenses,  but  from  the  subsequent  penalty  of  laws. 

The  state  of  the  press,  therefore,  under  the  common  law,  cannot  in 
this  point  of  view  be  the  standard  of  its  freedom  in  the  United  States. 

But  there  is  another  view  under  which  it  may  be  necessary  to  consi- 
der this  subject.  It  may  be  alledged  that  although  the  security  for  the 
freedom  cf  the  press  be  different  in  Great  Britain  and  this  country,  being 
a  legal  security  only  in  the  former,  and  a  constitutional  security  in  the 
latter  ;  and  although  there  iriay  be  a  further  difference,  in  an  extension 
of  the  freedom  of  the  press  here,  beyond  an  exemption  from  previous  re- 
straint, *to  an  exemption  from  subsequent  penalties  also,  yet  that  the  ac- 
tual legal  freedom  of  the  press,  under  the  common  law,  must  determine 
the  degree  of  freedom  which  is  meant  by  the  terms,  and  which  is  constitu- 
tionally secured  against  both  previous  and  subsequent  restraint. 

The  Committee  are  not  aware  of  the  difficulty  of  all  general  questions, 
which  may  turn  on  the  proper  boundary  between  the  liberty  and  licen- 
tiousness of  the  press.  They  will  leave  it,  therefore,  for  consideration 
only,  how  far  the  difference  between  the  nature  of  the  British  Grovem- 
ment,  and  the  nature  of  the  American  Governments,  and  the  practice 
under  the  latter,  may  show  the  degree  of  rigor  in  the  former  to  be  inap- 
plicable to,  and  not  obligatory  in,  the  latter. 

The  nature  of  governments  elective,  limited  and  responsible  in  all  their 
branches,  may  well  be  supposed  to  require  a  greater  freedom  of  animad- 
version than  might  be  tolerated  by  the  genius  of  such  a  government  as 
that  of  Great  Britain.  In  the  latter,  it  is  a  maxin  that  the  king,  an  here- 
ditary, not  a  responsible  magistrate,  can  do  no  wrong ;  and  that  the  legis- 
lature, which  in  two  thirds  of  its  composition  is  also  hereditary,  not 
responsible,  gan  do  what  it  pleases.  In  the  Uniied  States  the  executive 
magistrates  are  not  held  to  be  infallible,  nor  the  legislature  to  be  omnipo- 
tent ;  and  both  being  elective,  are  both  responsible.  Is  it  not  natural  and 
necessary,  under  such  different  circumstances,  that  a  different  degree  of 
freedom,  in  the  use  of  the  press,  should  be  contemplated  7 

Is  not  such  an  inference  favored  by  what  is  observable  in  Great  Britain 
itself  ?  Notwithstanding  the  general  doctrine  of  the  common  law,  on  the 
subject  of  the  press,  and  the  occasional  punishment  of  those  who  use  it 
with  a  freedom  offensive  to  the  government,  it  is  well  known,  that  with 
respect  to  the  responsible  members  of  the  government,  where  the  reasons 
operating  here  become  applicable  there,  the  freedom  exercised  by  the  press, 
and  protected  by  public  opinion,  far  exceeds  the  limits  prescribed  by  the 
ordinary  rules  of  law.  The  ministry,  who  are  responsible  to  impeach- 
ment, are  at  all  times  animadverted  on  by  the  press  with  peculiar  free-' 
dom ;  and  during  the  elections  for  the  House  of  Commons,  the  other  re- 
sponsible part  of  the  government,  the  press  is  employed  with  as  little 
reserve  towards  the  candidates. 

The  practice  in  America  must  be  entitled  to  much  more  respect.  In 
every  state,  probably,  in  the  Union,  the  press  has  exerted  a  freedom  in 
canvassing  the  merits  and  measures  of  pubHc  men  of  every  description, 
which  has  not  been  confined  to  the  strict  limits  of  the  common  law.    On 


VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS.  69 

this  footing  the  freedom  of  the  press  has  stood  ;  on  this  foundation  it  yet 
stands.  And  it  will  not  be  a  breach,  either  of  truth  or  of  candor,  to  say,  that 
no  persons  or  presses  are  in  the  habit  of  more  unrestrained  animadversions 
on  the  proceedincrs  and  functionaries  of  the  state  governments,  than  the 
persons  and  presses  most  zealous  m  vindicating  the  act  of  Congress  for 
punishing  similiar  animadversions  on  the  Government  of  the  United 
States. 

The  last  remark  will  not  be  understood  as  claiming  for  the  state  govern- 
ments an  immunity  greater  than  they  have  heretofore  enjoyed.  Some 
degree  of  abuse  is  inseparable  from  the  proper  use  of  every  thing;  and  in 
no  instance  is  this  more  true,  than  in  that  of  the  press.  It  has  accordingly 
been  decided  by  the  practice  of  the  states,  that  it  is  better  to  leav3  a  few 
of  its  noxious  branches  to  their  luxuriant  growth,  than  by  pruning  them 
away,  to  injure  the  v'gor  of  those  yielding  the  proper  fruits.  And  can  the 
wisdom  of  this  policy  be  doubted  by  any  one  who  reflects,  that  to  the 
press  alone,  chequered  as  it  is  with  abuses,  the  world  is  indebted  for  all  the 
triumphs  which  have  been  gained  by  reason  and  humanity,  over  error  and 
oppression ;  who  reflect  tliat  to  the  same  beneficent  source,  the  United 
States  owe  much  of  the  lights  which  conducted  them  to  the  ranks  of  a 
free  and  independent  nation;  and  which  have  improved  their  political 
system,  into  a  shape  so  auspicious  to  their  happiness.  Had  "  Sedition 
Acts,"  forbidding  every  publication  that  might  bring  tlie  constituted 
agents  into  contempt  or  disrepute,  or  that  might  excite  the  hatred  of  the 
people  against  the  authors  of  unjust  or  pernicious  measures,  been  uni- 
formly enforced  against  tlie  press ;  might  not  tlie  United  States  have 
been  languishing  at  this  day,  luider  the  infirmities  of  a  sickly  confede- 
ration 1  Might  they  not,  possibly,  be  miserable  colonies,  groaning 
under  a  foreign  yoke  1 

To  tliese  observations  one  fact  will  be  added,  which  demonstrates 
that  the  common  law  cannot  be  admitted  as  the  universal  expositor  of 
American  terms,  which  may  be  tlie  same  with  those  contained  in  that 
law.  The  freedom  of  conscience,  and  of  religion,  are  found  in  the  same 
instruments  which  assert  the  freedom  of  the  press.  It  will  never  be 
admitted  that  the  meaning  of  the  former,  in  the  common  law  of  Eng- 
land, is  to  limit  their  meaning  in  the  United  States. 

Whatever  weight  may  be  allowed  to  these  considerations,  the  Com- 
mittee do  not,  however,  by  any  means  intend  to  rest  the  question  on 
them.  They  contend  that  the  article  of  tlie  amendment,  instead  of  sup- 
posing in  Congress  a  power  that  might  be  exercised  over  the  press, 
provided  its  freedom  was  not  abridged,  was  meant  as  a  positive  denial 
to  Congress,  of  any  power  whatever  on  the  subject. 

To  demonstrate  that  this  was  the  true  object  of  the  article,  it  will  be 
sufficient  to  recall  the  circumstance  which  led  to  it,  and  to  refer  to  the 
explanation  accompanying  the  article. 

When  the  Constitution  was  under  the  discussions  which  preceded  its 
ratification,  it  is  well  known  that  great  apprehensions  were  expressed 
by  many,  lest  thettftission  of  some  positive  exception  from  the  powers 
delegated,  of  certain  rights,  and  of  the  freedom  of  the  press  particularly, 
might  expose  them  to  the  danger  of  being  drawn  by  construction  with- 
in some  of  the  powers  vested  in  Congress ;  more  especially  of  the  power 
to  make  all  laws  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying  their  otlier  powers 
into  execution.  In  reply  to  this  objection,  it  was  invariably  urged 
to  be  a  fundamental  and  characteristic  principle  of  the  Constitution, 


70  VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS. 

that  all  powers  not  given  by  it  were  reserved :  that  no  powers  were 
given  beyond  those  enumerated  in  the  Constitution,  and  such  as  were 
fairly  incident  to  them ;  that  the  power  over  the  rights  in  question,  and 
particularly  over  the  press,  was  neither  among  the  enumerated  powers 
nor  incident  to  any  of  them  ;  and  consequently  that  an  exercise  of  any 
such  power  would  be  manifest  usurpation.  It  is  painful  to  remark  how 
much  the  argimients  now  employed  in  behalf  of  the  Sedition  Act,  are 
at  variance  with  the  reasoning  which  then  justified  the  Constitution, 
and  invited  its  ratification. 

From  this  posture  of  the  subject  resulted  the  interesting  question  in 
so  many  of  the  Conventions,  whether  the  doubts  and  dangers  ascribed 
to  the  Constitution, 'should  be  removed  by  any  amendments  previous  to 
the  ratification,  or  be  postponed,  in  confidence  that  as  far  as  they  might 
be  proper,  they  would  be  introduced  in  the  form  provided  by  the  Con- 
stitution. The  latter  course  was  adopted ;  and  in  most  of  the  states  ra- 
tifications were  followed  by  propositions  and  instructions  for  rendering 
the  Constitution  more  explicit,  and  more  safe  to  the  rights  not  meant  to 
be  delegated  by  it.  Among  those  rights,  the  freedom  of  the  press,  in 
most  instances,  is  particularly  and  emphatically  mentioned.  The  firm 
and  very  pointed  manner  in  Avhich  it  is  asserted  in  the  proceedings  of 
the  Convention  of  this  State  will  be  hereafter  seen. 

In  pursuance  of  the  wishes  thus  expressed,  the  first  Congress  that 
assembled  under  the  Constitution  proposed  certain  amendments,  which 
have  since,  by  the  necessary  ratifications,  been  made  a  part  of  it; 
among  which  amendments  is  the  article  containing,  among  other  pro- 
hibitions on  the  Congress,  an  express  declaration  that  they  should 
make  no  law  abridging  the  freedom  of  the  press. 

Without  tracing  farther  the  evidence  on  this  subject,  it  would  seem 
scarcely  possible  to  doubt,  that  no  power  whatever  over  the  press  was 
supposed  to  be  delegated  by  the  Constitution,  as  it  originally  stood ;  and 
that  the  amendment  was  intended  as  a  positive  and  absolute  reserva- 
tion of  it. 

But  the  evidence  is  still  stronger.  The  proposition  of  amendments 
made  by  Congress,  is  introduced  in  the  following  terms  : 

"  The  Conventions  of  a  number  of  the  States  having  at  the  time  of 
their  adopting  the  Constitution^  expressed  a  desire^  in  order  to  prevent 
misconstructions  or  abuse  of  its  powers,  that  further  declaratory  and 
restrictive  clauses  should  be  added  ;  and  as  extending  the  ground  of 
public  confidence  in  the  government,  will  best  insure  the  benificent  ends 
of  its  institutions." 

Here  is  the  most  satisfactory  and  authentic  proof  that  the  several 
amendments  proposed  were  to  be  considered  as  either  declaratory  or 
restrictive ;  and  whether  the  one  or  the  other,  as  corresponding  with 
the  desire  expressed  by  a  number  of  the  states,  and  as  extending  the 
ground  of  public  confidence  in  the  government. 

Under  any  other  construction  of  the  amendment  relating  to  the  press, 
than  that  it  declared  the  press  to  be  wholly  exem'prirom  the  power  of 
Congress,  the  amendment  could  neither  be  said  to  correspond  with  the 
desire  expressed  by  a  number  of  the  states,  nor  be  calculated  to  extend 
the  ^ound  of  public  confidence  in  the  government. 

Nay,  more ;  the  construction  employed  to  justify  the  "  Sedition  Act," 
would  exhibit  a  phenomenon  without  a  parallel  in  the  political  world. 
It  would  exhibit  a  number  of  respectable  states,  as  denying,  first,  that 


VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS.  71 

any  power  over  the  press  was  delegated  by  the  Constitution ;  as  pro- 
posing, next,  that  an  amendment  to  it  should  explicitly  declare  that  no 
such  power  was  delegated ;  and,  finally,  as  concurring  in  an  amend- 
ment actually  recognizing  or  delegating  such  a  power. 

Is  then  the  Federal  Government,  it  will  be  asked,  destitute  of  every 
authority  for  restaining  the  licentiousness  of  the  press,  and  for  shielding 
itself  against  the  libellous  attacks  which  may  be  made  on  those  who 
administer  it  1 

The  Constitution  alone  can  answer  this  question.  If  no  such  power 
be  expressly  delegated,  and  if  it  be  not  both  necessary  and  proper  to 
carry  into  execution  an  express  power ;  above  all,  if  it  be  expressly  for- 
bidden, by  a  declaratory  amendment  to  tlie  Constitution,  the  answer 
must  be  that  the  Federal  Government  is  destitute  of  all  such  authority. 

And  might  it  not  be  asked,  in  turn,  whether  it  is  not  more  probable 
under  all  the  circumstances  which  have  been  reviewed,  that  the  authority 
should  be  withheld  by  the  Constitution,  than  that  it  should  be  left  to  a 
vague  and  violent  construction :  whilst  so  much  pains  were  bestowed  in 
enumerating  other  powers,  and  so  many  less  important  powers  are  incl- 
ed  in  the  enumeration  1 

Might  it  not  be  likewise  asked,  whether  the  anxious  circumspection 
which  dictated  so  many  peculiar  limitations  on  the  general  authority, 
would  be  unlikely  to  exempt  the  press  altogether  from  that  authority  1 
The  peculiar  magnitude  of  some  of  the  powers  necessarily  committed  to 
the  Federal  Government;  the  peculiar  duration  required  for  the  functions 
of  some  of  its  departments;  the  peculiar  distance  of  the  seat  of  its  pro- 
ceedings from  the  great  body  of  its  constituents ;  and  the  peculiar  diffi- 
culty of  circulating  an  adequate  knowledge  of  them  through  any  other 
channel ;  will  not  these  considerations,  some  or  other  of  which  produced 
other  exceptions  from  the  powers  of  ordinary  governments,  altogether  ac- 
count for  the  policy  of  binding  the  hand  of  the  Federal  Government, 
from  touching  the  channel  which  alone  can  give  efficacy  to  its  responsi- 
bility to  its  constituents :  and  of  leaving  those  who  administer  it  to  a  re- 
medy for  their  injured  reputations,  under  the  same  laws,  and  in  the  same 
tribunals  which  protect  their  lives,  their  liberties,  and  their  properties  7 

But  the  question  does  not  turn  either  on  the  wisdom  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, or  on  the  policy  which  gave  rise  to  its  particular  organization.  It 
turns  on  the  actual  meaning  of  the  instrument ;  by  which  it  has  appeared 
that  a  power  over  the  press  is  clearly  excluded  from  the  number  of  powers 
delegated  to  the  Federal  Government. 

3.  And  in  the  opinion  of  the  Committee,  well  may  it  be  said,  as  the 
resolution  concludes  with  saying,  that  the  unconstitutional  power  exer- 
cised over  the  press  by  the  "  Sedition  Act,"  ought,  "more  than  any 
other,  to  produce  universal  alarm ;  because  it  is  levelled  against  that  right 
of  freely  examining  public  characters  and  measures,  and  of  free  commu- 
nication among  the  people  thereon,  which  has  ever  been  justly  deemed 
the  only  effijctual  guardian  of  every  other  right.'' 

Without  scrutinizing  minutely  into  all  the  provisions  of  the  "  Sedition 
Act,"  it  will  be  sufficient  to  cite  so  much  of  section  2,  as  follows : — *'  And 
be  it  further  enacted,  that  if  any  person  shall  write,  print,  utter,  or  pub- 
lish, or  shall  cause  or  procure  to  be  written,  printed,  uttered,  or  publisned, 
or  shall  knowingly  and  willingly  assist  or  aid  in  writing,  printing,  uttering, 
or  publishing  any  false,  scandalous,  malicious  writing  or  writings  against 
the  Government  of  the  United  States,  or  either  House  of  the  Congress 


72  VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS. 

of  the  United  States,  with  an  intent  to  defame  the  said  Government,  or 
either  House  of  tJue  said  Congress,  or  the  President,  or  to  bring  them, 
or  either  of  them,  into  contempt  or  disrepute ;  or  to  excite  against 
them,  or  either,  \or  any  of  them,  the  hatred  of  the  good  people  of  the 
United  States,  <^c.  Then  such  person  being  thereof  convicted  before 
any  Court  of  the  United  States,  having  jurisdiction  thereof,  shall  be 
punished  by  a  fine  not  exceeding  two  thousand  dollars,  and  by  im- 
prisonment not  exceeding  two  years" 

1.  On  this  part  of  the  act  the  following  observations  present  thera- 


2.  The  Constitution  supposes  that  the  President,  the  Congress,  and 
each  of  its  Houses  may  not  discharge  their  trusts,  either  from  defect  of 
judgment  or  other  causes.  Hence,  they  are  all  made  responsible  to  their 
constituents,  at  the  returning  periods  of  election ;  and  the  President,  who 
is  singly  entrusted  with  very  great  powers,  is,  as  a  further  guard,  sub- 
jected to  an  intermediate  impeachment. 

2.  Should  it  happen,  as  the  Constitution  supposes  it  may  happen,  that 
cither  of  these  branches  of  the  government  may  not  have  duly  discharged 
its  trust ;  it  is  natural  and  proper  that,  according  to  the  cause  and  degree 
of  their  faults,  they  should  bo  brought  into  contempt  or  disrepute,  and 
incur  the  hatred  of  the  people. 

3.  Whether  it  has,  in  any  case,  happened  that  the  proceedings  of  either, 
or  all  of  those  branches,  evinces'  such  a  violation  of  duty  as  to  justify 
a  contempt,  a  disrepute,  or  hatred  among  the  people,  can  only  be  deter- 
mined by  a  free  examination  thereof,  and  a  free  communication  among 
the  people  thereon. 

4.  Whenever  it  may  have  actually  happened  that  proceedings  of  this 
sort  are  chargeable  on  all  or  either  of  the  branches  of  the  government,  it 
is  the  duty  as  well  as  right  of  intelligent  and  faithful  citizens  to  discuss 
and  promulge  them  freely,  as  well  as  control  them  by  the  censorship 
of  the  public  opinion,  as  promote  a  remedy  according  to  the  rules  of  the 
Constitution.  And  it  cannot  be  avoided  that  those  who  are  to  apply  the 
remedy  must  feel  in  some  degree  a  contempt  or  hatred  agcainst  the  trans- 
gressing party. 

5.  As  the  act  was  passed  on  July  14,  1798,  and  is  to  be  in  force  until 
March  3,  1801,  it  was  of  course,  that  during  its  continuance  two  elections 
of  the  entire  House  of  Representatives,  an  election  of  a  part  of  the  Senate, 
and  an  election  of  a  President  were  to  take  place. 

6.  That  consequently,  during  all  these  elections,  intended  by  the  Con- 
stitution to  preserve  the  purity,  or  to  purge  the  faults  of  the  Administra- 
tion, the  great  remedial  rights  of  the  people  were  to  be  exercised,  and  the 
responsibility  of  their  public  agents  to  be  screened  under  the  penalties  of 
this  act. 

May  it  not  be  asked  of  every  intelligent  friend  to  the  liberties  of  his 
country,  whether  the  power  exercised  in  such  an  act  as  this,  ought  not  to 
produce  great  and  universal  alarm  7  Whether  a  rigid  execution  of  such 
an  act,  in  time  past,  would  not  have  repressed  that  information  and  com- 
munication among  the  people  which  is  indispensable  to  the  just  exercise 
of  their  electoral  rights  1  And  whether  such  an  act,  if  made  perpetual, 
and  enforced  with  rigor,  would  not,  in  time  to  come,  either  destroy  our 
free  system  of  government,  or  prepare  a  convulsion  that  might  prove 
equally  fatal  to  it  1 


VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS.  73 

In  answer  to  such  questions,  it  has  been  pleaded  that  the  writings  and 
publications  forbidden  by  the  act,  are  those  only  which  are  false  and  maU-. 
cious,  and  intended  to  defame;  and  merit  is  claimed  for  the  privilege 
allowed  to  authors  to  justify,  by  proving  the  truth  of  their  publications, 
and  for  the  limitations  to  which  the  sentence  of  fine  and  imprisonment  is 
subjected. 

To  those  who  concurred  in  the  act,  under  the  extraordinary  belief  that 
the  option  lay  between  the  passing  of  such  an  act,  and  leaving  in  force  the 
common  law  of  libels,  which  punishes  truth  equally  with  falsehood ;  and 
submits  the  fine  and  imprisonment  to  the  indefinite  discretion  of  the  court, 
the  merit  of  good  intentions  ought  surely  not  to  be  refused.  A  like  merit 
may  perhaps  be  due  for  the  discontinuance  of  the  corporal  punishment 
which  the  common  law  also  leaves  to  the  discretion  of  the  court.  This 
merit  of  intention,  however,  would  have  been  greater,  if  the  several  miti- 
gations had  not  been  limited  to  so  short  a  period ;  and  the  apparent  incon- 
sistency would  have  been  avoided  between  justifying  the  act  at  one  time, 
by  contrasting  it  with  the  rigors  of  the  common  law,  otherwise  in  force  ; 
and  at  another  time  by  appealing  to  the  nature  of  the  crisis,  as  requiring 
the  temporary  rigor  exerted  by  the  act. 

But  whatever  may  have  been  the  meritorious  intentions  of  all  or  any 
who  contributed  to  the  Sedition  Act,  a  very  few  reflections  will  prove 
that  its  baleful  tendency  is  little  diminished  by  the  privilege  of  giving  in 
evidence  the  truth  of  the  matter  contained  in  poUtical  writings. 

In  the  first  place,  where  simple  and  naked  facts  alone  are  in  question, 
there  is  sufficient  difficulty  in  some  cases,  and  sufficient  trouble  and  vexa- 
tion in  all,  of  meeting  a  prosecution  from  the  government,  with  the  full 
and  formal  proof  necessary  in  a  court  of  law. 

But  in  the  next  place  it  must  be  obvious,  to  the  plainest  minds,  that 
opinions  and  inferences,  and  conjectural  observations,  are  not  only  in 
many  cases  inseparable  from  the  facts,  but  may  often  be  more  th3  objects 
of  the  prosecution  than  the  facts  themselves ;  or  may  even  be  altogether 
abstracted  from  particular  facts  ;  and  that  opinions  and  inferences,  and 
conjectural  observations,  cannot  be  subjects  of  that  kind  of  proof  which 
appertains  to  facts  before  a  court  of  law. 

Again :  It  is  no  less  obvious,  that  the  intent  to  defame  or  bring  into 
contempt  or  disrepute,  or  hatred,  which  is  made  a  condition  of  the  offence 
created  by  the  act,  cannot  prevent  its  pernicious  influence  on  the  freedom 
of  the  press.  For,  omitting  the  inquiry,  how  far  the  malice  of  the  intent 
is  an  inference  of  the  law  from  the  mere  publication,  it  is  manifestly  im- 
possible to  punish  the  intent  to  bring  those  who  administer  the  govern- 
ment into  disrepute  or  contempt,  without  striking  at  the  right  of  freely 
discussing  public  characters  and  measures :  because  those  who  engage  in 
such  discussions  must  expect  and  intend  to  excite  these  unfavorable  sen- 
timents, so  fir  as  they  may  be  thought  to  be  deserved.  To  prohibit  the 
intent  to  excite  those  unfavorable  sentiments  against  those  who  administer 
the  government,  is  equivalent  to  a  prohibition  of  the  actual  excitement 
of  them;  and  to  prohibit  the  actual  excitement  of  them  is  equivalent 
to  a  prohibition  of  discussions  having  that  tendency  and  effect;  which  again 
is  equivalent  to  a  protection  of  those  who  administer  the  government,  if 
they  should  at  any  time  deserve  the  contempt  or  hatred  of  the  people, 
against  being  exposed  to  it  by  free  animadversions  on  their  characters  and 
conduct.  Nor  can  there  be  a  doubt,  if  those  in  public  trust  be  shielded 
by  penal  laws  from  such  strictures  of  the  press  as  may  expose  them  to 
7 


74  VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS. 

contempt  or  disrepute,  or  hatred,  where  they  may  deserve  it,  that  in  exact 
proportion  as  they  may  deser\'e  to  he  exposed,  will  be  the  certainty  and 
criminality  of  the  intent  to  expose  them,  and  the  vigilance  of  prosecuting 
and  punishing  it;  nor  a  doubt  that  a  government  thus  intrenched  in 
penal  statutes  against  the  just  and  natural  eflects  of  a  culpable  adniinis- 
tration,  will  easily  evade  the  responsibility  which  is  essential  to  a  faithful 
discharge  of  its  duty. 

Let  it  be  recollected,  lastly,  that  the  right  of  electing  the  members  of  the 
government  constitutes  more  particularly  the  essence  of  a  free  and  respon- 
sible government.  The  value  and  efficacy  of  this  right  depends  on  the 
knowledge  of  the  comparative  merits  and  demerits  of  the  candidates 
for  public  trust ;  and  on  the  equal  freedom,  consequently  of  examin- 
ing and  discussing  these  merits  and  demerits  of  the  candidates  re- 
spectively. It  has  been  seen  that  a  number  of  important  elections  will 
take  place  while  the  act  is  in  force,  although  it  should  not  bo  continued 
beyond  the  term  to  which  it  is  limited.  Should  there  happen,  then,  as  is 
extremely  probable  in  relation  to  some  or  other  of  the  branches  of  the  go- 
vernment, to  be  competitions  between  those  who  are,  and  those  who  are 
not,  members  of  the  government,  what  will  be  the  situations  of  the  conv 
petitors  ]  Not  equal ;  because  the  characters  of  t  he  former  will  be  Covered 
by  the  "Sedition  Act"  from  animadversions  exposing  them  to  disrepute 
among  the  people  ;  whilst  the  latter  may  be  ex})0sed  to  the  contempt  and 
hatred  of  the  people,  without  a  violation  of  the  act.  What  will  be  the 
situation  of  the  people  1  Not  free ;  because  they  will  be  compelled  to 
make  their  election  between  competitors,  whose  pretensions  they  are  not 
permitted  by  the  act  equally  to  examine,  to  discuss,  and  to  ascertain.  And 
from  both  these  situations  will  not  those  in  power  derive  an  undue  advan- 
tage for  continuing  themselves  in  it ;  which,  by  impairing  the  right  of 
election,  endangers  the  blessings  of  the  government  founded  on  it  1 

It  is  with  justice,  therefore,  that  the  General  Assembly  have  affirmed  in 
the  resolution,  as  well  that  the  right  of  freely  examining  public  characters 
and  measures,  and  of  communication  thereon,  is  the  only  effectual 
guardian  of  every  other  right ;  as  that  this  particular  right  is  levelled  at 
by  the  power  exercised  in  the  "  Sedition  Act." 

Th<^  resolution  next  in  order  is  as  follows : 

nat  this  state  having  by  its  Convention^  which  ratified  the  Federal 
Constitution^  expressly  declared,  that  among  otlier  essential  rights^ 
"  the  liben'ty  of  conscience  and  of  the  press  cannot  he  cancelled,  abridged,^ 
restrained,  or  modified,  by  any  authority  of  the  United  States,"  and 
from  its  extreme  anxiety  to  guard  these  lights  from  every  possible 
attack  of  sophistry  and  ambition  having  with  other  states  recommended 
an  amendment  for  that  purpose,  which  amendment  was,  in  due  time, 
annexed  to  the  Constitution ;  it  would  mark  a  reproachful  inconsist- 
ency and  criminal  degeneracy,  if  an  indifference  were  shoivn  to 
the  most  palpable  violation  of  one  of  the  rights  thus  declared  and 
secured  ;  and  to  the  establishment  of  a  precedent  which  may  be  fatal  to 
the  other. 

To  place  this  resolution  in  its  just  light,  it  will  be  necessary  to  recur 
to  the  act  of  ratification  by  Virginia,  which  stands  in  the  ensuing  form : 

We,  the  delegates  of  the  people  of  Virginia,  duly  elected  iii  pursu- 
ance of  a  recommendation  from  the  General  Assembly,  and  now  met  in 
Convention,  having  fully  a%d  freely  investigated  and  discussed  the 
proceedings  of  the  Federal  Convention,  and  being  prepared  as  well  as 


VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS.  75 

the  most  mature  deliberation  hath  enabled  us,  to  decide  thereon  ;  DO^in 
the  name  and  in  the  behalf  of  the  people  of  Virginia,  declare  and  make 
know7i,  that  the  powers  granted  under  the  Constitution,  being  derived 
from  the  people  of  tJie  United  States,  may  be  resumed  by  them,  whenso- 
ever the  same  shall  be  perverted  to  their  injury  or  oppression ;  and  that 
every  power  not  granted  thereby,  remains  with  them,  and  at  their  will. 
That,  therefor^,  no  right  of  any  denomination  can  be  cancelled^ 
abridged,  restrained,  or  modified,  by  t/te  Congress  by  the  Senate,  or 
House  of  Representatives  acting  in  any  capacity,  by  the  President,  or 
any  department  or  officer  of  the  United  States,  except  in  those  instances 
in  which  power  is  giv e7i  by  the  Constitution  for  those  purposes ;  and 
that  among  other  essential  rights,  the  liberty  of  consience  and  of  the 
press  cannot  be  cancelled,  abridged,  restrained,  or  modified,  by  any 
authority  of  the  U7iited  Slates. 

Here  is  an  express  and  solemn  declaration  by  the  Convention  of  the 
State,  that  they  ratified  the  Constitution  in  the  sense  that  no  right  of  any 
denomination  can  be  cancelled,  abidged,  restrained,  or  modified,  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  States,  or  any  part  of  it,  except  in  those 
instances  in  which  power  is  given  by  the  Constitution,  and  in  the  sense 
particularly,  "  that  among  other  essential  rights,  the  liberty  of  con- 
science and  freedom  of  the  press  cannot  be  cancelled",  abridged,  restrain- 
ed, or  modified,  by  any  authority  of  the  United  States." 

Words  cannot  well  express,  in  a  fuller  or  more  forcible  manner,  the 
understanding  of  the  Convention,  that  the  liberty  of  conscience,  and  the 
freedom  of  the  press,  were  equally  and  completely  exempted  from  all 
authority  whatever  of  the  United  States. 

Under  an  anxiety  to  guard  more  effectually  these  rights  against  every 
possible  danger,  the  Convention,  after  ratifying  the  Constitution,  pro- 
ceeded to  preBx  to  certain  amendments  proposed  by  them,  a  declaration 
of  rights,  m  which  are  two  articles  providing,  the  one  for  the  liberty  of 
conscience,  the  other  for  the  freedom  of  speech  and  of  the  press. 

Similar  recommendations  having  proceeded  from  a  number  of  other 
states ;  and  Congress,  as  has  been  seen,  having  in  consequence  thereof, 
and  with  a  view  to  extend  the  ground  of  public  confidence  proposed 
among  other  declaratory  and  restrictive  clauses,  a  clause  expressly  secur- 
ing the  liberty  of  conscience  and  of  the  press ;  and  Virginia  having 
concurred  in  the  ratifications  which  made  them  a  part  of  the  Constitu- 
tion ;  it  will  remain  with  a:  candid  public  to  decide  whether  it  would  not 
mark  an  inconsistency  and  degeneracy,  if  an  indifference  were  now 
shown  to  a  palpable  violation  of  one  of  those  rights,  the  freedom  of  the 
press  ;  and  to  a  precedent  therein  which  may  be  fatal  to  the  other,  the 
free  exercise  of  religion. 

That  the  precedent  established  by  the  violation  of  the  former  of  these 
rights,  may,  as  is  affirmed  by  the  resolution,  be  fatal  to  the  latter,  ap- 
pears to  be  demonstrable  by  a  comparison  of  the  grounds  on  which 
they  respectively  rest ;  and  from  the  scope  of  reasoning  by  which  the 
power  of  the  fonner  has  been  vindicated. 

First,  Both  of  these  rights,  the  liberty  of  conscience  and  of  the  press, 
rest  equally  on  the  original  ground  of  not  being  delegated  by  the  Con- 
stitution, and  consequently  withheld  from  the  government.  Any  con- 
struction, therefore,  that  would  attack  this  original  security  for  the  one, 
must  have  the  like  effect  on  the  other. 

Secondly f  They  are  both  equally  secured  by  the  supplement  to  the 


76  VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS. 

Constitution ;  being  both  included  in  the  same  amendment  made  at  the 
same  time,  and  by  the  same  aulJiority.  Any  constniction  or  argu- 
ment, tlien,  which  would  turn  tlie  amendment  into  a  grant  or  acknow- 
ledgement of  power  with  respect  to  the  press,  might  be  equally  applied 
to  die  freedom  of  religion. 

Thirdly,  If  it  be  admitted  that  the  extent  of  the  freedom  of  the  press, 
secured  by  the  amendment,  is  to  be  measured  by  the  common  law  on 
this  subject,  the  same  authority  may  be  resorted  to  for  the  standard 
which  is  to  fix  the  extent  of  the  '*  free  exercise  of  religion."  It  cannot 
be  necessary  to  say  what  this  standard  would  be,  whether  the  common 
law  be  taken  solely  as  the  imwritten,  or  as  varied  by  the  written  law  of 
England. 

Fourthly,  If  the  words  and  phrases  in  the  amendment  are  to  be  con- 
sidered as  chosen  with  a  studied  discrimination  which  yields  an  argu- 
ment for  a  power  over  the  press,  under  the  limitation  that  its  freedom  be 
not  abridged ;  the  same  argument  results  from  the  same  consideration 
for  a  power  over  the  exercise  of  religion,  under  the  limition  that  its 
freedom  be  not  prohibited. 

For,  if  Congress  may  regulate  the  freedom  of  the  press  provided  they 
do  not  abridge  it,  because  it  is  said  only,  "  they  shall  not  abridge  it, 
and  is  not  said,  "  tliey  shall  make  no  law  respecting  it,"  the  analogy 
of  reasoning  is  conclusive,  that  Congress  may  regulate  and  even 
abridge  tlie  free  exercise  of  religion,  provided  they  do  not  prohibit  it; 
because  it  is  said  only  "  they  shall  not  prohibit  it ;"  and  is  not  said, 
"  they  shall  make  no  law  respecting,  or  no  law  abridging  it." 

The  General  Assembly  were  governed  by  the  clearest  reason,  then, 
in  considering  the  "  Sedition  Act,"  which  legislates  on  the  freedom  of 
the  press,  as  establishing  a  precedent  that  may  be  fatal  to  the  liberty  of 
conscience:  and  it  will  be  the  duty  of  all,  in  proportion  as  they  value 
the  security  of  tlie  latter,  to  take  the  alarm  at  every  encroachment  on 
the  foniier. 

The  two  concluding  resolutions  only  remain  to  be  examined.  They 
are  in  the  words  following : 

That  tJi£  good  people  of  the  Commonwealth,  having  ever  felt  and 
continuing  to  feel  the  most  sincere  affection  for  their  brethren  of  the 
other  states ;  the  truest  anxiety  for  establishing  and  perpetuating  the 
union  of  all;  and  the  most  scrupulous  fidelity  to  that  Constitution, 
which  is  tJie  pudge  of  mutual  friendship,  and  the  instrument  of  mutual 
happiness  ;  the  General  Assembly  doth  soleninly  appeal  to  the  like  dis- 
positions in  the  other  states,  in  confidence  that  they  will  concur  with  this 
Commonwealth  in  declaring  as  it  does  hereby  declare,  that  the  acts 
aforesaid  are  unconstitutional;  and  that  the  necessary  and  proper 
tneasures  will  betaken  by  each  for  co-operating  with  this  state  in  main- 
taining unimpaired  the  authorities,  rights,  and  liberties  reserved  to  the 
staMs  respectively,  or  to  the  people. 

That  tfi£  Governor  be  desired  to  transmit  a  copy  of  the  foregoing  re- 
solutions to  the  executive  autlurrity  of  each  of  the  other  states,  with  a 
request  that  the  same  may  be  communirated  to  the  Legislature  thereof  ; 
and  that  a  copij  be  furnished  to  each  of  the  Senators  and  Representa- 
tives, representing  this  State  in  the  Congress  of  tlte  United  Stat-es. 

The  fairness  and  regularity  of  the  course  of  proceeding  here  pursued, 
have  not  protected  it  against  objections  even  from  sources  too  respecta. 
ble  to  be  disregarded. 


VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS.  77 

It  has  been  said  that  it  belongs  to  the  Judiciary  of  the  United  States, 
and  not  to  the  State  Legislatures,  to  declare  the  meaning  of  the  Federal 
Constitution. 

But  a  declaration  that  proceedings  of  the  Federal  Government  are 
not  warranted  by  the  Constitution,  is  a  novelty  neither  amon^  the  citi- 
zens, nor  among  the  Legislatures  of  the  States  ;  nor  are  the  citizens  or 
the  Legislature  of  Virginia  singular  in  the  excunple  of  it. 

Nor  can  the  declarations  of  either,  whether  affirming  or  denying  the 
constitutionality  of  measures  of  the  Federal  Government,  or  whether 
made  before  or  after  judicial  decisions  thereon,  be  deemed  in  any  point 
of  view  an  assumption  of  the  office  of  the  judge.  The  declarations,  in 
such  cases,  are  expressions  of  opinion,  unaccompanied  with  any  other 
effect  than  what  thev  may;  produce  on  opinion,  by  exciting  reflection. 
The  expositions  of  the  judiciary,  on  the  other  hand,  are  carried  into  im- 
mediate effect  by  force.  The  former  may  lead  to  a  change  in  the  legis- 
lative expression  of  the  general  will;  possibly  to  a  change  in  the 
opinion  of  the  judiciary ;  the  latter  enforces  the  general  will,  whilst 
that  will  and  that  opinion  continue  unchanged. 

And  if  there  be  no  impropriety  in  declaring  the  unconstitutionality  of 
proceedings  in  the  Federal  Government,  where  can  be  the  impropriety 
of  communicating  the  declaration  to  other  states,  and  inviting  their  c6n- 
currence  in  a  like  declaration  1  What  is  allowable  for  one  must  be  al- 
lowable for  all ;  and  a  free  commimication  among  the  states,  where  the 
Constitution  imposes  no  restraint,  is  as  allowable  among  the  State 
Governments  as  among  other  public  bodies  or  private  citizens.  This 
consideration  derives  a  weight  that  cannot  be  denied  to  it,  from  the  rela- 
tion of  the  State  Legislatures  to  the  Federal  Legislature  as  the  imme- 
diate constituents  of  one  of  its  branches. 

The  Legislatures  of  the  States  have  a  right  also  to  originate  amend- 
ments to  the  Constitution,  by  a  concurrence  of  two  thirds  of  the  whole 
number,  in  application  to  Congress  for  the  purpose.  When  new  states 
are  to  be  formed  by  a  junction  of  two  or  more  states  or  parts  of  states, 
the  Legislatures  of  the  states  concerned,  are,  as  well  as  Congress,  to 
concur  m  the  measure.  The  states  have  a  right  also  to  enter  into  agree- 
ments or  compacts,  with  the  consent  of  Congress.  In  all  such  cases  a 
communication  among  them  results  from  the  object  which  is  common 
to  them. 

It  is  lastly  to  be  seen,  whether  the  confidence  expressed  by  the  reeo- 
lution,  that  the  necessary  and  proper  measures  would  be  taken  by  the 
other  states  for  co-operating  with  Virginia  in  maintaining  the  right« 
reserved  to  the  states,  or  to  the  people,  be  in  any  degree  liable  to  the 
objections  which  have  been  raised  against  it. 

If  it  be  liable  to  objection,  it  must  be  because  either  the  object  or  the 
means  are  objectionable. 

The  object  being  to  maintain  what  the  Constitution  has  ordained,  it 
in  itself  a  laudable  object. 

The  means  are  expressed  in  the  terms,  "  the  necessary  and  proper 
measures."  A  proper  object  was  to  be  pursued,  by  means  both  neces- 
sary and  proper. 

To  find  an  objection,  then,  it  must  be  shown  that  some  meaning  was 
annexed  to  these  general  terms  which  was  not  proper ;  and,  for  this 
purpose,  eithe*'  that  the  means  iised  by  the  General  Assembly  vere  an 
7* 


78  VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS. 

example  of  improper  means,  or  that  there  were  no  proper  means  to 
which  the  terms  could  refer: 

In  the  example  given  by  the  state,  of  declaring  the  Alien  and  Sedi- 
tion Acts  to  be  unconstitutional,  and  of  communicating  the  declaration 
to  other  states,  no  trace  of  improper  means  has  appeared.  And  if  the 
other  states  had  concurred  in  making  a  like'declaration,  supported  too 
by  the  nmnerous  applications  flowing  immediately  from  the  people,  it 
can  scarcely  be  doubted  that  these  simple  means  would  have  been  as 
sufficient  as  they  are  unexceptionable. 

It  is  no  less  certain  that  other  means  might  have  been  employed^ 
which  are  strictly  within  the  limits  of  the  Constitution.  The  Legisla- 
tures of  the  States  might  have  made  a  direct  representation  to  Con- 
gress, with  a  view  to  obtain  a  rescinding  of  the  two  offensive  acts;  or, 
they  might  have  represented  to  their  respective  Senators  in  Congress 
their  wish  that  two  thirds  thereof  would  propose  an  explanatory  amend- 
ment to  the  Constitution ;  or  two  thirds  of  themselves,  if  such  had  been 
their  option,  might,  by  an  application  to  Congress,  have  obtained  a 
Convention  for  the  same  object. 

These  several  means,  though  not  equally  eligible  in  themselves,  or 
probably  to  the  states,  were  all  constitutionally  open  for  consideration. 
And  if  the  General  Assembly,  after  declaring  the  two  acts  to  be  uncon- 
stitutional, the  first  and  most  obvious  proceeding  on  the  subject,  did  not 
undertake  to  point  out  to  the  other  states  a  choice  among  the  farther 
measures  that  might  become  necessary  and  proper,  the  reserve  will  not 
be  misconstruad  by  liberal  minds  into  any  culpable  imputation. 

These  observations  appear  to  form  a  satisfactory  reply  to  every  ob- 
jection which  is  not  founded  on  a  misconception  of  the  terms  employed 
in  the  resolutions.  There  is  one  other,  however,  which  may  be  of  too 
much  importance  not  to  be  added.  It  cannot  be  forgotten  that  among 
the  argmiients  addressed  to  those  who  apprehend  danger  to  liberty  from 
the  establishment  of  the  General  Government  over  so  great  a  countr^r, 
the  appeal  was  emphatically  made  to  the  intermediate  existence  of  the 
State  Governments,  between  the  people  and  that  Government,  to  the 
vigilance  with  which  they  would  descry  the  first  symptoms  of  usiu-pa- 
tion,  and  to  the  promptitude  with  which  they  would  sound  the  alarm  to 
the  public.  This  argument  was  probably  not  without  its  effect ;  and 
if  it  was  a  proper  one  then,  to  recommend  the  establishment  of  the 
Constitution,  it  must  be  a  proper  one,  now,  to  assist  in  its  interpreta- 
tion. 

The  only  part  of  the  two  concluding  resolutions  that  remains  to  be 
noticed  is  the  repetition  in  the  first  of  that  warm  aflfection  to  the  union 
and  its  members,  and  of  that  scrupulous  fidelity  to  the  Constitution, 
which  have  been  invariably  felt  by  the  people  of  this  state.  As  the 
proceedings  were  introduced  with  these  sentiments,  they  could  not  be 
more  properly  closed  than  in  the  same  manner.  Should  there  be  any 
so  far  misled  as  to  call  in  question  the  sincerity  of  these  professions, 
whatever  regret  may  be  axcited  by  the  error,  the  General  Assembly 
cannot  descend  into  a  discussion  of  it.  Those  who  have  listened  to 
the  suggestion,  can  only  be  left  to  their  d)wn  recollection  of  the  part 
which  this  state  has  borne  in  the  establisliment  of  our  national  inde- 
piendence,  in  the  eistablishment  of  our  National  Constitution,  and  in 
maintaining  under  it  the  authority  and  laws  of  the  Union,  without  a 
single  exception  of  internal  resistance  or  commotion.    By  recurring  to 


KENTUCKY  RESOLUTIONS.  79 

the  facts,  they  will  be  able  to  convince  themselves  that  the  Representa- 
tives of  the  people  of  Virginia  must  be  above  the  necessity  of  opposing 
any  other  shield  to  attacks  on  their  national  patriotism  than  their  own 
conscientiousness,  and  the  justice  of  an  enlightened  public,  who  will 
perceive  in  the  resolutions  themselves  the  strongest  evidence  of  attach- 
ment both  to  the  Constitution  and  to  the  Union,  since  it  is  only  by  main- 
taining the  different  governments  and  departments  within  their  respect- 
ive limits  that  the  blessings  of  either  can  be  perpetuated. 

The  extensive  view  of  the  subject,  thus  taken  by  the  Committee,  has 
led  them  to  report  to  the  House,  as  the  result  of  the  whole,  the  following 
resolution : 

Resolved,  That  the  General  Assembly,  having  carefully  and  respect- 
fully attended  to  the  proceedings  of  a  number  of  the  states,  in  answer 
to  their  resolutions  of  December  21,  1798,  and  having  accurately  and 
fully  re-examined  and  re-considered  the  latter,  find  it  to  be  their  indis- 
pensable duty,  to  adhere  to  the  same,  as  founded  in  truth,  as  consonant 
with  the  Constitution,  and  as  conducive  to  its  preservation ;  and  more 
especially  to  be  their  duty  to  renew,  as  they  do  hereby  renew,  their  pro- 
test against  "  the  Alien  and  Sedition  Acts,"  as  palpable  and  alarming 
infractions  of  the  Constitution. 


KENTUCKY  LEGISLATURE. 

IN    THE   HOUSE    OF    REPRESENTATIVES. 

November  10,  1798. 
The  House,  according  to  the  standing  order  of  the  day,  resolved  itself 
into  a  Committee  of  tlfe  whole,  on  the  state  of  the  Commonwealth. 

MR.  CALDWELL  in  the  Chair, 
And  after  some  time  spent  therein,  the  Speaker  resumed  the  chair, 
and  Mr.  Caldwell  reported  that  the  Committee  had.  according  to  order, 
had  under  consideration  the  Governor's  address,  and  had  come  to  the  fol- 
lowing resolutions  thereupon,  which  he  delivered  in  at  the  Clerk's  table, 
where  they  were  twice  read,  and  agreed  to  by  the  House. 

I.  Resolved,  That  the  several  states  composing  the  United  States 
of  America,  are  not  united  on  the  principle  of  unlimited  submission  to 
the  General  Government,  but  that  by  compact  under  the  style  and  title 
of  a  Constitution  for  the  United  States,  and  of  amendments  thereto,  they 
constituted  a  General  Government  for  special  purposes,  delegated  to 
that  Government  certain  definite  powers,  reserving  each  state  to  itself, 
the  residuary  mass  of  right  to  their  own  self  government ;  and  that 
whensoever  the  Genered  Government  assumes  undelegated  powers,  its 
acts  are  unauthoritive,  void,  and  of  no  force ;  that  to  this  compact  each 
state  acceded  as  a  state,  and  as  an  integral  party,  its  co-states  form- 
ing as  to  itself  the  other  party  ;  that  the  government  created  by  thig 
compact  was  not  made  the  exclusive  or  fin^S.  judge  of  the  extent  of  the 
powers  delegated  to  itself: — since  that  would  have  made  its  discretion, 
and  not  the  Constitution,  the  measur*  of  its  powers ;  but  that,  as  in  all 


80  KENTUCKY  RESOLUTIONS. 

oilier  cases  of  compact  among  parties  having  no  common  judge,  each 
party  lias  an  equal  ri«^lit  U^)  judge  for  itself,  as  well  of  infractions,  as  of 
the  mode  and  measure  of  redress. 

2.  licsolved,  That  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  having 
delegated  to  Congress  a  power  to  punish  treason,  counterfeiting  the 
secmrities  and  current  coin  of  the  United  States,  piracies  and  felonies 
committed  on  Uie  high  seas,  and  oft'ences  against  the  laws  of  nations, 
and  no  otlier  crimes  whatever,  and  it  beiii^  true  as  a  general  principle, 
and  one  of  the  amendments  to  the  Constitution  having  also  declared, 
"  That  tlie  powers  not  delegated  to  the  United  States  by  the  Constitu- 
tion, nor  prohibited  by  it  to  the  states,  are  reserved  to  the  states  re- 
spectively, or  to  the  people ;"  therefore,  also  tlie  same  act  of  Congress, 
passed  on  the  14th  day  of  July,  1798,  and  entitled  "An  Act  in  addition 
to  the  act  entitled  an  act  for  the  punishment  of  certain  crimes  against 
the  United  States ;"  as  also  the  act  passed  by  them  on  the  27th  day  of 
June,  1798,  entitled  "  An  act,  to  punish  frauds  committed  on  the  Bank 
of  the  United  States"  (and  all  oUier  of  tlieir  acts  which  assume  to  cre- 
ate, define,  or  punish  crimes  other  than  those  enumerated  in  the  Constitu- 
tion), are  altogether  void,  and  of  no  force,  and  that  the  power  to  create, 
define,  and  punish  such  other  crimes,  is  reserved,  and  of  right  apper- 
tains solely  and  exclusively  to,  tlie  respective  states,  ^ach  within  its 
own  territory. 

3.    Resolved,  That  it  is  true  as  a  general  principle,  as  is  also  ex- 
pressly declared  by  one  of  the  amendments  to  the  Constitution,  that 
"  The  powers  not  delegated  to  the  United  States  by  the  Constitution, 
nor  prohibited  by  it  to  the  states,  are  reserved  to  the  states  respective- 
ly, or  to  tlie  people  ;"  and  that  no  power  over  the  freedom  of  religion, 
freedom  of  speech,  or  freedom  of  the  press,  being  delegated  to  the  United 
states  by  the  Constitution,   nor  prohibited  by  it  to  the  states,   all  law- 
ful powers  respecting  the  same,  did  of  right  remain,  and  were  reserved 
to  the  states,  or  to  the  people ;  that  thus  was  manifested  their  determi- 
nation to  retain  to  themselves,  the  right  of  judging  how  far  the  licen- 
tiousness of  speech  and  of  tlie  press,  may  be  abridged  without  lessening 
their  useful  freedom,  and  how  far  those  ai)uses  which  cannot  be  sepa- 
rated from  their  use,  should  be  tolerated  rather  than  the  use  be  destroyed  ; 
and  thus,  also,   they  guarded   against  all  abridgement  by  tlie   United 
States  of  the  freedom  of  religious  opinions  and  exercises,   and   retained 
to  tliemselves  the  right  of  protecting  the  same,  as  tliis  state  by  a  law 
passed  on  the  general  demand  of  its  citizens,  had  already  protected  them 
from  all  human  restraints  or  interference:  And  that  in  addition  to  tliis 
general  principle  and  express  declaration,  another  and  more  special 
provision  hasl>een  made  by  one  of  the  amendments  to  tlie  Constitution, 
which  expressly  declares  that  "  Conpress  shall  make  no  law  respecting 
tn  establishment  of  religion,  or  prohibiting  the  free  exercise  thereof,  or 
abridging  the  freedom  of  8})eech  or  of  tlie  press  "  thereby  guarding  in 
the  same  sentence,  and  under  the  same  words,  the  freedom  of  religion, 
of  speech,  and  of  the  press,  insomuch,  that  whatever  violates  either, 
throws  down  the  sanctuary  which  covers  the  others,  and  that  libels, 
falsehoods,  and  defamation,  equally  with  heresy  and  false  religion,  are 
withheld  from  the  cognizance  of  F^eral  tribunals :  That  Ui^efore  the 
act  of  the  Congress  of  the   United  States,  passed  on  the  Htli  day  of 
July,  1798,  entitled,  "  An  act  in  addition  to  trie  act,  for  tlie  punishment 
of  certain  crimes  against  the  United  States,"  which   does  abridge 


KENTUCKY  RESOLUTIONS.  81 

the  freedom  of  tlie  press,  is  not  law,  but  it  is  altogether  void,  and  of  no 
effect. 

4.  Resolved,  That  alien  friends  are  under  the  jurisdiction  and  pro- 
tection of  the  laws  of  the  state  wherein  ihey  are  ;  that  no  power  over 
them  has  been  delegated  to  the  United  States,  nor  prohibited  to  the  indi- 
vidual states  distinct  from  their  power  over  citizens ;  and  it  being  true 
as  a  general  principle,  and  one  of  tlie  amendments  to  the  Constitution 
having  also  declared,  that  "  the  powers  not  delegated  to  the  United 
States  by  the  Constitution,  nor  prohibited  by  it  to  the  States,  are  reserv- 
ed to  the  states  respectively  or  to  the  people,"  the  act  of  the  Congress 
of  the  United  States,  passed  on  the  22d  day  of  June,  1798,  entitled  "  an 
act  concerning  aliens,"  which  assumes  power  over  alien  friends  not 
delegated  by  the  Constitution,  is  not  law,  but  is  altogether  void  and  of 
no  force. 

5.  Resolved,  That  in  addition  to  the  general  principle  as  well  as  the 
express  declaration,  that  powers  not  delegated  are  reserved,  another  and 
more  special  provision  inserted  in  the  Constitution  from  abundant  cau- 
tion has  declared,  "  that  the  migration  or  importation  of  such  persons 
as  any  of  the  states  now  existing  shall  think  proper  to  admit,  shall  not 
be  prohibited  by  the  Congress  prior  to  the  year  1808."  That  this  Com- 
monwealth does  admit  the  migration  of  alien  friends  described  as  the 
subject  of  the  said  act  concerning  aliens,  that  a  provision  against  pro- 
hibiting their  migration,  is  a  provision  against  all  acts  equivalent  there- 
to, or  it  would  be  nugatory ;  that  to  remove  them  when  migrated,  is 
equivalent  to  a  prohibition  of  their  migration,  and  is  therefore  contrary 
to  the  said  provision  of  the  Constitution  and  void.  * 

6.  Resolved,  That  the  imprisonment  of  a  person  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  laws  of  this  Commonwealth  on  hisfailare  to  obey  the  simple 
order  of  the  President,  to  depart  out  of  the  United  States,  as  is  under- 
taken by  the  said  act,  entitled  "  an  act  concerning  aliens,"  is  contrary 
to  the  Constitution ;  one  amendment  to  which  has  provided  that  "  no 
person  shall  be  deprived  of  liberty,  without  due  process  of  law,"  and 
that  another  having  provided,  "  that  in  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the 
accused  shall  enjoy  the  right  to  a  public  trial  by  an  impartial  jury,  to  be 
informed  of  the  nature  and  cause  of  the  accusation,  to  be  confronted 
with  the  witnesses  against  him,  to  have  compulsory  process  for  obtain- 
ing witnesses  in  his  favor,  and  to  have  the  assistance  of  counsel  for  his 
defence,"  the  same  act  undertaking  to  authorize  the  President  to  remove 
a  person  out  of  the  United  States  who  is  under  the  protection  of  the  law, 
on  his  own  suspicion,  without  accusation,  without  jury,  without  pub- 
lic trial,  without  confrontation  of  the  witnesses  against  him,  without 
having  witnesses  in  his  favor,  without  defence,  without  counsel,  is  con- 
trary to  these  provisions  also  of  the  Constitution,  is  therefore  not  law, 
but  utterly  void  and  of  no  force. 

That  transferring  the  power  of  judging  any  person  who  is  under  the 
protection  of  the  laws,  from  the  courts  to  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  as  is  undertaken  by  the  same  act  concerning  aliens,  is  against 
the  article  of  the  Constitution  which  provides  that  "  the  judicial  power 
of  the  United  States  shall  be  vested  in  courts,  the  judges  of  which  shall 
hold  their  offices  during  good  behavior,"  and  tliat  the  said  act  is  void 
for  that  reason  also;  and  it  is  further  to  be  noted  that  this  transfer  of 
judiciary  power  is  to  that  magistrate  of  the  General  Government  who 


83  KENTUCKY  RESOLUTIONS. 

already  possesses  all  the  executive,  aiid  a  qualified  negative  in  all  the 
legislative  powers. 

7.  Resolved  J  That  the  construction  applied  by  tlie  General  Govern- 
ment (as  is  evinced  by  sundry  of  their  proceedings)  to  those  parts  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  which  delegate  to  Congress  a  power 
to  lay  and  collect  taxes,  duties,  imposts,  and  excises ;  to  pay  the  debts, 
and  provide  for  the  common  defence  and  general  welfare  of  the  United 
States,  and  to  nuike  all  laws  which  shall  be  necessary  and  proper  for 
carrying  into  execution  the  powers  vested  by  the  Constitution  in  tlie 
Grovernment  of  the  United  States,  or  any  depeirtment  thereof,  goes  to 
the  destruction  of  all  the  limits  prescribed  to  their  power  by  the  Consti- 
tution— That  words  meant  by  that  instnnnent  to  be  subsidiary  only  to 
the  execution  of  tlie  limited  powers,  ought  not  to  be  so  construed  as 
themselves  to  give  unlimited  powers,  nor  a  part  so  to  be  taken  as  to  de- 
stroy the  whole  residue  of  tlie  instrument ;  that  the  proceedings  of  the 
General  Government  under  color  of  these  articles  will  be  a  fit  and  ne- 
cessary subject  for  revisal  and  correction  at  a  time  of  greater  tranc^uillity, 
while  those  specified  in  the  preceding  resolutions  call  for  immediate  re- 
dress. 

8.  Resolved,  That  the  preceding  resolutions  be  transmitted  to  the 
Senators  and  Representatives  in  Congress  from  this  Common  we  ilth, 
who  are  hereby  enjoined  to  present  the  same  to  their  respective  Houses, 
and  to  use  their  best  endeavors  to  procure,  at  the  next  session  of  Con- 
gress, a  repeal  of  the  aforesaid  unconstitutional  and  obnoxious  acts. 

9.  Resolved,  lastly,  That  the  Governor  of  this  Commonwealth  be, 
and  he  is  hereby,  authorised  and  requested  to  communicate  the  preced- 
ing resolutions  to  the  Legislatures  of  the  several  states,  to  assure  them 
that  this  Commonwealth  considers  Union  for  specified  national  pur- 
poses, and  particularly  for  those  specified  in  their  late  Federal  Compact, 
to  be  friendly  to  the  penccj  happiness,  and  prosperity  of  all  the  states  : 
that,  faithful  to  that  compact,  according  to  the  plain  intent  and  meaning 
in  which  it  was  understood  and  acceded  to  by  the  several  parties,  it  is 
sincerely  anxious  for  its  preservation ;  that  it  does  also  believe  that  to 
take  from  the  states  all  the  powers  of  self-government,  and  transfer 
them  to  a  general  and  consolidated  government,  witliout  regard  to  the 
special  delegations  and  reservations  solemnly  agreed  to  in  tliat  com- 
pact, is  not  for  the  peace,  happiness,  or  prosperity  of  tliese  states :  and 
that,  therefore,  this  Commonwealth  is  determined,  as  it  doubts  not  its 
co-states  are  tamely  to  submit  to  undelegated  and  consequently  unlim- 
ited powers  in  no  man  or  body  of  men  on  earth:  that  if  the  acts  before 
specified  should  stand,  these  conclusions  would  flow  from  them  ;  that 
the  General  Government  may  place  any  act  they  tliink  proper  on  the 
list  of  crimes,  and  punish  it  themselves,  whether  enumerated  or  not 
enumerated  by  the  Constitution,  as  recognizable  by  them ;  that  they  may 
transfer  its  cognizance  to  the  President,  or  any  other  person,  who  may 
himself  be  the  accuser,  counsel,  judge,  and  jury ;  whose  suspicions  may 
be  the  evidence,  his  order  the  sentence,  his  officer  tlie  executioner,  and 
his  breast  the  sole  record  of  the  transaction :  That  a  very  numerous  and 
valuable  description  of  the  inhabitants  of  these  states,  being  by  this 
precedent  reduced  as  outlaws  to  the  absolute  dominion  of  one  man,  and 
the  barrier  of  the  Constitution  thus  swept  away  from  us  all,  no  rampart 
now  remains  against  the  passions  and  the  power  of  a  majority  of  Con- 
p*es8,  to  protect  from  a  like  exportation  or  other  more  grevious  punish- 


KENTUCKY  RESOLUTIONS.  68 

ment  the  minority  of  the  same  body,  the  legislatures,  judges,  gover- 
nors, and  counsellors  of  the  states,  nor  their  other  peaceful  inhabitants 
who  may  venture  to  reclaim  the  constitutional  rights  and  liberties  of 
the  states  and  people,  or  who,  for  other  causes,  good  or  bad,  may  be  ob- 
noxious to  the  views,  or  marked  by  the  suspicions  of  the  President,  or 
be  thought  dangerous  to  his  or  their  elections,  or  other  interests,  public 
or  personal  :  That  the  friendless  alien  has  indeed  been  selected  as  the 
safest  subject  of  a  first  experiment;  but  the  citizen  will  soon  follow,  or 
rather  has  already  followed  ;  for,  already  has  a  Sedition  Act  marked 
him  as  its  prey :  that  these  and  successive  acts  of  the  same  character, 
unless  arrested  on  the  threshhold,  may  tend  to  drive  these  states  into  re- 
volution and  blood,  and  will  furnish  new  calumnies  against  Republi- 
can Governments,  and  new  pretexts  for  those  who  wish  it  to  be  believ- 
ed that  man  cannot  be  governed  but  by  a  rod  of  iron ;  that  it  would  be 
a  dangerous  delusion,  were  a  confidence  in  the  men  of  our  choice  to  si- 
lence our  fears  for  the  safety  of  our  rights ;  that  confidence  is  every 
where  the  parent  of  despotism :  that  free  government  is  founded  in  jea- 
lousy and  not  in  confidence:  it  is  jealousy,  not  confidence,  which  pre- 
scribes limited  Constitutions  to  bind  down  those  whom  we  are  obliged 
to  trust  with  power;  that  our  Constitution  has  accordingly  fixed  the 
limits  to  which,  and  no  further,  our  confidence  may  ^o  ;  and  let  the 
honest  advocate  of  confidence  read  the  Alien  and  Sedition  Acts,  and 
say  if  the  Constitution  has  not  been  wise  in  fixing  limits  to  the  govern- 
ment it  created,  and  whether  we  should  be  wise  in  destroying  those 
limits  1     Let  him  say  what  the  government  is,  if  it  be  not  a  tyranny, 
which  the  men  of  our  choice  have  conferred  on  the  President,  and  the 
President  ofour  choice  has  assented  to,  and  accepted  over  the  friendly 
strangers,  to  whom  the  mild  spirit  ofour  country  and  its  law  had  pledged 
hospitality  and  protection :  that  the  men  of  our  choice  have  more  re- 
spected the  bare  suspicions  of  the  President,  than  the  solid  rights  of  in- 
nocence, the  claims  of  justification,  the  sacred  force  of  truth,  and  the 
forms  and  substance  of  law  and  justice.     In  questions  of  power,  then, 
let  no  more  be  heard  of  confidence  in  man,  but  bind  him  down  from  mis- 
chief, by  the  chains  of  the  Constitution.     That  this  Commonwealth 
does,  therefore,  call   on  its  co-states  for  an  expression  of  their  senti- 
ments on  the  acts  concerning  aliens,  and  for  the  punishment  of  certain 
crimes  hereinbefore  specified,  plainly  declaring  whether  tliese  acts  are 
or  are  not  authorized  by  the  Federal  Compact  1     And  it  doubts  not  that 
their  sense  will  be  so  announced,  as  to  prove  tlieir  attachment  unalter- 
ed to  limited  government,  whether  general  or  particular,  and  that  the 
rights  and  liberties  of  their  co-states,  will  be  exposed  to  no  dangers  by 
remaining  embarked  on  a  common  bottom  with  their  own :  That  they 
will  concur  with  this  Commonwealth  in  considering  the  said  acts  as  so 
palpably  against  the  Constitution,  as  to  amount  to  an  undisguised  de- 
claration, that  the  compact  is  not  meant  to  be  the  measure  of  the  powers 
of  the  General  Government,  but  that  it  will  proceed  in  the  exercise  over 
these  states  of  all  powers  whatsoever :  That  they  will  view  this  as 
seizing  the  rights  of  the  states,  and  consolidating  them  in  the  hands 
of  the  General  Government,  with  a  power  assumed  to  bind  the  states, 
not  merely  in  cases  made  Federal,  but  in  all  cases  whatsoever,  by 
laws  made,  not  with  their  consent,  but  by  others  against  their  consent : 
That  this  would  be  to  surrender  the  form  of  government  we  have  cho- 
sen, and  to  live  under  one  deriving  its  powers  from  its  own  will,  and 


84  KENTUCKY  RESOLUTIONS. 

not  from  our  authority :  and  that  the  co-states  recurring  to  their  natur- 
al right  in  cases  not  made  Federal,  will  concur  in  declaring  these 
acts  void  and  of  no  force,  and  will  each  unite  with  this  Commonwealth 
in  requesting  their  repeal  at  the  next  session  of  Congress. 

EDMUND  BULLOCK,  5f.  H.  R. 
JOHN  CAMPBELL,  5:.  S.  P.  T. 
Passed  the  House  of  Representatives,  November  10th,  1798. 
Attest, 

THOMAS  TODD,  C.  H.  R. 
In  SENATE,  November  13th,  1798,  unanimously  concurred  in. 
Attest, 

B.  THURSTON,  Clerk  of  Senate. 
Approved,  November  16th,  1798. 

JAMES  GARRARD,  G.  K. 
Bv  the  Governor  : 

HARRY  TOULMIN,  Secretary  of  State. 


KENTUCKY  LEGISLATURE. 

IN   THE   HOUSE    OF    REPRESENTATIVES. 

Thursday,  Nov.  Uth,  1799. 

The  House,  according  to  the  standing  order  of  the  day,  resolved  itself 
into  a  Committee  of  the  whole  House,  on  the  State  of  the  Common- 
wealth, Mr.  Desha  in  the  chair ;  and  after  some  time  spent  therein,  the 
Speaker  resumed  the  chair,  and  Mr.  Desha  reported,  that  the  Commit- 
tee had  taken  under  consideration  sundry  resolutions  passed  by  several 
State  Legislatures,  on  the  subject  of  the  Alien  and  Sedition  Laws, 
and  had  come  to  a  resolution  thereupon,  which  he  delivered  in  at  the 
clerk's  table,  where  it  was  read,  and  unanimously  agreed  to  by  the 
House,  as  follows  : — 

The  Representatives  of  the  good  people  of  this  Commonwealth,  in 
general  Assembly  convened,  having  maturely  considered  the  answers 
of  sundry  states  in  the  Union,  to  their  resolutions  passed  at  the  last 
session,  respecting  certain  unconstitutional  laws  of  Congress,  commonly 
called  the  Aliens  and  Sedition  Laws,  would  be  faithless  indeed  to  them- 
selves, and  to  those  tliey  represent,  were  they  silently  to  acquiesce  in 
tJie  principles  and  doctrines  attempted  to  be  maintained  in  all  those  an- 
swers, that  of  Virginia  only  excepted.  To  again  enter  the  field  of  ar- 
gument, and  atteinpt  more  fully  or  forcibly  to  expose  the  unconstitution- 
ality of  those  obnoxious  laws,  would,  it  is  apprehended,  be  as  unneces- 
sary as  unavailing.  We  cannot,  however,  but  lament  that  in  the  dis- 
cussion of  those  interesting  subjects,  by  sundry  of  the  Legislatures  of 
our  sister  states,  unfounded  suggestions,  and  uncandid  insinuations, 
derogatory  of  tlie  true  character  and  principles  of  the  good  people  of 
this  Commonwealth,  have  been  substituted  in  place  of  fair  reasoning 
and  sound  argument.  Our  opinions  of  these  alarming  measures  of  the 
General  Government,  together  with  our  reasons  for  those  opinions, 
were  detailed  with  decency  and  with  temper,  and  submitted  to  the  dis- 
cussion and  judgment  of  our  fellow  citizens  throughout  the  Union. 
Whether  the  like  decency  and  temper  have  been  observed  in  the  an- 
swers of  most  of  those  states  ,who  have  denied  or  attempted  to  obviate 


KENTUCKY  RESOLUTIONS.  85 

the  great  truths  contained  in  those  resolutions,  we  have  now  only  to 
submit  to  a  candid  world.  Faithful  to  the  true  principles  of  the  Federal 
Union,  unconscious  of  any  designs  to  disturb  the  harmony  of  that 
Union,  and  anxious  only  to  escape  the  fangs  of  despotism,  the  good  peo- 
ple of  this  Commonwealth  are  regardless  of  censure  or  calumniation. 
Lest,  however,  the  silence  of  this  Commonwealth  should  be  construed 
into  an  acquiescence  in  the  doctrines  and  principles  advanced  and  at- 
tempted to  be  maintained  by  the  said  answers,  or  lest  those  of  our  fel- 
low citizens  throughout  the  Union,  who  so  widely  differ  from  us  on 
those  important  subjects,  should  be  deluded  by  the  expectation  that 
we  shall  be  deterred  from  what  we  conceive  our  duty,  or  shrink  from 
the  principles  contained  in  those  resolutions  ;  therefore, 

Resolved^  That  this  Commonwealth  considers  the  Federal  Uilion, 
upon  the  tenns  and  for  the  purposes  specified  in  the  late  compact,  as 
conducive  to  the  liberty  and  happiness  of  the  several  states  ;  that  it 
does  now  unequivocally  declare  its  attachment  to  the  Union,  and  to 
that  compact,  agreeable  to  its  obvious  and  real  intention,  and  will  be 
among  the  last  to  seek  its  dissolution:  That  if  those  who  administer 
the  General  Government  be  permitted  to  transgress  the  limits  fixed  by 
that  compact,  by  a  total  disregard  to  the  special  delegations  of  power 
therein  contained,  an  annihilation  of  the  State  Governments,  and  the 
erection  upon  their  ruins  of  a  general  consolidated  government,  will  be 
the  inevitable  consequence :  That  the  principle  and  construction  con- 
tended for  by  sundry  of  the  State  Legislatures,  that  the  General  Govern- 
ment is  the  exclusive  judge  of  the  extent  of  the  powers  delegated  to  it, 
stop  nothing  short  of  despotism,  since  the  discretion  of  those  who  ad- 
minister the  government,  and  not  the  Constitution^  would  be  the  mea- 
sure of  their  powers.  That  the  several  states  who  formed  that  instru- 
ment, being  sovereign  and  independent,  have  the  unquestionable  ri^ht 
to  judge  of.its  infraction,  and  that  a  nullification  by  those  sovereignties^ 
of  all  unauthorized  acts  done  under  color  of  that  instrument^  is  the 
rightful  remedy :  That  this  Commonwealth  does,  upon  the  most  de- 
liberate reconsideration,  declare  that  the  said  Alien  and  Sedition  Laws 
are,  in  their  opinion,  palpable  violations|of  the  said  Constitution  ;  and, 
however  cheerfully  it  may  be  disposed  to  surrender  its  opinion  to  a 
majority  of  its  sister  states  in  matters  of  ordinary  or  doubtful  policy, 
yet,  in  momentous  regulations  like  the  present,  which  so  vitally  wound 
the  best  rights  of  the  citizen,  it  would  consider  a  silent  acquiescence  as 
highly  criminal :  That  although  this  Commonwealth,  as  a  party  to  the 
Federal  Compact,  will  bow  to  the  laws  of  the  Union,  yet  it  does  at  the 
same  time  declare  that  it  will  not  now,  nor  ever  hereafter,  cease  to  op- 
pose in  a  constitutional  manner,  every  attempt,  from  what  quarter  so- 
ever offered,  to  violate  that  compact.  And,  finally,  in  order  that  no 
pretexts  or  arguments  may  be  drawn  from  a  supposed  acquiescence  on 
the  part  of  this  Commonwealth  in  the  constitutionality  of  those  laws, 
and  be  thereby  used  as  precedents  for  similar  future  violations  of  the 
Federal  Compact,  this  Commonwealth  does  no^^  enter  against  them  its 
SOLEMN  PROTEST. 

Extract,  &c. 

Attest :  THOMAS  TODD,  C.  H.  R. 

In  Senate,  November  22,  1799. 

Read  and  concurred  in. 
Attest:  B.  THURSTON,  C.  S. 

8 


EXTRACT  OP  A  LETTER 

FROM 

THOMAS    JEFFERSON, 

TO  GOVERNOR  GILES,  OF  VIRGINIA. 


"  26th  December,  1825. 

"  Dear  Sir — I  see  asyoudo,  and  with  the  deepest  affliction,  the  rapid 
strides  with  which  the  Federal  branch  of  our  government  is  advancing 
towards  the  usurpation  of  all  the  rights  reserved  to  the  states,  and  the 
consolidation  in  itself  of  all  powers,  foreign  and  domestic,  and  that,  too, 
by  constiTictions  which,  if  legitimate,  leave  no  limits  to  their  power. 
Take  together  the  decisions  of  the  Ferderal  Court,  the  doctrines  of 
the  President,  and  the  misconstructions  of  the  constitutional  compact 
acted  on  by  the  legislature  of  the  Federal  branch,  and  it  is  but  too  evi- 
dent that  the  three  ruling  branches  of  that  department  are  in  combina- 
tion to  strip  their  colleagues,  the  state  authorities,  of  the  powers  reserv- 
ed by  them,  and  to  exercise  themselves  all  functions,  foreign  and  do- 
mestic. Under  the  power  to  regulate  commerce,  they  assume  indefinitely 
that  also  over  agriculture  and  manufactures,  and  call  it  regulation,  too, 
to  take  the  earnings  of  one  of  those  branches  of  industry,  and  that  too  the 
most  def)ressed,  and  put  them  into  the  pockets  of  the  other,  the  most  flour- 
ishing of  all.  Under  the  authority  to  establish  post  roads  they  claim  that 
of  cutting  down  mountains  for  the  construction  of  roads,  of  digging  ca- 
nals, and  aided  by  a  little  sophistry  on  the  words  '  general  welfare,' 
a  right  to  do,  not  only  the  acts  to  effect  that  which  are  specifically  enu- 
merated and  permitted,  but  whatsoever  they  shall  think,  or  pretend,  will 
be  for  the  general  welfare.  And  what  is  our  resonrce  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  Constitution  1  Reason  and  argument !  You  might  as  well 
reason  and  argue  with  the  marble  columns  encircling  them.  The  re- 
presentatives chosen  by  ourselves  1  They  are  joined  in  the  combina- 
tion, some  from  incorrect  views  of  government,  some  from  corrupt  ones, 
suflficient  voting  together  to  out  number  the  sound  parts,  and  with  ma- 
jorities of  only  1,  2,  or  3,  bold  enough  to  go  forward  in  defiance.  Are 
we,  then,  to  stand  to  our  arms  ? 

"  No !  that  must  be  the  last  resource,  not  to  be  thought  of  until  much 
longer  and  greater  sufferings.  If  every  infraction  of  a  compact  of  so 
many  parties  is  to  be  resisted  at  once  as  a  dissolution  of  it,  none  can 
ever  be  formed  which  would  last  one  year.  We  must  have  patience  and 
long  endurance,  then,  with  our  brethren,  while  under  delusion.  Give 
them  time  for  reflection  and  experience  of  consequences ;  keep  ourselves 
in  a  sitution  to  profit  by  the  chapter  of  accidents — and  separate  from  our 
companions  only  when  the  sole  alternatives  left  are  the  dissolution  of 
our  union  with  them,  or  submission  to  a  government  without  limitation 
of  powers." 


0 


LETTER 

FROM 

MR.  MADISON, 

TO  HON.    EDWARD  EVERETT,  OF  MASSACHUSETTS 

PUBLISHED    IN    THE   NORTH   AMERICAN   REVIEW,    OCT.    1830. 

"  Montpelier,  August,  1830. 

"Dear  Sir, 

"  I  have  duly  received  your  letter,  in  which  you  refer  to  the 
'  nullifying  doctrine,'  advocated  as  a  constitutional  right,  by  some  of 
our  distinguished  fellow  citizens ;  and  to  the  proceedings  of  the  Virgi- 
nia Legislature  in  '98  and  '99,  as.  appealed  to  in  behalf  of  that  doctrine ; 
and  you  express  a  wish  for  my  ideas  on  those  subjects. 

"  1  am  aware  of  the  delicacy  of  the  task  in  some  respects,  and  the 
difficulty  in  every  respect,  of  doing  full  justice  to  it.  But,  having,  in 
more  than  one  instance,  complied  with  a  like  request  from  other  friend- 
ly quarters,  I  do  not  decline  a  sketch  of  the  views  which  I  have  been 
led  to  take  of  the  doctrine  in  question,  as  well  as  some  others  connected 
with  them ;  and  of  the  grounds  from  which  it  appears  that  the  pro- 
ceedings of  Virginia  have  been  misconceived  by  those  who  have  ap- 
pealed to  them.  In  order  to  understand  the  true  character  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States,  the  error,  not  uncommon,  must  be  avoided, 
of  viewing  it  through  the  medium,  either  of  a  consolidated  government, 
or  of  a  confederated  government,  whilst  it  is  neither  the  one  nor  the 
other ;  but  a  mixture  of  both.  And  having,  in  no  model,  the  similitudes 
and  analogies  applicable  to  other  systems  of  government,  it  must,  more 
than  any  other,  be  its  own  interpreter,  according  to  its  text  and  tJue  facts 
of  the  case. 

"  From  these  it  will  be  seen  that  the  characteristic  peculiarities  of 
the  Constitution  are,  1,  the  mode  of  its  formation ;  2,  the  division  of  tlie 
supreme  powers  of  government  between  the  states  in  their  united  ca- 
pacity, and  the  states  in  their  individual  capacities. 

"1.  It  was  formed,  not  by  the  governments  of  the  component  states, 
as  the  Federal  Government  for  which  it  was  substituted  was  formed. 
Nor  was  it  formed  by  a  majority  of  the  people  of  the  United  States,  as 
a  single  community,  in  the  maimer  of  a  consolidated  government. 

"  It  was  formed  by  the  states,  that  is,  by  the  people  in  each  of  the 
states,  acting  in  their  highest  sovereign  capacity ;  and  formed  conse- 
quently by  the  same  authority  which  formed  the  State  Constitutions. 

"  Being  thus  derived  from  the  same  source  as  the  constitutions  of  the 
states,  it  has,  within  each  state,  the  same  authority  as  the  constitution 
of  the  state  :  and  is  as  much  a  constitution  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term, 
within  its  prescribed  sphere,  as  the  constitutions  of  the  states  are, 
within  their  respective  spheres ;  but  with  this  obvious  and  essentifd 
difference,  that  being  a  compact  among  the  states  in  their  highest 
sovereign  capacity,  and  constituting  the  people  thereof  one  people  for 
certain  purposes,  it  cannot  be  altered  or  annulled  at  the  will  of  th« 


88  MR.  MADISON'S  LETTER. 

states  individually,  as  the  constitution  of  a  state  may  be  at  its  indivi- 
dual will. 

"  2.  And  that  it  divides  the  supreme  powers  of  government,  between 
the  government  of  tlie  United  States,  and  the  governments  of  the  indi- 
vidual states,  is  stamped  on  the  face  of  the  instniment;  the  powers  of 
war  and  of  taxation,  of  commerce  and  of  treaties,  and  other  enumerated 
powers  vested  in  the  government  of  the  United  Stales,  being  of  as  high 
and  sovereign  a  character  as  any  of  the  powers  reserved  to  the  state 
governments. 

**  Nor  is  the  government  of  the  United  States,  created  by  the  constitu- 
tion, less  a  government  in  the  strict  sense  of  tlieterm,  within  the  sphere 
of  its  powers,  than  the  governments  created  by  the  constitutions  of  the 
states  are,  within  their  several  spheres.  It  is  like  them  organized  into 
Legislative,  Executive,  and  Judiciary  Departments.  It  operates,  like 
them,  directly  on  persons  and  things.  And,  like  them,  it  has  at  com- 
mand a  physical  force  for  executing  the  powers  committed  to  it.  The 
concurrent  operation  in  certain  cases,  is  one  of  the  features  marking 
the  peculiarity  of  the  system. 

"  jBetween  these  different  constitutional  governments,  the  one  operat- 
ing in  all  the  states,  the  others  operating  separately  in  each,  with  the 
aggregate  powers  of  government  divided  between  them,  it  could  not 
escape  attention,  that  controversies  would  arise  concerning  the  bounda- 
ries of  jurisdiction;  and  that  some  provision  ought  to  be  made  for  such 
occurrences.  A  political  system  that  does  not  provide  for  a  peaceable 
and  authoritative  termination  of  occurring  controversies,  would  not  be 
more  than  the  shadow  of  a  government ;  the  object  and  end  of  a  real 
government  being  the  substitution  of  law  and  order,  for  uncertainty, 
confusion,  and  violence. 

"  That  to  have  left  a  final  decision,  in  such  cases,  to  each  of  the  states, 
then  thirteen,  and  already  twenty-four,  could  not  fail  to  make  the  con- 
stitution and  laws  of  the  United  States  different  in  different  states,  was 
obvious ;  and  not  less  obvious,  that  this  diversity  of  independent  decis- 
ions, must  altogether  distract  the  government  of  the  Union,  and  speedi- 
ly put  an  end  to  the  union  itself  A  uniform  authority  of  the  laws  is 
in  Itself  a  vital  principle.  Some  of  the  most  important  laws  could  not 
be  partially  executed.  They  must  be  executed  in  all  the  states,  or 
they  could  be  duly  executed  in  none.  An  impost,  or  an  excise,  for  ex- 
ample, if  not  in  force  in  some  states,  would  be  defeated  in  others.  It  is 
well  known  that  this  was  among  the  lessons  of  experience  which  had 
a  primary  influence  in  bringing  about  the  existing  constitution.  A  loss 
of  its  general  authority  would  moreover  revive  the  exasperating  ques- 
tions between  the  states  holding  ports  for  foreign  commerce,  and  the 
adjoining  states  without  them  ;  to  which  are  now  added  all  the  inland 
states,  necessarily  carrying  on  their  foreign  commerce  through  other 
states. 

"  To  have  made  the  decisions  under  the  authority  of  the  individucii 
states,  coordinate,  in  all  cases,  with  decisions  under  the  authority  of 
the  United  States,  would  unavoidably  produce  collisions  incompati- 
ble with  the  peace  of  society,  and  with  that  regular  and  efficient  admi- 
nistration, wnich  is  of  the  essence  of  free  governments.  Scenes  could 
not  be  avoided,  in  which  a  ministerial  officer  of  the  United  States,  and 
the  correspondent  officer  of  an  individual  state,  would  have  rencounters 
in  executing  conflicting  decrees ;  the  result  of  which  would  depend  on 


MR.  MADISON'S  LETTER.  89 

the  comparative  force  of  the  local  posses  attending  them ;  and  that,  a 
casualty  depending  on  the  political  opinions  and  party  feelings  in 
different  states. 

"  To  have  referred  every  clashing  decision,  under  the  two  authorities 
for  a  final  decision,  to  the  states  as  parties  to  the  constitution,  would  be 
attended  with  delays,  with  inconveniences,  and  with  expenses,  amount- 
ing to  a  prohibition  of  the  expedient ;  not  to  mention  its  tendency  to 
impair  the  salutary  veneration  for  a  system  requiring  such  frequent  in- 
terpositions, nor  the  delicate  questions  which  might  present  tliemselves 
as  to  the  form  of  stating  the  appeal,  and  as  to  the  quorum  for  deciding  it 

*' To  have  trusted  to  negociation  for  adjusting  disputes  between  the 
government  of  the  United  States  and  the  state  govermnents,  as  between 
independent  and  separate  sovereignties,  would  have  lost  sight  altogeth- 
er of  a  constitution  and  government  for  the  Union,  and  opened  a  direct 
road  from  a  failure  of  that  resort,  to  the  ultima  ratio  between  nations 
wholly  independent  of  and  alien  to  each  other.  If  the  idea  had  its 
origin  in  the  process  of  adjustment,  between  separate  branches  of  the 
same  government,  the  analogy  entirely  fails.  In  the  case  of  disputes 
between  independent  parts  of  the  same  government,  neither  part  being 
able  to  consummate  its  will,  nor  the  government  to  proceed  without  a 
concurrence  of  tlie  parts  necessity  brings  about  an  accommodation.  In 
disputes  between  a  state  government,  and  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  the  case  is  practically  as  well  as  theoretically  different ;  each 
party  possessing  all  the  departments  of  an  organized  government,  Legis- 
lative, Executive,  and  Judiciary ;  and  having  each  a  physical  force  to 
support  its  pretensions.  Although  the  issue  of  negotiation  might  some- 
times avoid  this  extremity,  how  often  would  it  happen,  among  so  many 
states,  that  an  unaccommodating  spirit  in  some,  would  render  that  re->- 
source  \m vailing  %  A  contrary  supposition  would  not  accord  with  a 
knowledge  of  human  nature,  or  the  evidence  of  our  own  political  his- 
tory. 

"  The  constitution,  not  relying  on  any  of  the  preceding  modifications, 
for  its  safe  and  successful  operation,  has  expressly  declared,  on  the  one 
hand,  1,  'that  the  constitution,  and  the  laws  made  in  pursuance  thereof, 
and  all  treaties  made  under  tlie  authority  of  the  United  States,  shall  bejthe 
supreme  law  of  the  land ;  2,  that  the  Judges  of  every  state  shall  be 
bound  thereby,  any  thing  in  the  constitution  and  laws  of  any  state 
to  the  contrary  notwithstanding;  3,  that  the  judicial  power  of  the 
United  States  shall  extend  to  all  cases  in  law  and  equity  arising  under 
the  constitution,  the  laws  of  the  United  States^  and  treaties  made  under 
their  authority,  &c.' 

"  On  the  other  hand,  as  a  security  of  the  rights  and  powers  of  the 
states,  in  their  individual  capacities,  against  an  undue  preponderance 
of  the  powers  granted  to  the  government  over  them  in  their  united  ca- 
pacity, the  constitution  has  relied  on,  1,  the  responsibility  of  the  Senat- 
ors and  Representatives  in  the  Legislature  of  the  United  States  to  the 
Legislatures  and  people  of  the  states;  2,  the  responsibility  of  the  Presi- 
dent to  the  people  of  the  United  States ;  and  3,  the  liability  of  the 
Executive  and  Judicial  functionaries  of  the  United  States  to  impeach- 
ment by  the  Representatives  of  the  people  of  the  states,  in  one  branch 
of  the  Legislature  of  the  United  States,  and  trial  by  the  Representatives 
of  the  states,  in  the  other  branch :  the  state  functionaries.  Legislative, 
Executive,  and  Judicial,  being,  at  the  same  time,  in  their  appointment 


90  MR.  MADISON'S  LETTER. 

and  responsibility,  altogether  independent  of  the  agency  or  authority  of 
the  United  States. 

''  How  far  this  structure  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  is 
adequate  and  safe  for  its  objects,  time  alone  can  absolutely  determine. 
Experience  seems  to  have  shown  that  whatever  may  grow  out  of  future 
stages  of  our  national  career,  there  is,  as  yet,  a  sufficient  control,  in  the 
popular  will,  over  the  Executive  and  Legislative  Departments  of  the 
government.  When  the  Alien  and  Sedition  Laws  were  passed  in 
contravention  to  the  opinions  and  feelings  of  the  community,  the  first 
elections  that  ensued  put  an  end  to  them.  And  whatever  may  have 
been  the  character  of  other  acts,  in  the  judgment  of  many  of  us,  it  is  but 
true,  that  they  have  generally  accorded  with  the  views  of  a  majority  of 
the  states  and  of  the  people.  At  the  present  day  it  seems  well  under- 
stood that  the  laws  which  have  created  the  most  dissatisfaction,  have 
had  a  like  sanction  without  doors ;  and  that  whether  continued,  varied, 
or  repealed,  a  like  proof  will  be  given  of  the  sympathy  and  responsi- 
bility of  the  representative  body,  to  the  constituent  body.  Indeed,  the 
great  complaint  now  is  against  the  results  of  this  sympathy  and  respon- 
sibility in  the  legislative  policy  of  the  nation. 

"  With  respect  to  the  judicial  power  of  the  United  States,  and  the  au- 
thority of  the  Supreme  Court  in  relation  to  the  boundary  of  jurisdiction 
between  the  Federal  and  State  Governments,  I  may  be  permitted  to  re- 
fer to  the  thirty-ninth  number  of  the  '  Federalist,'*  for  the  light  in 
which  the  subject  was  regarded  by  its  writer,  at  the  period  when  the 
Constitution  was  depending  ;  and  it  is  believed  that  the  same  was  the 
prevailing  view  then  taken  of  it,  that  the  same  view  has  continued  to 
prevail,  and  that  it  does  so  at  this  time,  notwithstanding  the  eminent 
exceptions  to  it. 

"  But  it  is  perfectly  consistent  with  the  concession  of  this  power  to  the 
Supreme  Court,  in  cases  falling  within  the  course  of  its  functions,  to 
maintain  that  the  power  has  not  always  been  rightly  exercised.  To 
say  nothing  of  the  period,  happily  a  short  one,  when  judges  in  their 
seats  did  not  abstain  from  intemperate  and  party  harangues,  equally  at 
variance  with  their  duty  and  their  dignity ;  there  have  been  occasional 
decisions  from  the  bench,  which  have  incurred  serious  and  extensive 
disapprobation.  Still  it  would  seem  that,  with  but  few  exceptions,  the 
course  of  the  Judiciary  has  been  hitherto  sustained  by  the  predominant 
sense  of  the  nation. 

'*  Those  who  have  denied  or  doubted  the  supremacy  of  the  judicial 
poAver  of  the  United  States,  and  denounce  at  the  same  time  a  nullifying 
power  in  a  state,  seems  not  to  have  sufficiently  adverted  to  the  utter 
inefficiency  of  a  supremacy  in  a  law  of  the  land,  without  a  supremacy 
in  the  exposition  and  execution  of  the  law ;  nor  to  the  destruction  of 
all  equipoise  between  the  Federal  Government  and  the  State  Govern- 
ments, if,  whilst  the  functionaries  of  the  Federal  Government  are  di- 
rectly or  indirectly  elected  by  and  responsible  to  the  states,  and  the 
functionaries  of  the  states  are  in  their  appointment  and  responsibility 

•  No.  39.  'Tt  iR  trae,  that  in  controversies  relating'  to  the  boundary  between  the  two  Jurisdictions, 
the  tribunal  which  is  ultimately  to  decide,  is  m  be  establislied  under  the  General  Government.  But  this 
doea  not  change  the  princif-le  ol"  the  case.  The  decision  is  lo  be  impartially  made,  according  to  th» 
rules  of  the  Constitution  ;  and  all  the  usual  and  most  eflectual  precautions  are  taken  to  secure  this  im- 
pjirliali'.y.  Some  such  tribunal  is  clearly  essential  to  prevent  an  appeal  (o  the  sword,  and  a  dissolution 
of  the  cpmpact ;  and  that  it  ought  to  be  established  under  the  general,  rather  than  under  the  local,  govern- 
nients  ;  or,  to  speak  more  properly,  that  it  could  be  safely  established  under  the  first  alone,  is  a  positioA 
uoi  likely  to  be  combated.' 


MR.  MADISON'S  LETTER.  91 

wholly  independent  of  the  United  States,  no  constitutional  control  of 
any  sort  belonged  to  the  United  States  over  the  states.  Under  such 
an  organization  it  is  evident  that  it  would  be  in  the  power  of  the  states, 
individually,  to  pass  unauthorized  laws,  and  to  carry  them  into  com- 
plete effect,  any  thing  in  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States 
to  the  contrary  notwithstanding.  This  would  be  a  nullifying  power 
in  its  plenary  character ;  and  whether  it  had  its  final  effect,  through 
the  Legislative,  Executive,  or  Judiciary  organ  of  the  state,  would  be 
equally  fatal  to  the  constituted  relation  between   the  two  governments. 

"  Should  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution,  as  here  reviewed,  be  found 
not  to  secure  the  government  and  rights  of  the  states  against  usurpa- 
tions and  abuses  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  the  final  resort  within 
the  purview  of  the  Constitution,  lies  in  an  amendment  of  the  Constitution, 
according  to  a  process  applicalDle  by  the  states. 

"  And  in  the  event  of  a  failure.of  every  constitutional  resort,  and  an 
accumulation  of  usurpations  and  abuses,  rendering  passive  obedience 
and  non-resistance  a  greater  evil  than  resistance  and  revolution,  there 
can  remain  but  one  resort,  the  last  of  all^ — an  appeal  from  the  cancelled 
obligations  of  the  constitutional  compact,  to  original  rights  and  the  law 
of  self-preservation.  This  is  the  ultima  ratio  under  all  governments, 
whether  consolidated,  confederated,  or  a  compound  of  both;  and  it  can- 
not be  doubted,  that  a  single  member  of  the  Union,  in  the  extremity  sup- 
. posed,  but  in  that  only,  would  have  a  right,  as  an  exti*a  and  ultra-con- 
stitutional right,  to  make  the  appeal. 

"  This  brings  us  to  the  expedient  lately  advanced,  which  claim?  for  a 
single  state  a  right  to  appeal  against  an  exercise  of  power  by  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  decided  by  the  states  to  be  unconstitutional,  to 
the  parties  to  the  constitutional  compact;  the  decision  of  the  state  to  have 
the  effect  of  nulUfying  the  act  of  the  government  of  the  United  States, 
unless  the  decision  of  the  state  be  reversed  by  three  fourths  of  the  parties. 

"  The  distinguished  names  and  high  authorities  which" appear  to  have 
asserted  and  given  a  practical  scope  to  this  doctrine,  entitle  it  to  a  respect 
which  it  might  be  difficult  otherwise  to  feel  for  it. 

"  If  the  doctrine  were  to  be  understood  as  requiring  the  three  fourths  of  the 
states  to  sustain,  instead  of  that  proportion  to  reverse  the  decision  of  the 
appealing  state,  the  decision  to  be  without  effect  during  the  appeal,  it 
would  be  sufficient  to  remark,  that  this  exti  a-constitutional  course  might 
well  give  way  to  that  marked  out  by  the  Constitution,  which  authorizes 
two  thirds  of  the  states  to  institute,  and  three  fourths  to  effectuate,  an 
amendment  of  the  Constitution,  establishing  a  permanent  rule  of  the 
highest  authority,  in  place  of  an  irregular  precedent  of  construction  only. 

"  But  it  is  understood  that  the  nullifying  doctrine  imports  that  the  deci- 
sion of  the  state  is  to  be  presumed  valid,  and  that  it  overrules  the  law  of 
the  United  States,  unless  overruled  by  three  fourths  of  the  states. 

"  Can  more  be  necessary  to  demonstrate  the  inadmissibility  of  such  a  doc- 
trine, than  that  it  p>uts  it  in  the  power  of  the  smallest  fraction  over  one 
fourth  of  the  United  States,  that  is,  of  seven  states  out  of  twenty-four,  to 
give  the  law  and  even  the  Constitution  to  seventeen  states,  each  of  the 
seventeen  having,  as  parties  to  the  Constitution,  an  equal  right  with  each 
of  the  seven,  to  expound  it,  and  t#  insist  on  the  exposition?  That  the 
seven  might,  in  particular  instanc^,  be  right,  and  the  seventeen  wrong,  is 
more  than  possible.  But  to  establish  a  positive  and  permanent  rule  giv- 
ing such  a  power,  to  such  a  minority,  over  such  a  majority,  would  over- 


n  MR.  MADISON'S  LETTER. 

turn  the  first  principle  of  free  government,  and  in  practice  necessahlj 
overturn  the  government  itself. 

"  It  is  to  be  recollected  that  tlie  Constitution  was  proposed  to  the  peo- 
ple of  the  states  as  a  whole^  and  unanimously  adopted  by  the  slates  aa 
a  yjhole^  it  being  a  part  of  the  Constitution  that  not  less  than  three 
fourths  of  the  states  should  be  competent  to  make  any  alterations  in 
what  had  been  unanimously  agreed  lo.  So  great  is  the  caution  on  this 
point,  Uiat  in  two  cases  where  peculiar  interests  were  at  stake,  a  pro- 
portion even  of  Uiree  fourths  is  distrusted,  and  unanimity  required  to 
make  an  alteration. 

"  When  the  Constitution  was  adopted  as  a  whole,  it  is  certain  that 
there  were  many  parts,  wliich,  if  separately  proposed,  would  have 
been  promptly  rejected.  It  is  far  from  impossible  that  every  part  of  a 
Constitution  might  be  rejected  by  a  majority,  and  yet  taken  together  as 
a  whole  be  unanimously  accepted.  Free  Constitutions  will  rarely,  if 
ever  be  formed,  without  reciprocal  concessions  ;  without  articles  con- 
ditioned on  and  balancing  each  otlier.  Is  there  a  Constitution  of  a 
single  state  out  of  the  twenty-four  that  would  bear  the  experiment  of 
having  its  component  parts  submitted  to  the  people  and  separately  de- 
cided on  1 

"  What  the  fate  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  would  be,  if 
a  small  proportion  of  the  states  could  expunge  parts  of  it  particularly 
valued  by  a  large  majority,  it  can  have  but  one  answer. 

'•  The  difficulty  is  not  removed  by  limiting  the  doctrine  to  cases  of 
construction.  How  many  cases  of  that  sort,  involving  cardined  provi- 
sions of  the  Constitution,  have  occurred!  How  many  now  exist  1 
How  many  may  hereafter  spring  up  1  How  many  might  be  ingeni- 
ously created,  if  entitled  to  the  privilege  of  a  decision  in  tlie  mode  pro- 
posed? 

"  It  is  certain  that  the  principle  of  that  mode  would  not  reach  further 
than  is  contemplated.  If  a  single  state  can  of  right  require  three  fourths 
of  its  co-stcites  to  overrule  its  exposition  of  the  Constitution,  because 
that  proportion  is  authorized  to  amend  it,  would  the  plea  be  less  plausi- 
ble that,  as  the  Constitution  was  unanimously  established,  it  ought  to 
be  unanimously  expounded  1 

"  The  reply  to  all  such  suggestions  seems  to  be  unavoidable  and  irre- 
sistible ;  that  the  Constitution  is  a  compact,  tliat  its  text  is  to  be  ex- 
pounded according  to  the  provisions  for  expounding  it — making  a  part 
of  the  compact;  and  that  none  of  the  parties  can  rightfully  renounce 
the  expounding  provision  more  than  any  other  part.  When  such  a 
riffht  accrues,  as  may  accrue,  it  must  grow  out  of  abuses  of  tlie  compact 
releasing  the  sufferers  from  their  fealty  to  it. 

"  In  ftivor  of  the  nullifying  claim  for  the  states,  individually,  it  ap- 
pears, as  you  observe,  that  the  proceedings  of  the  Legislature  of  Vir- 
ginia, in  98  and  '99,  against  the  Alien  and  Sedition  Acts,  are  much 
dwelt  upon. 

"  It  may  often  happen,  as  experience  proves,  that  erroneous  construe- 
tions,  not  anticipated,  may  not  be  sufficiently  guarded  against,  in  the 
language  used ;  and  it  is  due  to  the  distinguished  individuals,  who 
have  miseonceived  the  intention  of  those  proceedings,  to  suppose  that 
the  meaning  of  the  Legislature,  tliough  well  comprehended  at  the  time, 
may  not  now  be  obvious  to  those  unacquainted  with  the  contemporary 
indications  and  impressions. 


MR.  MADISON'S  LETTER.  93 

"  But  it  is  b^eved  that  by  keeping  in  view  the  distinction  between 
the  governments  of  the  states,  and  3ie  states  in  which  they  were  par- 
ties to  the  Constitution ;  Ixtween  the  rights  of  the  parties,  in  their  con- 
current and  in  tluir  individual  capacities;  between  the  several  modes 
and  objects  of  int.  I  iiM^ii,  111  against  the  abuses  of, power,  and  especially 
between  int(  i  hin  the  purview  of  the  Constitution,  and  in- 

terpositions  wj.,  m  the  Constitution  to  tlie  rights  of  nature 

paramount  to  all  <  (ions;  with  an  attention,  always  of  explana- 

tory use,  to  the  Viiv.v...  ....d  arguments  which  were  combated,  the  Reso- 
lutions of  Virgini'^  as  vindicated  in  the  Report  on  them,  will  be  foimd 
entitled  to  an  exposition,  showing  a  consistency  in  their  parts,  and  an 
inconsistency  of  the  whole  with  the  doctrine  under  consideration. 

"  That  the  Legislature  could  not  have  intended  to  sanction  such  a  doc- 
trine, is  to  be  inferred  from  the  debates  in  the  Houses  of  Delegates,  and 
from  the  address  of  the  two  Houses  to  their  constituents,  on  the  subject 
of  the  resolutions.  The  tenor  of  the  debates,  which  were  ably  conduct- 
ed, and  are  understood  to  have  been  revised  for  the  press  by  most,  if  not 
all,  of  the  speakers,  discloses  no  reference  whatever  to  a  constitutional  right 
in  an  individual  state,  to  arrest  by  force  the  operation  of  a  law  of  the 
United  States.  Concert  among  the  states  for  redress  against  the  Aliien 
and  Sedition  Laws,  as  acts  of  usurped  power  was  a  leading  sentiment ; 
and  the  attainment  of  a  concert  the  immediate  object  of  the  coarse 
adopted  by  the  legislature,  which,  was  that  of  inviting  the  other  states  *  to 
concur  in  declarmg  the  acts  to  be  unconstitunal,  and  io  co-operate  by  the 
necessary  ami  proper  measures  in  maintaining  unimpaired  the  authorities, 
rights  and  liberties  reserved  to  the  states  respectively,  and  to  the  people."* 
Tliat  by  the  necessary  and  proper  measures  to  be  C07icurrenfly  and  co- 
operatively taken,  were  meant  measures  known  to  the  Constitution, 
particularly  the  ordinary  control  of  the  people  and  legislatures  of  the 
states,  over  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  cannot  he  doubted ; 
and  the  interposition  of  this  control,  as  the  event  showed,  was  equal  to 
the  occasion. 

"  It  is  worthy  of  remark,  and  explanatory  of  the  intentions  of  the 
Legislature,  that  the  words  '  not  law,  but  utterly  null,  void,  and  of  no 
force  or  elfect,'  which  had  followed,  in  one  of  the  resolutions,  the  word 
'  unconstitutional,'  were  struck  out  by  common  consent.  Though  the 
words  were  in  fact  but  synonymous  with  '  unconstitutional ;'  yet  to 
guard  against  a  misunderstanding  of  this  phrase  as  more  than  declaratory 
of  opinion,  the  word  '  unconstitutional '  alone  was  retained,  as  not  liabl« 
to  that  danger. 

"  The  published  Address  of  the  Legislature  to  the  people,  their  consti- 
tuents, affords  another  conclusive  evidence  of  its  views.  The  address 
warns  them  against  the  encroaching  spirit  of  the  General  Government, 
argues  the  unconstitutionality  of  the  Alien  and  Sedition  Acts,  points  to 
other  instances  in  which  the  constitutional  limits  had  been  overleaped ; 
dwells  upon  the  dangerous  mode  of  deriving  power  by  implication ;  and 
in  general  presses  the  necessity  of  watching  over  the  consolidating  ten- 
dency of  the  Federal  jtoWcy,  But  nothing  is  said  that  can  be  understood 
to  look  to  means  of  maintaining  the  rights  of  the  states,  beyond  the  regu- 
lar ones,  within  the  forms  of  the  Constitution. 

"  If  any  futher  lights  on  the  subject  could  be  needed,  a  very  strong  on© 

*  See  the  eoncludine  resolutioo  of  1799. 


94  ON  THE  RIGHT  OF  SECESSION. 

it  reflected  in  the  answers  to  the  resolutions,  by  the  states  which  pro- 
terted  against  them.  The  main  objection  of  these,  beyond  a  few  general 
complaints  of  the  inflammatory  tendency  of  the  resolutions,  was  directed 
against  the  assumed  authority  of  a  State  Legislature  to  declare  a  law  of 
the  United  States  unconstitutional,  which  they  pronounced  an  unwarrant- 
able interference  with  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States.  Had  the  resolutions  been  regarded  as  avowing  and 
maintaining  a  right,  in  an  individual  state,  to  arrest,  by  force,  the  execu- 
tion of  a  law  of  the  United  States,  it  must  be  presumed  that  it  would  have 
been  a  conspicuous  object  of  their  denunciation. 

"  With  cordial  salutations, 

JAiMES  MADISON." 


ON  THE  RIGHT  OF  SECESSION, 

[Extract  from  tfie  Richmond  Enquirer,  Nov.  1,  1814.] 


Editorial  Remarks.  "No  man,  no  association  of  men,  no  State, 
or  set  of  States,  has  a  right  to  withdraw  itself  from  this  Union  of  its 
own  accord.  The  same  power  which  knit  us  toffether  can  unknit.  The 
same  formality  which  formed  the  links  of  the  Union  is  necessary  to 
dissolve  it.  The  majority  of  Slates  which  formed  the  Union  must 
consent  to  the  withdrawal  of  any  one  branch  of  it.  Until  that  consent 
has  been  obtained,  any  attempt  to  dissolve  the  Union,  or  obstruct  the 
efficacy  of  the  constitutional  laws,  is  treason — treason  to  all  intents  and 
purposes." 


HARTFORD   CONVENTION 


A  Convention  of  Delegates  from  the  New  England  States,  appointed 
to  meet  in  Convention  at  Hartford,  Connecticut,  assembled  for  that 
purpose  in  the  Council  Chamber  of  the  State  House,  in  that  city,  on 
Thursday,  December  15,  1814,  at  10  o'clock,  A.  M.  On  being  called 
to  order  they  proceeded  to  organize  themselves,  by  unanimously  choosing 
the  Hon.  George  Cabot,  a  member  from  Massachusetts,  their  President . 
and  Theodore  D wight,  of  Hartford,  Secretary. 

The  following  are  the  names  of  the  members  : 

Elected  by  the  Legislatures. 

From  Massachusetts  12.  From  Connecticut  7. 


George  Cabot, 
William  Prescott, 
Harrison  Gray  Otis, 
Timothy  Bigelow, 
Stephen  Longfellow, 
Daniel  Waldo, 
George  Bliss, 
Nathan  Dane, 
Hodijah  Baylies, 
Sfimuel  Sumner  Wilde, 
Joseph  Lyman, 
Joshua  Thomas. 


Chauncey  Goodrich, 
James  Hillhouse, 
John  Treadwell, 
Zephaniah  Swift, 
Nathaniel  Smith, 
Calvin  Goddard, 
Roger  Minott  Sherman. 

From  Rhode  Island  4 
Daniel  Lyman, 
Samuel  Ward, 
Benjamin  Hazard, 
Edward  Manton. 


Elected  by  County  Conventions  from  Cheshire  and  Grafton. 
New  Hampshire  2. 

Benjamin  West, 
Mills  Olcott 


96       REPORT  OP  THE  HARTFORD  CONVENTION. 


REPORT,    &c. 


The  Delegates  from  the  Legislatures  of  the  States  of  Massachusetts, 
Connecticut,  and  Rhode  Island,  and  from  the  Counties  of  Grafton  and 
Cheshire,  in  the  State  of  New  Hampsliire,  and  the  County  of  Wind- 
ham, in  the  State  of  Vermont,  assembled  in  Convention,  beg  leave 
to  report  the  following  result  of  their  conference. 

The  Convention  is  deeply  impressed  with  a  sense  of  tlic  arduous 
nature  of  the  commission  which  they  were  appointed  to  execute,  of 
devising  the  means  of  defence  against  dangers,  and  of  relief  from 
oppressions  proceeding  from  the  act  of  their  own  government,  without 
violating  constitutional  principles,  or  disappointing  the  hopes  of  a  suf- 
fering and  injured  people.  To  prescribe  patience  and  firmness  to  those 
who  are  already  exhausted  by  distress,  is  sometimes  to  drive  them  to 
despair,  and  the  progress  towards  reform  by  the  regular  road,  is  irksome 
to  those  whose  imaginations  discern,  and  whose  feelings  prompt  to  a 
shorter  course.  But  when  abuses,  reduced  to  system  and  accumulated 
through  a  course  of  years,  have  pervaded  every  department  of  govern- 
ment, and  spread  corruption  through  every  region  of  the  state  ;  when 
these  are  closed  with  the  forms  of  law,  and  enforced  by  an  executive 
whose  will  is  their  source,  no  summary  means  of  relief  can  be  applied 
without  recourse  to  direct  and  open  resistance.  This  experiment,  even 
when  justifiable,  cannot  fail  to  be  painful  to  the  good  citizen ;  and  the 
success  of  the  effort  will  be  no  security  against  the  danger  of  the  exam- 
ple. Precedents  of  resistance  to  the  worst  administration,  are  eagerly 
seized  by  those  who  are  naturally  hostile  to  the  best.  Necessity  alone 
can  sanction  a  resort  to  this  measure ;  and  it  should  never  be  extended 
in  duration  or  degree  beyond  the  exigency,  until  the  people,  not  merely 
in  the  fervor  of  sudden  excitement,  but  after  full  deliberation,  are  deter- 
mined to  change  the  Constitution. 

It  is  a  truth  not  to  be  concealed,  that  a  sentiment  prevails  to  no  incon- 
siderable extent,  that  administration  have  given  such  constructions  to 
that  instrument,  and  practised  so  many  abuses  under  color  of  its  au- 
thority, that  the  time  for  a  change  is  at  hand.  Those  who  so  believe,  re- 
gard the  evils  which  surround  tnem  as  intrinsic  and  incurable  defects  in 
the  Constitution.  They  yield  to  a  persuasion,  that  no  change,  at  any 
time,  or  on  any  occasion,  can  aggravats  the  misery  of  their  country. 
This  opinion  may  ultimately  prove  to  be  correct.  But  as  the  evidence  on 
which  it  rests  is  not  yet  conclusive,  and  as  measures  adopted  upon  the 
assumption  of  its  certainty  might  be  irrevocable,  some  general  considera- 
tions are  submitted,  in  the  hope  of  reconciling  all  to  a  course  of  modera- 
tion and  firmness,  which  may  save  them  from  the  regret  incident  to  sud- 
den decisions,  probable  avert  the  evil,  or  at  least  insure  consolation  and 
success  in  the  last  resort. 


HARTFORD  CONVENTION.  97 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  under  the  auspices  of  a  wise 
and  virtuous  administration,  proved,  itself  competent  to  all  the  objects  of 
national  prosperity,  comprehended  in  the  views  of  its  framers.  No  parallel 
can  be  found  in  history,  of  a  transition  so  rapid  as  that  of  the  United 
States  from  the  lowest  depression  to  the  highest  felicity — from  the  condi- 
tion of  weak  and  disjointed  republics,  to  that  of  a  great,  united,  and 
prosperous  nation. 

Although  this  high  state  of  public  happiness  has  undergone  a  misera- 
ble and  artlicting  reverse,  through  the  prevalence  of  a  weak  and  profligate 
policy,  yet  the  evils  and  afflictions  which  have  thus  been  induced  upon 
the  country,  are  not  peculiar  to  any  form  of  government.  The  lust  and 
caprice  of  power,  the  corruption  of  patronage,  the  oppression  of  the 
weaker  interests  of  the  community  by  the  stronger,  heavy  taxes,  wasteful 
expenditures,  and  unjust  and  ruinous  wars,  are  the  natural  offspring  of 
bad  administrations  in  all  ages  and  countries.  It  was  indeed  to  be  hoped 
that  the  rulers  of  these  states  would  not  make  such  disastrous  haste  to 
involve  their  infancy  in  the  embarrassments  of  old  and  rotten  institutions. 
Yet  all  this  have  they  done ;  and  their  conduct  calls  loudly  for  their  die- 
mission  and  disgrace.  But  to  attempt  upon  every  abuse  of  power  to 
change  the  Constitution,  would  be  to  perpetuate  the  evils  of  revolution. 

Again,  the  experiment  of  the  powers  of  the  Constitution,  to  regain  its 
vigor,  and  of  the  people  to  recover  from  their  delusions,  has  been  hitherto 
made  under  the  greatest  possible  disadvantages  arising  from  the  state  of 
the  world.  The  fierce  passions  which  have  convulsed  the  nations  of  Eu- 
rope, have  passed  the  ocean,  and  finding  their  way  to  the  bosoms  of  our 
citizens,  have  afforded  to  administration  the  means  of  perverting  public 
opinion  in  respect  to  our  foreign  relations,  so  as  to  acquire  its  aid  in  the 
indulgence  of  their  animosities,  and  the  increase  of  their  adherents.  Fur- 
ther, a  reformation  of  public  opinion,  resulting  from  dear  bought  experi- 
ence in  the  southern  Atlantic  states,  at  least  not  to  be  despaired  of  They 
will  have  felt  that  the  eastern  states  cannot  be  made  exclusively  the  vic- 
tims of  a  capricious  and  impassioned  policy.  They  will  have  seen  that 
the  great  and  essential  interests  of  the  people  are  common  to  the  south  and 
to  the  east.  They  will  realise  the  fatal  errors  of  a  system  which  seeks 
revenge  for  commercial  injuries  in  the  sacrifice  of  commerce,  and  aggra- 
vates by  needless  wars,  to  an  immeasurable  extent,  the  injuries  it  professes 
to  redress.  They  may  discard  the  influence  of  visionary  theorists,  and 
recognise  the  benefits  of  a  practical  policy.  Indications  of  this  desirable 
revolution  of  oynnion  among  our  brethren  in  those  states,  are  already 
manifested.  While  a  hope  remains  of  its  ultimate  completion,  its  pro- 
gress should  not  be  retarded  or  stopped  by  exciting  fears  which  must 
check  these  favorable  tendencies,  and  frustrate  the  efforts  of  the  wisest 
and  best  men  in  those  states,  to  accelerate  this  propitious  change. 

Finally,  if  the  Union  be  destined  to  dissolution,  by  reason  of  the  multi- 
plied abuses  of  administrations,  it  should,  if  possible,  be  the  work  of  peace- 
able times,  and  deliberate  consent.  Some  new  form  of  confederacy 
should  be  substituted  among  those  states,  which  shall  intend  to  maintain 
a  federal  relati<m  to  each  other.  Events  may  prove  tliat  tlie  causes  of 
our  calamities  are  deep  and  permanent.  They  may  be  found  to  pro- 
ceed, not  merely  from  the  blindness  of  prejudice,  pride  of  opinion,  vio- 
lence of  party  spirit,  or  the  confusion  of  the  times ;  but  tliey  may  be 
traced  to  implacable  combinations  of  individuals,  or  of  states,  to 
monopolize  power  and  office,  8ind  to  trample  without  remorse  upon  the 
9 


96  HARTFORD  CONVENTION. 

rights  and  interests  of  commercial  sections  of  tlie  Union.  Whenever 
it  shall  appear  that  these  causes  are  radical  and  permanent,  a  separa- 
tion by  equitable  arrangement  will  be  preferable  to  an  alliance  by 
constraint,  among  nominal  friends,  but  real  enemies,  inflamed  by  mutual 
hatred  and  jealousies,  and  inviting  by  intestine  divisions,  contempt,  and 
aggression  from  abroad.  But  a  severance  of  the  Union  by  one  or  more 
states,  against  the  will  of  the  rest,  and  especially  in  a  time  of  war,  can 
be  justified  only  by  absolute  necessity.  These  are  among  the  principal 
objections  against  precipitate  measures  tending  to  disunite  tne  states, 
and  when  examined  in  connexion  with  the  farewell  address  of  the 
Father  of  his  country,  they  must,  it  is  believed,  be  deemed  conclusive. 

Under  these  impressions,  the  Convention  have  proceeded  to  confer 
and  deliberate  upon  the  alarming  state  of  public  affairs,  especially  as 
affecting  the  interests  of  the  people  who  have  appointed  them  for  this 
purpose,  and  they  are  naturally  led  to  a  consideration,  in  the  first  place, 
of  tne  dangers  and  grievances  which  menace  an  immediate  or  speedy 
pressure,  with  a  view  of  suggesting  means  bf  pressent  relief;  m  the 
next  place,  of  such  as  are  of  a  more  remote  and  general  description,  in 
the  hope  of  attaining  future  security. 

Amon^  the  subjects  of  complaint  and  apprehension,  which  might 
be  comprised  imder  the  former  of  these  propositions,  the  attention  of 
the  Convention  has  been  occupied  with  the  claims  and  pretensions 
advanced,  and  the  authority  exercised  over  the  militia,  by  the  executive 
and  legislative  departments  of  the  National  Government.  Also,  upon 
tlie  destitution  of  the  means  of  defence  in  which  the  Eastern  States  are 
left ;  while  at  the  same  time  they  are  doomed  to  heavy  requisitions  of 
men  and  money  for  national  objects. 

The  authority  of  the  National  Government  over  the  militia  is  derived 
from  those  clauses  in  the  Constitution  which  give  power  to  Congress 
"  to  provide  for  calling  forth  the  militia,  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union, 
suppress  insurrections,  and  repel  invasions" — also,  "to  provide  for 
organizing,  arming,  and  disciplining  the  militia,  and  for  governing 
such  parts  of  them  as  may  be  employed  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States,  reserving  to  the  states  respectively  the  appointment  of  the  offi- 
cers, and  the  authority  of  training  the  militia  acconiing  to  the  discipline 
prescribed  bv  Congress."  Again,  "  The  President  shall  be  Com- 
mander in  Chief  of  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United  States,  and  of 
the  militia  of  the  several  states,  w/ten  called  into  the  actual  service  of 
the  United  States^  In  these  specified  cases  only,  has  the  National 
Government  any  power  over  the  militia ;  and  it  follows,  conclusively, 
that,  for  all  general  and  ordinary  purposes,  this  power  belongs  to  the 
states  respectively,  and  to  them  alone.  It  is  not  only  with  regret,  but 
with  astonishment,  the  Convention  perceive  that,  under  color  of  an 
authority  conferred  with  such  plain  and  precise  limitations,  a  power  is 
arrogated  by  the  executive  government,  and  in  some  instances  sanc- 
tioned by  the  two  Houses  of  Congress,  of  control  over  the  militia,  which 
if  conceaed  will  render  nugatory  the  rightful  authority  of  the  individual 
states  over  that  class  of  men,  and,  by  placing  at  the  disposal  of  the 
National  Government  the  lives  and  services  of  the  great  body  of  the 
people,  enable  it  at  pleasure  to  destroy  their  liberties,  and  erect  a  mili- 
tary despotism  on  the  ruins. 

An  elaborate  examination  of  the  principles  assumed  for  the  basis  of 
these  extravagant  pretensions,  of  the  consequences  to  which  they  lead, 


HARTFORD  CONVENTION.  99 

and  of  the  insurmountable  objections  to  their  admission,  would  trans- 
cend the  limits  of  this  Report.  A  few  general  observations,  with  an 
exhibition  of  the  character  of  these  pretensions,  and  a  recommendation 
of  a  strenuous  opposition  to  them,  must  not  however  be  omitted. 

It  will  not  be  contended  that,  by  the  terms  used  in  the  constitutional 
comoact,  the  power  of  the  National  Government  to  call  out  the  militia 
is  otiner  than  a  power  expressly  limited  to  three  cases.  One  of  these 
must  exist  as  a  condition  precedent  to  the  exercise  of  that  power — unless 
the  laws  shall  be  opposed,  or  an  insurrection  shall  exist,  or  an  invasion 
shall  be  made.  Congress,  and  of  consequence  the  President  as  their 
organ,  has  no  more  power  over  the  militia  than  over  the  armies  of  a 
foreign  nation. 

But  if  the  declaration  of  the  President  should  be  admitted  to  be  an 
unerring  test  of  the  existence  of  these  cases,  this  important  power 
would  depend,  not  upon  the  truth  of  the  fact,  but  upon  executive  infal- 
libility ;  and  the  limitation  of  the  power  would  consequently  be  nothing 
more  than  merely  nominal,  as  it  might  always  be  eluded.  It  follows, 
therefore,  that  the  decision  of  the  President  in  this  particular  cannot  be 
conclusive.  It  is  as  much  the  duty  of  the  state  authorities  to  watch 
over  the  rights  reserved^  as  of  the  United  States  to  exercise  the  powers 
which  are  delegated. 

The  arrangement  of  the  United  States  into  military  districts,  with  a 
small  portion  of  the  regular  force,  under  an  officer  of  high  rank  of  the 
standing  army,  with  power  to  call  for  the  militia,  as  circumstances  in 
his  judgment  may  require  ;  and  to  assmne  the  command  of  them,  is  not 
warranted  by  the  Constitution  or  any  law  of  the  United  States.  It  is 
not  denied  that  Congress  may  delegate  to  the  President  of  the  United 
States  the  power  to  call  forth  the  militia  in  the  cases  which  are  within 
their  jurisdiction — but  he  has  no  authority  to  substitute  military  prefects 
throughout  the  Union,  to  use  their  own  discretion  in  such  instances. 
To  station  an  officer  of  the  army  in  a  military  district  witliout  troops 
corresponding  to  his  rank,  for  the  purpose  of  taking  command  of  tne 
militia  that  may  be  called  into  service,  is  a  manifest  evasion  of  that 
provision  of  the  Constitution  which  expressly  reserves  to  the  states 
the  appointment  of  the  officers  of  the  militia ;  and  the  object  of  detach- 
ing such  officer  cemnot  be  well  conceived  to  be  any  other  than  that  of 
superseding  the  Governor  or  other  officers  of  the  militia  in  their  right 
to  command. 

The  power  of  dividing  the  militia  of  the  states  into  classes,  and  obliging 
such  classes  to  furnish,  by  contract  or  draft,  able  bodied  men,  to  serve  for 
one  or  more  years  for  the  defence  of  the  frontier,  is  not  delegated  to  Con- 
gress. If  a  claim  to  draft  the  militia  for  one  year  for  such  general  object 
be  admissible,  no  limitation  can  be  assigned  to  it,  but  the  discretion  of 
those  who  make  the  law.  Thus  with  a  power  in  Congress  to  authorize 
such  a'draft  or  conscription,  and  in  the  Executive  to  decide  conclusively 
upon  the  existence  and  continuance  of  the  emergency,  the  whole  militia 
may  be  converted  into  a  standing  army  disposable  at  the  will  of  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States. 

The  power  of  compelling  the  militia  and  other  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  by  a  forcible  draft  or  conscription  to  serve  in  the  regular  armies, 
as  proposed  in  a  late  official  letter  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  is  not  dele- 
gated to  Congress  by  the  constitution,  and  the  exercise  of  it  would  be  not 
less  dangerous  to  their  liberties,  than  hostile  to  the  sovereignty  of  the 


100  HARTFORD  CONVENTION. 

states.  The  cfTort  to  deduce  this  power  from  the  right  of  raising  armieff, 
is  a  flagrant  attempt  to  pervert  the  sense  of  the  clause  in  the  constitution 
which  confers  that  right,  and  is  incompatible  with  other  provisions  in  that 
instrument.  The  armies  of  the  United  States  have  always  been  raised 
by  contract,  never  by  conscription,  and  nothing  more  can  be  wanting  to  a 
government,  possessing  the  i)ower  thus  claimed,  to  enable  it  to  usurp  the 
entire  control  of  the  militia,  in  derogation  of  the  authority  of  the  state, 
and  to  convert  it  by  impressment  into  a  standing  army. 

It  may  be  here  remarked,  as  a  circumstance  illustrative  of  the  deter- 
mination of  the  Executive  to  establish  an  absolute  control  over  aJl  de- 
scriptions of  citizens,  that  the  right  of  impressing  seamen  into  the  naval 
service  is  expressly  asserted  by  the  Secretaiy  of  the  Navy  in  a  late 
report.  Thus  a  practice  which,  in  a  foreign  government,  has  been 
regarded  with  great  abhorrence  by  the  people,  finds  advocates  among 
those  who  have  been  the  loudest  to  condemn  it. 

The  law  authorizing  the  enlistment  of  minors  and  apprentices  into 
the  armies  of  the  United  States,  without  the  consent  of  tlie  parents  and 
guardians,  is  also  repugnant  to  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution.  By  a 
constniction  of  the  power  to  raise  armies,  as  applied  by  our  present 
rulers,  not  only  persons  capable  of  contracting  are  liable  to  be  impressed 
into  the  army,  but  those  who  are  under  legal  disabilities  to  make  con- 
tracts, are  to  be  invested  with  this  capacity,  in  order  to  enable  them  to 
annul  at  pleasure  contracts  made  in  their  behalf  by  legal  guardians. 
Such  an  interference  with  the  municipal  laws  and  rights  of  the  several 
states,  could  never  have  been  contemplated  by  the  framers  of  the  Con- 
stitution. It  impairs  the  salutary  control  and  influence  of  the  parent 
over  his  child — the  master  over  his  servant — the  guardian  over  his 
ward^and  thus  destroys  the  most  important  relations  in  society,  so  that 
by  the  conscription  of  the  father,  and  the  seduction  of  the  son,  the  power 
of  the  Executive  over  all  the  effective  male  population  of  tlie  United 
States  is  made  complete. 

Such  are  some  of  the  odious  features  of  the  novel  system  proposed 
by  the  rulers  of  a  free  country,  under  tlie  limited  powers  derived  from 
the  Constitution.  What  portion  of  them  will  be  embraced  in  acts  finally 
to  be  passed,  it  is  yet  impossible  to  determine.  It  is,  however,  sufif- 
ciently  alarming  to  perceive  that  these  projects  emanate  from  the  highest 
authority ;  nor  should  it  be  forgotten  that,  by  the  plan  of  the  Secretary 
of  War,  the  classification  of  the  militia  embraced  the  principle  of  direct 
taxation  upon  the  white  population  only ;  and  that,  in  the  House  of 
Representatives,  a  motion  to  apportion  the  militia  amon^  the  white 
population  exclusively,  which  would  have  been  in  its  operation  a  direct 
tax,  was  strenuously  urged  and  supported. 

In  this  whole  series  of  devices  and  measures  for  raising  men,  this  Con- 
vention discern  a  total  disregard  for  the  Constitution,  and  a  disposition  to 
violate  its  provisions,  demanding  from  the  individual  states  a  firm  and 
decided  opposition.  An  iron  despotism  can  impose  no  harder  servitude 
upon  the  citizen,  than  to  force  him  from  his  home  and  his  occupation,  to 
wage  offensive  wars,  undertaken  to  gratify  the  pride  or  passions  of  his 
master.  The  example  of  France  has  recently  shown  that  a  cabal  of  indi- 
viduals assuming  to  act  in  the  name  of  the  people,  may  transform  the 
great  body  of  citizens  into  soldiers,  and  deliver  them  over  into  the  hands 
of  a  single  tyrant.  No  war,  not  held  in  just  abhorrence  by  a  people,  can 
require  the  aid  of  such  stratagems  to  recruit  an  army,    tiad  the  troops 


HARTFORD  CONVENTION.  101 

already  raised,  and  in  great  numbers  sacrificed  upon  the  frontier  of  Canada, 
been  employed  for  the  defence  of  the  country,  and  had  the  millions  which 
have  been  squandered  with  shameless  profusion,  been  appropriated  to 
their  payment,  to  the  protection  of  the  coast,  and  to  the  naval  service, 
there  would  have  been  no  occasion  for  unconstitutional  expedients.  Even 
at  this  late  hour  let  government  leave  to  New  England  the  remnant  of 
her  resources,  and  she  is  ready  and  able  to  defend  her  territory,  and  to 
resign  the  glories  and  advantages  of  the  border  war,  to  those  who  are 
determined  to  persist  in  its  prosecution. 

That  acts  of  Congress  in  violation  of  the  Constitution  are  absolutely 
void,  is  an  undeniable  position.  It  does  not,  however,  consist  with  the 
respect  and  forbearance  due  from  a  confederate  state  towards  the  general 
government,  to  fly  to  open  resistance  upon  every  infraction  of  the  Con- 
stitution. The  mode  and  the  energy  of  the  opposition  should  always 
conform  to  the  nature  of  the  violation,  the  intention  of  its  authors,  the 
extent  of  the  injury  inflicted,  the  determination  manifested  to  persist  in 
it,  and  the  danger  of  delay.  But  in  cases  of  deliberate,  dangerous,  and 
palpable  infractions  of  the  Constitution,  aflfecting  the  sovereignty  of  a 
state,  and  liberties  of  the  people,  it  is  not  onl^  the  right  but  the  duty  of 
such  a  state  to  interpose  its  authority  for  their  protection,  in  the  manner 
best  calculated  to  secure  that  end.  When  emergencies  occur  which  are 
either  beyond  the  reach  of  the  judicial  tribunals,  or  too  pressing  to  admit 
of  the  delay  incident  to  their  forms,  states,  which  have  no  common  um- 
pire, must  be  their  own  judges,  and  execute  their  own  decisions.  It  will 
thus  be  proper  for  the  severd  states  to  await  the  ultimate  disposal  of  the 
obnoxious  measures,  recommended  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  or  pending 
before  Congress,  and  so  to  use  their'power  according  to  the  character  these 
measures  shall  finally  assume,  as  eflfectually  to  protect  their  own  sove- 
reignty, and  the  rights  and  liberties  of  their  citizens. 

The  next  subject  which  has  occupied  the  attention  of  the  Convention, 
is  the  means  of  defence  against  the  common  enemy.  This  naturally 
leads  to  the  inquiries,  whether  any  expectation  can  be  reasonably  enter- 
tained, that  adequate  provision  for  the  defence  of  the  Eastern  states  will 
be  made  by  the  national  government  1  Whether  the  several  states  can, 
from  their  own  resources,  provide  for  self-defence  and  fulfil  the  requisi- 
tions which  are  to  be  expected  for  the  national  treasury  1  and,  generally, 
what  course  of  conduct  ought  to  be  adopted  by  those  states,  in  relation  to 
the  great  object  of  defence  1 

Without  pausing,  at  present,  to  comment  upon  the  causes  of  the  war, 
it  may  be  assumed  as  a  truth,  oflliciallv  announced,  that  to  achieve  the 
conquest  of  Canadian  territory,  and  to  hold  it  as  a  pledge  for  peace,  is  the 
deliberate  purpose  of  administration.  This  enterprise,  commenced  at  a 
period  when  government  possessed  the  advantage  of  selecting  the  time 
and  occasion  for  making  a  sudden  descent  upon  an  unprepared  enemy, 
now  languishes  in  the  third  year  of  the  war.  It  has  been  prosecuted  with 
various  fortune,  and  occasional  brilliancy  of  exploit,  but  without  any  solid 
acquisition.  The  British  armies  have  been  recruited  by  veteran  regi- 
ments. Their  navy  commands  Ontario.  The  American  ranks  are 
thinned  by  the  casualties  of  war.  Recruits  are  discouraged  by  the 
unpopular  character  of  the  -contest,  and  by  the  uncertainty  of  receiving 
their  pay. 

In  the  prosecution  of  this  favorite  warfare,  administration  have  left  the  ex- 
posed and  vulnerable  parts  Of  the  country  destitute  of  all  eflScient  meant 
9* 


102  HARTFORD  CONVENTION. 

of  defence.  The  main  body  of  the  regular  army  has  been  marched  to  the 
frontier.  The  navy  has  been  stripped  of  a  great  part  of  its  sailors  for  the 
service  of  the  Lakes.  Meanwhile  the  enemy  scours  the  seacoast,  block- 
ades our  ports,  ascends  our  bays  and  rivers,  makes  actual  descents  in  vari- 
ous and  distant  places,  holds  some  by  force,  and  threatens  all  that  are 
assailable  with  fire  and  sword.  The  seaboard  of  four  of  the  New  Eng- 
land states,  following  its  curvatures,  presents  an  extent  of  more  than 
seven  hundred  miles,  generally  occupied  by  a  compact  population,  and 
accessible  by  a  naval  force,  exposing  a  mass  of  people  and  property  to  the 
devastation  of  the  enemy,  which  bears  a  great  proportion  to  the  residue  of 
the  maratime  frontier  of  the  United  States.  This  extensive  shore  has 
been  exposed  to  frequent  attacks,  repeated  contributions,  and  constant 
alarms.  The  regular  forces  detached  by  the  national  government  for  its 
defence,  are  mere  pretexts  for  placing  officers  of  high  rank  in  command. 
They  are  besides  confined  to  a  few  places,  and  are  too  insignificant  in 
number  to  be  included  in  any  computation. 

These  states  have  thus  been  left  to  adopt  measures  for  their  own 
defence.  The  militia  have  been  constantly  kept  on  tlie  alert,  and  har- 
rassed  by  garrison  duties,  and  other  hardships,  while  the  expenses,  of 
which  the  National  Government  decline  the  reimbursement,  tlireaten  to 
absorb  all  the  resources  of  the  states.  The  President  of  the  United 
States  has  refused  to  consider  the  expense  of  the  militia  detached  by 
state  autliority,  for  the  indispensable  defence  of  the  state,  as  chargeable 
to  the  Union,  on  the  ground  of  a  refusal  by  the  executive  of  the  state,  to 
place  them  under  the  command  of  officers  of  the  regular  army.  De- 
tachments of  militia  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  General  Government, 
have  been  dismissed  either  without  pay,  or  with  depreciated  paper. 
The  prospect  of  the  ensuing  campaign  is  not  enlivened  by  the  promise 
of  any  alleviation  of  these  grievances.  From  authentic  documents, 
extorted  by  necessity  from  those  whose  inclination  might  lead  them  to 
conceal  the  embarrassments  of  the  government,  it  is  apparent  that  the 
treasury  is  bankrupt,  and  its  credit  prostrate.  So  deplorable  is  the 
state  of  the  finances,  that  those  who  feel  for  the  honor  and  safety  of  tlie 
country,  would  be  willing  to  conceal  the  melancholy  spectacle,  if  those 
whose  infatuation  has  produced  this  state  of  fiscal  concerns,  had  not 
found  themselves  compelled  to  unveil  it  to  public  view. 

If  the  war  be  continued,  there  appears  no  room  for  reliance  upon  the 
national  government  for  the  supply  of  those  means  of  defence,  which 
must  become  indispensable  to  secure  these  states  from  desolation  and 
ruin.  Nor  is  it  possible  that  the  states  can  discharge  this  sacred  duty 
from  their  own  resources,  and  continue  to  sustain  tlie  burden  of  the 
national  taxes.  The  Administration,  after  a  long  perseverance  in 
plans  to  baffle  every  efibrt  of  commercial  enterprise,  Iwd  fatally  suc- 
ceeded in  their  attempts  at  the  epoch  of  the  war.  Commerce,  the  vital 
spring  of  New  England's  prosperity,  was  annihilated.  Embargoes, 
restrictions,  and  the  rapacity  of^  revenue  officers,  had  completed  its  de- 
struction. The  various  objects  for  the  employment  of  productive  labor, 
in  the  branches  of  business  dependent  on  commerce,  have  disappeared. 
The  fi.sheries  have  shared  its  fate.  Manufactures,  which  government 
has  professed  an  intention  to  favor  and  to  cherish,  as  an  indemnity  for 
the  failure  of  these  branches  of  business,  are  doomed  to  struggle  in 
their  infancy  with  taxes  and  obstructions,  which  cannot  fail  most  seri- 
ously to  affect  their  growth.     The  specie  is  withdrawn  from  circulation. 


HARTFORD  CONVENTION.  103 

The  landed  interest,  the  last  to  feel  these  burdens,  must  prepare  to  be- 
come their  principal  support,  as  all  other  sources  of  revenue  must  be 
exhausted.  Under  these  circumstances,  taxes,  of  a  description  and 
amount  unprecedented  in  this  country,  are  in  a  train  of  imposition,  the 
burden  of  which  must  fall  with  the  heaviest  pressure  upon  the  states 
east  of  the  Potomac.  The  amount  of  these  taxes  for  the  ensuing  year, 
cannot  be  estimated  at  less  than  five  millions  of  dollars  upon  the  New- 
England  states,  and  the  expenses  of  the  last  year  for  defence,  in  Massa- 
chusetts, alone  approaches  to  one  million  of  dollars. 

From  these  facts,  it  is  almost  superfluous  to  state  the  irressistible  in- 
ference, that  these  states  have  no  capacity  of  defraying  the  expense 
requisite  for  their  own  protection,  and,  at  tlie  same  time,  of  discharging 
the  demands  of  the  national  treasury. 

The  last  inquiry,  what  course  of  conduct  ought  to  be  adopted  by  the 
aggrieved  states,  is  in  a  high  degree  momentous.  When  a  great  and 
brave  people  shall  feel  themselves  deserted  by  their  government,  and 
reduced  to  the  necessity  either  of  submission  to  a  foreign  enemy,  or  of 
appropriating  to  their  own  vise  those  means  of  defence  which  are  in- 
dispensable to  self-preservation,  they  cannot  consent  to  wait  passive 
spectators  of  approaching  ruin,  which  it  is  in  their  power  to  avert,  and 
to]  resign  the  last  remnant  of  their  industrious  earnings  to  be  dissipated 
in  support  of  measures  destructive  of  the  best  interests  of  the  nation. 

This  Convention  will  not  trust  themselves  to  express  their  conviction 
of  the  catastrophe  to  which  such  a  state  of  things  inevitably  tends. 
Conscious  of  their  high  responsibility  to  God  and  their  country,  solicit- 
ous for  the  continuance  of  the  Union,  as  well  as  the  sovereignty  of  the 
states,  unwilling  to  furnish  obstacles  to  peace — resolute  never  to  submit 
to  a  foreign  enemy,  and  confiding  in  the  Divine  care  and  protection, 
they  will,  until  the  last  hope  shall  be  extinguished,  endeavor  to  avert 
such  consequences. 

With  this  view  they  suggest  an  arrangement,  which  may  at  once  be 
consistent  with  the  honor  and  interest  of  the  National  Government,  and 
the  security  of  these  states.  This  it  will  not  be  diflicult  to  conclude,  if 
that  government  should  be  so  disposed.  By  the  terms  of  it  these  states 
might  be  allowed  to  assume  their  own  defence,  by  the  militia  or  other 
troops.  A  reasonable  portion,  also,  of  the  taxes  raised  in  each  state 
might  be  paid  into  its  treasury,  and  credited  to  the  United  States,  but  to 
be  appropriated  to  the  defence  of  such  state,  to  be  accounted  for  with 
the  United  States.  No  doubt  is  entertained  that,  by  such  an  arrange- 
ment, this  portion  of  the  countiy  could  be  defended  with  greater  effect, 
and  in  a  mode  more  consistent  witli  economy,  and  the  public  conveni- 
ence, than  any  which  has  been  practised. 

Should  an  application  for  these  purposes,  made  to  Congress  by  the 
state  legislatures,  be  attended  with  success,  and  should  peace  upon  just 
terms  appear  to  be  unattainable,  the  people  would  stand  together  for  the 
common  defence,  until  a  change  of  Administration,  or  of  disposition  in 
the  enemy,  should  facilitate  the  occurrence  of  that  auspicious  event. 
It  would  be  inexpedient  for  this  Convention  to  diminish  the  hope  of  a 
successful  issue  to  such  an  application,  by  recommending,  upon  suppo- 
sition of  a  contrary  event,  ulterior  proceedings.  Nor  is  it  indeed  with- 
in their  province.  In  a  state  of  things  so  solemn  and  trying  as  may 
then  arise,  the  legislatures  of  the  states,  or  Conventions  of  tlie  whole 


104  HARTFORD  CONVENTION. 

people,  or  delegates  appointed  by  them  for  the  express  purpose  in  another 
Convention,  must  act  as  such  urgent  circunistances  may  then  require. 

But  the  duty  incumbent  on  this  Convention  will  not  have  been  per- 
formed, without  exhibiting  some  general  view  of  such  measures  as  they 
deem  essential  to  secure  the  nation  against  a  relapse  into  difficulties  and 
dangers,  should  they,  by  the  blessing  of  Providence,  escape  from  their 
present  condition  without  absolute  ruin.     To  this  end  a  concise  retro- 
spect of  this  nation  under  the  advantages  of  a  wise  Administration, 
contrasted  with  the  miserable  abyss  into  which  it  is  plunged  by  the 
profligacy  and  folly  of  political  theorists,  will  lead  to  some  practical  con- 
clusions.    On  this  subject,  it  will  be  recollected  that   the  immediate  in- 
fluence of  the  Federal  Constitution  upon  its  first  adoption,  and  for 
twelve  succeeding  years,  upon  the  prosperity  and  happiness  of   the 
nation,  seemed  to  countenance  a  belief  in  the  trancednency  of  its  per- 
fection over  all  other  himian  institutions.     In  the  catalogue  of  blessings 
which  have  fallen  to  the  lot  of  the  most  favored  nations,  none  could  be 
enumerated  from  which  our  country  was  excluded.     A  free  Constitu- 
tion, administered  by  great  and  incorruptible  statesmen,  realized  the 
fondest  hopes  of  liberty  and  independence.     The  progress  of  agricul- , 
ture  was  stimulated  by  the  certainty  of  value  in  the  harvest — and  com- 
merce, after  traversing  every  sea,  returned  with  the  riches  of  every 
clime.     A  revenue,  secured  by  a  sense  of  honor,  collected  without  op- 
pression, and  paid  without  murmurs,  melted   away  the  national  debtj 
and  the  chief  concern  of  the  public  creditor  arose  from  its  too  rapid 
diminution.     The  wars  and  commotions  of  the  European  nations,  and 
the  interruptions  of  their  commercial  intercourse  afforded  to  those,  who 
had  not  promoted,  but  who  would  have  rejoiced  to  alleviate  their  cala- 
mities, a  fair  and  golden  opportunity,  by  enriching  themselves  to  lay  a 
broad  foundation  for  national  wealth.     Although  occasional  vexations  to 
commerce  arose  from  the  furious  collissions  of  the  powers  at  war,  yet 
the  great  and  good  men  of  that  time  conformed  to  the  force  of  circimi- 
stances  which  they  could  not  control,  and  preserved  their  country  in  se- 
curity from  the  tempests  which  overwhelmed  the  old  world,  and  threw 
the  wreck  of  their  fortunes  on  these  shores.     Respect  abroad,  prosperi- 
ty at  home,  wise  laws  made  by  honored  legislators,  and  prompt  obedi- 
ence yielded  by  a  contented  people,  had  silenced  the  enemies  of  repub- 
lican institutions.     The  arts  flourished — the  sciences  were  cultivated — 
the  comforts  and  conveniences  of  life  were  universally  diffused — and 
nothing  remained  for  succeeding  administrations,  but  to  reap  the  ad- 
vantages, and  cherish  the  resources,  flowing  from   the  policy  of  their 
predecessors. 

But  no  sooner  was  a  new  administration  established  in  the  hands  of 
the  party  opposed  to  the  Washington  policy,  than  a  fixed  determination 
was  perceived  and  avowed  of  changing  a  system  which  had  already 
produced  these  sulostantial  fruits.  The  consequences  of  this  change,  for 
a  few  years  after  its  commencement,  were  not  sufficient  to  counteract 
the  prodigious  impulse  towards  prosperity,  which  had  been  given  to  the 
nation.  But  a  steady  jperseverance  m  the  new  plans  of  administration 
at  length  developed  their  weakness  and  deformity,  but  not  until  a  ma- 
jority of  the  people  had  been  deceived  by  flattery,  and  inflamed  by  pas- 
sion, into  blindness  to  their  defects.  Under  the  withering  influence  of 
this  new  system,  the  declension  of  the  nation  has  been  uniform  and  ra- 
pid. The  richest  advantages  for  securing  the  grea  tobjects  of  the  Consti- 


HARTFORD  CONVENTION.  105 

tution  have  been  wantonly  rejected.  While  Europe  reposes  from  the  con- 
vulsions that  had  shaken  down  her  ancient  institutions,  she  beholds  with 
amazement  this  remote  country,  once  so  happy  and  so  envied,  involved  in 
a  ruinous  war,  and  excluded  from  intercourse  with  the  rest  of  the  world. 

To  investigate  and  explain  the  means  whereby  this  fatal  reverse  has 
been  effected,  would  require  a  voluminous  discussion.  Nothing  more 
can  be  attempted  in  this  report,  than  a  general  allusion  to  the  prnicipal 
outlines  of  the  policy  which  has  produced  this  vicissitude.  Among 
these  may  be  enumerated — 

Rlrst.  A  deliberate  and  extensive  system  for  effecting  a  combina- 
tion among  certain  states,  by  exerting  local  jealousies  and  ambition,  so 
as  to  secure  to  popular  leaders  in  one  section  of  the  Union,  the  control 
of  public  affairs,  in  perpetual  success.  To  which  primary  object  most 
other  characteristics  of  the  system  may  be  reconciled. 

Secondly.  The  political  intolerance  displayed  and  avowed,  in  ex- 
cludingifrom  office  men  of  unexceptionable  merit,  for  want  of  adher- 
ence to  the  executive  creed. 

Thirdly.  The  infraction  of  the  judiciary  authority  and  rights,  by 
depriving  judges  of  their  offices  in  violation  of  the  Constitution. 

Foiirthly.  The  abolition  of  existing  taxes,  requisite  to  prepare  the 
country  for  those  changes  to  which  nations  are  always  exposed,  with  a 
view  to  the  acquisition  of  popular  favor. 

Fifthly.  '  The  influence  of  patronage  in  the  distribution  of  offices, 
which  in  these  states  has  been  almost  invariably  made  among  men  the 
least  entitled  to  such  distinction,  and  who  have  sold  themselves  as  rea- 
dy instruments  for  distracting  public  opinion,  and  encouraging  admi- 
nistration to  hold  in  contempt  the  wishes  and  remonstrances  of  a  people 
thus  apparently  divided. 

Sixthly.  The  admission  of  new  states  into  the  Union,  formed  at 
pleasure  in  the  western  region,  has  destroyed  the  balance  of  power 
which  existed  among  the  wiginal  states,  and  deeply  aflfected  their 
interest. 

Seventhly.  The  easy  admission  of  naturalized  foreigners  to  places 
of  trust,  honor  or  profit,  operating  as  an  inducement  to  the  malcontent 
subjects  of  the  old  world  to  come  to  these  states,  in  quest  of  executive 
patronage,  and  to  repay  it  by  an  abject  devotion  to  executive  measures. 

Eighthly.  Hostility  to  Great  Britain,  and  partiality  to  the  late  gov- 
ernment of  France,  adopted  as  coincident  with  popular  prejudice,  and 
subservient  to  the  main  object,  party  power.  Connected  witli  these 
must  be  ranked  erroneous  and  distorted  estimates  of  the  power  and  re- ' 
sources  of  those  nations,  of  the  probable  results  of  their  controversies, 
and  of  our  political  relations  to  them  respectively. 

Lastly  and  principally.  A  visionary  and  superficial  theory  in  re- 
gard to  commerce,  accompanied  by  a  real  hatred,  but  a  feigned  regard, 
to  its  interests,  and  a  minous  perseverance  in  efforts  to  render  it  an  in- 
strument of  coercion  and  war. 

But  it  is  not  conceivable  that  the  obliquity  of  any  administration 
could,  in  so  short  a  period,  have  so  nearly  consummated  the  work  of 
national  ruin,  unless  favored  by  defects  in  the  constitution. 

To  enumerate  all  the  improvements  of  which  that  instrument  is  sus- 
ceptible, and  to  propose  such  amendments  as  might  render  it  in  all  re- 
spects perfect,  would  be  a  task,  which  this  convention  has  not  thought 
proper  to  assume.     They  have  confined  their  attention  to  such  as  ex- 


106  HARTFORD  CONVENTION. 

perience  has  demonstrated  to  be  essential,  and  even  amonff  these  some 
arc  considered  entitled  to  a  more  serious  attention  than  others.  They 
are  suggested  without  any  intentional  disrespect  to  other  states,  and 
are  meant  to  be  such  as  all  shall  find  an  interest  in  promoting.  Their 
object  is  to  stren^en,  and  if  possible  to  perpetuate,  the  Union  of  the 
states,  by  removmg  tlie  grounds  of  existing  jealousies,  and  providing 
for  a  fair  and  equal  representation,  and  a  Imiitation  of  powers  whicn  . 
have  been  misused. 

The  first  amendment  proposed,  relates  to  the  apportionment  of  repre- 
sentatives among  the  slave  holding  states.  This  cannot  be  claimed  as 
a  right.  Those  states  are  entitled  to  the  slave  representation,  by  a  con- 
stitutional compact.  It  is  therefore  merely  a  subject  of  agreement, 
which  should  be  conducted  upon  principles  of  mutual  interest  and  ac- 
commodation, and  upon  which  no  sensibility  on  either  side  should  be 
permitted  to  exist.  It  has  proved  unjust  and  unequal  in  its  operation. 
Had  this  eflfect  been  foreseen,  the  privilege  would  probably  i\^t  have 
been  demanded ;  certainly  not  conceded.  Its  tendency  in  future  will 
be  adverse  to  that  harmony  and  mutual  confidence,  which  are  more 
conducive  to  the  happiness  and  prosperity  of  every  confederated  state, 
than  a  mere  preponderance  of  power,  the  prolific  source  of  jealousies 
and  controversy,  can  be  to  any  one  of  them.  The  time  may  therefore 
arrive,  when  a  sense  of  magnanimity  and  justice  will  reconcile  those 
states  to  acquiesce  in  a  revision  of  this  article,  especially  as  a  fair  equi- 
valent would  result  to  them  in  the  apportiomnent  of  taxes. 

The  next  amendment  relates  to  the  admission  of  new  states  into  the 
Union. 

This  amendment  is  deemed  to  be  highly  important,  and  in  fact  indis- 
pensable. In  proposing  it,  it  is  not  intended  to  recognise  the  richt  of 
Congress  to  admit  new  states  without  the  original  limits  of  the  United 
States,  nor  is  any  idea  entertained  of  disturbing  the  tranquility  of  any 
state  already  admitted  into  the  Union.  The  object  is  merely  to  restrain 
the  constitutional  power  of  Congress  in  admitting  new  states.  At  the 
adoption  of  the  Constitution,  a  certain  balance  of  power  among  the 
original  parties  was  considered  to  exist,  and  there  was  at  that  time,  and 
yet  is,  among  those?  parties,  a  strong  aflinity  between  their  great  and 
general  interests.  By  the  admission  of  these  states,  that  balance  has 
been  materially  affected,  and  unless  the  practice  be  modified,  must  ulti- 
mately be  destroyed,  The  southern  states  will  first  avail  tliemselves  of 
their  new  confederates  to  govern  the  east,  and  finally  the  western  states 
multiplied  in  number,  and  augmented  in  population,  will  control  the  in- 
terests of  the  whole.  Thus  for  the  sake  of  present  power,  the  southern 
states  will  be  common  sufferers  with  the  east,  in  the  loss  of  permanent 
advantages.  None  of  the  old  states  can  find  an  interest  in  creating  pre- 
maturely an  overwhelming  western  influence,  which  may  hereafter 
discern  (as  it  has  heretofore)  benefits  to  be  derived  to  them  by  wars  and 
commercial  restrictions. 

The  next  amendments  proposed  by  the  convention,  relate  to  the  pow- 
ers of  Congress,  in  relation  to  embargo  and  the  interdiction  of  commerce. 

Whatever  theories  upon  the  subject  oT  commerce  have  hitherto  divided 
the  opinions  of  statesmen,  ex[)crience  has  at  last  shown,  that  it  is  a  vital 
interest  in  the  United  States,  and  that  its  success  is  essential  to  the 
encouragement  of  aitriculturc  and  manufactures,  and  to  the  wealth,  finan- 
ces, defence,  and  lilx;rty  of  the  nation.    Its  welfare  can  never  interfere 

\ 


HARTFORD  CONVENTION.  107 

with  the  other  great  interests  of  the  stale,  but  must  promote  and  uphold 
them.  Still,  those  who  are  immediately  concerned  in  the  prosecution  of 
commerce,  will,  of  necessity,  be  always  a  minority  of  the  nation.  They 
are,  however,  best  qualified  to  manage  and  direct  its  course  by  the  advan- 
tages of  experience,  and  the  sense  of  interest.  But  they  are  entirely  una- 
ble to  protect  themselves  against  the  sudden  and  injudicious  decisions  of 
bare  majorities,  and  the  mistaken  or  oppressive  projects  of  those  who  are 
not  actively  concerned  in  its  pursuits.  Of  consequence,  this  interest  is 
always  exposed  to  be  harrassed,  interrupted,  and  entirely  destroyed,  upon 
pretence  of  securing  other  interests.  Had  the  merchants  of  this  nation 
been  permitted,  by  their  own  government,  to  pursue  an  innocent  and 
lawful  commerce,  how  different  would  have  been  the  state  of  the  treasury 
and  of  public  credit !  How  shortsighted  and  miserable  is  the  policy  which 
has  annihilated  this  order  of  men,  and  doomed  their  ships  to  rot  in  the 
docks,  their  capital  to  waste  unemployed,  and  their  affections  to  be  alien- 
ated from  the  government  which  was  formed  to  protect  them !  What 
security  for  an  ample  and  unfiiling  revenue  can  ever  be  had,  comparable 
to  that  which  onc3  was  realized  in  the  good  faith,  punctuality,  and  sense 
of  honor,  which  attached  the  mercantile  class  to  the  interests  of  the  govern- 
ment 1  Without  commerce,  where  can  be  found  the  aliment  for  a  navy  ; 
and  without  a  navy,  what  is  to  constitute  the  defence,  and  ornament,  and 
glory  of  this  nation  1  No  union  can  be  durably  cemented,  in  which  every 
great  interest  does  not  find  itself  reasonably  secured  against  the  encroach- 
ment and  combinations  of  other  interests.  When,  therefore,  the  past 
system  of  embargoes  and  commercial  restrictions  shall  have  been  reviewed — 
when  the  fluctuation  and  inconsistency  of  public  measures,  betraying  a 
want  of  information  as  well  as  feeling  in  the  majority,  shall  have  been 
considered,  the  reasonableness  of  some  restrictions  upon  the  power  of  a 
bare  majority  to  repeat  these  oppressions,  will  appear  to  be  obvious. 

The  next  amendment  proposes  to  restrict  the  power  of  making  offensive 
war.  In  the  consideration  of  this  amendment,  it  is  not  necessary  to  in- 
quire into  the  justice  of  the  present  war.  But  one  sentiment  now  exists 
in  relation  to  its  expediency,  and  regret  for  its  declaration  is  nearly  uni- 
versal. No  indemnity  can  ever  be  attained  for  this  terrible  calamity,  and 
its  only  palliation  must  be  found  in  obstacles  to  its  future  recurrence. 
Rarely  can  the  state  of  this  country  call  for  or  justify  offensive  war.  The 
orenius  of  our  institutions  is  unfavorable  to  its  successful  prosecution ;  the 
felicity  of  our  situation  exempts  us  from  its  necessity.  In  this  case,  as  in 
the  former,  those  more  immediately  exposed  to  its  fatal  efiects  are  a  mi- 
nority of  the  nation.  The  commercial  towns,  the  shores  of  our  seas  and 
rivers  contain  the  population,  whose  vital  interests  are  most  vulnerable  by 
a  foreign  enemy.  Agriculture,  indeed,  must  feel  at  last ;  but  this  appeal 
to  its  sensibility  comes  too  late.  Again,  the  immense  population  wnich 
has  swarmed  into  the  West,  remote  from  immediate  danger,  and  which 
is  constantly  augmenting,  will  not  be  averse  from  the  occasional  disturban- 
ces of  the  Atlantic  states.  Thus  interest  may  not  unfrcquently  combine 
with  passion  and  intrigue,  to  plunge  the  nation  in  needless  wars,  and 
compel  it  to  become  a  miUtary,  rather  than  a  happy  and  flourishing  people. 
These  considerations,  which  it  would  be  easy  to  augment,  call  loudly  for 
the  limitation  proposed  in  the  amendment 

Another  amendment,  subordinate  in  importance,  but  still  in  a  high 
degree  expedient,  relates  to  the  exclusion  of  foreigners,  hereafter  arriving 


108  HARTFORD  CONVENTION. 

ia  the  United  States,  from  the  capacity  of  holding  offices  of  trust,  honor, 
or  profit. 

That  the  stock  of  population  already  in  these  states,  is  amply  sufficient 
to  render  this  nation  in  due  time  sufficiently  great  and  powerful,  is  not  a 
controvertible  question — nor  will  it  be  seriously  pretended,  that  the  na- 
tional deficiency  in  wisdom,  arts,  science,  arms,  or  virtue,  needs  to  be 
replenished  from  foreign  countries.  Still,  it  is  agreed  that  a  liberal  poUcy 
should  offi^r  the  rights  of  hospitality,  and  the  choice  of  settlement,  to 
those  who  are  disposed  to  visit  the  country.  But  why  admit  to  a  partici- 
pation in  the  government  aliens  who  were  no  parties  to  the  compact — who 
are  ignorant  of  the  nature  of  our  institutions,  and  have  no  stake  in  the 
welfare  of  the  country,  but  what  is  recent  and  transitory  1  It  is  surely  a 
privilege  sufficient,  to  admit  them,  after  due  probation,  to  become  citizens, 
for  all  but  political  purposes.  To  extend  it  beyond  these  limits,  is  to  en- 
courage foreigners  to  come  to  these  states  as  candidates  for  preferment. 
The  Convention  forbear  to  express  their  opinion  upon  the  inauspicious 
effects  which  have  already  resulted  to  the  honor  and  peace  of  this  nation, 
from  this  misplaced  and  indiscriminate  liberality. 

The  last  amendment  respects  the  limitation  of  tlie  office  of  President 
to  a  single  constitutional  term,  and  his  elligibility  from  the  same  state 
two  terms  in  succession. 

Upon  this  topic  it  is  superfluous  to  dilate.  The  love  of  power  is  a 
principle  in  the  human  heart,  which  too  often  impels  to  the  use  of  all 
practicable  means  to  prolong  its  duration.  The  office  of  President  has 
charms  and  attractions  which  operate  as  powerful  incentives  to  this 
passion.  The  first  and  most  natural  exertion  of  a  vast  patronage  is 
directed  towards  the  security  of  a  new  election.  The  interest  of  the 
country,  the  welfare  of  the  people,  even  honest  fame  and  respect  for  the 
opinion  of  posterity,  are  secondary  considerations.  All  the  engines  of 
intrigue,  all  the  means  of  cormption,  are  likely  to  be  employed  for  this 
object.  A  president,  whose  political  career  is  limited  to  a  single  elec- 
tion, may  find  no  other  interest  than  will  be  promoted  by  making  it 
glorious  to  himself,  and  beneficial  to  his  countiy.  But  the  hope  of  re- 
election is  prolific  of  temptations,  under  which  these  magnanimous  mo- 
tives are  deprived  of  their 'principal  force.  The  repeated  election  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States  from  any  one  state,  affords  inducements 
and  means  for  intrigue,  which  tend  to  create  an  undue  local  influence, 
and  to  establish  the  domination  of  particular  states.  The  justice, 
therefore,  of  securing  to  every  state  a  fair  and  equal  chance  for  the 
election  of  this  officer  from  its  own  citizens,  is  apparent,  and  this  object 
will  be  essentially  promoted  by  preventing  an  election  from  the  same 
state  twice  in  succession. 

Such  is  the  general  view  which  this  Convention  has  thought  proper 
to  submit,  of  uie  situation  of  these  states,  of  their  dangers lincl  their 
duties.  Most  of  tlie  subjects  which  it  embraces  have  separately  re- 
ceived an  ample  and  luminous  investigation,  by  the  great  and  able 
assertors  of  the  rights  of  their  country,  m  the  National  Legislature; 
and  nothing  more  could  be  attempted  on  this  occasion,  than  a  digest  of 
general  principles,  and  of  recommendations,  suited  to  the  present  state 
of  public  affairs.  The  peculiar  difficulty  and  delicacy  of  performing, 
even  this  undertaking,  will  be  appreciated  by  all  who  think  seriously 
upon  the  crisis.    Negociations  for  peace  are  at  this  hour  supposed  to 


HARTFORD  CONVENTION.  109 

be  pending,  the  issue  of  which  must  be  deeply  interesting  to  all.  No 
measures  should  be  adopted,  which  might  unfavorably  affect  that  issue ;  * 
none  which  should  embarrass  the  Administration,  if  their  professed 
desire  for  peace  is  sincere ;  and  none,  which  on  supposition  of  their 
insincerity,  should  afford  tliem  pretexts  for  prolonging  the  war,  or  re- 
lieving themselves  from  the  responsibility  of  a  dishonorable  peace.  It 
is  also  devoutly  to  be  wished  that  an  occasion  may  be  afforded  to  all 
friends  of  the  country,  of  all  parties,  and  in  all  places,  to  pause  and 
consider  the  awful  state  to  which  pernicious  counsels,  and  olind  pas- 
sions, have  brought  this  people.  The  number  of  those  who  perceive, 
and  who  are  ready  to  retrace  errors,  must,  it  is  believed,  be  yet  sufficient 
to  redeem  the  nation.  It  is  necessary  to  rally  and  unite  them  by  the  as- 
surance that  no  hostility  to  the  constitution  is  meditated,  and  to  obtain 
their  aid  in  placing  it  under  guardians,  who  alone  can  save  it  from 
destruction.  Should  this  fortunate  change  be  effected,  the  hope  of  hap- 
piness and  honor  may  once  more  dispel  the  surrounding  gloom.  Our 
nation  may  yet  be  great,  our  union  durable.  But  should  this  prospect 
be  utterly  hopeless,'  the  time  will  not  have  been  lost,  which  shall  have 
ripened  a  general  sentiment  of  the  necessity  of  more  mighty  efforts  to 
rescue  from  ruin,  at  least  some  portion  of  our  beloved  country. 

TJierefore  Resolved,  That  it  be,  and  hereby  is,  recommended  to  the 
Legislatures  of  the  several  states  represented  in  this  Convention,  to 
adopt  all  such  measures  as  may  be  necessary  effectually  to  protect  the 
citizens  of  said  states  from  the  operation  and  effects  of  all  acts  which 
have  been  or  may  be  passed  by  the  Congress  of  the  United  States, 
which  shall  contam  provision,  subjecting  the  militia  or  other  citizens  to 
forcible  drafts,-  conscriptions,  or  impressments,  not  authorized  by  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States. 

Resolved,  That  it  be  and  hereby  is  recommended  to  the  said  legisla- 
tures, to  authorize  an  immediate  and  earnest  application  to  be  made  to 
the  government  of  the  United  States,  requesting  their  consent  to  some 
arrangement,  whereby  the  said  states  may,  separately  or  in  concert,  be 
empowered  to  assume  upon  themselves  the  defence  of  their  territory 
against  the  enemy ;  and  a  reasonable  portion  of  the  taxes,  collected 
within  said  states,  may  be  paid  into  the  respective  treasuries  thereof, 
and  appropriated  to  the  payment  of  the  balance  due  said  states,  and  to 
the  future  defence  of  the  same.  The  amount  so  paid  into  the  said  trea- 
suries to  be  credited,  and  the  disbursements  made  as  aforesaid  to  be 
charged  to  tlie  United  States. 

Resolved,  That  it  be,  and  it  hereby  is,  recommended  to  tlie  legisla- 
tures of  the  aforesaid  states,  to  pass  laws  (where  it  has  not  already  been 
done)  authorizing  the  governors  or  commanders  in  chief  of  their  militia 
to  make  detachments  from  the  same,  or  to  form  voluntary  corps,  as  shall 
be  most  convenient  and  conformable  to  their  constitutions,  and  to  cause 
the  same  to  be  well  armed,  equipped  and  disciplined,  and  held  in  readi- 
ness for  service;  and  upon  the  request  of  the  governor  of  either  of  the 
other  states,  to  employ  the  whole  of  such  detachment  or  corps,  as  well 
as  the  regular  forces  of  the  state,  or  such  part  tliereof  as  may  be  requir- 
ed and  can  be  spared  consistenly  with  the  safety  of  the  state,  in  assist- 
ing the  state,  making  such  request  to  repel  any  invasion  thereof  which 
shall  be  made  or  attempted  by  the  public  enemy. 

Resolved,  That  the  following  amendments  of  the  constitution  of  the 
United  States  be  recommended  to  the  states  represented  as  aforesaid, 
10 


110  HARTFORD  CONVENTION. 

to  be  proposed  by  them  for  adoption  by  the  state  legislatures,  and,  in 
such  cases  as  may  be  deemed  expedient,  by  a  convention  chosen  by  the 
people  of  each  state. 

And  it  is  fiirther  recommended  that  the  said  states  shall  persevere  in 
their  efforts  to  obtain  such  amendments,  until  the  same  shall  be  effected. 

Pirst.  Representatives  and  direct  taxes  shall  be  apportioned  among 
the  several  states  which  may  be  included  within  this  tJnion,  according 
to  their  respective  numbers  of  free  persons^  including  those  bound  to 
serve  for  a  term  of  years,  and  including  Indians  not  taxed,  and  all  other 
persons. 

Second.  No  new  state  shall  be  admitted  into  the  Union  by  Con- 
gress in  virtue  of  the  power  granted  by  the  constitution,  without  the 
concurrence  of  two  thirds  of  both  houses. 

Third.  Congress  shall  not  have  power  to  lay  any  embargo  on  the 
ships  or  vessels  of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  in  the  ports  or  har- 
bors thereof,  for  more  than  sixty  days. 

Fourth.  Congress  shall  not  have  power,  without  the  concurrence  of 
two  thirds  of  both  houses,  to  interdict  the  commercial  intercourse  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  any  foreign  nation  or  the  dependencies 
thereof. 

Fifth.  Congress  shall  not  make  or  declare  war,  or  authorize  acts  of 
hostility  against  any  foreign  nation,  without  the  concurrence  of  two 
thirds  of  both  houses,  except  such  acts  of  hostility  be  in  defence  of  the 
territories  of  the  United  States  when  actually  invaded. 

Sixth.  No  person  who  shall  hereafter  be  naturalized,  shall  be  eligi- 
ble as  a  member  of  the  Senate  or  House  of  Representatives  of  the  Unit- 
ed States,  nor  capable  of  holding  any  civfl  office  under  the  authority  of 
the  United  States. 

Seventh.  The  same  person  shall  not  be  elected  president  of  the  Unit- 
ed States  a  second  time ;  nor  shall  the  president  be  elected  from  the 
same  state  two  terms  in  succession. 

Resolved.  That  if  the  application  of  these  states  to  the  government 
of  the  United  States,  recommended  in  a  foregoing  resolution,  should  be 
unsuccessful,  and  peace  should  not  be  concluded,  and  the  defence  of 
these  states  should  be  neglected,  as  it  has  been  since  the  commencement 
of  the  war,  it  will  in  the  opinion  of  this  convention  be  expedient  for  the 
legislatures  of  the  several  states  to  appoint  delegates  to  another  conven- 
tion, to  meet  at  Boston,  in  the  state  of  Massachusetts,  on  the  third 
Thursday  of  June  next,  with  such  powers  and  instructions  as  the  exi- 
gency of  a  crisis  so  momentous  may  require. 

Resolved^  That  the  Hon.  George  Cabot,  the  Hon.  Chauncey  Good, 
rich,  and  the  Hon,  Daniel  Lyman,  or  any  two  of  them,  be  authorized  to 
call  another  meeting  of  this  convention,  to  be  holden  in  Boston,  at  any 
time  before  new  delegates  shall  be  chosen,  as  recommended  in  tlie  above 
resolution,  if  in  their  judgment  the  situation  of  the  country  shall  urgent- 
ly require  it. 
George  Cabot,  Nathan  Dane,  William  Prescott,  Harrison  Gray  Otis, 

Timothy  Bigelow,  Joshua  Thomas,  Samuel  Sumner  Wilde,  Joaeph 

Lyman,  Stephen  Longfellow,  Jr.,  Daniel  Waldo,  Hodijah  Baylies, 

GJeorge  Bliss,  Chauncey  Groodrich,  James  Hillhouse,  John  Treaclwell, 

Zephaniah  Swifl,  Nathaniel  Smith,  Calvin  Goddard,  Roger  Minott 

Sherman,  Daniel  Lyman,  Samuel  Ward,  Edward  Manton,  Benjamin 

Hazard,  Benjamin  West,  Mills  Oicott,  Wm.  Hall,  Jr.  of  Vermont. 
Hartford,  January  4th,  1815. 


SPEECHES 


OF 


MESSRS.  HAYNE  AND  WEBSTER. 


Extracts  from  the  Speeches  of  Hon.  Robert  Y.  Hayne,  of  Soutli 
Carolina,  and  Hon.  Daniel  Webster,  of  Massachusetts,  delivered 
in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  Jan.  21  and  26,  1830. 


On  Tuesday,  December  29,  1829,  Mr.  Foot,  of  Connecticut,  submit- 
ted to  the  Senate  the  following  resolution : 

Resolved^  That  the  committee  on  public  lands  be  instructed  to  inquire 
into  the  expediency  of  limiting  for  a  certain  period  the  sales  of  the  pub- 
lic lands  to  such  lands  only  as  have  heretofore  been  offered  for  sale,  and 
are  subject  to  entry  at  the  minimum  price.  And  also,  whether  the  office 
of  Surveyor  General  may  not  be  abolished  without  detriment  to  the  pub- 
lic interest. 

After  discussion  on  this  resolution  by  several  senators,  Mr.  Webster 
replied  to  some  remarks  of  Mr.  Hayne  on  the  20th  of  Jeinuary,  to  which 
the  latter  made  a  rejoinder  on  the  following  day. 

"  Who  then,  Mr.  President,  are  the  true  friends  of  the  Union  *?  Those 
who  would  confine  the  federal  government  strictly  within  the  limits 
pre.scrihed  by  t.hp.  nnnsjt.itntinn;  who  would  pi-e.serve  to  the  states  and 
the  people  all  powers  not  expressly  delegatecl ;  who  would  make  this  a 
federal  and  not  a  national  Union,  and  who,  administering  the  govern- 
ment in  a  spirit  of  equal  justice,  would  make  it  a  blessing  and  not  a 
curse.  And  who  are  its  enemies  1  Those  who  are  in  favor  of  con- 
solidation — who  are  constantly  stealing  power  from  the  states,  and 
adding  strength  to  the  federal  government.  Who,  assuming  an  un- 
warrantable jiu-isdiction  over  the  states  and  the  people,  undertake  to 
regulate  the  whole  industry  and  capital  of  the  country.  But,  sir,  of  all 
descriptions  of  men,  I  consider  those  as  the  worst  enemies  of  the  IJnion, 
who  sacrifice  the  equal  rights  which  belong  to  every  member  of  the 
confederacy,  to  combinations  of  interested  majorities,  for*  personal  or 
IDolitical  objects.  But  tlie  gentleman  apprehends  no  evil  from  the  de^ 
pendance  of  the  states  on  the  federal  government;  he  can  see  no  danger 
of  corruption  from  the  influence  of  money  or  of  patronage.  Sir,  I 
know  that  it  is  supposed  to  be  a  wise  saying,  -that  patronage  is  a  source 
of  weakness,'  and  inlsupport  of  tliat  maxim,  it  has  been  said,  that 
'  every  ten  appointments  makes  a  hundred  enemies.'  But  I  am  rather 
inclined  to  tliink,  with  the  eloquent  and  sagacious  orator  now  reposing 
on  his  laurels  on  the  banks  of  tlie  Roanoke,  that  *  tlie  power  of  confer- 
ing  favors  creates  a  crowd  of  dependants ;"  he  gave  a  forcible  illus- 
tration of  the  truth  of  tlie  remark  when  he  told  us  of  the  effect  of  hold- 
ing up  the  savory  morsel  to  the  eager  eyes  of  the  hungry  hounds  gathered 


112  MR.  HAYNE'S  SPEECH. 

around  his  door.  It  mattered  not  whether  the  gift  was  bestowed  on 
Towser  or  Sweetlips,  '  Tray,  Blanch,  or  Sweetheart,'  while  held  in 
suspense,  they  were  all  governed  by  a  nod,  and  when  the  morsel  was 
bestowed,  the  expectation  of  tlie  favors  of  tomorrow,  kept  up  the  sub- 
jection of  today. 

"  The  senator  from  Massachusetts,  in  denouncing  what  he  is  pleased  to 
call  the  Carolina  doctrine,  has  attempted  to  throw  ridicule  upon  the  idea 
that  a  state  has  any  constitutional  remedy,  by  tlie  exercise  of  its  sove- 
reign authority,  against '  a  gross,  palpable,  and  deliberate  violation  of  the 
constitution.'  He  calls  it  '  an  idle  or  *  a  ridiculous  notion,'  or  some- 
thing to  that  effect,  and  added,  that  it  would  make  the  Union  '  a  mere 
rope  of  sand.'  Now,  sir,  as  the  gentleman  has  not  condescended  to 
enter  into  any  examination  of  the  question,  and  has  been  satisfied  with 
throwing  tlie  weight  of  his  authority  into  the  scale,  I  do  not  deem  it 
necessary  to  do  more  than  throw  into  the  opposite  scale  the  authority 
on  which  South  Carolina  relies,  and  there,  for  tlie  present,  I  am  per- 
fectly willing  to  leave  the  conti'oversy.  The  South  Carolina  doctrme, 
that  is  to  say,  the  doctrine  contained  in  an  exposition  reported  bv  a 
committee  of  the  legislature  in  December,  1828,  and  published  by  tneir 
autliority,  is  the  good  old  republican  doctrine  of  '98 — the  doctrine  of 
the  celebrated  '  Virginia  Resolutions '  of  that  year,  and  of  '  Madison's 
Report'  of '99." 

Aft^r  quoting  the  Kentucky  Resolutions  of  1798,  Mr.  Madison's 
Report,  and  the  opinions  of  Mr,  Jefferson  and  others  on  slate  rights, 
&c.,  Mr.  H.  concluded  as  follows : 

"  Thus,  it  will  be  seen,  Mr.  President,  that  the  South  Carolina  doc- 
trine is  the  republican  doctrine  of  '98 ;  that  it  was  promulgated  by  the 
fathers  of  the  faith — that  it  was  maintained  by  Virginia  and  Kentucky 
in  the  worst  of  times — that  it  constituted  the  very  pivot  on  which  the 

political  revolution  of  that  day  tTimcd  that  it  cinbracca  tho  very  prin- 
ciples, the  triumph  of  which,  at  that  time,  saved  the  constitution  at  its 
last  gasp,  and  which  New  England  statesmen  were  not  unwilling  to 
adopt,  when  they  believed  themselves  to  be  the  victims  of  unconstitu- 
tional legislation.  Sir,  as  to  the  doctrine  that  the  federal  government 
is  the  exclusive  judge  of  the  extent  as  well  as  the  limitations  of  its 
powers,  it  seems  to  me  to  be  utterly  subversive  of  the  sovereignty  and 
independence  of  the  states.  It  makes  but  little  difference,  in  my  esti- 
mation, whether  Congress  or  tlie  supreme  court  are  invested  with  this 
power.  If  the  federal  government,  in  all  or  any  of  its  departments, 
are  to  prescribe  the  limits  of  its  own  authority,  and  the  states  are  bound 
to  submit  to  the  decision,  and  are  not  to  be  allowed  to  examine  and 
decide  for  tliemselves,  when  the  barriers  of  the  constitution  shall  be 
overleaped,  this  is  practically  a  '  government  without  limitation  of  pow- 
ers.' The  states  are  at  once  reduced  to  mere  petty  corporations,  and 
the  people  are  entirely  at  your  mercy.  I  have  but  one  word  more  to  add. 
In  all  the  efforts  that  have  been  made  by  South  Carolina,  to  resist  the 
uncx)nstitutional  laws  which  Congress  has  extended  over  them,  she  has 
kept  steadily  in  view  the  preservation  of  the  Union,  by  the  only  means 
by  which  she  believes  it  can  be  long  preserved — a  nrm,  manly,  and 
steady  resistance  against  usurpation.  The  measures  of  the  federal 
government  have,  it  is  true,  prostrated  her  interests,  and  will  soon  in- 
volve the  whole  South  in  irretrievable  ruin.    But  even  this  evil,  great 


MR.  WEBSTER'S  SPEECH.  113 

as  it  is,  is  not  the  chief  ground  of  our  complaints.  It  is  the  principle 
involved  in  the  contest,  a  principle  which,  substituting  tlie  discretion  of 
.  Congress  for  the  limitations  of  the  Constitution,  brings  the  states  and 
the  peoplfc  to  the  feet  of  tlie  federal  government,  and  leaves  them  nothing 
they  can  call  their  own.  Sir,  if  the  measures  of  tlie  federal  governmenr 
were  less  oppressive,  we  should  still  strive  eigainst  this  usuiyation.  The 
South  is  acting  on  a  principle  she  has  always  held  sacred-— resistance 
to  unauthorized  taxation.  These,  sir,  are  the  principles  which  induced 
the  immorted  Hampden  to  resist  the  payment  of  a  tax  of  twenty  shil- 
lings. Would  twenty  sliillings  have  ruined  his  fortune  1  No  !  but  the 
payment  of  half  twenty  shillings,  on  the  principle  on  which  it  was 
demanded,  would  have  made  him  a  slave.  Sir,  if  in  acting  on  these 
high  motives — if  animated  by  that  ardent  love  of  liberty  which  has 
always  been  tlie  most  prominent  trait  in  the  Southern  character — we 
should  be  hurried  beyond  the  bounds  of  a  cold  and  calculating  prudence, 
who  is  there,  with  one  noble  and  generous  sentiment  in  his  bosom,  that 
would  not  be  disposed,  in  the  language  of  Burke,  to  exclaim,  '  You  must 
pardon  something  to  the  spirit  of  litoty !' " 


EXTRACTS  FROM  MR.  WEBSTER'S  SPEECH  IN  REPLY 
TO  MR.  HAYNE. 

"  I  must  now  beg  to  ask,  sir,  whence  is  this  supposed  right  of  the 
states  derived  1  where  do  they  find  the  power  to  interfere  with  the  laws 
of  the  Union  1  Sir,  the  opinion  wliich  the  honorable  gentleman  main- 
tains is  a  notion,  founded  in  a  total  misapprehension,  in  my  judgnient, 
of  the  origin  of  this  government,  and  of  the  foundation  on  which  it 
stands.  I  hold  it  to  a  popular  government,  erected  by  the  people ;  those 
who  administer  it  responsible  to  the  people  ;  and  itself  capable  of  being 
eimended  and  modified,  just  as  the  people  may  choose  it  should  be.  It 
is  as  popular,  just  as  truly  emanating  from  the  people,  as  the  state 
governments.  It  is  created  for  one  purpose ;  tlie  state  governments  for 
another.  It  has  its  own  powers ;  they  have  theirs.  There  is  no  more 
authority  with  them  to  arrest  the  operation  of  a  law  of  Congress  than 
with  Congress  to  arrest  their  laws.  We  are  here  to  administer  a  Con- 
stitution emanating  immediately  from  the  people,  and  trusted,  by  them, 
to  our  administration.  It  is  not  the  creature  of  the  state  governments. 
It  is  of  no  moment  to  the  argument  that  certain  acts  of  the  state  legisla- 
tures are  necessary  to  fill  our  seats  in  tliis  body.  That  is  not  one  of 
their  original  state  powers,  a  part  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  state.  It  is 
a  duty  which  the  people,  by  the  constitution  itself,  have  imposed  on  the 
state  legislatures ;  and  which  they  might  have  left  to  be  performed  else- 
where, if  they  had  seen  fit.  So  they  have  left  the  choice  of  President, 
with  electors ;  but  all  this  does  not  affect  tlie  proposition,  that  this  go- 
vernment, President,  Senate,  and  House  of  Representatives,  is  a  popu- 
lar government.  It  leaves  it  still  all  its  popular  character.  The 
governor  of  a  state  (in  some  of  the  states)  is  chosen,  not  directly  by  the 
people,  but  by  tliose  who  are  chosen  by  the  people,  for  the  puipose  of 


114  MR.  WEBSTER'S  SPEECH. 

performing,  among  other  duties,  that  of  electing  a  governor.  Is  the  so- 
verementof  a  state,  on  that  account,  not  a  popular  government  1  This 
^vernment,  sir,  is  the  independent  offsprmg  of  the  popular  will.  It 
IS  not  tlie  creature  of  state  legislatures ;  nay,  more,  it  the  whole  truth 
must  be  told,  the  people  brought  it  into  existence,  established  it,  and  have 
hitherto  supported  it,  for  tlie  very  purpose,  amongst  others,  of  imposing 
certain  salutary  restraints  on  stiite  sovereign  ties.  The  states  cannot 
now  make  war ;  they  cannot  contract  alliances ;  they  cannot  make 
each  for  itself,  separate  regulations  of  commerce ;  they  cannot  lay  im- 
posts ;  they  cannot  coin  money.  If  this  constitution,  sir,  be  the  creature 
of  state  legislatures,  it  must  be  admitted  that  it  has  obtained  a  strange 
control  over  tlie  volitions  of  its  creators. 

The  people,  then,  sir,  erected  this  government.  They  gave  it  a  con- 
stitution, and  in  that  constitution  they  have  enumerated  the  powers 
which  they  bestow  on  it.  They  have  made  it  a  limited  government. 
They  have  defined  its  authority.  They  have  restrained  it  to  the  exer- 
cise of  such  powers  as  are  granted  j  and  all  others  they  declare  are 
reserved  to  the  states  or  the  people.  But,  sir,  they  have  not  stopped 
here.  If  they  had,  they  would  have  accomplished  but  half  their  work. 
No  definition  can  be  so  clear  as  to  avoid  possibility  of  doubt;  no  limi- 
tation so  precise,  as  to  exclude  all  uncertainty.  Who,  then,  shall  con- 
strue this  grant  of  the  people  1  Who  shall  interpret  their  will  where  it 
may  be  supposed  they  have  left  it  doubtful  1  With  whom  do  they  re- 
pose tliis  ultimate  right  of  deciding  on  the  powers  of  the  government  ^ 
Sir,  they  have  settled  all  this  in  the  fullest  manner.  They  have  left  it 
with  the  government  itself,  in  its  appropriate  branches.  Sir,  the 
very  chief  end,  the  main  design,  for  which  the  whole  constitution 
was  framed  and  adopted,  was  to  establish  a  government  that  should  not 
be  obliged  to  act  through  state  agency,  or  depend  on  state  opinion  and 
state  discretion.  The  people  have  had  quite  enough  of  that  kind  of 
government,  under  the  confederacy.  Under  that  system,  the  legal  ac- 
tion— the  application  of  law  to  individuals,  belong:ed  exclusively  to  the 
states.  Congress  could  only  recommend — their  acts  were  not  of  bind- 
ing force,  till  the  states  had  adopted  and  sanctioned  them.  Are  we  in 
that  condition  still  1  Are  we  yet  at  the  mercy  of  state  discretion,  and 
state  construction  ?  Sir,  if  we  are,  then  vain  will  be  our  attempt  to 
maintain  the  constitution  under  which  we  sit. 

But,  sir,  the  people  have  wisely  provided,  in  the  constitution  itself,  a 
proper,  suitable  mode  and  tribunal  for  settling  questions  of  constitution- 
al law.  There  are,  in  the  constitution,  grants  of  powers  to  Con2:resa  ; 
and  restrictions  on  these  powers.  There  are,  also,  prohibitions  oi)  the 
states.  Some  authority  must,  therefore,  necessarily  exist,  havin<::the 
ultimate  jurisdiction  to  fix  and  ascertain  the  interpretation  of  these 
grants,  restrictions,  and  prohibitions.  The  constitution  has  itself 
pointed  out,  ordained,  and  established  that  authority.  How  has  it  ar- 
a)mplishcd  this  great  and  essential  end  7  By  declaring,  sir,  that  "  t/ie 
Constitution  and  Uie  laws  oft  tite  United  States  made  in  pursuance 
thereof,  shallhe  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  anything  in  the  constilu- 
iAon  or  laws  af  any  staff,  to  the  contrary  7iotwiihslandi7ig." 

This,  sir,  was  the  first  i^rcat  step.  By  this,  the  supremacy  of  the 
constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States  is  declared.  The  people  so 
will  it.  No  state  law  is  tf)  b  e  valid,  which  comes  in  conflict  witli  the 
aonstitution,  or  any  law  of  Uie  United  States.     But  who  shall  decide 


MR.  WEBSTER'S  SPEECH.  115 

this  question  of  interference?  To  whom  lies  the  last  appeal?  This, 
sir,  the  constitution  itself  decides,  also,  by  declaring:,  ^''that  the  judicial 
-power  shall  extend  to  all  cases  arising  under  tJie  constitution  and  laws 
of  the  United  States"  These  two  provisions,  sir,  cover  the  whole 
^ound.  They  are  in  truth,  the  key-stone  of  the  arch.  Witli  these,  it 
is  a  constitution ;  without  them  it  is  a  confederacy.  In  pursuance  of 
these  clear  and  express*  provisions,  Congress  established,  at  its  very 
first  session,  in  the  judicial  act,  a  mode  for  carrying  them  into  full  effect, 
and  for  bringing  all  questions  of  constitutional  power  to  the  final  deci- 
sion of  the  Supreme  Court.  It  then,  sir.  became  a  government.  It  then 
had  the  means  of  self-protection ;  and,  but  for  this,  it  would  in  all  proba- 
bility have  been  now  among  things  which  are  past.  Having  consti- 
tutea  the  government,  and  declared  its  powers,  the  people  have  furtlier 
said,  that  since  somebody  must  decide  on  the  extent  of  these  powers, 
the  government  shall  itself  decide;  subject,  always,  like  otlier  popular 
governments,  to  its  responsibility  to  the  people.  And  now,  sir,  I  repeat, 
how  is  it  tliat  a  state  legislature  acquires  any  power  to  interfere  ?  Who 
or  what  gives  them  the  right  to  say  to  the  people,  "  We,  who  are  your 
agents  and  servants  for  one  purpose,  will  undertake  to  decide,  that  your 
other  agents  and  servants,  appointed  by  you  for  another  purpose,  have 
transcended  the  authority  you  gave  them !"  The  reply  would  be.  I 
think,  not  impertinent — "  Who  made  you  a  judge  over  another's  ser- 
vants ?  To  their  own  masters  they  stand  or  fall." 

Sir,  I  deny  this  power  of  state  Legislatures  altogether.  It  cannot 
stand  the  test  of  examination.  Gentlemen  may  say  that,  in  an  extreme 
case,  a  state  government  might  protect  the  people  from  intolerable 
oppression.  Sir,  in  such  a  case,  the  people  might  protect  themselves,  with- 
out the  aid  of  the  state  governments.  Such  a  case  warrants  revolution. 
It  must  make,  when  it  comes,  a  law  for  itself  A  nullifying  act  of  a 
state  legislature  cannot  alter  the  case  nor  make  resistance  any  more 
lawful.  In  maintaining  these  sentiments,  sir,  I  am  but  asserting  the 
rig;hts  of  the  people.  I  state  what  they  have  declared,  and  insist  on 
their  right  to  declare  it.  They  have  chosen  to  repose  this  power  in  the 
general  government,  and  I  think  itmy  duty  to  support  it,  like  other 
constitutional  powers. 

For  myself,  sir,  I  do  not  admit  the  jurisdiction  of  South  Carolina,  or 
any  other  state,  to  prescribe  my  conistitutional  duty,  or  to  settle,  between 
me  and  the  people,  the  validity  of  laws  of  Congress,  for  which  I  have 
voted.  I  decline  her  umpirage..  I  have  not  sworn  to  support  the  con- 
stitution according  to  her  construction  of  its  clauses.  I  have  not  stipu- 
lated, by  my  oath  of  office,  or  otherwise,  to  come  under  any  responsi- 
bility, except  to  the  people,  and  those  whom  they  have  appointed  to  pass 
upon  the  question,  whether  laws,  supported  by  my  votes,  conform  to 
the  constitution  of  the  country.  And,  sir,  if  we  look  to  the  general  na- 
ture of  the  case,  could  any  thing  have  been  more  prq>osterous,  than  to 
make  a  government  for  the  whole  union,  and  yet  leave  its  powers  sub- 
ject, not  to  one  interpretation,  but  to  thirteen  or  twenty-four  interpreta- 
tions? Instead  of  one  tribunal,  established  by  all,  responsible  to  all, 
with  power  to  decide  for  all — shall  constitutional  questions  be  left  to 
four  and  twenty  popular  bodies,  each  at  liberty,  too,  to  give  a  new 
constniction  on  every  new  election  of  its  own  members  1  Would  any 
tiling,  with  such  a  principle  in  it,  or  rather  with  such  a  destitution  of  all 
principle,  be  fit  to  be  called,  a  government  ?    No,  sir.     It  should  not  be 


116  MR.  WEBSTER'S  SPEECH. 

denominated  a  constitution.  It  should  be  called,  rather,  a  collection  of 
topics  for  everlasting  controversy ;  heads  of  debate  for  a  disputatious 
people.  It  would  not  be  a  government.  It  would  not  be  adequate  to 
any  good,  nor  fit  for  any  country  to  live  under.  To  avoid  all  possi- 
bility of  being  misunderstood,  allow  me  to  repeat  again  in  the  fullest 
manner,  that  I  claim  no  powers  for  the  government  by  forced  or  un- 
fair construction.  I  admit  that  it  is  a  government  of  strictly  limited 
powers;  of  enumerated,  specified,  and  particularised  powers;  and 
that  whatsoever  is  not  granted,  is  withheld.  But  notwithstanding 
all  this,  and  however  the  grant  of  powers  may  be  expressed,  its  limit 
and  extent  may  yet  in  some  cases,  admit  of  doubt ;  and  the  general 
government  would  be  good  for  nothing,  it  would  be  incapable  of  long- 
existing,  if  some  mode  had  not  been  provided,  in  which  those  doubts, 
as  they  should  arise,  might  be  peaceably,  but  authoritatively,  solved. 

Mr.  President,  I  have  thus  stated  the  reasons  of  my  dissent  to  the 
doctrines  which  have  been  advanced  and  maintained.  I  am  conscious 
of  having  detained  you  and  the  Senate  too  long.  I  was  drawn  into  the 
debate,  with  no  previous  deliberation,  such  as  is  suited  to  the  discussion 
of  so  grave  and  important  a  subject.  But  it  is  a  subject  of  which  my 
heart  is  full,  and  I  have  not  been  willing  to  suppress  the  utterance  of 
its  spontaneous  sentiments.  I  cannot  even  now  persuade  myself  to 
relinquish  it,  without  expressing,  once  more,  my  deep  conviction,  that 
since  it  respects  nothing  less  than  the  union  of  the  states,  it  is  of  most 
vital  and  essential  importance  to  the  public  happiness.  I  profess,  sir, 
in  my  career,  hitherto,  to  have  kept  steadily  in  view  the  prosperity  and 
honor  of  the  whole  country,  and  the  preservation  of  our  Federal  Union. 
It  is  to  that  Union  we  owe  our  safety  at  home,  and  our  consideration 
and  dignity  abroad.  It  is  to  that  Union  that  we  are  chiefly  indebted  to 
whatever  makes  us  most  proud  of  our  countiy.  That  Union  we  reached 
only  by  the  discipline  of  our  virtues  in  the  severe  school  of  adversity. 
It  had  its  origin  in  the  necessities  of  disordered  finance,  prostrate  com- 
merce, and  ruined  credit.  Under  its  benign  influences,  these  great 
interests  immediately  awoke,  as  from  the  dead,  and  sprang  forth  with 
newness  of  life.  Every  year  of  its  duration  has  teemed  with  fresh 
proofs  of  its  utility  and  its  blessings  ;  and,  although  our  territory  has 
stretched  out  wider  and  wider,  and  our  population  spread  farther  and 
farther,  they  have  not  outrun  its  protection  or  its  benefits.  It  has  been 
to  us  all  a  copious  fountain  of  national,  social,  and  personal  happiness. 
I  have  not  allowed  myself,  sir,  to  look  beyond  the  Union,  to  see  what 
might  be  hidden  in  the  dark  recess  behind.  I  have  not  coolly  weighed 
the  chances  of  preserving  liberty  when  the  bonds  that  unite  us  together 
shall  be  broken  asunder.  I  have  not  accustomed  myself  to  hang  over 
the  precipice  of  disunion,  to  see  whether,  with  my  short  sight,  I  can 
fathom  the  depth  of  the  abyss  below  ;  nor  could  I  regard  him  as  a  safe 
counsellor  in  the  affairs  of  this  government,  whose  thoughts  should  be 
mainly  bent  on  considering,  not  how  the  Union  should  be  best  preserved, 
but  how  tolerable  might  be  the  condition  of  the  people  when  it  shall  be 
broken  up  and  destroyed.  While  the  Union  lasts,  we  have  hi^h,  exciting, 
gratifying  prospects  spread  out  before  us,  for  us  and  our  children.  Be- 
yond that  I  seek  not  to  penetrate  the  veil.  God  grant  that,  in  my  day 
at  least,  that  curtain  may  not  rise.  God  grant  that  on  my  vision  never 
may  be  opened  what  lies  behind.  When  my  eyes  shall  be  turned  to 
behold,  for  the  last  time,  the  sun  in  Heaven,  may  I  not  see  him  shining 


SOUTH  CAROLINA  ORDINANCE.  117 

on  the  broken  and  dishonored  fragments  of  a  once  glorious  Union ;  on 
states  dissevered,  discordant,  belligerent ;  on  a  land  rent  with  civil  feuds, 
or  drenched,  it  may  be,  in  fraternal  blood !  Let  their  last  feeble  and 
lingering  glance  rather  behold  the  gorgeous  ensign  of  the  republic,  now 
known  and  honored  throughout  the  earth,  still  full  high  advanced,  its 
arms  and  trophies  streaming  in  their  original  lustre,  not  a  stripe  erased 
or  polluted,  nor  a  single  star  obscured,  bearing  for  its  motto  no  such 
miserable  interrogatory  as,  WAat  is  all  this  toorth  ?  nor  those  other 
words  of  delusion  and  folly.  Liberty  first  and  Union  afterwards — but 
every  where,  spread  all  over  in  characters  of  living  light,  blazing  on  all 
its  ample  folds,  as  they  float  over  the  sea  and  over  the  land,  and  in  every 
wind  under  the  whole  Heavens,  that  other  sentiment,  dear  to  every 
true  American  heart — "  Liberty  and  Union,  now  and  for  ever,  one  and 
inseparable !" 


SOUTH  CAROLINA  ORDINANCE. 

PASSED  IN  CONVENTION,  AT  COLUMBIA,  NOV.  24,  1832. 

An  Ordinance  to  nullify  certain  acts  of  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  purporting  to  be  the  laws  giving  duties  and  imposts  on  the 
importation  of  foreign  commodities. 

Whereas  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  by  various  acts  purport- 
ing to  be  acts  laying  duties  and  imposts  on  foreign  imports,  but  in  re- 
ality intended  for  the  protection  of  domestic  manufactures,  and  the  giv- 
ing of  bounties  to  classes  and  individuals  engaged  in  particular  employ- 
ment, at  the  expense  and  to  the  injury  and  oppression  of  other  classes 
and  individuals,  and  by  wholly  exempting  from  taxation  certain  fo- 
reign commodities,  such  as  are  not  produced  or  manufactured  in  the 
United  States,  to  aiford  a  pretext  for  imposing  higher  and  excessive 
duties  on  articles  similar  to  those  intended  to  be  protected,  hath  exceed- 
ed its  just  powers  imder  the  constitution,  which  confers  on  it  no  autho- 
rity to  aiford  such  protection,  and  hath  violated  the  true  meaning  and 
intent  of  the  constitution,  which  provides  for  equality  in  imposing  the 
burdens  of  taxation  upon  the  several  states  and  portions  of  the  confe- 
deracy. And  whereas  the  said  Congress,  exceeding  its  just  power  to 
impose  taxes  and  collect  revenue  for  the  purpose  of  effecting  and  ac- 
complishing, hath  raised  and  collected  unnecessary  revenues,  for  ob- 
jects unauthorized  by  the  constitution : 

We,  therefore,  the  people  of  the  state  of  Carolina  in  convention  as- 
sembled, do  declare  and  ordain,  and  it  is  hereby  declared  and  ordained, 


118  SOUTH  CAROLINA  ORDINANCE. 

that  the'  several  acts  and  parts  of  acts  of  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  purporting  to  be  laws  for  the  imposing  of  duties  and  imposts  on 
the  importaitons  of  the  United  States,  and  more  especially  an  act  enti- 
tled "  an  act  in  alteration  of  the  several  acts  imposing  duties  on  im- 
ports," approved  on  the  nineteenth  day  of  May,  one  thousand  eight 
hundred  and  twenty  eight,  and  also  an  act  entitled  "  an  act  to  alter  and 
amend  the  several  acts  imposing  duties  on  imports,"  approved  on  the 
fourteenth  day  of  July,  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  thirty  two,  are 
unauthorized  by  the  constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  violate  the 
true  meaning  thereof,  and  are  null  and  void,  and  no  law,  now  binding 
upon  this  state,  its  officers  or  citizens :  and  all  promises,  contracts,  and 
obligations,  made  or  entered  into,  with  the  purpose  to  secure  the  duties 
imposed  by  said  acts,  and  all  judicial  proceedings  which  shall  be  here- 
after had  in  affirmance  thereof,  are,  and  shall  be,  held  utterly  null 
and  void. 

And  it  is  further  ordained  that  it  shall  not  be  lawful  for  any  of  the 
constituted  authorities,  whether  of  this  State  or  of  the  United  States,  to 
enforce  the  payment  of  duties  imposed  by  the  said  acts  within  the  li- 
mits of  this  state ;  but  that  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  legislature  to 
adopt  such  acts  as  may  be  necessary  to  give  full  effect  to  this  Ordi- 
nance, and  to  prevent  the  enforcement  and  arrest  the  operation  of  the 
said  acts  and  parts  of  acts  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  within 
the  limits  of  this  state,  from  and  after  the  first  day  of  February  next, 
and  the  duty  of  all  other  constituted  authorities,  and  of  all  persons  re- 
siding or  being  within  the  limits  of  this  state,  and  they  are  hereby  re- 
quired and  enjoined  to  obey  and  give  effect  to  this  ordinance,  and  such 
acts  and  measures  of  the  legislature  as  may  be  passed  or  adopted  in 
obedience  thereto. 

And  it  is  further  ordained,  that  in  no  case  of  law  or  equity,  decided 
in  the  court  of  this  state,  wherein  shall  be  drawn  in  question  the  autho- 
rity of  this  ordinance,  or  the  validity  of  such  act  or  acts  of  legislature  as 
may  be  passed  for  the  purpose  of  gi vino;  effect  thereto,  or  the  validity  of 
tlie  aforesaid  acts  of  Congress,  imposing  duties,  shall  any  appeal  be 
taken,  or  allowed,  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  nor 
shall  any  copy  of  the  record  be  permitted  or  allowed  for  that  pui-pose ; 
and  if  any  such  appeal  shall  be  attempted  to  be  taken,  the  courts  of  this 
state  shall  proceed  to  execute  and  enforce  their  judgments,  according  to 
the  laws  and  usages  of  the  state,  without  reference  to  such  attempted 
appeal ;  and  the  persons  attempting  to  take  such  appeal  may  be  dealt 
with  for  a  contempt  of  the  court. 

And  be  it  further  enacted,  that  all  persons  now  holding  any  office  of 
honor,  profit  or  trust,  civil  or  military,  under  this  state,  shall  within 
such  time  as  the  legislature  may  prescribe,  take,  in  such  manner  as  the 
legislature  may  direct,  an  oath  well  and  truly  to  obey,  execute  and  en- 
force this  ordinance,  and  such  act  or  acts  of  the  legislature  as  may  be 
passed  in  pursuance  thereof,  according  to  the  true  intent  and  meaning 
of  the  same ;  and  on  the  neglect  or  omission  of  any  such  person  or  per- 
sons so  to'do,  his  or  their  office  or  offices,  shall  be  forthwith  vacated,  and 
shaU  be  filled  up,  as  if  such  person  or  persons  were  dead  or  had  resign- 
ed, and  no  person  hereafter  elected  to  any  office  of  honor,  profit  or  trust, 
civil  or  military,  shall,  until  the  legislature  shall  otherwise  provide  and 
direct,  enter  on  the  execution  of  his  office,  or  be  in  any  respect  compe- 
tent to  discharge  the  duties  thereof,  until  he  shall,  in  like  manner,  have 


PROTEST  OP  THE  S.  C.  UNION  PARTY.  119 

taken  a  similar  oath;  and  no  juror  shall  be  impannelled  in  any  of  the 
courts  of  this  state,  in  any  cause  in  which  shall  be  in  question  this  ordi- 
nance, or  any  act  of  the  legislature  passed  in  pursuance  thereof,  unless 
he  shall  first,  in  addition  to  the  usual  oath,  have  taken  an  oath,  that  he 
will  well  and  truly  obey,  execute  and  enforce  this  ordinance,  and  such 
act  or  acts  of  the  legislature,  as  may  be  passed  to  carry  the  same  into 
operation  and  eiFect,  according  to  the  true  intent  and  meaning  thereof. 

And  we,  the  people  of  South  Carolina,  to  the  end,  that  it  may  be  fully 
understood  by  the  government  of  the  United  States,  and  the  people  of 
the  co-states,  that  we  are  determined  to  maintain  this,  our  ordinance 
and  declaration  at  every  hazard,  do  further  declare  that  we  will  not 
submit  to  the  application  of  force,  on  the  part  of  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment to  reduce  this  state  to  obedience ;  but  that  we  will  consider  the 
passage  by  Congress,  of  any  act  authorizing  the  employment  of  any 
military  or  naval  force  against  the  state  of  South  Carolina,  her  consti- 
tuted authorities  or  citizens,  or  any  act  abolishing  or  closing  the  ports 
of  this  state  or  any  of  them,  or  otherwise  obstructing  the  free  ingress 
and  egress  of  vessels,  to  and  from  the  said  ports,  or  any  other  act  on  the 
part  of  the  Federal  Government  to  coerce  the  state,  shut  up  her  ports, 
destroy  her  commerce,  or  so  enforce  the  acts  hereby  declared  to  be  null 
and  void,  otherwise  than  through  the  civil  tribunals  of  the  country,  as 
inconsistent  with  the  longer  continuance  of  South  Carolina  in  the 
Union :  and  that  the  people  of  this  state  will  thenceforth  hold  themselves 
absolved  from  all  further  obligation  to  maintain  or  preserve  their  politi- 
cal connexion  with  the  people  of  other  states,  and  will  forthw'ith  pro- 
ceed to  organize  a  separate  government,  and  do  all  other  acts  and 
things,  which  sovereign  and  independent  states  may  of  right  do. 


SOUTH  CAROLINA  REMONSTRANCE 

AND 

PROTEST  OF  THE  UNION  AND  STATE  RIGHTS  PARTY. 


The  Union  and  State  Rights  Party  of  South  Carolina  do  remon- 
strate and  solemnly  protest  against  the  Ordinance  passed  by  the  State 
Convention  on  the  twenty  fourth  day  of  November  last. 

1st.  Because  the  people  of  South  Carolina  elected  delegates  to  the 
said  convention  under  the  solemn  assurance  that  these  delegates  would 
do  no  more  than  devise  a  peaceable  and  constitutional  remedy  for  the 
evils  of  the  protective  tariff,  without  endangering  the  Union  of  these 
states.  Instead  of  which  that  convention  has  passed  an  Ordinance  in 
direct  violation  of  all  these  pledges. 


120  PROTEST  OF  THE  S.  C.  UNION  PARTY. 

2nd.  Because  the  said  Ordinance  has  insiduously  assailed  one  of 
the  inalienable  rights  of  n^an,  by  endeavoring  to  enslave  all  freedom  of 
conscience  by  the  tyrannical  engine  of  power — a  Test  Oath. 

3rd.  Because  it  has  disfranchised  and  proscribed  nearly  one  half  of 
the  Freeman  of  South  Carolina/for  an  honest  difference  of  opinion  by 
declaring  that  those  whose  consciences  will  not  permit  them  to  take  the 
test  oath  shall  be  deprived  of  every  office,  civil  and  military. 

4th.  Because  it  has  trampled  under  foot  the  great  principles  of 
Liberty  secured  to  the  citizen  by  the  constitution  of  this  state  in  depriv- 
ing the  freemen  of  this  country  of  the  right  to  an  impartial  trial  by 
jury,  thereby  violating  that  clause  of  the  constitution  intended  to  be  per- 
petual, which  declares  that  "  The  trial  by  jury  as  heretofore  used  in 
this  state,  and  the  liberty  of  the  press,  shall  be  forever  inviolably  pre- 
served. 

5th.    Because  it  has  violated  the  indepenidence  guaranteed  to  the" 
Judiciary,  by  enacting  that  the  judges  shall  take  a  revolting  test  oath, 
or  be  wchiixsin\Y  femoved  from  office,  thereby  depriving  them  of  the  pri- 
vilege of  trial  by  impeachment,  which,  by  the  constitution  of  the  state, 
is  intended  to  be  secured  to  every  civil  officer. 

6th.  Because  the  Ordinance  has  directly  violated  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  which  gives  authority  to  Congress  to  collect  revenue, 
in  forbidding  the  collection  of  any  revenue  within  flie  limits  of  South  Ca- 
rolina. 

7th.  Because  it  has  violated  the  same  Constitution,  in  that  provision 
of  it  which  declares  that  no  preference  shall  be  given  to  one  port  over  any 
other  in  the  United  States  by  enacting  that  goods  shall  be  imported  into 
the  ports  of  South  CaroUna  without  paying  any  duties. 

8tn.  Because  it  violates  the  same  Constitution,  and  tramples  upon  the 
RIGHTS  of  the  citizen  by  denying  him  the  privilege  of  appeal  in  cases  in 
Law  and  Equity  arising  under  the  Constitution  and  Laws  of  the  Union. 

9th.  Because  it  has  virtually  destroyed  the  Union  by  carefully  pre- 
venting the  General  Government  from  enforcing  their  laws  through  the 
civil  tribunals  of  the  country,  and  then  enacting  that  if  that  Government 
should  pursue  any  other  mode  to  enforce  them,  then  this  State  shall  be 
no  longer  a  member  of  the  Union. 

10th.  Because  the  tyranny  and  oppression  inflicted  by  this  Ordi- 
nance are  of  a  character  so  revolting,  and  the  effects  anticipated  from 
it  so  ruinous,  that  tlie  commerce  and  credit  of  the  state  are  already  sen- 
sibly affected,  and  will  soon  he  prostrated ;  and  its  peaceable  and  mdus- 
trious  citizens  are  driven  from  their  homes  to  seek  ti'anquility  in  some 
other  state. 

The  Union  Party  of  South  Carolina,  in  Convention  assembled,  do 
further  remonstrate  and  solemnly  protest  against  the  project  of  a  Stand- 
ing Army,  proposed  by  the  party  m  power,  as  dangerous  to  the  liberties 
of  the  people.  They  would  respectfully  ask  their  fellow  citizens,  whe- 
ther such  an  army  must  not  be  confessedly  inadequate  to  protect  the 
Nullification  Party  against  the  people  of  the  rest  of  the  United  States, 
should  they  resolve  to  coerce  them.  What  other  object,  therefore,  can 
such  a  force  accomplish  than  to  serve  as  an  instrument  of  tyranny  over 
their  fellow  citizens. 

This  Convention  doth  further  protest  against  any  effort,  by  a  system 
of  Conscription,  to  force  the  citizens  of~the  state  from  their  firesides 
and  homes,  to  take  up  armSj  and  incur  the  pains  and  penalties  of  trea- 


PRESIDENT'S  PROCLAMATION.  121 

son^  in  support  of  a  doctrine  which  the  people  were  assured  was  pacific 
in  its  nature  and  utterly  inconsistent  with  any  idea  of  danger  to  the 
Constitution  or  the  Union. 

Solemnly  remonstrating,  as  they  hereby  do,  against  the  above  men- 
tioned grievances,  the  Union  Party  would  further  express  their  firm 
DETERMINATION  to  maintain  the  principles  which  have  ever  been  the 
rule  of  their  conduct ;  and  while,  on  the  one  hand,  they  will  continue 
their  unfaltering  opposition  to  the  protective  tariffs,  so  on  the  other  they 
will  not  be  driven  from  the  enjoyment  of  these  inalienable  rights  which, 
by  inheritance,  belong  to  every  American  citizen.  Disclaiming,  there- 
fore, all  intention  of  lawless  or  insurrectionary  violence,  they  hereby 
proclaim  their  determination  to  protect  their  rights  by  all  legal  and 
constitutional  means,  and  that  in  doing  so  they  will  continue  to  main- 
tain the  character  of  peacable  citizens,  unless  compelled  to  throw  it 
aside  by  intolerable  oppression. 

THOMAS  TAYLOR,  President. 

Henry  Middleton, 

David  Johnson, 

Richard  I.  Manning, 

Starling  Tucket, 

[Signed,  in  addition,  by' nearly  one  hundred  and  eighty  members.] 
Done  at  Columbia,  on  Friday,  the  14th  day  of  December,  in  the  year 

of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  thirty- two,  and  in  the 

fifty-seventJi  year  of  the  Independence  of  the  United  States    of 

America. 
Attest : 

jlMrEL'^KTSKT,!  ^-'--"Z  contention. 


Vice  Presidents. 


PROCLAMATION 
BY  ANDREW  JACKSON, 

president  op  the  united  states. 

Whereas,  a  Convention  assembled  in  the  state  of  South  Carolina, 
have  passed  an  Ordinance  by  which  they  declare,  "  That  the  several 
acts  and  parts  of  acts  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  purporting 
to  be  laws  for  the  imposing  of  duties  and  imposts  on  the  importation  of 
foreign  commodities,  and  now  having  uctual  operation  and  effect  within 
the  United  States,  and  more  especially,"  two  acts  for  the  same  purposes, 
11 


122  PRESIDENT'S  PROCLAMATION. 

passed  on  the  29th  of  May,  1828,  and  on  the  14th  of  July,  1832,  "are 
unauthorised  by  tlie  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  violate  the 
true  meaning  and  intent  thereof,  and  are  null  and  void,  and  no  law," 
nor  binding  on  tlie  citizens  of  tliat  state  or  its  officers :  and  by  the  said 
Ordinance,  it  is  further  declared  to  be  unlawful  for  any  of  the  constituted 
autliorities  of  tlie  state,  or  of  the  United  States,  to  enforce  tlie  payment 
of  the  duties  imposed  by  tlie  said  acts  within  tlie  same  state,  and  that  it 
is  the  duty  of  tlie  legislature  to  pass  such  laws  as  may  be  necessary  to 
give  full  effect  to  tlie  said  Ordinance. 

And  whereas,  by  the  said  Ordinance  it  is  further  ordained,  that  in 
no  case  of  law  or  equity,  decided  in  the  courts  of  tlie  said  state,  wherein 
sheJl  be  drawn  in  question  the  validity  of  the  said  Ordinance,  or  of  the 
acts  of  the  legislature  that  may  be  passed  to  give  it  effect,  or  of  the  said 
laws  of  the  United  States,  no  appeal  shall  be  allowed  to  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  nor  shall  any  copy  of  the  record  be  per- 
mitted or  allowed  for  that  purpose,  and  that  any  person  attempting  to 
take  such  appeal  shall  be  punished  as  for  a  contempt  of  court : 

And,  finally,  the  said  ordinance  declares,  tliat  the  people  of  South 
Carolina  will  maintain  the  said  Ordinance  at  every  hazard ;  and  that 
they  will  consider  tlie  passage  of  any  act  by  Congress  abolishing  or 
closing  tlie  ports  of  the  said  state,  or  otherwise  obstructing  the  free 
ingress  or  egress  of  vessels  to  and  from  the  said  ports,  or  any  other  act 
of  the  federal  government  to  coerce  the  state,  shut  up  jier  ports,  destroy 
or  harrass  her  commerce,  or  to  enforce  the  said  acts  otherwise  than 
through  the  civil  tribunals  of  the  country,  as  inconsistent  with  the  longer 
continuance  of  South  Carolina  in  the  Union ;  and  that  the  people  of  the 
said  state  will  thenceforth  hold  themselves  absolved  from  all  further 
obligation  to  maintain  or  preserve  their  political  connection  witli  the 
people  of  the  other  states,  and  will  forthwith  proceed  to  organize  a  sepa- 
rate government,  and  do  all  other  acts  and  things  which  sovereign  and 
independent  states  may  of  right  do ; 

And  whereas,  the  said  Ordinance  prescribes  to  the  people  of  South 
Carolina  a  course  of  conduct  in  direct  violation  of  their  duty  as  citizens 
of  the  United  States,  contrary  to  the  laws  of  their  country,  subversive 
of  its  constitution,  and  having  for  its  object  the  destruction  of  the  Union — 
that  Union  which,  coeval  with  our  political  existence,  led  our  fathers, 
without  any  other  ties  to  unite  them  than  those  of  patriotism  and  a  com- 
mon cause,  through  a  sanguinary  struggle  to  a  glorious  independence — 
that  sacred  Union,  hitherto  inviolate,  which,  perfected  by  our  happy 
Constitution,  has  brought  us,  by  the  favor  of  heaven,  to  a  state  of  pros- 
perity at  home,  and  high  consideration  abroad,  rarely,  if  ever,  equalled 
m  tlie  history  of  nations.  To  preserve  this  bond  of  our  political  exist- 
ence from  destruction,  to  maintain  inviolate  this  state  of  national  honor 
and  prosperity,  and  to  justify  the  confidence  my  fellow  citizens  have 
reposed  in  me,  I,  Andrew  Jackson,  President  of  the  United  States, 
have  thought  proper  to  issue  this  my  PROCLAMlATION,  stating  my 
views  of  the  Constitution  and  laws  applicable  to  the  measures  adopted 
by  the  Convention  of  South  Carolina,  and  to  the  reasons  they  have^put 
forth  to  sustain  them,  declaring  the  course  which  duty  will  require  me 
to  pursue,  and  appealing  to  the  understanding  and  patriotism  of  the 
people,  warn  them  of  the  consequences  that  must  inevitably  result  from 
an  observance  of  the  dictates  of  the  Convention. 

Strict  duty  would  require  of  mo  nothing  more  than  the  exercise  of  those 


PRESIDENT'S  PROCLAMATION.  123 

powers  with  which  I  am  now,  or  may  hereafter  be  invested,  for  preserving 
the  peace  of  the  Union  and  for  the  execution  of  the  laws.  But  the  impos- 
ing aspect  which  opposition  has  assumed  in  this  case,  by  clothing  itself 
with  state  authority  and  the  deep  interest  which  the  people  of  the  United 
States  must  all  feel  in  preventing  a  resort  to  stronger  measures,  while 
there  is  a  hope  that  any  will  be  yielded  to  reasoning  and  remonstance, 
perhaps  demand,  and  will  certainly  justify,  a  full  exposition  to  South 
Carolina  and  the  nation  of  the  views  I  entertain  on  this  important  question, 
as  well  as  a  distinct  enunciation  of  the  course  which  my  sense  of  duty 
will  require  me  to  pursue. 

The  Ordinance  is  founded,  not  on  the  indefeasible  right  of  resisting  acts 
which  are  plainly  unconstitutional  and  too  oppressive  to  be  endured ;  but 
on  the  strange  position  that  any  one  state  may  not  only  declare  an  Act 
of  Congress  void,  but  prohibit  its  execution — that  they  may  do  this  con- 
sistently with  the  Constitution — that  the  true  construction  of  that  instru- 
ment permits  a  state  to  retain  its  place  in  the  Union,  and  yet  be  bound 
by  no  other  of  its  laws  than  those  it  may  choose  to  consider  as  con- 
stitutional. It  is  true,  they  add,  that  to  justify  this  abrogation  of 
a  law,  it  must  be  palpably,  contrary  to  the  Constitution ;  but  it  is  evi- 
dent, that  to  give  the  right  of  resisting  laws  of  that  description,  coupled 
with  the  uncontrolled  right  to  decide  what  laws  deserve  that  character,  is 
to  give  the  power  of  resisting  all  laws.  For,  as  by  the  theory,  there  is  no 
appeal,  the  reasons  alleged  by  the  state,  good  or  bad,  must  prevail.  If  it 
should  be  said  that  pubUc  opinion  is  a  sufficient  check  against  the  abuse 
of  this  power,  it  may  be  asked  why  is  it  not  deemed  a  sufficient  guard 
against  the  passage  of  an  unconstitutional  Act  by  Congress.  There  is, 
however,  a  restraint  in  this  last  case,  which  makes  the  assumed  power  of 
a  state  more  indefensible,  and  which  does  not  exist  in  the  other.  There 
are  two  appeals  from  the  unconstituional  Act  passed  by  Congress — one 
to  the  Judiciary,  the  other  to  the  People,  and  the  States.  There  is  no 
appeals  from  the  State  decision  in  theory,  and  the  practical  illustration 
shows  that  the  courts  are  closed  against  an  application  to  review  it,  both 
judges  and  jurors  being  sworn  to  decide  in  its  favor.  But  reasoning  on 
this  subject  is  superfluous  when  our  social  compact  in  express  terms  de- 
clares that  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  its  Constitution  and  treaties 
made  under  it,  are  the  supreme  law  of  the  land — and  for  greater  caution 
adds,  "  that  the  judges  in  every  state  shall  be  bound  thereby,  any  thing 
in  the  constitution  or  laws  of  any  state  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding." 
And  it  may  be  asserted  without  fear  of  refutation,  that  no  Federative 
Grovemment  could  exist  without  a  similar  provision.  Look  for  a  moment 
to  the  consequence.  If  South  Carolina  considers  the  revenue  laws  un- 
constitutional, and  has  a  right  to  prevent  their  execution  in  the  port  of 
Charleston,  there  would  be  a  clear  constitutional  objection  to  their  collec- 
tion in  every  other  port,  and  no  revenue  could  be  collected  any  where, 
for  all  imposts  must  be  equal.  It  is  no  answer  to  repeat,  that  an  unconsti- 
tutional law  is  no  law,  so  long  as  the  question  of  its  legality  is  to  be  decid- 
ed by  the  state  itself;  for]  every  law  operating  injuriously  upon  any  local 
interest  will  be  perhaps  thought  and  certainly  represented,  as  unconstitu- 
tional, and,  as  has  been  shown,  there  is  no  appeal. 

If  this  doctrine  had  been  established  at  an  earlier  day,  the  Union  would 
have  been  dissolved  in  its  infancy.  The  excise  law  of  Pennsylvania,  the 
embargo  and  non-intercourse  law  in  the  Eastern  States,  the  carriage  tax 
in  Virginia,  were  all  deemed  unconstitutional  and  were  more  equal  in 


124  PRESIDENT'S  PROCLAMATION. 

their  operation  than  any  of  the  laws  now  complained  of;  but  fortunate- 
ly none  of  those  states  discovered  that  they  had  tlie  right  now  claimed 
by  Soutli  Carolina.  The  war  into  which  we  were  forced,  to  support 
the  dignity  of  the  nation  and  the  rights  of  our  citizens,  might  have 
ended  in  defeat  and  disgrace  instead  of  victory  and  honor,  if  the  states 
who  supposed  it  a  ruinous  and  unconstitutional  measure  had  thought 
they  possessed  the  right  of  nullifying  tlie  act  by  which  it  was  declared, 
and  denying  supplies  for  its  prosecution.  Hardly  and  unequally  as 
those  measures  bore  upon  several  members  of  tlie  Union,  to  the  legisla- 
tures of  none  did  this  efficient  and  peaceable  remedy,  as  it  is  called, 
suggest  itself.  The  discovery  of  this  important  feature  in  our  consti- 
tution was  reserved  to  the  present  day.  To  the  statesmen  of  South 
Carolina  belongs  the  invention,  and  upon  the  citizens  of  that  state  will 
uniformly  fall  3ie  evils  of  reducing  it  to  practice. 

If  the  doctrine  of  a  state  veto  upon  the  laws  of  the  Union  carries 
with  it  internal  evidence  of  its  impracticable  absurdity,  our  constitution- 
al history  will  also  afford  abimdant  proof  that  it  would  have  been  repu- 
diated with  indignation  had  it  been  proposed  to  form  a  feature  in  our 
government. 

In  our  colonial  state,  although  dependent  on  another  power,  we  very 
early  considered  ourselves  as  connected  by  common  interest  with  eacn 
other.  Leagues  were  formed  for  common  defence,  and  before  the  De- 
claration of  Independence  we  w^ere  known  in  our  aggregate  character 
AS  THE  United  Colonies  of  America.  That  decisive  and  important 
step  was  taken  jointly.  We  declared  ourselves  a  nation  by  a  joint, 
not  by  several  acts,  and  when  tlie  terms  of  our  confederation  were  re- 
duced to  form,  it  was  in  that  of  a  solemn  league  of  several  states,  by 
which  had  agreed  that  they  would  collectively  form  one  nation  for  the 
purpose  of  conducting  some  certain  domestic  concerns  and  all  foreign 
relations.  In  the  instrument  forming  that  union,  is  found  an  article 
which  declares  that  "  every  state  shall  abide  by  tne  determinations  of 
Congress  on  all  questions  which  by  that  confederation  should  be  sub- 
mitted to  them." 

Under  the  confederation,  then,  no  state  could  legally  annul  a  decision 
of  the  Congress,  or  refuse  to  submit  to  its  execution ;  but  no  provision 
was  made  to  enforce  these  decisions.  Congress  made  requisitions  but 
they  were  not  complied  with.  The  government  could  not  operate  on 
individuals.     They  had  no  judiciary,  no  means  of  collecting  revenue. 

But  the  defects  of  the  confederation  need  not  be  detailed.  Under  its 
operation  we  could  scarcely  be  called  a  nation.  We  had  neitlier  pros- 
perity at  home  nor  consideration  abroad.  This  state  of  things  could 
not  be  endured,  and  our  present  happy  constitution  was  formed,  but 
formed  in  vain,  if  this  fatal  doctrine  prevails.  It  was  formed  for  impor- 
tant objects  that  are  announced  in  the  preamble  made  in  the  name,  and 
by  the  authority  of  the  people  of  the  United  States,  whose  delegates 
framed,  and  whose  conventions  approved  it.  The  most  important 
among  these  objects,  that  which  is  placed  first  in  rank,  on  which  all  the 
others  rest,  is  ^Ho  form  a  more  perfect  Union."  Now,  is  it  possible 
that  even  if  there  were  no  express  provision  giving  supremacy  to  the 
constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States  over  those  of  the  states — can 
it  be  conceived,  that  an  instrument  made  for  the  purpose  of  ^^  forming 
a  more  perfect  Union"  thsin  ihoX  of  the  confederation,  could  be  so  con- 
fttructed  by  the  assembled  wisdom  of  our  country  as  to  substiKite  for 


PRESIDENT'S  PROCLAMATION.  125 

that  confederation  a  form  of  gjovemment,  dependent  for  its  existence  on 
the  local  interest,  the  party  spirit  of  a  state,  or  of  a  prevailing  faction  in 
a  state  1  Every  man  of  plain,  unsophisticated  understanding,  who 
hears  the  question,  will  give  such  an  answer  as  will  preserve  the  union. 
Metaphysical  subtlety,  in  pursuit  of  an  impracticable  theory,  could  alone 
have  devised  one  that  is  calculated  to  destroy  it. 

I  consider  then  the  power  to  annul  a  law  of  ths  United  States,  as- 
sumed by  one  state,  incompatible  with  the  existence  of  the 
Union,  contradicted  expressly  by  the  letter  op  the  Consti- 
tution, unauthorised  by  its  spirit,  inconsistent  with  every 
principle  on   which  it   was  founded,  and   destructive   of  the 

GREAT    object   FOR   WHICH    IT    WAS   FORMED. 

After  this  general  view  of  the  leading  principle,  we  must  examine 
the  particular  application  of  it  which  is  made  in  the  Ordinance. 

The  preamble  rests  its  justification  on  these  grounds : — It  assumes  a 
fact,  that  the  obnoxious  laws,  although  they  purport  to  be  laws  for  rais- 
ing revenue,  were  in  reality  intended  for  the  protection  of  manufactures, 
which  purpose  it  asserts  to  be  unconstitutional ;  and  that  the  operation 
of  these  laws  is  unequal ;  that  the  amount  raised  by  them  is  greater  than 
is  required  by  the  wants  of  the  government ;  and,  finally,  that  the  pro- 
ceeds are  to  be  applied  to  objects  anauthorized  by  the  constitution. 
These  are  the  only  causes  alleged  to  justify  an  open  opposition  to  the 
laws  of  the  country,  and  a  threat  of  seceding  from  the  union,  if  any 
attempt  should  be  made  to  enforce  them.  The  first  virtually  acknow- 
ledges, that  the  law  in  question  was  passed  under  a  power  expressly 
given  by  the  constitution,  to  lay  and  collect  imposts,  but  its  constitution- 
ality is  drawn  in  question  from  the  motives  of  those  who  passed  it. 
However  apparent  this  purpose  may  be  in  the  present  case,  nothing  can 
be  more  dangerous  than  to  admit  the  position  that  an  unconstitutional 
purpose,  entertained  by  the  members  who  assent  to  a  law  enacted  under 
a  constitutional  power  shall  make  that  law  void ;  for  how  is  that  purpose 
to  be  ascertained  1  Who  is  to  make  the  scrutiny  1  How  often  may 
bad  purposes  be  falsely  imputed — in  how  many  cases  are  they  concealed 
by  false  profossions — in  how  many  is  no  declaration  of  motive  made  % 
Admit  this  doctrine,  and  you  give  to  the  states  an  uncontrolled  right  to 
decide,  and  every  law  may  be  annulled  under  this  pretext.  If,  therefore, 
the  absurd  and  dangerous  doctrine  should  be  admitted  that  a  state  may 
annul  an  unconstitutional  law,  or  one  that  it  deems  such,  it  will  not 
apply  to  the  present  case. 

The  next  objection  is,  that  the  laws  in  question  operate  unequally. 
This  objection  may  be  made  with  truth,  to  every  law  that  has  been  or 
can  be  passed.  The  wisdom  of  man  never  yet  contrived  a  system  of 
taxation  that  would  operate  with  perfect  equality.  If  the  unequal  ope- 
ration of  a  law  makes  it  unconstitutional,  and  if  all  laws  of  tliat  de- 
scription may  be  abrogated  by  any  state  for  that  cause,  then  indeed  is 
the  Federed  Constitution  unworthy  of  the  slightest  eflfort  for  its  preserva- 
tion. We  have  hitherto  relied  on  it  as  the  perpetual  bond  of  our  union. 
We  have  received  it  as  the  work  of  the  assembled  wisdom  of  the  nation. 
We  have  trusted  to  it  as  the  sheet  anchor  of  our  safety  in  the  stormy 
times  of  conflict  with  a  foreign  or  domestic  foe.  We  have  looked  to  it 
with  sacred  awe,  as  to  the  palladium  of  our  liberties,  and  with  all  the 
solemnities  of  religion  have  pledged  to  each  other  our  lives  and  fortunes 
here,  and  our  hopes  of  happmess  hereafter,  in  its  defence  and  support. 
11* 


126  PRESIDENT'S  PROCLAMATION. 

Were  we  mistaken,  my  coimtrymen,  in  attaching  this  importance  to  the 
constitiuioii  of  our  country  1    Was  our  devotion  paid  to  the  wretched, 
incafficient,  clumsy  contrivance,  which  this  new  doctrine  would  make  it  1 
Did  we  pledge  ourselves  to  tne  support  of  an  airy  nothing,  a  bubble 
that  must  be  blown  away  by  the  first  breath  of  disaffection  1    Was  this 
self-destroying,  visionary,  theory,  tlie  work  of  the  profound  statesman, 
the  exaltedpatriots,  to  whom  the  task  of  constitutional  reform  was  en- 
trusted '?    Did  the  name  of  Washington  sanction,  did  the  states  delibe- 
rately ratify  sucli  an  anomaly  in  the  history  of  fundamental  legislation  1 
No.    We  were  not  mistaken.     The  letter  of  this  great  instrument  is 
free  from  this  radical  fault;  its  language  directly  contradicts  the  impu- 
tation ;  its  spirit — its  evident  intent  contradicts  it.     No,  we  do  not  err ! 
Our  constitution  does  not  contain  the  absurdity  of  giving  power  to  make 
laws,  and  another  power  to  resist  them.     The  sages  whose  memory 
will  always  be  reverenced,  have  given  us  a  practical,  and  as  they  hoped 
a  permanent  constitutional  compact.     The  father  of  his  contry  did  not 
affix  his  revered  name  to  so  palpable  an  absurdity.    Nor  did  the  states, 
when  they  severally  ratified  it,  do  so  under  the  impression  that  a  veto  on 
the  laws  of  the  United  States  was  reserved  to  them,  or  that  they  could 
exercise  it  by  implication.     Search  the  debates  in  all  their  conventions 
— examine  the  speeches  of  the  most  zealous  opposers  of  federal  autho- 
rity— look  at  the  amendments  that  were  proposed — ^they  are  all  silent — 
not  a  syllable  uttered,  not  a  vote  given,  not  a  motion  made  to  correct  the 
explicit  supremacy  given  to  the  laws  of  the  Union  over  those  of  the 
states — or  to  show  that  implication,  as  is  now  contended,  could  defeat 
it.    No — we  have  not  erred !     The  constitution  is  still  the  object  of  our 
union,  our  defence  in  danger,  the  source  of  our  prosperity  in  peace.     It 
shall  descend,  as  we  have  received  it,  uncorrupted  by  sophistical  con- 
struction, to  our  posterity,  and  the  sacrifices  of  local  interest,  of  state 
prejudices,  of  personal  animosities,  that  were  made  to  bring  it  into  ex- 
istence, will  again  be  patriotically  offered  for  its  support. 

The  two  remaining  objections  made  by  the  ordinance  to  these  laws 
are  that  the  sums  intended  to  be  raised  by  them,  are  greater  than  are 
required,  and  that  the  proceeds  will  be  unconstitutionally  employed. 

The  constitution  has  given  expressly  to  Congress  the  right  of  raising 
revenue  and  of  determining  the  sum  the  public  exigences  will  require. 
The  states  have  no  control  over  the  exercise  of  this  right,  other  than 
that  which  results  from  the  power  of  changing  the  representatives  who 
abuse  it,  and  thus  procure  redress.  Congress  may  undoubtedly  abuse 
this  discretionary  power,  but  the  same  may  be  said  of  others  with 
which  they  are  vested.  Yet  the  discretion  must  exist  somewhere.  The 
constitution  has  given  it  to  the  representative  of  all  the  people  checked 
by  the  representatives  of  the  states,  and  by  the  executive  power.  The 
&5uth  Carolina  construction  gives  it  to  the  legislature  or  the  conven- 
tion of  a  single  state,  where  neither  the  people  of  the  different  states, 
nor  the  states  in  their  separate  capacity,  nor  the  Chief  Magistrate  elect- 
ed by  the  people  have  any  representation.  Which  is  the  most  discreet 
disposition  of  the  power  1  I  do  not  ask  you,  fellow  citizens,  which  is 
the  constitutional  disposition — ^that  instrument  speaks  a  language  not 
to  be  misunderstood.  But  if  you  were  assembled  in  general  convention, 
which  would  you  think  the  safest  depository  of  this  discreiionary  pow- 
er in  the  last  resort  1  Would  you  add  a  clause  giving  it  to  each  of  the 
states,  or  would  you  sanction  the  wise  provisions  already  made  by  your 


PRESIDENT'S  PROCLAMATION.  127 

constitution  1  If  this  should  be  the  result  of  your  deliberations  when 
providing  for  the  future,  are  you,  can  you  be  ready  to  risk  all  that  you 
hold  dear  to  establish,  for  a  temporary  and  local  purpose,  that  which 
you  must  acknowledge  to  be  destructive  and  even  absurd  as  a  general 
provision*?  Carry  out  the  consequences  of  this  right  vested  in  the 
different  states,  and  you  must  perceive  that  the  crisis  your  conduct  pre- 
sents at  this  day  would  recur  whenever  any  law  of  the  United  States 
displeased  any  of  the  states,  and  that  we  should  soon  cease  to  be  a  nation. 
The  Ordinance,  with  the  same  knowledge  of  the  future  tliat  cheirac- 
terizes  a  former  objection,  tells  you  that  the  proceeds  of  the  tax  will  be 
unconstitutionally  applied.  If  this  could  be  ascertained  with  certainty, 
the  objection  would,  with  more  propriety,  be  reserved  for  the  law  so 
applying  the  proceeds,  but  surely  cannot  be  urged  against  the  laws 
levymg  the  duty. 

These  are  the  allegations  contained  in  the  Ordinance.  Examine  them 
seriously,  my  fellow-citizens — judge  for  yourselves.  I  appeal  to  you  to 
determine  whether  they  are  so  clear,  so  convincing,  as  to  leave  no  doubt 
of  their  correctness :  and  even  if  you  should  come  to  this  conclusion,  how 
far  they  justify  the  reckless,  destructive  course,  which  you  are  directed  to 
pursue.  Review  these  objections,  and  the  conclusions  drawn  from  them 
once  more.  What  are  they  1  Every  law  then,  for  raising  revenue,  ac- 
cording to  the  South  Carolina  Ordinance  may  be  rightfully  annulled, 
unless  it  be  so  framed  as  no  law  ever  will  or  can  be  framed.  Congress 
have  aright  to  pass  laws  for  raising  revenue,  and  each  state  has  a  right  to 
oppose  their  execution — two  rights  directly  opposed  to  each  other ;  and 
yet  is  this  absurdity  supposed  to  be  contained  in  an  instrument  drawn 
for  the  express  purpose  of  avoiding  collisions  between  the  states  and  the 
general  government,  by  an  assembly  of  the  most  enlightened  statesmen 
and  purest  patriots  ever  embodied  for  a  similar  purpose. 

In  vain  have  these  sages  declared  that  Congress  shall  have  power  to 
lay  and  collect  taxes,  duties,  imposts,  and  excises — in  vain  have  they 
provided  that  they  shall  have  power  to  pass  laws  which  shall  be  necessary 
and  proper  to  carry  those  powers  into  execution ;  that  those  laws  and  that 
Constitution  shall  be  the  "  supreme  law  of  the  land  ;  and  that  the  judges 
in  every  state  shall  be  bound  thereby,  any  thing  in  the  Constitution  or  laws 
of  any  state  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding."  In  vain  have  the  people  of 
the  several  states  solemnly  sanctioned  these  provisions,  made  them  their 
paramount  laws,  and  individually  sworn  to  support  them  whenever  they 
were  called  on  to  execute  any  office.  Vain  provisions !  ineffectual  restric- 
tions !  vile  profanation  of  oaths  !  miserable  mockery  of  legislation !  if  a 
bare  majority  of  the  voters  in  any  one  state  may,  on  a  real  or  supposed 
knowledfge  of  the  intent  with  which  a  law  has  been  passed,  declare  them- 
selves free  from  its  operation — say  here  it  ^ves  too  little,  there  too  much, 
and  operates  unequally— here  it  suffers  articles  to  be  free  that  ought  to  be 
taxed,  there  it  taxes  those  that  ought  to  be  free — in  this  case  the  proceeds 
are  intended  to  be  applied  to  purposes  which  we  do  not  approve ;  in  that 
the  amount  raised  is  more  than  is  wanted.  Congress,  it  is  true,  are 
invested  by  the  Constitution  with  the  right  of  deciding  these  questions 
according  to  their  sound  discretion.  Congress  is  composed  of  the  repre- 
sentatives of  all  the  states,  and  of  all  thp  people  of  all  the  states ;  but  W£, 
part  of  the  people  of  one  state,  to  whom  the  Constitution  has  given  no 
power  on  the  subject,  from  whom  it  has  expressly  taken  it  away — we, 
who  have  solemnly  agreed  that  this  Constitution  shall  be  our  law — we. 


128  PRESIDENT'S  PROCLAMATION. 

most  of  whom  have  sworn  to  support  it — we^  now  abrogate  this  law,  and 
swear,  and  force  others  to  swear,  that  it  shall  not  be  obeyed — and  we  do 
this,  not  because  Congress  have  no  right  to  pass  such  laws ;  this  we  do 
not  allege;  but  because  they  have  passed  them  with  improper  views. 
They  are  unconstitutonal  from  the  motives  of  those  who  passed  them, 
which  we  can  never  with  certainty  know,  from  their  unequal  operation  ; 
although  it  is  impossible,  from  the  nature  of  things,  that  they  should  be 
equal,  and  from  the  disposition  which  we  presume  may  be  made  of  their 
proceeds,  although  that  disposition  has  not  been  declared.  This  is  the 
plain  meaning  of  the  Ordinance  in  relation  to  laws  which  it  abrogates  for 
alleged  unconstitutionality.  But  it  does  not  stop  there.  It  repeals,  in 
e?fpress  terms,  an  important  part  of  the  Constitution  itself,  and  of  laws 
passed  to  give  it  effect,  which  have  never  been  alleged  to  be  unconstitu- 
tional. The  Constitution  declares  that  the  judicial  powers  of  the  United 
States  extend  to  cases  arising  under  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  and 
that  such  laws,  the  Constitution,  and  treaties  shall  be  paramount  to  the 
state  constitutions  and  laws.  The  judiciary  act  prescribes  the  mode  by 
which  the  case  may  be  brought  before  a  court  of  the  United  States,  by 
appeal,  when  a  state  tribunal  shall  decide  against  this  provision  of  the 
Constitution.  The  Ordinance  declares  there  shall  be  no  appeal ;  makes 
the  state  law  paramount  to  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United 
States ;  forces  judges  and  jurors  to  swear  that  they  will  disregard  their 
provisions ;  and  even  makes  it  penal  in  a  suitor  to  attempt  relief  by  appeal. 
It  further  declares  that  it  shall  not  be  lawful  for  the  authorities  of  the 
United  States,  or  of  that  state,  to  enforce  the  payment  of  duties  imposed 
by  the  revenue  laws  within  its  limits. 

Here  is  a  law  of  the  United  States,  not  even  pretended  to  be  unconsti- 
tutional, repealed  by  the  authority  of  a  small  majority  of  the  voters  of  a 
single  state.  Here  is  a  provision  of  the  Constitution  which  is  solemnly 
abrogated  by  the  same  authority. 

On  such  expositions  and  reasonings  the  Ordinance  grounds  not  only  an 
assertion  of  the  right  to  annul  the  laws  of  which  it  complains,  but  to 
enforce  it  by  a  threat  of  seceding  from  the  Union,  if  any  attempt  is  made 
to  execute  them. 

This  right  to  secede  is  deduced  from  the  nature  of  the  Constitution, 
which,  they  say,  is  a  compact  between  sovereign  states  who  have  preserved 
their  whole  sovereignty,  and,  therefore,  are  subject  to  no  supenor :  that, 
because  they  made  the  compact,  they  can  break  it  when,  in  their  opinion, 
it  has  been  departed  from  by  the  other  states.  Fallacious  as  this  course 
of  reasoning  is,  it  enlists  state  pride,  and  finds  advocates  in  the  honest 
pr^udices  of  those  who  have  not  studied  the  nature  of  our  government 
sufficiently  to  see  the  radical  error  on  which  it  rests. 

The^  people  of  the  United  States  formed  the  Constitution,  acting 
through  the  state  legislatures  in  making  the  compact,  to  meet  and  discuss 
its  provisions,  and  acting  in  separate  conventions  when  they  ratified  those 
provisions ;  but  the  terms  used  in  its  construction,  show  it  to  be  a  govern- 
ment in  which  the  people  of  all  the  states  collectively  are  represented. 
We  are  one  people  in  the  choice  of  the  President  and  Vice  President. 
Here  the  states  have  no  other  agency  than  to  direct  the  mode  in  which 
the  votes  shall  be  given.  The  candidates  having  the  majority  of  all  the 
votes  are  chosen.  The  electors  of  a  majority  of  states  may  have  given 
their  votes  for  one  candidate,  and  yet  another  may  be  chosen.  The  people 
then,  and  not  the  states,  are  represented  in  the  executive  branch. 


PRESIDENT'S  PROCLAMATION.  129 

In  the  House  of  Representatives  there  is  this  diflference,  that  the  people 
of  one  state  do  not,  as  in  the  case  of  President  and  Vice  President,  all 
vote  for  the  same  officers.  The  people  of  all  the  states  do  not  vote  for  all 
the  members,  each  state  electing  only  its  own  representatives.  But  this 
creates  no  material  distinction.  When  chosen,  they  are  all  representa- 
tives of  the  United  States,  not  representatives  of  the  particular  state  from 
which  they  come.  They  are  paid  by  the  United  States,  not  by  the  state ; 
nor  are  they  accountable  to  it  for  any  act  done  in  the  performance  of  their 
legislative  functions ;  and,  however  they  may  in  practice,  as  it  is  their 
duty  to  do,  consult  and  prefer  the  interests  of  their  particular  constituents 
when  they  come  in  conflict  with  any  other  partial  or  local  interest,  yet  it  is 
their  first  and  highest  duty,  as  representatives  of  the  United  States,  to 
promote  the  general  good. 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  then,  forms  a  government^  not 
a  league ;  and  whether  it  be  formed  by  compact  between  the  states,  or  in 
any  other  manner,  its  character  is  the  same.  It  is  a  government  in  which 
all  the  people  are  represented,  which  operates  directly  on  the  people  indi- 
vidually, not  upon  the  states :  they  retained  all  the  power  they  did  not 
grant.  But  each  state  having  expressly  parted  with  so  many  powers  as 
to  constitute,  jointly  with  the  other  states,  a  single  nation,  cannot,  firom 
that  period,  possess  any  right  to  secede,  because  such  secession  does  not 
break  a  league,  but  destroys  the  unity  of  a  nation,  and  any  injury  to  that 
unity  is  not  only  a  breach  which  would  result  from  the  contravention  of 
a  compact,  but  it  is  an  offence  against  the  whole  Union.  To  say  that  any 
state  may  at  pleasure  secede  from  the  Union,  is  to  say  that  the  United 
States  are  not  a  nation :  because  it  would  be  a  solecism  to  contend  that 
any  part  of  a  nation  might  dissolve  its  connexion  with  the  other  parts,  to 
their  injury  or  ruin,  without  committing  any  offence.  Secession,  like  any 
other  revolutionary  act,  may  be  morally  justified  by  the  extremity  of 
oppression ;  butt  c  call  it  a  constitutional  right  is  confounding  the  meaning 
of  terms,  and  can  only  be  done  through  gross  error,  or  to  deceive  those 
who  are  willing  to  assert  a  right,  but  would  pause  before  they  made  a 
revolution,  or  incur  the  penalties  consequent  on  a  failure. 

Because  the  Union  was  formed  by  compact,  it  is  said  the  parties  to  that 
compact  may,  when  they  feel  themselves  aggrieved,  depart  from  it ;  but  it 
is  precisely  because  it  is  a  compact  that  they  cannot.  A  compact  is  an 
agreement  or  binding  obligation.  It  may,  by  its  terms,  have  a  sanction 
or  penalty  for  its  breach,  or  it  may  not.  If  it  contains  no  sanction,  it  may 
be  broken  with  no  other  consequence  than  moral  guilt :  if  it  have  a  sanc- 
tion, then  the  breach  incurs  the  designated  or  implied  penalty.  A  league^ 
between  independent  nations,  generally,  has  no  sanction  other  than  a 
moral  one ;  or,  if  it  should  contain  a  penalty,  as  there  is  no  common  supe- 
rior, it  cannot  be  enforced.  A  government,  on  the  contrary,  always  has  a 
sanction,  express  or  implied ;  and,  in  our  case,  it  is  both  necessarily  implied 
and  expressly  given.  An  attempt,  by  force  of  arms,  to  destroy  a  govern- 
ment, is  an  offence,  by  whatever  means  the  constitutional  compact  may 
have  been  formed ;  and  such  government  has  the  right,  by  the  law  of  self- 
defence,  to  pass  acts  for  punishing  the  offender,  unless  that  right  is  modi- 
fied, restrained,  or  resumed,  by  the  constitutional  act.  In  our  system, 
although  it  is  modified  in  the  case  of  treason,  yet  authority  is  expressly 
^ven  to  pass  all  laws  necessary  to  carry  its  powers  into  effect,  and  under 
this  grant  provision  has  been  made  for  punishing  acts  which  obstruct  tb© 
due  administration  of  the  laws. 


130  PRESIDENT'S  PROCLAMATION. 

It  would  seem  superfluous  to  add  any  thing  to  show  the  nature  of  that 
union  which  connects  us  ;  but  as  erroneous  opinions  on  this  subject  are 
the  foundation  of  doctrines  the  most  destmctive  to  our  peace,  I  must  give 
some  furtlier  development  to  my  views  on  this  subject.  No  one,  fellow 
citizens,  has  a  higher  reverence  for  the  reserved  right  of  the  states,  than 
the  magistrate  who  now  addresses  you.  No  one  would  make  greater 
personal  sacrifices,  or  oflicial  exertions,  to  defend  them  from  violation ; 
but  equal  care  must  be  taken  to  prevent,  on  their  part,  an  improper  inter- 
ference with,  or  resumption  of,  the  rights  they  have  vested  in  the  na- 
tion. The  line  has  not  been  so  distinctly  drawn  as  to  avoid  doubts,  in 
some  cases,  of  the  exercise  of  power.  Men  of  the  best  intentions  and 
.soundest  views  may  differ  in  their  construction  of  some  parts  of  the 
Constitution :  but  there  are  others  on  which  dispassionate  reflection  can 
leave  no  doubt.  Of  this  natiue  appears  to  be  the  assumed  right  of 
secession.  It  rests,  as  we  have  seen,  on  the  alledged  undivided  sove- 
reignty of  the  states,  and  on  their  having  formed,  in  this  sovereign 
capacity,  a  compact  which  is  called  the  Constitution,  from  which,  be- 
cause they  made  it,  they  have  a  right  to  secede.  Both  of  these  posi- 
tions are  erroneous,  and  some  of  the  arguments  to  prove  them  so  nave 
been  anticipated. 

The  states  severally  have  not  retained  their  entire  sovereignty.  It 
has  been  shown  that  in  becoming  parts  of  a  nation,  not  members  of  a 
league,  they  surrendered  many  of  their  essential  parts  of  sovereignty. 
The  right  to  make  treaties — declare  war — levy  taxes — exercise  exclu- 
sive judicial  and  legislative  powers,  were  all  of  them  functions  of  sove- 
reign power.  The  states,  then,  for  all  these  important  purposes,  were 
no  longer  sovereign.  The  allegiance  of  their  citizens  was  transferred, 
in  the  first  instance,  to  the  government  of  the  United  States — they 
became  American  citizens,  and  owed  obedience  to  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  and  to  laws  made  in  conformity  witli  the  powers  it 
vested  in  Congress.  This  last  position  has  not  been,  and  cannot  be 
denied.  How  then  can  that  state  be  said  to  be  sovereign  and  inde- 
pendent, whose  citizens  owe  obedience  to  laws  not  made  by  it,  and 
whose  magistrates  are  sworn  to  disregard  those  laws,  when  they  come 
in  conflict  with  those  passed  by  another'?  What  shows  conclusively 
that  the  states  cannot  be  said  to  have  reserved  an  undivided  sovereignty 
is,  that  they  expressly  ceded  the  right  to  punish  treason — not  treason 
against  their  separate  power — ^but  treason  against  the  United  States. 
Treason  is  an  offence  against  sovereignty y  and  sovereignty  must  reside 
with  the  power  to  punisn  it.  But  the  reserved  rights  of  the  states  are 
not  less  sacred,  because  they  have,  for  their  common  interest,  made  the 
general  government  the  depositoiy  of  tliese  powers.  The  unity  of  our 
political  character  (as  has  been  shown  for  another  purpose)  commenced 
with  its  very  existence.  Under  the  royal  government  we  had  no  sepa- 
rate character — our  opposition  to  its  oppressions  began  as  United  Colo- 
nies. We  were  the  United  States  under  the  confederation,  and  the  name 
was  perpetuated  and  the  Union  rendered  more  perfect  by  the  Federal 
Constitution.  In  none  of  these  stages  did  we  consider  ourselves  in  any 
other  light  than  as  forming  one  nation.  Treaties  and  alliances  were 
made  in  the  name  of  all.  Troops  were  raised  for  the  joint  defence. — 
How  then,  with  all  these  proofs  that  under  all  changes  of  our  position 
we  had,  for  designated  purposes  and  with  defined  powers,  created  na- 
tional governments — how  is  it,  that  the  most  perfect  of  these  several 


PRESIDENT'S  PROCLAMATION.  131 

modes  of  Union,  should  now  be  considered  as  a  mere  league  that  may 
be  dissolved  at  pleasure'?  It  is  from  an  abuse  of  terms.  Compact  is 
used  as  synonomous  with  league,  althought  the  true  term  is  not  employ- 
ed because  it  would  at  once  show  the  fallacy  of  the  reasoning.  It  would 
not  do  to  say  that  our  constitution  was  only  a  league,  but  it  is  labored 
to  prove  it  a  compact  (which  in  one  sense  it  is)  and  then  to  argue  that 
as  a  league  is  a  compact,  every  compact  between  nations  must  of  course 
be  a  league,  and  that  from  such  an  engagement  every  sovereign  power 
has  a  right  to  secede.  But  it  has  been  shown  that  in  this  sense  the 
states  are  not  sovereign,  and  that  even  if  they  were,  and  the  national 
constitution  had  been  formed  by  compact,  there  would  be  no  right  in 
any  one  state  to  exonerate  itself  from  its  obligations. 

So  obvious  are  the  reasons  which  forbid  this  secession,  that  it  is  ne- 
cessary only  to  allude  to  them.  The  Union  was  fonned  for  the  benefit 
of  all.  It  was  produced  by  mutual  sacrifices  of  interests  and  opinions. 
Can  those  sacrifices  be  recalled  1  Can  tlie  states,  who  magnanimously 
surrendered  their  title  to  the  territories  of  the  west,  recal  the  grant'? 
Will  the  inhabitants  of  the  inland  states  agree  to  pay  the  duties  that 
may  be  imposed  without  their  assent  by  those  on  the  Atlantic  or  the 
Gulf,  for  their  own  benefit '?  Shall  there  be  a  free  port  in  one  state  and 
onerous  duties  in  an  other  *?  No  one  believes  that  any  right  exists  in  a 
single  state  to  involve  all  the  others  in  these  and  countless  other  evils 
contrary  to  engagements  solemnly  made.  Eveiy  one  must  see  that  the 
other  states,  in  self  defence,  must  oppose  it  at  all  hazards. 

These  are  the  alternatives  that  are  presented  by  the  convention :  A 
repeal  of  all  the  acts  for  raising  revenue,  leaving  the  government  with- 
out the  means  of  support ;  or  an  acquiescence  in  the  dissolution  of  our 
Union  by  the  secession  of  one  of  its  members.  When  the  first  was 
proposed,  it  was  known  that  it  could  not  be  listened  to  for  a  moment. 
It  was  known  if  force  was  applied  to  oppose  the  execution  of  the  laws 
that  it  must  be  repelled  by  force — that  Congress  could  not,  without  in- 
volving itself  in  disgrace  and  the  country  in  ruin,  accede  to  the  proposi- 
tion; and  yet  if  this  is  not  done  in  a  given  day,  or  if  any  attempt  is  made 
to  execute  the  laws,  the  state  is,  by  the  ordinance,  declared  to  be  out  of 
the  Union. 

The  majority  of  a  convention  assembled  for  the  purpose,  have  dictated 
these  terms,  or  rather  this  rejection  of  all  terms,  in  the  name  of  the  peo- 
ple of  South  Carolina.  It  is  true  that  the  governor  of  the  state  speaks  of 
the  submission  of  their  grievances  to  a  convention  of  all  the  states ;  which 
he  says  they  "sincerely  and  anxiously  seek  and  desire."  Yet  this  obvi- 
ous and  constitutional  mode  of  obtaining  the  sense  of  the  other  states  on 
the  construction  of  the  federal  compact,  and  amending  it,  if  necesrary, 
has  never  been  attempted  by  those  who  have  urged  the  state  on  to  this 
destructive  measure.  The  state  might  have  proposed  the  call  for  a  gen- 
eral convention  of  the  other  states  ;  and  Congress,  if  a  sufficient  number 
of  them  concurred,  must  have  called  it.  But  the  first  magistrate  of  South 
Carolina,  when  he  expressed  a  hope  that,  "  on  a  review  by  Congress  and 
the  functionaries  of  the  general  government  of  the  merits  of  the  contro- 
versy," such  a  convention  will  be  accorded  to  them,  must  have  known 
that  neither  Congress  nor  any  functionary  of  the  general  government  has 
authority  to  call  such  a  convention,  unless  it  be  demanded  by  two  thirds 
of  the  states.  This  suggestion,  then,  is  another  instance  of  the  reckless 
inattention  to  the  provisions  of  the  constitution  with  which  this  crisis  has 


132  PRESIDENT'S  PROCLAMATION. 

been  madly  hurried  on ;  or  of  the  attempt  to  persuade  the  people  that  a 
constitutional  remedy  has  been  soutrht  and  refused.  If  the  legislature  of 
South  Carolina  "  anxiously  desires"  a  general  convention  to  consider  their 
complaints,  why  have  they  not  made  application  for  it  in  the  way  the  con- 
stitution points  out.  The  assertion  that  they  "  earnestly  seek"  it,  is  com- 
pletely^ negatived  by  the  omission. 

This,  then,  is  the  position  in  which  we  stand.  A  small  majority  of 
the  citizens  of  one  state  in  the  Union  have  elected  delegates  to  a  state 
convention :  that  convention  has  ordained  that  all  the  revenue  laws  of 
the  United  States  must  be  repealed,  or  that  they  are  no  longer  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Union.  The  gavernor  of  that  state  has  recommended  to  the 
legislature  tlie  raising  of  an  army  to  carry  the  secession  into  effect,  and 
that  he  may  be  empowered  to  give  clearances  to  vessels  in  the  name  of 
the  state.  No  act  of  violent  opposition  to  the  laws  has  yet  been  com- 
mitted, but  such  a  state  of  things  is  hourly  apprehended,  and  it  is  the 
intent  of  this  instrument  to  proclaim  not  only  that  the  duty  imposed  on 
me  by  the  constitution  "  to  take  care  that  the  laws  be  faitlifully  execut- 
ed," shall  be  performed  to  the  extent  of  the  powers  already  vested  in 
me  by  law,  or  of  such  others  as  the  wisdom  of  Congress  shall  devise  and 
entrust  to  me  for  that  purpose ;  but  to  warn  the  citizens  of  South  Caro- 
lina, who  have  been  deluded  into  an  opposition  to  the  laws,  of  the  dan- 
ger they  will  incur  by  obedience  to  the  illegal  and  disorganizing  ordi- 
nance of  the  convention — to  exhort  those  who  have  refused  to  support 
it  to  persevere  in  their  determination  to  uphold  the  constitution  and  laws 
of  their  country — and  to  point  out  to  all,  the  perilous  situation  into 
which  the  good  people  of  that  state  have  been  led — and  tliat  the  course 
they  are  urged  to  pursue  is  one  of  ruin  and  disgrace  to  the  very  state 
whose  rights  they  affect  to  support. 

Fellow  citizens  of  my  native  state ! — let  me  not  only  admonish  you, 
as  the  first  magistrate  of  our  common  country,  not  to  incur  the  penalty 
of  its  laws,  but  use  the  influence  that  a  father  would  over  his  children 
whom  he  saw  rushing  to  certain  ruin.  In  that  paternal  language,  with 
that  paternal  feeling,  let  me  tell  you  my  countrymen,  that  you  are  delud- 
ed by  men  who  are  either  deceived  themselves  or  wish  to  deceive  you. 
Mark  under  what  pretences  you  have  been  led  on  to  the  brink  of  insur- 
rection and  treason,  on  which  you  stand !  First,  a  dimunition  of  the 
value  of  your  staple  commodity,  lowered  by  over  production  in  other 

auarters,  and  the  consecjuent  dimunition  in  the  value  of  your  lands,  were 
le  sole  effect  of  the  tariff  laws.  The  effect  of  those  laws  was  confess- 
edly injurious,  but  the  evil  was  greatly  exaggerated  by  tlie  unfounded 
theory  you  were  taught  to  believe,  that  its  burdens  were  in  proportion 
to  your  exports,  not  to  your  consumption  of  imported  articles.  Your 
pride  was  roused  by  the  assertion  that  a  submission  to  those  laws  was 
a  state  of  vassalage,  and  that  resistance  to  them  was  equal,  in  patriotic 
merit,  to  the  opposition  our  fathers  offered  to  the  oppressive  laws  of 
Great  Britain.  You  were  told  that  this  opposition  might  be  peaceably 
— might  be  constitutionally  made — that  you  might  enioy  all  the  advan- 
tages of  the  Union  and  bear  none  of  its  burthens.  Eloquent  appeals  to 
your  passions,  to  your  state  pride,  to  your  native  courage,  to  your  sense 
of  real  injury,  were  used  to  prepare  you  for  the  period  when  the  mask 
which  concealed  the  hideous  features  of  disunion,  should  be  taken  off. 
It  fell,  and  you  were  made  to  look  with  complacency  on  objects  which 
not  long  since  you  would  have  regarded  with  horror.    Look  back  at 


PRESIDENT'S  PtlOCLAMATION^I  1391 

the  iirts  which  have  brought  you  to  this  state,  look  forward' to  the  con- 
sequences to  which  it  must  inevitably  lead!  Look  back  to  what  was 
first  told  you  as  an  indiicerrtent-  to  enter  into  this  dttngerous  course.  The 
great^political  truth  was  repeated'to  you,  that  you  had  the  revolutionary 
right  of  resisting  all  laws  that  were  palpably  unconstitutional  and  in- 
tolerably oppressive — it  was  added  that  the  right*  to  nullify  a  law  rest- 
ed on  the  same  principle,  but  that  it  was  a  peaceable?  remedy !  This 
character  which  was  given  to  it,  madfe  you  I'eceive  with  too  much  con- 
fidence the  assertions  that  were  made  of  the  unconstitutionality  of  the 
law  and  its  oppressive  effects. 

Mark,  my  fellow  citizens,  that  by  the  admission  of  your  leadfers^  the 
unconstitutionality  must  be  palpable,  or  it  will  not  justify  either  resist- 
ance or  nullification!  What  is  the  meaning  of  the  word /?a/pfl:^Ze  in 
the  sense  in  which  it-  is  here  used '?— that  which  is  apparent  to  every 
one,  tliat  which  no  man  of  ordinary  intellect  will  fail^  to  perceive.  Ifr 
the  unconstitutionality  of  these  laws  of  that  description  ?  Let  those 
among  your  leaders  who  once  approved  and  advocated 'the  principle  of 
protective  policy,  answer  the  question;  and  let  them  choose  whether- 
they  will  be  considered  as  incapable,  then,  of  perceiving  that  which 
must  have  been  apparent  to  every  man  of  common  understanding,  or  as 
imposing  upon  your  co)ifidence  and  endeavoring  to  mislead  you  now. 
In  either  case  they  are  unsafe  guides  in  the  perilous  paths  they  urge 
you  to  tread:  Ponder  well  on  this  circumstance,  and  you  will  know 
now  to  appreciate  the  exaggerated  language  they  address  to  you.  They- 
are  not  champions  of  liberty  emulating  tile. fame  of  onr  revolutionary 
fathers;  nor  are  you  an  oppressed  people,  contendingj  as  they  repeat 
to  you,  against  worse  than  colonial  vassalage..  You  are  free  members  ' 
of  a  flourishing  and  happy  Union.  There  is  no  settled' design  to  op- 
press  you.  You  have  i^ideed  felt  the  unequal  operation  of  laws  which 
may  have  been  unwisely,  not  unconstitutionally  passed ;  bu^  that  ine- 
qaality  must  necessarily  be  removed. 

At  the  very  moment  when  you  were  madly  urged  on  to  the  unfortu- 
nate course  you  have  begim,  a  change  in  public  opinion  had 'commenc- 
ed. The  nearly  approaching  payment  of  the  public  debt,  and  the  con- 
sequent necessity  of  a  dimunition  of  duties,  had  already  produced  a 
considerable  reduction,  and  that  too  on  some  ai:ticles  of  general  con- 
sumption in  your  state.  The  importance  of  thischmga  was  under- 
rated, and  you  were  authoritatively  told  that  no  further  alleviation  of ' 
your  burdens  was  to  be  expected  at  tbe  very  time  when  the  condition 
of'  the  country  imperiously  demanded  such  a  modification  of  the  duties 
as  should  reduce  them  to  a  just  and  equitable  scale.  But,,  as  if  appre- 
hensive of  the  effect  of  this  change  in  all&.ying^  your  discontents, 
ypu  were  precipitateJ  into  the  feai*ful  state  in  which  you  now  find 
yourselves. 

'  I  have  urged  you  to  look  b^^ck  to  the  means  th^  were  used  to  h  urry 
you  on  to  i\\e  position  you  have  now  assumed,  and  forward  to  the  eon- 
sequences  it  will  prodiice.  Something  more  is  necessary,  CiJn tem- 
plate the  condition  of  that  country  of  which  ypu  still  farm  an  i^nportant 
part!— consider  its  ^ov,ernment  uniting  in  ojie  bondpf  conifmon  interest 
and  general  protection  so  many  different  states — giving  to  all  their  inha- 
bitants the  proud  title  of  American  citizens — protecting  their  connuerce 
— securing  their  literature  and  their  arts — facilitating  tjieir  intercom- 
munication— defending  their  frontiers — and  makings  their  name  respeet- 
12 


,  184  PRESIDENT'S  PROCLAMATION. 

ed  in  the  remotest  parts  of  the  earth !  Consider  the  extent  of  its  terri- 
tory, its  increasing  and  happy  population,  its  advance  in  arts,  which 
render  life  agreeeble,  and  the  sciences,  which  elevate  the  mind.  See 
education  spreading  the  lights  of  religion,  humanity^  and  general  infor- 
mation, into  every  cottage  in  this  wide  extent  of  our  territories  and 
states !  Beliold  it  as  the  asylum  where  tlie  wretched  and  the  oppressed 
find  a  rufuge  and  support !  Look  on  this  picture  of  happiness  and  ho- 
nor, and  say,  we,  too^  are  citizens  of  America  ;  Carolina  is  one  of 
these  pround  states :  her  arms  have  defended — her  best  blood  has  ce- 
mented, this  happy  Union  !  And  then  add,  if  you  can,  without  horror 
and  remorse,  this  happy  Union  we  will  dissolve — this  picture  of  peace 
and  prosperity  we  well  deface — this  free  intercourse  we  will  interrupt 
— these  fertile  fields  we  will  deluge  with  blood — the  protection  of  that 
glorious  flag  we  renounce — the  very  name  of  Americans  we  discard 
And  for  what,  mistaken  men !  for  whaldo  you  throw  away  these  ines- 
timable blessings — for  what  would  you  exchange  your  share  in  the  ad- 
vantages aud  honor  of  the  Union  'I  For  the  dream  of  a  separate  inde- 
pendence— a  dream  interrupted  by  bloody  conflicts  with  your  neighbors,, 
and  a  vile  dependence  on  a  foreign  power.  If  your  leaders  could  suc- 
ceed in  establishing  a  separation,  what  would  be  your  situation  ]  Are 
you  united  at  home — are  you  free  from  the  apprehension  of  civil  dis- 
cord, with  all  its  fearful  consequences  1  Do  our  neighboring  republics^ 
every  day  suflfering:  some  new  revolution^  or  contending  with  some  new 
insurrection — do  they  excite  your  envy'?  But  the  dictates  of  a  high 
duty  oblige  me  solemnly  to  announce  that  you  cannot  succeed. 

The  laws  of  the  United  States  must  be  executed,  I  have  no  discre- 
tionary power  on  the  subject ;  my  duty  is  emphatically  pronounced  in 
the  constitution.  Those  who  told  you  that  you  might  peaceably  pre- 
veiit  their  execution,  deceived  you — they  could  not  have  been  deceived 
themselves.  They  know  that  a  forcible  opposition  could  alone  prevent 
tlie  execution  of  the  laws,  and  they  know  that  such  opposition  must  be 
repelled.  Their  object  is  disunion :  but  be  not  deceived  by  names :  dis- 
union, by  armed  force,  is  treasOxN.  Are  you  really  ready  to  incur  its 
guilt  ]  If  you  are,  on  the  heads  of  the  instigators  of  the  act  be  the 
dreadful  consequences — on  their  heads  be  the  dishonor,  but  on  youra 
may  fall  the  punishment,  on  your  unhappy  state  will  inevitably  fall 
all  the  evils  of  the  conflict  you  force  upon  the  government  of  your  coun- 
try. It  cannot  accede  to  the  mad  project  of  disunion,  of  which  you 
would  be  the  first  victims — its  first  magistrate  cannot,  if  he  would, 
avoid  the  performance  of  his  duty — the  consequence  must  be  fearful  for 
you,  distressing  to  your  fellow  citizens  here,  and  to  the  friends  of  good 
government  throughout  the  world. 

Its  enemies  have  beheld  our  prosperity  with  a  vexation  they  could, 
not  conceal — it  was  a  standing  refutation  of  their  slavish  doctrines,  and 
they  will  point  to  our  discord  with  the  triumph  of  malignant  joy.  It  is 
yet  in  your  power  to  disappoint  them.  There  is  yet  time  to  show  that 
the  descendands  of  the  Pinckneys,  the  Suinpters,  the  Rutledges,  and  of 
the  thousand  other  names  which  adorn  the  pages  of  your  revolutionary 
liistory,  will  not  abandon  that  union,  to  support  which  so  many  of  them 
fought,  and  bled,  and  died.  I  adjure  you  as  you  honor  their  memory — 
as  you  lova  the  cause  of  freedom,  to  which  they  dedicated  their  lives — 
as  you  prize  the  peace  of  your  country,  the  lives  of  its  best  citi2Kns, 
and  your  own  fair  fame,  to  retrace  your  steps.  Snatch  from  the  archives 


PRESIDENT'S  PROCLAMATION.  135 

of  your  state,  the  disorganizing  edict  of  its  convention — bid  its  mem- 
bers to  reassemble  and  promulgate  the  decided  expression  of  your  will 
to  remain  in  the  path  which  alone  can  conduct,  you  to  safety,  prosperity, 
and  honor — tell  them  that  compared  to  disunion,  all  other  evils  are  light, 
because  tliat  brings  with  it  an  accumulation  of  all — declare  that  you 
will  never  take  the  field  unless  the  star-spangled  banner  of  your  country 
shall  float  over  you — that  you  will  not  be  stigmatized  when  dead,  and 
dishonored  and  scorned  while  you  livC;  as  the  authors  of  the  first  attack 
on  the  constitution  of  your  country ! — Its  destroyers  you  cannot  be. 
You  may  disturb  its  peace — you  may  interrupt  the  course  of  its  prosper- 
ity— you  may  cloud  its  reputation  for  stability — but  its  tranquility  will 
be  restored,  its  prosperity  will  return,  and  the  stain  upon  its  national 
-character  will  be  transferred  and  remain  an  eternal  blot  on  the  memory 
of  those  who  caused  the  disorder. 

Fellow  citizens  of  the  United  States  !  The  threat  of  unhallowed  dis- 
union— the  names  of  those  once  respected,  by  whom  it  is  uttered — the 
array  of  military  force  to  support  it — denote  the  approach  of  a  crisis  in 
our  aflfairs,  on  which  the  continuance  of  our  unexampled  prosperity, 
our  political  existence,  and,  perhaps,  that  of  all  free  governments  may 
depend.  The  conjuncture  demanded  a  free,  a  full,  and  explicit  enunci- 
ation, not  only  of  my  intentions  but  of  my  principles  of  action  ;  and  as 
the  claim  was  asserted  of  a  right  by  a  state  to  annul  the  laws  of  the 
union,  and  even  to  secede  from  it  at  pleasure,  a  frank  exposition  of  my 
opinions  in  relation  to  the  origin  and  form  of  our  government,  and  the 
constniction  I  give  to  the  instrument  by  which  it  was  created,  seemed 
to  be  proper.  Having  the  fullest  confidence  in  the  justness  of  the  legal 
and  constitutional  opinion  of  my  duties  which  has  been  expressed,  I 
rely  with  equal  confidence  on  your  undivided  support  in  my  determina- 
tion to  execute  the  laws — to  preserve  the  Union  by  all  constitutional 
means — to  arrest  if  possible,  by  moderate  but  firm  measures,  the  neces- 
sity of  a  recourse  to  force ;  and,  if  it  be  the  will  of  Heaven  that  the 
recurrence  of  its  primeval  curse  on  man  for  the  shedding  of  a  brother's 
blood,  should  fall  upon  our  land,  that  it  be  not  called  down  by  any  of- 
fensive act  on  the  part  of  tlie  United  States. 

Fellow  citizens !  The  momentous  case  is  before  you.  On  your  un- 
divided support  of  your  government,  depends  the  decision  of  the  great 
question  it  involves,  whether  your  sacred  union  will  be  preserved,  and 
the  blessing  it  secures  to  us  as  one  people  shall  be  pei*petuated.  No 
one  can  doubt  the  unanimity  with  which  that  decision  will  be  expressed 
will  be  such  as  to  inspire  new  confidence  in  republican  institutions,  and 
that  the  prudence,  the  wisdom,  and  the  courage  which  it  will  bring  to 
their  defence,  will  transmit  them  unimpaired  and  invigorated,  to  our 
children. 

May  the  great  Ruler  of  nations  grant  that  the  signal  blessings  with 
which  He  has  favored  ours,  may  not  by  the  madness  of  party  or  per- 
sonal ambition,  be  disregarded  and  lost;  and  may  His  wise  Providence 
bring  those  who  have  produced  this  crisis,  to  see  the  folly  before  they 
feel  the  misery  of  civil  strife;  and  inspire  a  returning  veneration  for 
that  union,  which,  if  we  may  dare  to  penetrate  His  designs,  he  has 
chosen  as  the  only  means  of  attaining  the  high  destinies  to  which  we 
may  reasonably  aspire. 
In  testimony  whereof,  I  have  caused  the  seal  of  the  United  States  to  be 

hereunto  ?ifl[i^ed,  haying  signed  the  same  with  my  hand. 


136  .KvFRESIDENTIAL  ^TLECTIONS. 

Done  at  the  City  of  Washington,  'this,  10th  dp-y  of  December,  in  the 
year  of  our  Lord,  one  thoussind  eight  hundred  and  thirty-two,  and  of 
the  Inciependence  of  the  United  States,  the  fifty-seventh. 

ANDREW  JACKSON. 
By  the  President, 

Edw.  •  Livingston,  Secretary  of  State. 


ELECTIONS  *** 

PRESIDENT   AND  VlCE  PRESIDENT 

A  statement  of  the  voti^  given  by  the  Presidential  Electors^  for  Presi- 
dent and  Vice  President  of  the  United  States,  since  the  adop- 
tion of  the  Constitution. 

N.  B.  At  the  four  first  elections,  the  candidates  were  voted  for 
agreeably  to  the  original  prrovision  of  the  Constitution,  [seepage  17] 
which  was  afterwards  amended,  by  which  the  person  havingthe  high- 
est vote  was  elected  President,  and  the  next  highest.  Vice  President. 
In  1800,  the  votes  for  Mr.  Jefferson  and  Mr.  Burr,  being  equal,  the 
election  was  decided  by  the  House  of  Repi-esentativeS,  in  1801,  after 
protracted  ballotings,  in  favor  of  Mr.  Jefferson. 

[Electors  of  -President  appointed  1st  Wednesday  of  Ja«.  1789. 

El^fctibnof  Pre'side^t,  1st  Wednesday  of  Feb.  178^. 

Constitation  went  into  operation,  1st  Wednesday  of  MaVch,  1789. 

President  Washington  inaugmrated,  April  30,  1789.] 

ll89.-^Whole  number-  of  vfftes  for  President  d7id  Vice  PresidM,W. 
—George  Washington,  69;  John  Adams,  84;  John  Jay,  9;  R.  R. 
Hanson,  6  ;  Jcl^n  Rutledge,  6 ;  John  Hancock,  4 ;  George  Clinton,  3 ; 
Samuel  Huntioigton,  8*;  John  -Milton,  '2>;  James  Armstrong,  1 ;  Ed- 
ivaixi  TeWait,  1 .;  Benjamin  Lincoln,  1:^-69 

(At  the  first  dlec^ioii  the  states  were  entitled  to  the  following  electoral 
votes,  vik :— -Nc^v  H'ampshii'e,  5 ;  Massactmsetts,  10 ;  Rhode  Inland, 
3;  OonneMieut,  7.;  New  York,  ^ ;  New  Jefrsey ,  6 ;  Petmsylvania,  10; 
Delaware,  3;  Maryland,  8;  Virginia,  12;  North  Carolina,  7;  Soufh 
Carolina,  7 ;  Georgia,  6.— TdtM,  91.  Ne*^  Yoi4c,  Rhode  Mand,  and 
Nimh  Carolina  did  not  vote.] 

i79^.~George  Washington, '13S;  Johh  Adams,  "77;  'Geo%e  Clinton, 
50;  Thomas  (JefferBon,  4;  Aaron  ^Btfrr,  1 ;— 182. 

47^6.'-^John  AdamB,  71 ;  Thomas  Jeffersoifi,  68-;  Thomas  :Pincfcney, 
69.;  Aiaron  Burr,  :36;  Samuel  Adams,,  16;  Cliver  Ellsworth,  11; 
i3«o»ge ^Clinton,  7.;  iFoh'n  Jay,'5;  Jamds  iredell,3;  George  Washing- 
ton, 2;  Samuel  Johnston,  2 ;  John  Henry,  2;  Charies  C,  Pinckney,  1 ; 
--^876;  tititiiberofVotete,  138. 

1800.— Tholfnas  Jeff^son,  73 ;  Aai"on  Bwr,  73^  Johh  Adams,  i65 ; 
Charles  C.  Pinckney,  64 ;  John  Jay,  1 ; — 276;  number  of  votes,  138. 


ADOPTION  OP  THE  CONSTITUTION.  137 

1804.  President— Thomas  Jefferson,  162 ;  Charles  C.  Pinckney,  14. 
Vice  President— George  Clinton,  162;  |  Rufus  King,  14;— number 
of  votes,  176. 

1808.  President — James  Madison,  122 ;  Charles  C.  Pinckney,  47 ; 
George  Clinton,  6.  Vice  President — George  Clinton,  113;  RiifusKing, 
47;  John  Langdon,  9 ;  James  Monroe,  3 ;  James  Madison,  3 ;  number 
of  votes,  175. 

1812.  President — James  Madison,  128 ;  Dewitt  Clinton,  89.  Vice 
President — Elbridge  Gerry,  131 ;  Jared  Ingersoll,  86 ;  number  of  votes, 
217. 

1816.  President— James  Monroe,  183 ;  Rufus  Kins;,  34.  Vice 
President — Daniel  D.  Tompkins,  183;  James  E.  Edwards,  22 ;  James 
Ross,  5  ;  John  Marshall,  4 ;  Robert  G.  Harper,  3 ;  number  of  votes, 
217. 

1820.  President— James  Monroe,  228;  John  Cluincy  Adams,  1. 
Vice  President — Daniel  D.  Tompkins,  215;  Richard  Stockton,  8; 
Daniel  Rodney,  4 ;  Richard  Rush,  1 ;  Robert  G.  Harper,  1 ;  number  of 
votes,  229. 

1824.  President — Andrew  Jackson,  99 ;  *John  Cluincy  Adams,  84  ; 
William  H.  Crawford,  41 ;  Henry  Clay,  37.  Vice  President — John 
C.  Calhoun,  182 ;  Nathan  Sanford,  30 ;  Nathaniel  Macon,  24;  Andrew 
Jackson,  13;  Martin  Van  Buren,  9;  Henry  Clay,  2;  number  of  votes, 
261. 

1828.  President— Andrew  Jackson,  178 ;  John  Cluincy  Adams,  83. 
Vice  President — John  C.  Calhoun,  178 ;  Richard  Rush,  83 ;  number  of 
votes,  261. 

1832.  President.  —Andrew  Jackson,  219 ;  Henry  Clay,  49 ;  Jolm 
Floyd,  11;  William  Wirt,  7.  Vice  President— Martin  Van  Buren, 
189;  John  Sergeant,  49;  William  Wilkins,  30;  Henry  Lee,  11; 
Amos  Ellmaker,  7 :  number  of  votes,  286. 


'A 

Dates  of  the  Adoption  qf  the  Constitution,    by  the  several   original 

States. 

1— Delaware,  December  7,  1787.  ^ 

2 — Pennsylvania,  December,  12, 1787, 

3 — New  Jersey,  December  18,  1787. 

4 — Georgia,  January  2, 1788. 

5 — Connecticut,  January  9,  1788. 

6 — Massachusetts^  February  7,  1788. 

7— Maryland,  April  28,  1788. 

S— South  Carolina,  May  23,  1788. 

9 — New  Hampshire,  June  21,  1788. 
10—  Virginia,  June  27,  1788. 
n^New  YorA;,  July26,  1788. 
V2r— North  Carolina,  November  21,  1789. 
\Z-^Rhode  Island,  May  29,  1790. 
The  seven  states  in  italics,  recommended  amendments. 

*  Mr.  Adami  was  elected  Pruideuibx  th*«IIovM  of  RepreseDtativei,  luviag  tbe  tote  of  thirteeti  statet 
ouUicfirKtbaDoU 

12» 


188  VOTES  ON  TBE  TAIUf^l^fe.   ^  - 

Statement  of  the  votes  in  the  United  States^  House  of  Rffpfe^^tMi^eSj 
0fh  the  v'ariff%i  T^iff^JBiUs,  ^^ce  1&16. 

Vi)tem  the  Tdrifof  1816.  Vot^  on  the  Tariff  of  18'^. 

EAiiTEttN  States. 


Yeas. 

0 

1 

2 

t  4 
0 

2 

Ab.ent. 

0 
2 
1 
9 
0 

3 

Maine. 

New  Hampshire. 

Vermont. 

Massachusetts. 

Rhode  Island. 

Conhecticut. 

Yeas. 
1 

i 

5 
1 

2 
5 

5 

1? 
0 

1 

Ab^U' 

0 

d 
d 
1 
d 

d 

li 

i5 

16 

MibDLE  States. 

15 

i 

1 

17 

d 

5 

d 

3 

d 

5 

10 

5 

1 
3 

13 

New  York. 
New  jei-sey. 
Pennsylvania, 
l^elaware. 
Maryland. 

Southern  &tateb. 

24 

\ 

60 

8 

d 

1 

0 
0 

1 

d 
d 

i 

7 

13 

11 

3 

1 

3 

Virginia. 

1 

21 
13 

9 
1 
3 

1 
3 

0 

0 
4 
3 

0 

2 
2 

d 

0 

North  Carolina. 
South  Carolina. 
Qedfgia. 
Alabama. 

Louisiahd. 

0 

I 

0 

j 

0 
0 

d 

0 
0 
0 

14 

31 

7 

WESTEfei4  Sta^e^. 

1 

57 

6 
3 
5 

1 
2 
0 

3 

1 
1 

Kentucky. 

Teiliifess^e. 

Ohio. 

Indiana. 

Illinois. 

Missouri. 

11 

2 

u 

si 

1 
I 

0 

•? 
0 

d 
d 
d 

8 

li 

1 

1 

ii 

7 

2 

i 

u 

id 

Total. 

m 

102 

4 

0 

7 

4 

2 

2 

11 

1 

1 

4 

e 

4 

1 

VOTEB  ON  THE  TAftlFFB.  139 

mem  the  Tarif  of  1828.  Vote^f^th^e  Tariff  of  1832. 

Eastern  States. 

Abseht  Y^           Nayft.         Absent. 

0          Maine.     '  6-1  0 

0          New  Harhpshire.  6            0  1 

0          Massachusetts.  *4            8  1 

0          Rhode  Island.  0            2  0 

0          Gxiniie(^.tici«.  2            3  1 

0          Vermont.  0            3  2 

15          24            0  17          17  6 

Middle  dtates. 

27           6            1          NewYcfik.  '^           2  b 

5            0            1          NewJeVsey.  3            3  0 

23            0            3          Pennsylvania.  14          12  0 

i            0           d          Deldware.  D            1  i) 

1            5            3          Maryland.  8            0  1 

57          11            8  32          18  6 

SouTHERit  States. 

3          15            4          Virginia.  11            8  3 

0          13            0          North  Carolina.  8            4  1 

0           8            1          Strath  Carolina.  3           6  0 

0            7            0          Georgia.  16  0 

0            3            0          Louisiana.  1            2  0 

0            6            «l     ;    AWBaihb.  ^Uja^..i  b 

0            10          Mississippi.  10  0 

3          50            a  27          27  4 

WEStERk   StAtfes. 

12  0            0          Kentucky  9            3  0 

0  9           0          Tfennesse^;  9           0  0 

13  0  1  Ohio.  13  0  I 
3  0  0  Iildi^hd.  3  0  0 
0 .           1            0          Missouri.  1  .  . .  ^  a.  ..  0 

1  0            0          Illinois.  .{'Ai^tnJVv  0 

29          10            1  36           3            1 

105          94          14                Total.  132          65  16 

Thus  it  appears  by  tlie  above  table  that  at  the  passage  of  no  Tariff 

has  a  majority  of  the  whole  New  England  delegation  voted  for  the  Ta- 
riflf,  either  in  1816,  '24,  '28  or  32. 

yeas.  Nayt.                       Abaent- 

In     1816      16  10        15 

1894       15  ^         1 

1898       19  24         0 

1832      11  17        5 


140  VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS  OF  1810. 

The  Middle  States  have  sustained  the  several  Tariffs  which  have 
been  passed,  by  strong  and  decided  majorities,  as  appears  by  examin- 
ation. 

In 


1816 

Yea«. 

44 

1824 

60 

1828 

57 

1832 

52 

Nay.. 

AbKnt. 

10 

13 

15 

1 

11 

8 

18 

6 

The  same  remarks  will  also  apply  to  the  Western  States.     They 
have  always  gone  for  the  Tariff. 

Yea«.                        Nara.  ibMot. 

In           1816               14                   3  5 

7  3 

10  1 

3  1 

The  Southern  States  have  gone  strongly  against  every  Tariff,  until 
that  of  1832. 

Yeai.                         Nara.  Absent. 

In     1816      14        31  7 

1824       1        57  0 

1828       3        50  5 

1832      27        27  4 


1816 

Yea*. 

14 

1824 

31 

1828 

29 

1832 

36 

VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS  OF  1810. 


The  following  proceedings  of  the  Vii^inia  Legislature,  in  1809-10, 
having  been  frequently  referred  to  in  Constitutional  discussions,  are 
deemed  sufficiently  iprjportant  for  insertion  here.  They  were  unani- 
mously adopted  iii  each  House,  namely,  by  the  House  of  Delegates, 
January  23,  and  by  the  Senate,  January  26,  1810. 

VIRGINIA    LEGISLATURE. 

Extract  from  the  Message  of  Gov,  Tyler,  of  Virginia,  Dec,  4,  1809. 

"  A  proposition  from  the  state  of  Pennsylvania  is  herewith  submitted, 
with  Governor  Snyder's  letter  accompanying  the  same,  in  which  is 
suggested  the  propriety  of  amending  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  so  as  to  prevent  collision  between  the  Government  of  the  Union 
and  the  State  Governments." 

HOUSE    OP    DELEGATES. 

Friday,  December  15,  1809. 

Qn  motion,  Ordered,  That  so  much  of  the  Governor's  communica- 
tion as  relates  to  the  communication  from  the  Governor  of  Pennsylva- 
nia, on  the  subject  of  an  amendment  proposed  by  the  Legislature  of  that 


vmaiNiA  RESOLUTIONS  OP  1810.         m 

state  to  tlie  cdnstitUtitDn  of*tlie  tFiiitecl  States,  be  ief erred  to  Messi^. 
Peyton,  Otey,  Cabell,  Wklk^r,  'Maai^oh,  Holt,  Ne^vton,  Parker,  Ste- 
venson, Randolph  (of  Amelia),  tJOcke,  Wyatt,  and  Michh.^— Page 
25  of  the  JcnlrTial. 

Thilrsdny,  JUnkary  11, 18lO. 

1^.  Peyton, ^roih  tHe  committee,  to  whom  was  referrj^d  tliat  partx>f 
the  Crovetno'r^s  communication  which  relates  to  the  aanenqment.  propos- 
ed by  the  ^tate  of,  Pennsylvania,  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
Stilus,  made  tlie  following  report:  ^  .   , 

The  conirhittee  ^o  whom  was  referred  the  communination  of 'the 
Goveriipr -of  Pennsylvania,  (iovering^  certain  resolutions  of  the  Legisla- 
tiire  6'f  tliat  state,  proposing  an  amendment  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  by  the  appointment  of  an  impartial  tribunal  to  decide 
disputes  between,  tlie  states  and  Federal  Judiciary,  have  had  the  same 
under  their  consideration,  and  are  of  opinion  tliat  a  tribunal  is  already 
provided  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  to  wit :  the  Supreme 
Court,  more  eminently  qualified  from  tlieir  habits  and  duties,  from  the 
mode  of  their  selection,  and  from  the  tenure  of  tlieir  offices,  to  decidecl 
the.  disputes  aforesaid,  in  an  enlightened  and  impartial  manner,  than 
any  other  tribunal  which  could  be  created. 

The  members  of  the  Supreme  Court  are  selected  from  tliose  in  the 
United  States  Who  are  itio^tccTebrMed  for  Virtue  and  legal  learniiig,  riot 
at  tlie  will  df  a  sfngle  individual,  bbt  by  the  cdrtcurrefit  wishes  of  the 
President  and  Senate  of  the  United  States  :  they  will  therefore  have 
no  local  prejudices  and  partialities.  The  duties  they  have  to  perfomi 
iead  them  ftecessari^y  to  'thiB  niffet  enllai'fifed  and  iicc'iti-ate  acquaintance 
\^ith  the  jurisdiction  of 'the  l-'edeVal  kild^State  Courts  together,  and  with 
the  admirable  symmetry  of  orr  government.  The  teniire  of  their  oiH- 
ces  'eWMeS  them  to  pi'(^ounce  the  sound  and  C(5rrrect  opiidoris  they  may 
have  formed  without  fear,  favor,  or  partiality. 

T'he^frlendinfem  to  the  constitution  pr6p0s^d  by  Pe'tinsylvanra,  g^^ms 
to  be  founded  upon  the  idea  tfhatthe  federal  judHctary  ^11,  ^froin  a  lust 
ofpoweh*^  enlarge  their  jui''isdiction  to  the  total  annihilation  of  the  juris- 
diction of  t^fe  state  cotn-ts,  -^atdiey  Will  eierci^e  their  Will,  instead  of 
the  laW  and  the'cdristittitioYi. 

This  argumerrt,  if  it  'pi-oVcs  anything,  would  Cipei'stte  ttiore  Strongly 
a^in^t  the  tribunal  ^roflo^ed  to  be  created,  wliich  promises  so  little, 
thaniAgain^  tJife  Supreme  Cc^rt,  which,  for  the  reasons  g-iven  before, 
have  everythinsr  connected  with  their  appointrheilt  calculated  to  erisirfe 
coftfldence.  What  seciti-ity  have  We,  Were  the  proposed  amendment 
ad«6^Ced,  that  this  triljtrnal  Would  not  ^(b^titutethehr  Will,  and  their  plea- 
stft^,  in  plcice  of  the  law  1  The  judiciai-y  are  the  weakest  of  the  three 
depaiUifients  of  goV'efrnmeht,  and  lea^  dangerous  to  the  politicalrights 
of  We  '(Constitution  i  they  hold  neither  the  ptii-Se  nor  the  sword;  and 
eVeYi  Yo  enforce  their  oWn  judgments  aVld  decisions,  must  ultimately 
dc^jjend  tipon  the  executive  arrhr  Shoft/ld  the  federal  judiciary,  hoWeVer 
tiftniindfol  of  theit  weaknefej*,  unfrt^ndf^rofthe  duty  Which  they  owe  to 
themi^c?lVes  and  their  (iOuritry.  become  coi¥ttpt,  and  transcend  the  limits 
of 'their  jurj^dtcti-OV*,  Would  ihe  pr6"]lds(5d  amendineilt  'oppose  even  a 
jn^6b^blebavriM- in^^Wc^'an'iWiprobable^ateo^^  » 

'T*fe  creation  Of  a'tribtin^,  kic?h  aB  i^  JWopo^ed  by  Petmfeylvkwia,  so 
far  as  t^c  Mh  able  (6  fovm  ^afft  M^a  of  4%  ftom  the  descriptions  given  in 


142  MR.  CALHOUN'S  SPEECH. 

the  resolutions  of  the  legislature  of  that  state,  would,  in  the  opinion 
of  your  committee,  tend  rather  to  invite  than  to  prevent  collisions 
between  the  Federal  and  State  Courts.  It  might  also  become,  in  pro« 
cess  of  time,  a  serious  and  dangerous  embarrassment  to  the  operations 
of  the  General  Government. 

Resolved,  therefore,  that  the  legislature  of  this  state  do  disapprove 
of  the  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  proposed 
by  the  Legislature  of  Pennsylvania. 

Resolved,  also,  that  his  excellency  the  governor  be,  and  he  is  hereby, 
requested  to  transmit  forthwith  a  copy  of  the  foregoing  preamble  and 
resolutions  to  each  of  the  senators  and  representatives  of  this  state  in 
Congress,  and  to  the  executive  of  the  several  states  in  the  Union,  with 
a  request  that  the  same  be  laid  before  the  Legislatures  thereof. 

The  said  resolutions,  being  read  a  second  time,  were,  on  motion, 
ordered  to  be  referred  to  a  committee  of  the  whole  house  on  the  state  of 
the  commonwealth. 

[Adopted  unanimously  without  amendment,  in  the  House  of  Dele- 
gati^s.  January  23,  and  in  the  Senate,  January  26,  1810.J 


Mr.  Calhoun'' s  Remarls  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  January 
I6th,  1833,  on  the  President's  Message  transmitting  the  South  Ca- 
rolina Documents,  tf-c, 

A  message  was  received  from  the  President  of  the  United  states,  ac- 
companying the  Proclamation  and  other  documents  relating  to  South 
Carolina,  her  Ordinance,  &c,  &c. 

The  reading  of  the  message  occupied  an  hour  and  a  quarter.  As  soon 
as  it  was  finished — 

Mr.  Grundy  moved  to  refer  the  message  and  documents  to  the  commits 
tee  on  the  Judiciary,  and  that  they  be  printed. 

Mr.  Calhoun  then  rose  and  said,  that  his  object  in  taking  the  floor  was 
not  to  make  any  remark  on  the  motion  which  was  immediately  before  the 
Senate.  What  he  was  al)out  to  sav,  therefore,  would,  under  parliamen- 
tary rule,  be  entirely  out  of  order.  But  he  would,  in  the  peculiar  circum- 
stances of  his  situation,  throw  himself  on  the  indulgence  of  the  Senate, 
for  his  pardon  for  the  entire  irrelevance  of  the  remarks  which  he  should 
feel  himself  bound  to  make. 

He  felt  no  disposition  to  notice  many  of  the  errors  which  the  message 
contained  in  reference  to  the  documents  bv  which  it  was  accompanied, 
but  there  was  one  which  he  should  deem  himself  a  recreant  to  his  state 
if  he  did  not  rise  emphatically  and  promptly  to  notice.  It  was  stated  by 
the  Chief  Magistrate,  in  substance,  that  the  movements  made  by  the  state 
of  South  Carolina  were  of  a  character  hostile  to  the  Union.  Was  he 
right  in  this  impression  7  If  so,  he  would  say  that  there  was  not  a  sha- 
dow of  foundation  for  such  a  statement.  There  was  not  a  state  in  the 
Union  less  disposed  than  South  Carolina  to  put  herself  in  such  attitude  of 
hostility.  But  the  grounds  on  which  the  President  founds  this  inference 
were  not  less  extraordinary  than  the  inference  itself.  When  he  stated 
that  hostile  movements  had  been  made,  it  was  to  be  regretted  that  the 
President  did  not  state  the  whole  of  the  movements  of  this  character 
Tvhich  had  taken  place.    Before  South  Carolina  had  taken  any  position 


MR.  CALHOUN'S  SPEECH.  143 

of  a  conflicting  character,  there  had  been  a  concentration  of  United 
States'  troops  on  two  points,  obviously  for  the  purpose  of  controlling  the 
movements  of  the  state.  One  of  these  concentrations  was  at  Augusta, 
and  the  other  at  Charleston.  Previous  to  this  circumstance,  the  state  of 
South  Carolina  had  looked  to  nothing  beyond  a  civil  process,  and  had  in- 
fended  merely  to  give  effect  to  her  opposition  in  the  form  of  a  suit  at  law. 
It  was  only  when  a  military  force  was  displayed  on  her  borders,  and  in 
her  limits,  and  when  the  menace  was  thrown  out  against  the  lives  of  her 
citizens,  and  of  their  wives  and  children,  that  they  found  themselves  driv- 
en to  an  attitude  of  resistance.  Then  it  was  that  they  all  prepared  tp 
resist  any  aggression. 

But  the  president  had  also  rested  his  in  Terence  on  another  ground.  He 
laid  it  down  that  the  tribunal  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
was,  in  the  last  resort,  the  only  arbiter  of  the  difference  in  the  construtr- 
tion  of  the  constitutionahty  of  the  laws.  On  this  point  there  seems  to 
have  been  a  great  change  in  the  op'.nion  of  the  executive  within  the  last 
twelve  months.  The  president  had  not  held  this  opinion  in  reference  to 
the  resistance  of  the  state  of  Georgia.  x\  narrow  river  only  divides  the 
territory  of  Greorgia  from  that  of  South  Carolina,  yet,  on  the  one  side,  the 
power  of  the  Supreme  Court,  as  the  arbiter  in  the  last  resort,  is  to  be  sus- 
tained ;  while,  on  the  other  side  the  will  of  the  exe^^utive  is  to  be  supreme. 

But,  if  the  Supreme  Court  was  to  be  the  arbiter,  he  wished  to  know  in 
what  manner  the  decision  of  that  tribunal  as  to  the  constitutionality  of  the 
Tariff  law,  as  a  measure  of  protection,  was  to  be  obtained  1  How  was 
an  issue  to  be  made  up'?  This  mode  had  already  been  tried  in  the  case 
of  Holmes,  a  citizen  of  Charleston,  and  the  court  had  declared  its  inca- 
pacity to  act  for  want  of  jurisdiction,  and  refused  to  take  cognizance  of 
the  subject.  Ho  wished  to  know  why  this  circumstance  had  been  sup- 
pressed— no,  supprestad  was  too  strong  a  term — forgotten  in  the  message 
of  the  executive.  It  will  be  remembered  that  when  the  bill  of  1828  was 
introduced,  which  had  been  justly  called  by  the  Senator  from  Miissachu- 
setts,  a  bill  of  abominations,  a  representative  from  South  Carolina  had  in- 
effectually endeavored  to  obtain  an  amendment  of  the  title  of  it,  so  that  it 
might  bear  on  its  face  the  character  of  protection,  which  belonged  to  it. 
But  it  was  sent  abroad  under  a  delusive  and  deceptive  name.  How,  then, 
was  South  Carolina  to  try  the  question  1  Even  if  she  had  every  reliance 
on  the  authority  of  the  Supreme  Court,  she  could  not  obtain  the  judg- 
ment of  that  court.  What  course  then  was  left  for  South  Carolina^ 
but  that  which  she  had  pursued  1 

It  was  also  sag;g;ested  in  the  message  of  the  executive,  that  tlie  state 
ought  to  have  resorted  to  the  other  remedy  which  was  pointed  out,  and 
asked  at  an  earlier  period  for  a  Convention  of  the  States,  in  order  to 
cimend  the  Constitution.  South  Carolina  had  been  prevented  from  many 
applications  on  this  subject.  She  had  wished  over  and  over  a.'^^ain  to- 
obtain  a  Convention,  but  she  had  uniformly  found  a  fixed  majority  in 
both  houses  against  her.  How,  then,  was  she  to  obtain  the  acquies- 
cence of  the  constitutional  majority  of  two  thirds  of  the  two  houses  1 
Under  these  circumstances,  she  made  no  application  until  the  State 
itself  had  declared  it  unconstitutional,  and  the  emergency  arose  which 
called  for  it. 

It  was  obvious  that  the  country  had  now  reached  a  crisis.  It  had 
been  often  said  that  every  thing  which  lives  carries  in*  itself  the  ele- 
ments of  its  own  desti-uction.  This  princinle  was  no  less  applicable  to 
political,  than  to  physical  constructions.    The  principle  of  decay  is  to 


144  MR,  CALHOUN'S  SPEECH. 

be  found  m  our  institutions ;  and  unless  it  can  be  checked  and  corrected 
in  its  course,  by  the  wisdom  of  the  federal  government,  its  operation 
will  form  no  exception  to  the  general  course  of  events.  The  only  cause 
of  vvonder  in  his  opinion  was,  that  our  Union  had  continued  so  lon^ ; 
that,  at  the  end  of,  forty-four  years,  our  government  should  still  retain 
its  original  form,  He  considered  that  to  the  great  event  of  1801,  the 
success  of  the  party  which  had  elevated  Mr.  Jeft'erson  to  the  presidencyj 
wa?  mainly  to  be  attributed  this,  duration.  Nothing  but  the  elevation 
of  that  individual  had  prevented  the  earlier  termination  of  an  experir 
ment.  3ut  the  time  had  at  length  come  when  we  are  required  to  decide 
whether  this  shall  be  a  confederacy  any  longer,  or  whether  it  shall  give 
way  to  a  consolidated  government.  He  called  on. senators  solemnly  to 
pause  and  deliberate  on  this  important  question.  As  he  lived,  he  be- 
lieved  tliat  the  continuance  of  any  consolidated  government  was  impos- 
sible,. It  must  inevitably  lead  to  military  despotism.  At  this  moment, 
Without  having  been  brought  into  contact  with  any  adverse  circum- 
stances, without  any  conflicting  causes,  in  a  time  of  peace,  and  under  ^ 
the  influence  of  an  unexampled  prosperity,  our  Union  stands  on  the  eve 
of  dissolution,  or  the  verge  of  a  civil  war.  How  was  this '?  Was  it 
npt  attributable  to  the  powerful  workings  of  the  consoUdation  principle  1 

Gentlemen  might  contend  that  this  was  not  a  question  of  consolida- 
tion. But  it  is  consolidation.  And  he  could  see  no  distinction  between 
a  consolidated  government  and  one  which  assumed  the  right  of  judging 
of  the  propriety  of  interposing  military  power  to  coerce  a  State. 

We  (said  Mr.  C.)  made  no  such  government.  South  Carolina  sanc- 
tioned no  such  government.  She  entered  the  confederacy  with  the 
understanding  that  a  State,  in  the  last  resort,  has  a  right  to  judge  of' 
the  expediency  of  resistance  to  oppression,  or  secession  from  the  Union. 
And  for  so  doing,  it  is  that  we  are,  threatened  to  have  our  throats  cut, 
and  those  of  our  wives  and  children.  No  ;  I' go  too  far.  I  did  not  intend 
to  use  language  so  strong.  The  chief  magistrate  had  not  yet  recon\- 
mended  so  desperate  a  remedy.  The  present  is  a  great  question,  and 
the  liberties  of  the  American  people  depend  upon  t^ie  decision  of  it.  It , 
was  impossible  that  a.  consolidf^^ted  government  could  exist  in  this 
country.  It  never  can.  Did  I  say  in  this  country'?  It  never  can  exist 
in  any  country.  If  any  man  would  look  into  the  history  of  the  world,  and' 
find  any  single  case  in  which  the  govornment  of,  absolute  majority, 
unchecked  by  any  constitutional  restraints,  had  lasted  one  century,  he 
would  yield  the  question.  For  himself ;he  had  been  from  his  earliest 
life  deeply  attached  to  the  Union ;  and  he.  felt,  with  a  proportionate 
intensity,  the  importance  of  this  question.  In  his  early  youth,  he  had 
cherished  a  deep  and  enthusiastic  admiration  of  this  Union.  He  had 
looked  on  its  progress  with  rapture,  ajid  encouraged  the  most  sanguine 
expectations  of  its  endurance.  He  still  believed  that  if  it  could  be  con- 
formed to  the  principles  of  1798,  as  they  were  then  construed,  it  might 
endure  forever.  Bring  back  the  government  to  those  principles,  and  he 
would  be  th-e  last  to  abandon  it,  and  "South  Carolina  would  be  amongst 
its  warmest  advocates.  But  depart  from  these  principles,  and,  in  the 
course  often  year^,  we  shall  degenerate  into  a  military  despotism.  The 
cry  hud  been  rased^'  the  Union  is  in  danger."  He  knew  of  no  other 
danger  but  that  of  military  despotism.,  He  would  proclaim  it  on  this 
floor  .that  tl;iis  was  the  greatest  danger  with  w^ich  it,  was  m^naced^  a 
danger  the  greatest  which  any  country  had  to  apprehend. 


14  DAY  USE 

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